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Abstract 
 
 
 
The graduation theses of the Scottish universities in the first half of the seventeenth 
century are at the crossroads of philosophical and historical events of fundamental 
importance: Renaissance and Humanist philosophy, Scholastic and modern philosophy, 
Reformation and Counterreformation, the rise of modern science. The struggle among 
these tendencies shaped the culture of the seventeenth century, and the graduation theses 
are part of this narrative. Graduation theses are a product of the Scholasticism of the 
modern age, which survived the Reformation in Scotland and decisively influenced 
Scottish philosophy in the seventeenth century, including the reception of early modern 
philosophy. We can therefore speak of a ‘Scottish Scholasticism’, characterised by an 
original reception and interpretation of the long traditions of Scholastic philosophy and 
Aristotelianism. The aim of the thesis is the analysis of the general physics of the 
graduation theses: the two central theories are prime matter and movement. Natural 
philosophy is a particularly interesting case, and the main features of the graduation theses 
are the reception of Scholasticism alongside innovation within Scholasticism. Graduation 
theses adhere to the Scholastic tradition, especially Scotism, while being innovative in their 
opposition to Catholic forms of Scholasticism. In particular, natural philosophy reveals the 
influence of the Reformed confession of faith of the Scottish universities in central aspects 
of Scholastic philosophy, such as the theory of accidents and natural theology. Scottish 
Scholasticism can be further qualified as an example of ‘Reformed Scholasticism’. From 
the point of view of the historiography of Scholasticism, the Reformed character of the 
natural philosophy of the graduation theses provides interesting insights, and helps to 
understand Protestant Scholasticism. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
I shall investigate the natural philosophy of the graduation theses of the Scottish 
universities in the first half of the seventeenth century. I shall seek to prove that the natural 
philosophy of the Scottish universities can be defined as ‘Eclectic Scotistic Reformed 
Scholasticism’. The focus will be on two concepts of general physics: prime matter and 
movement. These concepts are fundamental to the understanding of Scholastic natural 
philosophy and its relation to early modern philosophy and science. My primary focus will 
be on the former aspect. 
 
 
 
1. Natural philosophy in the graduation theses in Scotland in the first half of 
the seventeenth century 
 
In the first half of the seventeenth century the academic teaching in Scotland was still 
conducted according to the Scholastic way, inherited from the Medieval Scholasticism of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This movement was still strong across Europe in the 
early modern age, and the Scottish universities are a part of this narrative. Scholasticism is 
the historical product of the attempted harmonisation of two great philosophical traditions 
with the Christian revelation: on the one side, Aristotelianism, the long-established 
tradition of commentaries and interpretations of the corpus of Aristotle, which flourished 
again in the thirteenth century in virtue of the European reception of the Arabic 
commentary tradition. On the other hand, Augustinianism, the philosophy inspired by Saint 
Augustine, more closely related to the Platonic tradition. 
From the late Middle Ages to the early modern era, Scholasticism underwent deep 
changes: as has been argued by Charles Schmitt regarding Aristotelianism, it is more 
accurate to talk of ‘Scholasticisms’ rather than ‘Scholasticism’ as a monolithic body. 
Scholasticism is divisible into different schools (Thomism, Scotism and Nominalism, just 
to name the most important ones) and into different disciplines (Scholastic philosophy and 
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Scholastic theology). Scholasticism was also influenced by Renaissance philosophy, 
Renaissance Aristotelianism and Humanism, and was finally challenged by the rise of the 
new science in the early seventeenth century. A key aspect of my research is the 
investigation of the Scottish graduation theses in relation to the history of Scholasticism. I 
shall argue that the philosophy of the graduation theses is Scholastic in nature, heavily 
influenced by Scotistic themes, yet enriched by an eclectic character. 
It cannot be forgotten that Scholasticism was born as an enterprise of human (or 
“natural”) reason to penetrate the mysteries of the revelation: ‘intellectus quaerens fidem’, 
intelligence in search of faith, but also ‘fides quaerens intellectum’, faith in search of 
intelligence, according to the famous phrase of Anselm of Canterbury. Thus, the history of 
Scholasticism is also, at least partially, the history of the European Christian faith up to the 
modern age. The historical evolution of the Roman Church first, and later on of the 
Reformed churches played a major role in the development of Scholasticism, in terms of 
different schools, traditions and doctrines. I shall seek to investigate graduation theses from 
this point of view as well, in order to assess whether the Scottish Reformation influenced 
the Scholastic philosophy taught in Scotland. My answer will be that Scottish 
Scholasticism can be properly qualified as ‘Reformed Scholasticism’. 
Natural philosophy is the discipline which investigates natural bodies: their principles, 
properties and structure. Following Aristotle, ‘natural bodies’ are defined as bodies 
endowed with a ‘nature’, understood as the internal principle of change or movement in 
general. Natural bodies are thus defined by their nature, and change, that is any passage 
from potency to act, is the first and main consequence of their nature. 
Natural philosophy is divided into general physics and special physics: the former deals 
with the general principles of bodies, namely, what qualifies them in general qua bodies. 
The latter is a cluster of different disciplines (for example, astronomy, chemistry, 
psychology), and deals with bodies as they fall into these disciplines. General physics 
extends further than any discipline of special physics, and includes them all as the genus 
includes the species. 
My focus will be on two theories of general physics: prime matter and movement. Prime 
matter is the material principle of all bodies. In the framework of the Aristotelian theory of 
cause, prime matter is the material cause of bodies, a constitutive principle of the natural 
body, when united with the formal cause (form). Prime matter is traditionally and famously 
defined as ‘pure potency’. We will see how the regents reject the Thomistic theory, and 
side with Duns Scotus. 
The Scholastic theory of movement is central to our understanding of the very nature of 
Scholastic natural philosophy, precisely because of the close relation between nature and 
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movement. Nature is the principle of movement, therefore movement follows from the 
nature of bodies, and informs us about it. We will see that the regents are still committed to 
Scholastic natural philosophy, yet in an original sense. 
Prime matter and movement are the two key concepts of Scholastic natural philosophy. 
The analysis of them helps to clarify general physics as a whole, since prime matter and 
movement are not intelligible without the broader context of theories such as act and 
potency, form and matter, substance and the four Aristotelian causes. Regarding prime 
matter, I shall argue that graduation theses reveal the influence of Scotistic themes, as they 
deploy a metaphysics of essence and the notion of metaphysical (or entitative) act. 
Regarding movement, graduation theses inscribe themselves in the Scholastic tradition of 
natural places, directedness of movement and difference in nature between sublunary and 
celestial bodies. 
The choice of prime matter and movement is also motivated by historical considerations. 
The seventeenth century saw the rise of the new science and the consequent revolution in 
our understanding of the world. Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo and Descartes are just the 
main figures of this revolution in the first half of the seventeenth century. As a 
consequence, the Scholastic notions of prime matter and movement were extensively 
discussed and criticised in the first half of the seventeenth century. Although they are still 
within the Scholastic tradition, graduation theses bear witness to this debate: we will see 
that some theses break with Scholasticism and, more generally, that the form of 
Scholasticism in use in the Scottish universities seems to anticipate later themes in early 
modern philosophy. I shall seek to highlight these aspects, especially in the theory of 
natural places and secondary causes, the definition of accident and the theory of substance. 
Yet, my approach aims at shedding light not on the graduation theses in relation to the 
so-called ‘modern philosophy’ or ‘early modern philosophy’, but instead on the graduation 
theses within the Scholastic tradition; and I shall account for their specific character in the 
light of this tradition. Nonetheless, I believe that graduation theses not only anticipate 
some themes of modern philosophy but also that, more generally, Scholasticism in the 
seventeenth century prepared the ground for modern philosophy in a way that is yet to be 
fully acknowledged by scholars. While keeping the focus on Scottish Scholasticism, I hope 
to shed some light on these connections. 
An important consequence of my approach is the choice of the period that I shall 
investigate. Regarding the terminus a quo, the first printed set of graduation theses 
available, which is by J. Robertson, regent at the University of Edinburgh, is dated 1596. 
Before that date, there is no printed evidence of what exactly was taught in the universities. 
The terminus ad quem requires more justification. I shall examine graduation theses until 
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1649, the latest being that of D. Forrester 1649, again from the University of Edinburgh. 
Up to that date, university teaching was still fully Scholastic in form and contents, while 
from the 1650s onwards we witness the epoch-making beginning of the reception of 
Descartes’ philosophy in Scotland: Andrew Cant’s Theses philosophicae, Aberdeen 1654, 
written for Marischal College, are the first graduation theses which refer to Descartes. 
The reception of Descartes and, thereafter, of other modern philosophers, produced a 
profound change in the philosophy of the Scottish universities, which ultimately led to the 
shift from Scholasticism to the Enlightenment and modern science, less than one century 
later. I shall argue that the 1640s are the final years of the long tradition of Scottish 
Scholasticism in its purer form. This does not mean that this tradition did not survive the 
arrival of modern philosophy: as a matter of fact, Scholasticism was influential for the 
whole century and ultimately shaped the reception of modern philosophy in Scotland. I 
shall hint at this historical fact by reference to, for example, the theory of the relation 
between prime matter and quantity: the Cartesian notion of res extensa was quickly 
received in the Scottish universities in the 1660s and 1670s because it was anticipated by 
the Scottish Scholastic concept of quantity, one of the properties of prime matter, as 
essentially extended in place.1 A similar point could be made regarding separate substances 
as the object of metaphysics, the concept of mind and of its faculties, the role of 
perception, just to name some other philosophical theories common in Scottish 
Scholasticism.2 
One final premise of my research is the idea that the corpus of graduation theses of the 
first half of the seventeenth century can be investigated as a uniform, collective 
philosophy. From the point of view of the historical unity of my sources, graduation theses 
                                         
1
 I believe that in the graduation theses the expression ‘extension in place’ is equivalent to ‘extension in 
space’. I prefer the former because it is closer to the original Latin, extensio in ordine ad locum. Every 
place (locus) is spatially extended, while not every space is a place (for example, the spatium 
imaginarium around the upper limit of the heavens). The regents favour ‘place’ instead of ‘space’, while 
Suárez some times favours ‘space’, as in DM, 40, II, 22, ‘extensio in spatio’. As it appears in part I, 
chapter 4, section 4 regarding the distinction between extensio in ordine ad se and extensio in ordine ad 
locum, one of the characteristic of a place is that it is extended in space. Baron 1627, TP IV, explains the 
relation between place and space: “Forma, quae motu locali acquiratur, et ejus terminus ad quem est 
Ubi, realis praesentia rei in loco, sive vero, sive imaginario spatio.” Therefore, even if the expression 
‘extension in space’ is perhaps more intuitive than ‘extension in place’, I follow more closely the original 
text. 
2
 “The thesis, then, is not that the seventeenth-century brand of Scholasticism directly influenced Descartes’ 
formulation of his philosophy but that, at least, it prepared the way for the acceptance of Cartesianism.” 
R. Ariew - M. Grene, in Descartes and the Last Scholastics, Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press, 
1999, p. 78, fn. 1. Ariew and Grene admittedly expand a thesis by V. Carraud of the presence of a form of 
Ockhamism in Arnauld’s philosophy, which drew him close to Descartes’ Meditationes. V. Carraud, 
Arnauld: From Ockhamism to Cartesianism, in R. Ariew - M. Grene (eds.), Descartes and his 
Contemporaries, Chicago - London, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 110-128. Regarding the 
Scholasticism of the graduation theses, I agree with the general view that some specific forms of 
Scholasticism were perceived to be close to Cartesian doctrines. 
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are the same type of text across all of Scotland, arguably written in similar material, 
cultural and social conditions. It is thus possible to investigate them under the collective 
name of ‘graduation theses’ of the Scottish universities. But the claim that their philosophy 
can be treated collectively, or sub specie scholae, is more debatable. I shall seek to 
investigate graduation theses as a philosophical unity, not simply as a historical one: that 
is, I shall seek to prove that they introduce us to a common philosophy characterised by the 
acceptance of an identifiable set of key doctrines. It is not enough to describe graduation 
theses as ‘Scholastic’, and the more precise term ‘Scotistic’ falls short of the target as well. 
Therefore, graduation theses are a unitary body whether regarded on their own or in 
relation to the Scholastic tradition. The risk of my approach is that the individual 
contribution may be overlooked in favour of the general notion of the ‘philosophy of the 
graduation theses’; the opposite risk is to underestimate the general acceptance of some 
theories in the name of the respect for the individual philosopher. I shall seek to balance 
this collective approach of my research with the need for accounting, when appropriate, for 
the variety of individual positions. 
Let me anticipate a historical remark about graduation theses which sheds light on the 
scope of my methodology. Graduation theses were written by the regents and are the most 
reliable source of information about the philosophy of the Scottish universities. Yet, it 
would be inaccurate to regard them as anything different from the summary of the 
curriculum of the Faculties of Arts. This means that graduation theses are not the product 
of a conscious search for innovation and personal research from the side of the regents. 
Rather, graduation theses enlighten us on the social dimension of the teaching of 
philosophy at the undergraduate level. This means that their philosophy is not the 
philosophy of the community of professional philosophers, it is rather the philosophy of 
the “laymen”, it is the philosophy of students who, for the most part, did not pursue an 
academic career or personal research. Therefore, we can truly speak of a ‘social 
dimension’ of the philosophy of the graduation theses. I believe that this is the historical 
relevance of the graduation theses. The evidence of a common philosophy in the 
graduation theses is then even more important and revealing of the spirit of the time. 
I shall now turn to a brief description of my primary sources, to the analysis of the 
academic context of the graduation theses and, in conclusion, to the relation between my 
research and the history of Scholastic philosophy. 
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2. Theses philosophicae: type of text and historical background3 
 
The primary sources of my thesis are the graduation theses of the Faculties of Arts of the 
Scottish universities of the seventeenth century: King’s and Marischal College in 
Aberdeen, St Salvator’s and St Leonard’s Colleges in St Andrews, and the universities of 
Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
Graduation theses are texts of variable length (from 8 pages up to 60 pages), in quarto, 
written in neo-Latin and usually printed by the local printer, with the exception of St 
Andrews theses. Graduation theses were ‘class theses’, written by the regents for the whole 
class of students for the purpose of the graduation ceremony.4 The regent is the lecturer in 
charge of the four-year curriculum of the Faculty of Arts: in the tradition of the regenting 
system, adopted by the Scottish universities in the seventeenth century, the same lecturer 
would guide his students through the learning of the four main branches of philosophy: 
logic, metaphysics, ethics and natural philosophy.5 The curriculum culminated in a public 
graduation ceremony, to be held before the local community: this would include civil and 
religious authorities as well as other students and the regents. The candidate would engage 
in philosophical debate on a vast number of doctrines, to show his philosophical as well as 
rhetorical skills. This practice closely resembles the medieval disputationes, which were an 
important part of both the teaching and the examining of students. 
                                         
3
 I shall present here the historical information required in order to understand the academic background of 
the graduation theses; I do not wish to offer an analysis of the universities in the first half of the 
seventeenth century. This is partly the object of broader studies, among others: Christine M. King (later 
Shepherd), Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th century, 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1974, and Steven J. Reid, Humanism and Calvinism: Andrew 
Melville and the Universities of Scotland 1560-1625, Farnham - Burlington (VT), Ashgate 2011. 
Important research on the history of the universities and of the graduation theses was inaugurated by P. J. 
Anderson, librarian of the University of Aberdeen between the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. I take the information regarding graduation theses from these works in particular: P. J. Anderson, 
The Arts Curriculum, Aberdeen 1892; and Notes on Academical Theses, Aberdeen, Aberdeen University 
Press, 1912; R. G. Cant, The Scottish University in the XVIIth Century, in Aberdeen University Review, 
43 (1970), pp. 223-233. 
4
 To my knowledge, the only exceptions to this practice are the individual sets of theses discussed by T. 
Mierbek, Theses physicae de generatione et corruptione quas defendere conabor sub praesidio J. Echlini, 
Edinburgh 1600; and by S. Decanus, Positiones nonnullae physiologicae...sub praesidio M. Patricii 
Gordonii, Aberdeen 1643. The candidates were granted the possibility to follow the graduation practice 
of their native country. Individual graduation theses were not prohibited, as we read for example in the 
Fasti Aberdonenses, Aberdeen, Spalding Club, 1854, in the Leges Collegii Regii Aberdonensis, p. 329: 
“It is lykwayes speciallie ordered that ther be no privat lawreatione in aither of the tuo colledges, without 
consent of the earle Marischall, rector, principall, and regents of his colledge.” 
5
 The regenting system was in use in the Scottish universities, albeit intermittently: C. M. King, Philosophy 
and Science, pp. 18-24. As the dates and authors of the graduation theses confirm, Edinburgh and St 
Andrews constantly applied the regenting system, while, for example, Aberdeen preferred the professorial 
system from around the 1620s to the 1640s: Sibbald, Seton and Leech were not regents, but professors of 
Natural philosophy in charge of the final year of the curriculum. Therefore, they wrote graduation theses 
more often than once every four years. In Glasgow the regenting system was reintroduced in 1642, when 
Dalrymple was appointed regent. 
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In order to understand the nature of the graduation theses, it is important to bear in mind 
that they were written for the purpose of the graduation ceremony. Class graduation theses 
do not belong to any traditional type of philosophical text, and can be said to be a genre on 
their own. Some theses are structured as short treatises, some others as short commentaries 
on Aristotle, yet it is evident that they are all examples of the broader category of 
graduation theses, which includes the oral discussion. There are no extant records of any 
actual discussion, but some graduation theses present lists of questions, usually under the 
heading ‘Problemata’, which can give us an idea of the sorts of topics discussed. A typical 
discussion would cover all areas of philosophy. The main scope of the graduation theses 
was to provide students with a summary of the curriculum, in which they would find what 
the regent considered to be the central doctrines and the best answers to philosophical 
debates. In some rare cases, the regent explicitly refers in the graduation theses to the 
candidates’ discussion, and leaves the answers to them. 
Given the variety of graduation theses and their broad spectrum, it is no surprise that the 
analysis can be detailed and long in some cases, and sketchy and incomplete in other cases, 
either within the same set of theses or between different sets. It takes a longer analysis to 
reveal where the main interests of the regent lay. Some sets are particularly detailed, for 
example the graduation theses by the three main regents of Edinburgh university in the 
1610s and 1620s, Fairley, King and Reid. One regent who explicitly favours a shorter style 
in writing is for example Alexander Lunan, King’s College, whose graduation theses of 
1622 are a collection of short and often unexplained statements. We can generally claim 
that in the 1640s graduation theses are much shorter and more in the style of a handout 
than in the previous decades. 
An indirect sign of the importance of the oral dimension is that the practice of printing 
graduation theses of the Faculty of Arts was started in Edinburgh only in 1596, to be 
quickly adopted by the other universities, but the graduation theses were not written with 
publication in mind. Graduation theses were discussed, and probably circulated as 
manuscripts among students before 1596 as well.6 This means that, in general, a good deal 
of effort is required from the reader in order to understand the philosophy they expound. 
More often than not, graduation theses just present a brief explanation for extremely 
complex theories and, even in longer ones, the discussion of a particular theory cannot 
match the extensive analysis characteristic of Scholastic texts. 
                                         
6
 We have evidence of a manuscript version of graduation theses: Theses aliquot logicae, ethicae, physicae, 
et astronomicae, in publicam Disputationem exibendae, quas Adolescentes nonnulli Salvatorianae 
Academicae alumni jam laurea donandi, Praeside Jacobo Gleg, conabuntur sun qeio~~ propugnare, St 
Andrews 1609. Ms 125 in Worcester College library, Oxford. This manuscript is the only extant version 
of this set of graduation theses. 
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I believe that graduation theses could be regarded as a shorter version of the Scholastic 
textbooks which became so popular in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
There are in fact similarities between Scholastic textbooks and graduation theses: both 
avoid the structure of quaestiones and articula typical of earlier Scholastic texts, both 
engage mainly with the clearest and best formulation of a problem, avoiding the longer 
process of obiectio and sed contra for each theory, and both abandon the practice of the 
commentary, as I mentioned above, with rare exceptions in the theses. Differences are no 
less evident: graduation theses are not written as an effective and exhaustive analysis of a 
branch of philosophy, or as an introduction to it, nor as a text to be used for teaching. In 
these similarities with Scholastic textbooks, graduation theses show the influence of the 
developments of Scholasticism in the early modern age.7 
Graduation theses are thus the culmination of the undergraduate teaching in the Faculty 
of Arts. They stand in close relation with teaching, since they are a sort of summary of the 
four-year curriculum. Regarding the Scottish universities, there is evidence of the practice 
of teaching also in the form of course notes. They were usually compiled by students from 
lectures, and sometimes approved of by the regents. The most evident use for these notes is 
their circulation and sale among students as textbooks, since there is evidence that 
universities adopted the same notes over a period of several years. 
The investigation of this material could shed light on university teaching. I have not used 
course notes alongside graduation theses in this thesis for the following reasons: 1) 
graduation theses are a more reliable source of information since they were written by the 
regents, while course notes are usually the result of the initiative of students; 2) graduation 
theses are the official philosophical production of the universities, while course notes are 
unofficial internal productions; 3) unlike course notes, the graduation theses are texts in 
which the regent was free to engage with philosophical debate without the needs imposed 
by teaching: graduation theses reveal much more of the personal philosophy of the regent; 
4) alongside the issue of the chronological unity of my research, there is the fact of the 
strong unity of my primary sources. Graduation theses then seem to be the most 
historically reliable source of information about the philosophy of the universities.8 
Graduation theses are usually divided into four sections: Theses logicae, Theses ethicae, 
Theses physicae and Theses metaphysicae. This division reflects the afore-mentioned 
quadripartition of the curriculum. This division is not always respected, and some 
differences between universities are well exemplified by changes in the structure of the 
                                         
7
 For an analysis of the Scholastic textbook: P. Reif, The Textbook Tradition in Natural Philosophy, in 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 30 (1969), No. 1, pp. 17-32. 
8
 For the analysis of coursenotes, see King, Philosophy and Science, passim. 
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theses: for example, this quadripartition applies well to both Aberdeen colleges, King’s and 
Marischal, while Edinburgh and, less evidently, St Salvator’s and St Leonard’s in St 
Andrews tend to have Theses astronomicae in place of Theses metaphysicae; the former 
are virtually absent from Aberdeen theses. Sections on the distinctions between branches 
of philosophy (Theses generales or Theses de disciplinis) might be present, as well as 
Theses geometricae or Theses mathematicae. The invariable core of graduation theses is 
the tripartition into logic, ethics and natural philosophy.9 Around these three sections, the 
regents were free to add a fourth or even a fifth section dealing with astronomy, geometry 
or metaphysics, which arguably reveals more of the specific character of each university. 
Thus, Aberdeen and St Andrews seem to have a greater interest in metaphysics than 
Edinburgh, which prefers to give space to science.10 If we limit the investigation to natural 
philosophy, differences in structure among universities are less evident than in the 
graduation theses as a whole, and we can recognize a coherent and uniform natural 
philosophy. 
Graduation theses derive their name from the practice of dividing the text into several 
theses that the regent proposes for the candidates’ analysis. This division can be either into 
main theses and clarificatory sub-theses or simply into different theses. Here are two 
examples: 
 
I. Esin hJ uJlh dunamiß, to d´eidoß ejntele;ceia. 
[sic] 2. de An. Tex. 2. 8. Met. 15. 
APPEND. I. Materia ergo essentialiter est potentia, 
eaque pura. 
2. Per seipsam est receptiva formae, non per accidens 
superadditum. [Reid 1614, TP I] 
 
I. Philosophia speculatrix circa res versatur 
necessarias, a materia (quae erroris omnis, omnis 
                                         
9
 The general title of graduation theses is usually ‘Theses philosophicae’ or ‘Theses logicae, ethicae, 
physicae et metaphysicae’. I will refer to graduation theses, in general, as Theses philosophicae. 
Regarding the sections of the theses, I shall adopt the following abbreviations: TL for Theses logicae, TP 
for Theses physicae and TM for Theses metaphysicae, followed by the number of the thesis and, if 
necessary, by the number of the sub-thesis. I shall adopt these abbreviations even for those sets of 
graduation theses with different titles, very common in particular at King’s College, Aberdeen: for 
example, W. Forbes, Positiones aliquot logicae, ethicae, physicae, metaphysicae, sphaericae, Aberdeen 
1623; and for those sets whose physical theses are divided in sections, as for Sibbald 1625 for example. 
Therefore, each logical, physical and metaphysical section of the graduation theses will be referred to as 
respectively TL, TP and TM. 
10
 By ‘science’ I mean astronomy, geometry, mathematics, not natural philosophy. As further evidence for 
this claim: Aberdeen theses are the most insightful in metaphysics, ranging from the discussion of the 
difference between essence and existence to the status of created beings in relation to God; St Andrews 
theses seem to develop a metaphysics of separate substances which anticipates later aspects of modern 
philosophy; Edinburgh theses basically offer the whole philosophy of science of the Scottish universities; 
finally, there are no extant theses for Glasgow, with the exception of a truly interesting set of theses from 
1646, authored by James Dalrymple (later Viscount Stair). 
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obscuritatis est latebra, et in cognoscendo 
difficultatis prima radix) mentis cogitationes 
avulsas [...] 
II. Mathematica non datur communis, ipse tamen vel 
maxime scientiae digna nomine [...] [Schewer 
1614, TP I-II] 
 
These passages are the first lines of the Theses physicae by Reid 1614 and Schewer 
1614, regents respectively at Edinburgh and St Salvator’s. Reid 1614 structures his set of 
theses as a commentary on Aristotle’s passages, usually with the text in Greek as the main 
theses. The regent then moves on to expound Aristotle by means of several sub-theses 
which can lead to either the approval or the rejection of the main theses. The division 
between theses and sub-theses is particularly suitable for Reid’s emphasis on commentary 
of the original text by Aristotle. Schewer 1614 structures his theses differently: there are no 
main theses and sub-theses, and each thesis is independent from others. 
There are also other ways of structuring the theses. Some regents include either short 
treatises (as in the case of St Salvator’s and St Leonard’s 1629), or structure the theses in 
distinct sections, arranged by theses, as in Sibbald 162511, who divides his Theses physicae 
in: 1) De pluralitate formarum in eodem composito; 2) An materia coeli sit diversa a 
materia sublunarium; 3) A quo coeli moveantur; 4) De speciebus intelligibilibus; 5) De 
praestantia intellectus et voluntatis; 6) A quo voluntas determinatur. It appears that in this 
division by topics the regent focuses more on particular doctrines and less on covering the 
whole of natural philosophy. 
We have seen that the practice of printing graduation theses was established in 
Edinburgh in the late sixteenth century, the oldest set of graduation theses available being 
J. Robertson’s Theses philosophicae, Edinburgh 1596. Regarding the survey of extant 
graduation theses, one preliminary consideration is important. We can only speculate about 
the number of copies printed in the universities for the graduation ceremony. Considering 
an average number of twenty students per class, we can argue that perhaps twice as many 
copies were printed: one copy per student and the remaining copies distributed among the 
audience of the ceremony. There is, however, no record of this. This estimate and the 
consideration that graduation theses were not printed in order to be published and sold 
                                         
11
 James Sibbald (1595-1647), minister of the Church of Scotland, regent and member of the Aberdeen 
Doctors. Graduated in 1618 at Marischal College, Aberdeen. First Professor of Natural Philosophy, 
appointed in 1620 as regent of the magistrand class. He wrote three graduation theses for the years 1623, 
1625 and 1626. His theses cover the four-year curriculum, even if his teaching was restricted to natural 
philosophy. As the other Aberdeen Doctors, Sibbald was opposed to the National Covenant, and he 
eventually left Scotland for good in 1640. Died in Dublin in 1647. FAM, p. 33. 
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justifies the claim that graduation theses were, and are today, among libri rarissimi.12 It is 
then rather surprising that a good number of graduation theses are still extant. The only 
graduation theses which did not survive are from the University of Glasgow, with the 
remarkable exception of James Dalrymple’s 1646 theses. Here is a list of the existing 
theses for the other four universities:13 
 
Aberdeen, King’s College: A. Lunan 1622; W. Forbes 1623; J. Forbes 1624; W. Lesley 
1625; J. Lundie 1626; J. Lundie 1627; A. Strachan 1629; A. Strachan 1631; D. Leech 
1633; D. Leech 1634; D. Leech 1635; D. Leech 1636; D. Leech 1637; D. Leech 1638; P. 
Gordon 1643. 
 
Aberdeen, Marischal College: A. Aedie 1616; J. Sibbald 1623; J. Sibbald 1625; J. 
Sibbald 1626; J. Seton 1627; J. Seton 1630; J. Seton 1631; J. Seton 1634; J. Seton 1637; J. 
Seton 1638; J. Ray 1643. 
 
Edinburgh: J. Robertson 1596; W. Craig 1599; J. Adamson 1600; J. Knox 1601; J. 
Adamson 1604; J. Knox 1605; A. Young 1607; J. Reid 1610; W. King 1612; A Young 
1613; J. Reid 1614; J, Fairley 1615; W. King 1616; A. Young 1617; J. Reid 1618; J. 
Fairley 1619; W. King 1620; A. Young 1621; J. Reid 1622; J. Fairley 1623; W. King 1624; 
A. Stevenson 1625; J. Reid 1626; R. Rankine 1627; W. King 1628; A. Stevenson 1629; J. 
Brown 1630; R. Rankine 1631; A. Hepburn 1632; D. Forrester 1641; T. Craufurd 1642; J. 
Wiseman 1643; D. Forrester 1645; T. Craufurd 1646; J. Wiseman 1647; D. Forrester 1649. 
 
St Andrews:14 J. Petrey 1603 (StS); D. Wilkie 1603 (StL); W. Wedderburn 1608 (StS); 
Anon 1608 (StL); J. Cleg 1609 (StS);15 D. Robertson 1610 (StS); P. Bruce 1610 (StL); A. 
Henderson 1611 (StS); J. Strang 1611 (StL); J. Blair 1612 (StS); J. Wemys 1612 (StL); W. 
                                         
12
 J. F. Kellas Johnstone, Notes on Academic Theses of Scotland, in Records of the Glasgow Bibliographical 
Society, 8 (1930), pp. 81-98: “Arts Graduation theses are very rare, many rank among “libri rarissimi”. I 
take the estimate of the number of students from the dedicatory letter of each set of theses, which includes 
a list of the candidates. See also King, Philosophy and Science, Appendix 4, pp. 398 ff. 
13
 Christine M. King based her research on the list in Harry G. Aldis, A list of books printed in Scotland 
before 1700, Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, 1904, reprinted 1970. A more complete list is in 
Alfred W. Pollard, A short-title catalogue of books printed in England, Scotland & Ireland and of English 
books printed abroad, 1475-1640, 2nd ed. revised and enlarged by W. A. Jackson - F. S. Ferguson, 
London, Bibliographical Society, 1976-1991. The main difference between Aldis and Pollard is the 
Clarke’s collection, a bundle of graduation theses from St Andrews, missing from Aldis, now in 
Worcester College library, Oxford. I am grateful to Joanna Parker, librarian of the Special Collections, for 
the identification of these St Andrews theses as the Clarke’s collection. 
14
 StS stands for St Salvator’s, StL for St Leonard’s. 
15
 Ms at Worcester College library, Oxford. See above, p. 14, footnote 3. 
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Lamb 1613 (StS); W. MacDowell 1613 (StL); J. Schewer 1614 (StS); A. Bruce 1614 
(StL); D. Monroe 1615 (StS); Anon. 1615 (StL);16 J. Wemys 1616 (StL); R. Baron 1617 
(StS); J. Carr 1617 (StL); W. Martin 1618 (StS); A. Bruce 1618 (StL); R. Baron 1621 
(StS); J. Baron 1627 (StS); A. Monroe 1628 (StS); M. Murray 1628 (StL); J. Ramsey 1629 
(StS); J. Wedderburn 1629 (StL); J. Mercer 1630 (StL); J. Barclay 1631 (StS); W. Wemys 
1631 (StL); A. Monroe 1632 (StS); J. Mercer 1632 (StL); M. Murray 1634 (StL); J. 
Armour 1635 (StS); W. Wemys 1635 (StL); J. Wood 1637 (StS), D. Nevaius, 1648 (StL).17 
 
The general picture is that we are in possession of an almost complete list for Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and St Andrews, with the regrettable loss of almost all Glasgow theses. As far 
as I know, the list until 1649 I provide here, a combination of Aldis, Pollard and personal 
research, is the most complete. 
 
 
 
3. Protestant Scholasticism 
 
In section 1 of this introduction I sketched a proof that the graduation theses are part of 
the tradition of Protestant or Reformed Scholasticism. This notion is indeed called into 
question by scholars for two different yet converging reasons: on the one side, Catholic 
scholars tend to restrict the notion of Scholasticism to ‘Catholic Scholasticism’, and, even 
more precisely, to Thomism as the appropriate style in philosophy for a Catholic 
philosopher. On the other side, non-Catholic scholars tend to mark the difference between 
the Roman Church and the Reformed churches in terms of the rejection of Scholasticism 
tout court, which allegedly took place because of the Reformation. It is hard not to detect a 
political agenda behind these two positions, both unmindful of two pertinent 
considerations: 1) Scholasticism was not exclusively adopted by Catholic philosophers; 2) 
Scholasticism was not ended by the Reformation, and, for example in Scotland, after the 
conversion of the Scottish church in 1560, flourished well into the seventeenth century. 
                                         
16
 King did not find any records for the regents at St Leonard’s for the years 1603-10 and 1614-16. The 
unique copies of the theses for 1608 StL and 1615 StL that I have read at Worcester College library have 
no title page. The names of the regents are unknown. 
17
 The Clarke’s collection includes the following theses, some of which are unique: 1609 StS, 1610 StS and 
StL, 1611 StS and StL, 1612 StS, 1613 StS and StL, 1614 StS, 1615 StS and StL, 1616 StS and StL, 1617 
StS and StL, 1618 StS. J. Wood 1637 StS is not listed in Pollard, and the following theses from the 
Clarke’s collection are not included in Shepherd 1974: 1610 StS and StL, 1611 StS, 1612 StS, 1613 StL, 
1614 StS, 1615 StS and StL, 1616 StS and StL, 1617 StS, 1618 StS. 
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Now, with regards to the notion of ‘Reformed Scholasticism’, there are two main 
questions to be asked: 1) what is the actual state of research? and, 2) is there a criterion in 
virtue of which it is possible to define a tradition in Scholasticism as ‘Reformed’ or 
‘Protestant’? I shall seek to analyse the present state of research on Reformed 
Scholasticism and argue that Scottish Scholasticism can shed important light on the whole 
notion, and I shall explain why I believe it possible to identify Reformed features in the 
natural philosophy of the theses. 
 
 
3.1 The Theses philosophicae and the historiography of Scholasticism 
 
Reformed Scholasticism is still underexplored territory. Scholasticism in general 
deserves more attention than scholars have been willing to show.18 It is a merit of the 
Catholic universities to have fostered the interest in Scholasticism, in particular following 
the Encyclical Letter Aeterni Patris of 1879, in which Pope Leo XIII officially adopted 
Thomistic philosophy for the teaching of the Roman Church. The work of Etienne Gilson 
is probably the highest and among the first examples of this renewed interest in 
Scholasticism. But by no means is it the only one: the works of P. O. Kristeller, C. Schmitt, 
B. P. Copenhaver among others19 mark the beginning of a better understanding of 
Renaissance and early modern philosophy, which includes the Scholastic and Aristotelian 
traditions. Even if research is currently under way,20 the variety and depth of Scholasticism 
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 M. W. F. Stone, in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, D. Rutherford (ed.), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 299-327, in particular pp. 302-304 and 317-320 
addresses the role of Protestant Scholasticism: “Protestant Scholasticism made an important contribution 
to the theology and philosophy of the period” (p. 302), in particular in relation to great figures of early 
modern philosophy, such as Leibniz, Locke and Kant. The author underlines the fact that the 
interpretation of Protestant Scholasticism as “a period of intellectual decline” has been put forward by 
twentieth-century Protestant theologians with no interest in Scholasticism (p. 317). An invaluable work 
for the reassessment of Protestant Scholasticism is R. A. Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed 
Dogmatics, Grand Rapids (MI), Baker Book House, 1987. Muller connects the development of Protestant 
theology with Scholasticism, and even if his interest mainly lies in the theological aspect, his work can 
shed light on the history of philosophy as well. 
19
 Among other works: C. B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University 
Press, 1983; John Case and the Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, Kingston, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1983; The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities, London, Variorum 
Reprints, 1984; Reappraisals in Renaissance thought, edited by C. Webster, London, Variorum Reprints, 
1989. P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts, Princeton - Oxford, Princeton University Press, 
1990. B. P. Copenhaver - C. B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992. 
These authors contributed in a decisive way to the idea that Renaissance philosophy was an autonomous 
area in the history of philosophy. They caused a shift in the scholarly opinion on Renaissance 
Aristotelianism and Scholasticism, contributing to the understanding of the many different aspects of 
Renaissance philosophy, and provided guidelines for future research in many areas: from the history of 
the universities to the relations with early modern philosophy. 
20
 J. Schmutz, Bulletin de scholastique moderne, in Revue Thomiste, 100 (2000), No. 1, pp. 270-341. The 
author offers an insightful review of recent publications on Scholasticism and also proposes lines of 
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requires much more investigation in three main directions: 1) the relation between 
Scholasticism and Renaissance philosophy; 2) the relation between Scholasticism and early 
modern philosophy - the best known area, in virtue of the attempts to understand the 
background of Cartesian philosophy; and finally 3) the relation between Catholic and 
Protestant Scholasticism. My interest lies in shedding light on point 3: I shall also hint at 
possible lines of research regarding point 2. 
Prior to the acceptance of the notion of a ‘Reformed Scholasticism’, scholars debated the 
definition of Scholasticism in the early modern era. Whereas there seems to be no doubt 
that Scholasticism in the early modern era is a distinct philosophical movement from the 
Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, there is no agreement regarding what makes it a distinct 
movement. The most common formulae are ‘second Scholasticism’, ‘modern 
Scholasticism’, ‘late Scholasticism’, ‘academic Scholasticism’, ‘Renaissance 
Scholasticism’, ‘Baroque Scholasticism’, which exemplify well the extent of the 
disagreement among scholars.21 The premise of theses formulae seems to be the 
assumption that, despite the differences among the schools, Scholasticism in the early 
modern era was ultimately a unitary movement. I argue that this disagreement could be 
resolved by appealing to a different criterion of classification, philosophical rather than 
historical. If it is true that some degree of unity within Scholasticism in the early modern 
era is evident, nevertheless the division into ‘Catholic Scholasticism’ and ‘Protestant 
Scholasticism’, already in use in the history of theology, might be profitable in history of 
philosophy as well. 
The definition of a historical period reveals the point of view of the historian, just as 
much as it reveals characteristics of the defined object. If we accept the idea that a 
definition in the history of philosophy cannot exhaustively define its object, then I believe 
that a division of Scholasticism on the basis of the faith of the philosophers can be a useful 
one. Clearly, all the afore-mentioned definitions shed light on some aspects of the 
Scholasticism of the modern age. Yet, the question raised in my research seems to regard 
                                                                                                                           
research. The analysis seems a little unbalanced in favour of Spanish Scholasticism. Historically more 
interesting is M. Forlivesi’s introduction A Man, an Age, a Book to the volume Rem in seipsa cernere: 
Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673), M. Forlivesi (ed.), Padua 2006. Forlivesi 
engages with the account of the Scholastic tradition in the period from the late middle ages to seventeenth 
century and offers extensive bibliography on the subject. Once again, the focus is on Catholic 
Scholasticism. Scotland is not mentioned and the sole reference to England is made for Britain, page 48. 
Despite this, Forlivesi’s analysis is a most accurate account of our current knowledge of Scholasticism. 
Some other fundamental texts in Renaissance philosophy are: N. Kretzmann - A. Kenny - J. Pinborg 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982; C. B. Schmitt - Q. Skinner - E. Kessler (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; J. Hankins (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
21
 Forlivesi, ivi, pp. 106-114. Forlivesi seems to approve of ‘Renaissance Scholasticism’, while pointing out 
that all the formulae are in some sense profitable (p. 112). 
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more what is specific to the Scottish Scholasticism as a form of Scholasticism, rather than 
what Scholasticism is in general. 
The advantage of the definition that I set out to employ is that it accounts well for the 
philosophy of the graduation theses. In fact, we shall see that graduation theses put forward 
a ‘Reformed’ philosophy not simply on the general recognition that the regents were 
philosophers who “happened to belong” to a Reformed faith community; rather, the 
graduation theses expound doctrines whose philosophical character originates from a 
Reformed confession of faith. My two key examples will be the theory of the relation 
between accident and substance (part I, chapter 4) and the rejection of natural theology 
(part II, chapter 3). 
The formula ‘Reformed Scholasticism’ and the application of this formula to the whole 
of Scholasticism prompt the not easily answerable question of the acceptability of a 
theological category in a philosophical categorisation. There is no doubt that the division 
into Reformed and Catholic philosophy is primarily motivated by religious events and 
theological doctrines, and that the very reference to theological doctrines in a philosophical 
context might seem an illicit move. Yet, I believe that this criticism can be rebutted in two 
ways: 
1) the graduation theses do not openly engage with theology, because the Faculties of 
Arts were dedicated to the teaching of philosophy. There is then among the regents the 
awareness that philosophy is a distinct discipline from theology. I shall argue that the 
natural philosophy of the theses shows this attitude well. Yet, the regents feel compelled to 
investigate theological doctrines insofar as they have consequences for philosophy. Even if 
this investigation is conducted within the limits of and according to the principles of 
philosophy, nonetheless it is prompted by theological doctrines. Within Scholasticism, the 
specific character of the graduation theses is exemplified by such philosophical theories: 
the regents understood themselves to be different as philosophers from Catholic 
Scholastics primarily in virtue of the rejection of the Catholic theory of accidents, 
grounded in their Reformed reading of the Eucharist as a symbol. 
2) More generally, the importance of religion and theology in the philosophical debate of 
the seventeenth century should not be underestimated. Later, religion is thought of as a 
private aspect of men’s lives, but in seventeenth-century Europe the public dimension of 
religion was very prominent, and an important part of the struggle of the new philosophy 
and science was for independence from religion and theology. I believe that the graduation 
theses are fully Scholastic in spirit when it comes to the relation between philosophy and 
theology; yet, a degree of autonomy of philosophy from theology was part of the 
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Scholastic tradition as well. As we will see, even if graduation theses do not engage with 
theology, they are nonetheless influenced by religion. 
In sum, the graduation theses contain, explicitly or otherwise, natural philosophical 
theories which are motivated by the faith of the regents. Religion is then an acceptable 
basis for distinctions within Scholasticism.22 
Other formulae in use are those of ‘early modern philosophy’ and ‘modern philosophy’. 
These formulae seem to include, especially in the analytic tradition, almost exclusively the 
philosophy after Descartes. This approach tends to exclude philosophical traditions such as 
Renaissance or Scholastic philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even if 
Scholasticism is an important part of the narrative of early modern philosophy (as the 
increasing literature on the Scholastic background of Cartesian philosophy shows), I shall 
employ ‘early modern philosophy’ and ‘modern philosophy’ to refer only to the Cartesian 
and post-Cartesian traditions. In a sense, this choice is motivated by the use in the 
graduation theses of the expressions ‘Scholastici’ and ‘Moderni’ as referring respectively 
to those philosophers who follow the philosophy of the schools and those who do not. 
Therefore, we are confronted with three traditions in the analysis of the theses: primarily 1) 
Reformed Scholasticism and 2) Catholic Scholasticism; then 3) early modern philosophy. 
Renaissance philosophy, in particular in the form of Humanism, is in secondary position. 
 
 
3.2 The doctrine of the Fall: a religious premise to natural philosophy 
 
The doctrine of the Fall is part of the Christian faith. Historically, it gained greater 
importance because of the Reformation: Reformed theologians, philosophers and laymen 
felt the corrupt condition of human nature in a more vivid way than Catholics. This 
doctrine finds its way into some graduation theses, and into natural philosophy more often 
than into moral philosophy, where its importance should be more evidently perceived. A 
corrupt state entails our essential incapacity for good moral behaviour. 
In the graduation theses, the doctrine of the Fall is exploited as a premise to natural 
philosophy, and it seems to imply that not just the moral judgment of men is impaired, but 
                                         
22
 My focus is on natural philosophy only. Perhaps surprisingly, the Reformed Scholastic character of the 
theses is best exemplified by natural philosophical theories rather than by, for example, the theory of free 
will. In fact, even if Scottish Reformed regents did not believe in free will, graduation theses expound the 
doctrine of free will because it is the best possible solution to the question of human action according to 
the principles of human reason alone. On the one side, this evidence shows the degree of autonomy that 
philosophy was granted in the Scottish universities; on the other, it is even more remarkable that in some 
natural philosophical theories, rather than in moral ones, the regents perceived ‘good philosophy’ to be in 
harmony with their religion. 
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the understanding of the natural world as well. Therefore, corruption affects human reason 
in both its moral and theoretical aspects, and therefore in respect of both will and intellect. 
 
Lapsu flebili, non modo paralysi dissoluti affectus, 
transversum acta voluntas, sed et Thebanis 
sphingibus, Cymmerijs tenebris obtenebrata mens. 
Lugubris conditio humana non modo disciplinae 
practicae medelam, sed et scientiae contemplativae 
collyrium et solem requisivit. [Robertson 1596, TP 
1]23 
 
Execrabili hominis Apostasia, sicuti vitiati sunt 
affectus, corrupta ac depravata voluntas: ita mens 
densissima ignorantiae caligine obnubilata est. 
Morborum animi, cujus medicina est Philosophia [...] 
[King 1612, TP I] 
 
These two passages from Robertson and King claim that the corruption due to the Fall is 
not limited to the will, but extends to the intellect as well. Robertson talks of the ‘grievous 
human condition’, while King talks of the ‘diseases of the human soul’. In both passages, 
the remedy for this condition is contemplative science or philosophy. 
This picture applies particularly well to our understanding of prime matter, whose 
analysis follows each of these two passages. In fact, as we will see, prime matter is most 
obscure to us, because it is not endowed with form. Yet, the prominence given to the 
doctrine of the Fall by Robertson and King is remarkable: natural philosophy as a whole 
should be regarded as an enterprise originally impaired by the limitedness and corrupt state 
of our understanding, which originated with the Fall. Philosophy is a remedy, but it does 
not to seem to be a solution. 
Now, the reference to the doctrine of the Fall in the context of natural philosophy seems 
to be a consequence of the Reformed religion of the regents, in this case identifiable as a 
form of Calvinism. Can we say that this reference is sufficient ground for the definition of 
the Scottish Scholasticism as ‘Reformed Scholasticism’? I think it is not. In fact, the 
doctrine of the Fall does not affect the philosophy of the regents. More precisely, there 
appears to be no philosophical doctrine which is different from an equivalent doctrine in a 
Catholic Scholastic context because of the doctrine of the Fall. I do not wish to 
underestimate the importance of the doctrine of the Fall in shaping the worldview of the 
regents; yet, this doctrine seems to qualify as a religious premise rather than a 
philosophical theory. Therefore, the reference to the Fall should be understood as a sign of 
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 A translation of the Theses physicae of Robertson 1596 is in the Appendix. 
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the Reformed religion of the regents, rather than an aspect of their religion which actively 
shapes their philosophical argumentations.24 I have argued above that this is not the case 
for the Reformed reading of the Eucharist, and the belief in the Calvinist sensus divinitatis: 
these religious doctrines respectively shape the regents’ theory of the relation between 
accident and substance, and ground the rejection of natural theology. In these cases in fact, 
the regents oppose Catholic Scholasticism on the basis of their religion, and bring about 
fundamental changes with respect to Catholic Scholastic philosophical theories. 
 
The investigation of graduation theses can prove an extremely important step to a better 
understanding of Scholasticism. The characteristic of the graduation theses as the official 
philosophical production of the Scottish universities enables the historian of philosophy to 
investigate a coherent and unitary corpus of Scholastic texts. It is evident that 
Scholasticism in the early modern era was an incredibly variegated philosophy, with 
differences on the basis of nationality, religion, philosophical heritage and political 
pressure. Scotland is a particularly suitable territory for the investigation of academic 
Scholasticism, a territory in which the national element coheres with a philosophical unity. 
With regards to the Reformed aspect of Scholasticism, the graduation theses are a form 
of Reformed Scholasticism. The advantages of the graduation theses that I have pointed 
out with respect to Scholasticism in general are not less important in the context of the 
investigation of ‘Reformed’ Scholasticism. In particular, the graduation theses are purely 
philosophical texts, which can help to qualify Reformed philosophy without references to 
Reformed theology and Reformed theologians, though it is these references that have 
dominated approaches so far.25 
 
 
                                         
24
 It is an established interpretation of the outcome of the Reformation that the worldview of the Reformed 
countries became increasingly favourable to a scientific research independent of religion, fostering the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. P. Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism and the rise of 
natural science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, in particular chapter 2, believes that a 
direct consequence of the Reformation was the distinction of spheres between the two books, that of 
nature and that of revelation, thus benefiting the autonomy of natural philosophical research. Moreover, 
even the non-mediated access to the Scriptures, comparably greater in the Reformed countries than in the 
Catholic ones, favoured the spirit of independent research. 
25
 C. R. Trueman - R. Scott Clark (eds.), Protestant Scholasticism, Carlisle, Paternoster Press, 1999; W. J. 
van Asselt - E. Dekker (eds.), Reformation and Scholasticism, Grand Rapids (MI), Baker Academic, 2001; 
W. J. van Asselt, Protestant scholasticism: some methodological considerations in the study of its 
development, in Dutch Review of Church History, 81 (2001), pp. 265-274; Scholasticism Protestant and 
Catholic: Medieval sources and methods in seventeenth-century Reformed thought, in J. Frishman - W. 
Otten - G. Rouwhorst (eds.), Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation. The 
Foundational Character of Authoritative Sources in the History of Christianity and Judaism, Leiden, 
Brill, 2004, pp. 457-470. E. Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and 
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4. Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is about prime matter, and consists of 
four chapters: 1) Materia prima: quod sit et quid sit; 2) De potentiis materiae primae; 3) De 
proprietatibus materiae primae; and 4) De Transubstantiatione. The investigation will show 
the Scotistic influence in the graduation theses and the coherence between Aristotelianism 
and Reformed religion in the theory of the relation between accidents and substance. 
The second part is about movement, and consists of three chapters: 1) Motus: general 
features of movement; 2) The movement of gravia and levia; and 3) The movement of the 
heavens. The Scholastic theory of movement and the Reformed religion of the regents will 
have implications for the rejection of natural theology. 
The Conclusions include the account of the reception of Aristotle in the theses: a 
Humanist renewed interest in the Greek text of Aristotle is conjoined with the Christian 
reading of Aristotle and the specific Reformed interpretation of Aristotle on the theory of 
substance. 
In the Appendix I provide the translations of four sets of Theses physicae, extracts from 
Robertson 1596, Aedie 1616, Reid 1626 and Dalrymple 1646. These sets of theses are 
particularly interesting for the following reasons: 1) Robertson 1596 is the oldest set 
available to us; 2) Aedie 1616 is the oldest set for Aberdeen and it includes unique sections 
on special physics; 3) Reid 1626 and Dalrymple 1646 critically engage with the tradition of 
Scholasticism, in a way unknown to the other regents.26 
 
                                                                                                                           
Reformation, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1995, focuses also on the Humanist counterpart 
of Reformed Scholasticism. 
26
 Theses texts (in particular Aedie 1616) show a variety of natural philosophical doctrines which can be 
difficult to contextualize for a contemporary reader. I have provided some references already, but I am 
planning to provide fuller references to them in later publications. 
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Part I, chapter 1 
 
 
 
Materia prima: quod sit et quid sit 
 
 
 
1. The relevance of prime matter in Scholastic natural philosophy 
 
Prime matter (materia prima) is the stuff all bodies are made of. It is a common 
Scholastic theory that prime matter is the root of potentiality, the underlying principle on 
which form acts as the informing principle. The result of these two principles is a 
compound (compositum): a union of form and matter, a union which is essentially one 
because the two principles alone are not able to exist one without the other. Aristotle 
considers only form and matter principles per se of the compound, while calling privation 
(privatio) a principle per accidens of the compound, because 1) it is not a being in the full 
sense, since it is an absence of being; and 2) it is ultimately absence of form: therefore 
privation is reduced to form, because the absence of a (new) form is always the presence of 
a form (Phys. I). 
Generally speaking, Scholastics claim that every body is a compound of matter and form. 
This is different from hylomorphism, which entails that all beings (with the exception of 
God) are made of form and matter, including, for example, angels. Not all Scholastics 
accept this theory, which is traditionally held by the Franciscan school. When it comes to 
natural philosophy, which deals with the realm of things-in-becoming, we can say that 
hylomorphism is shared by all Scholastics. Scottish regents also embraced hylomorphism. 
Prime matter is then one of the two principles all natural things are made of: this is 
enough to show how important a notion it is. Alongside this, prime matter is the root of 
becoming. ‘Becoming’ (fieri) is the name given to any changes whatsoever: becoming is 
the continuous process of ‘passing away-coming to be-passing away’ which any compound 
undergoes in the course of nature. It was debated among Scholastics whether all becoming 
was included in the notion of movement or not. As it will appear in part II, the Scholastic 
notion of movement (motus) does not coincide with our contemporary notion, as it includes 
phenomena we would not call a ‘movement’ today. An even broader term is change 
(mutatio), which also includes changes which take place in an instant, and that some 
Scholastics and some regents tend to exclude from the number of ‘movements’. A 
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theoretical unity of all these processes is given by their common material cause, prime 
matter, the passive principle of the compound which causes (in the sense of ‘material 
cause’) the succession of forms, therefore the succession of beings. 
In the structure of a compound, matter is on the side of potency and form on that of act. 
In general, this principle is accepted by Scholastics. In its strict version, it is famously a 
Thomistic doctrine. It is, however, not shared by all Scholastics, and the regents in general 
reject it. In natural philosophy, no specific contradiction between this doctrine and 
experience is evident, while regents felt compelled by philosophical arguments to go 
beyond this doctrine when dealing with prime matter under a metaphysical point of view. 
The notions of act and potency are most important in Scholastic philosophy. It may suffice 
here to define potency as: a) “first, the principle of movement or change that we find in 
something else or in the same thing as something else”; and b) “the principle by which one 
thing is changed or moved by something else or by itself as other [from itself]” (Aristotle, 
Met., V, 12, 1019 a 15-20);1 and act as “a being which has some sort of actuality, thanks to 
which it is not nothing” (Suárez, DM, 13, 5, 7.); and “the ‘existing’ of one thing” (Arist, 
Met., IX, 6, 1048 a 32).2 I believe that these definitions are general enough to serve as 
introductory definitions: we will see how the regents will employ them in their philosophy. 
So, prime matter is: 1) the common material principle underlying all natural substances; 
2) the root of becoming, by being the principle of receptivity of form; 3) the principle of 
unity in nature, both metaphysical and logical. This last aspect is particularly important to 
my work, as it also gives theoretical unity to part I. Following the metaphysical order 
within prime matter I have structured part I as follows: I first focus on the essence, 
secondly on the powers and thirdly on the properties of prime matter. The essential 
connection between prime matter and movement establishes a unity between parts I and II. 
In this first chapter I shall investigate: 1) the evidence for the existence of prime matter 
(the Scholastic question ‘utrum sit’), by means of three arguments: from natural becoming, 
by eminence and by negation; 2) the arguments for the definition of the essence of prime 
matter, or what prime matter is (‘quid sit’). The answers given by the regents are that prime 
matter exists and that it is a ‘receptive entitative act’. 
 
 
 
                                         
1
 a) ‘Duvnamiß levgetai hJ mevn ajrch; kinhvsewß h] metabolh~ß hJ ejn eJtevrw· h] h|· e}teron’; b) ‘ajrch; 
metabolh~ß h] kinhvsewß levgetai duvnamiß ejn eJtevrw· h] h|· e}teron, hJ d´ uJf´ eJtevrou h] h|· e}teron.’ 
My translation. 
2
 ‘[E] ]sti dh; ejnevrgeia to; uJpavrcein to; pra~gma.’ My translation. 
Part I, chapter 1. Materia prima: quod sit et quid sit 30 
2. Prime matter: quod sit 
 
By this expression Scholastics mean ‘that it is’. A proof ‘quod sit’ about prime matter 
aims to show ‘that prime matter is’, or, with a more contemporary terminology, ‘that prime 
matter exists’. The Latin sit is philosophically more neutral than ‘exists’, since it only 
entails the attribution of being to a subject, while existentia is more precise. Existence 
“dicatur esse modus quidam essentiae intrinsecus quo formaliter res dicitur esse actu sive 
extra suas causas”, according to Eustachius a Sancto Paulo.3 So, existence is a mode 
intrinsic to an essence by which we can say that an essence is in act outside of its causes. 
To say that something is and that something exists are then different claims. I will use the 
expression ‘existence’, also because the analysis of the Theses philosophicae will show 
precisely that according to the regents prime matter exists in the sense employed by 
Eustachius. 
The claim that prime matter exists is different from the claim that matter exists: there is 
hardly any debate in Scholasticism over the existence of matter, while uncertainty about 
prime matter is strong. What is the difference? Matter is commonly intended as the matter 
of a given compound, and no doubt is possible regarding its existence: it is a fact that all 
bodies are also material. This is the Aristotelian notion of matter as potential principle of 
the compound. On the contrary, prime matter is the metaphysical notion of matter before 
information, a general, underlying principle of which we have no direct experience. The 
inference from this matter in a compound to prime matter in general is not immediate, and 
requires justification. Neither specific individual matters are species of the genus prime 
matter, so that the existence of the species entails the existence of the genus. Indeed, prime 
matter is not distinct from the individual matter and vice versa. No attribute of prime 
matter is withdrawn from informed matter, thus the genus-species parallelism does not 
work. 
Inevitably though, any demonstration of the existence of prime matter has the existence 
of informed matter as a premise. There is more than a simple inference from informed 
matter to prime matter and regents deploy arguments in favour of the existence of it. They 
all agree that prime matter is and that it also exists in a more precise sense. 
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 SPhQ, IV, II, II, IV. 
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2.1 Argument from natural philosophy 
 
Scholastics developed a range of demonstrations of the existence of prime matter which 
vary from more theological ones to metaphysical and physical ones. I wish to analyse the 
argument in its physical form because it is limited to the realm of natural philosophy, it 
aims at being self-sufficient with regard to other arguments, and it is favoured by the 
majority of the regents. The sets of theses offering the best formulation are Wedderburn 
and Ramsay 1629, a joint set of graduation theses for the students of the colleges of St 
Leonard’s and St Salvator’s in St Andrews. It relies on the principle that in omni causarum 
genere datur aliqua prima causa and runs as follows: 
 
Ducitur ex naturali rerum generatione: ex nihilo 
quicquam gigni non potest, ut experientia constat. 
Ergo, ex aliquo praeexistente, quod in re genita 
maneat. Id autem non est forma, ea namque denuo 
inducitur. Est igitur quidpiam, quod advenientem 
formam excipiat, et unum idemque permaneat, id vero 
est materia, quam primam dicimus. [Disputatio 
physica, an detur materia prima, et qualis ea sit] 
 
If we couple the principle that in every causal genus a first cause is given with the 
principle that nothing can come from nothing, according to Wedderburn and Ramsay we 
are compelled to say that prime matter exists. Not simply matter, but prime matter: in fact, 
the matter of a compound is part of the premise of the argument, and a datum of our 
experience. The argument wants to bridge the distance between individual portions of 
matter we are aware of in our experience and prime matter by means of metaphysical 
principles. The structure of this argument is inevitable, given the ontological status of 
prime matter. 
The relevance of this argument in natural philosophy is that it appeals to the causes of 
becoming in the natural world. Things become (come-to-be and cease-to-be): this whole 
process would be unintelligible if deprived of a metaphysical and physical unity, which is 
provided by prime matter. If prime matter did not exist as an underlying common principle 
of things in becoming, then 1) things would come out of nothing; or 2) things would be 
created and sustained continuously by God. In the first case we would have a 
contradiction: it is not possible that natural substances come from nothing, that is, from a 
material nothing, unless by means of creation. In the second case, we would have a 
continuous act of creation required to avoid the contradiction in the first case. If prime 
matter is posited, continuous creation is not necessary. In itself, the second case is not 
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contradictory, it simply undermines the ‘independence’ of the natural world. According to 
the regents, the natural world is created, so ultimately dependent on God’s causality in 
coming-to-be and in continuing-to-be; yet they are also aware of the independence of 
natural philosophy as a discipline and of the natural world as a realm on its own. Thus, the 
idea of a continuous creation is rejected. I believe that this approach is central in the theses 
and will surface again in my analysis. 
This argument from natural becoming can be said to be Aristotelian in spirit, but less 
Aristotelian in letter. The Aristotelian side of it is the attention paid to the philosophical 
justification of change by the search for an unchanging principle; by the reconduction of 
plurality to unity; and finally by the rejection of absolute nothing as part of reality (for 
instance, Phys. I). What is not much Aristotelian is the very notion of prime matter: 
Aristotle never directly enquired into a prime matter with all the qualifications that 
Scholastics attributed to it. We might say that the notion of ‘prime matter’ has its full 
meaning only in the framework of a philosophical theology of created beings. 
 
 
2.2 Other arguments: per eminentiam and per negationem 
 
A physical argument is not the only way to prove the existence of prime matter. How 
arguments are structured reflects the sort of knowledge we can have of the demonstratum. 
In the previous case, in physical terms, we must deduce the existence of prime matter by 
means of metaphysical principles because our experience alone does not show that prime 
matter is. We simply do not know prime matter in the way we know natural substances 
because prime matter is not a part of our experience. This is due to the lack of form: we 
cannot say that our knowledge of things is limited per se to compounds of form and matter, 
but we can say that in nature we only experience compounds of form and matter. All 
knowledge of the physical world other than direct knowledge from experience must be 
obtained by philosophical means. This will be particularly important in the analysis of the 
heavens, in part II, chapter 3. 
This specific status of prime matter is reflected in two other arguments employed by 
regents: they can be labelled the argument per eminentiam and the argument per 
negationem. 
The first is found in Lunan 1622, who writes that prime matter: 
 
esse ens non ens, omnia nihil, existere non existere, 
potentiam non potentiam, actum non actum, unam 
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multam, Singularem universalem, substantiam non 
substantiam, corpoream incorpoream, formatam 
informatam, quantam non quantam, omnia nihil 
appetere. [TP 1] 
 
This passage is unique in all the theses for its explicitness. It is an inclusive list of all the 
oppositions available about prime matter. In this passage, Lunan employs the via eminentia 
to make us aware of the status of prime matter: usual oppositions derived from the 
terminology about the finite world do not apply to prime matter because it is before (and 
thus above) those determinations. Terms such as ‘existent’, ‘singular’, ‘bodily’, 
‘quantified’, lose much of their original meaning when predicated of prime matter, which 
is essentially all of those determinations and at the same time exclusively none of them. In 
a strict sense, this is not an argument: Lunan does not proceed from premises to 
conclusions in order to prove the existence of prime matter. What he does is to show the 
non-natural status of prime matter and the attendant difficulties we experience when trying 
to define it. As it appears, this passage already implies the notion of what prime matter is, 
quid sit. 
The second argument is taken again from St Andrews 1629: 
 
Per negationem, ita ut ab ea [prime matter] omnes 
perfectiones determinatas removeamus, dicendo: eam 
non esse substantiam, non quantitatem, non 
qualitatem, nec ullam ex determinatis entis speciebus. 
[...] Deinde docuit Arist. eam cognosci per analogiam: 
quemadmodum enim se habet aes ad statuam, cera ad 
sigillum recipiendum ita se habet materia prima ad 
formas recipiendas. [ibidem] 
 
Wedderburn and Ramsay use much of the terminology we find in Lunan 1622 in a 
different context: where Lunan places prime matter above finite beings, Wedderburn and 
Ramsay on the contrary subtract qualifications from prime matter. The result is similar: 
prime matter is said not to have the perfections we find in the compounds of form and 
matter. 
Via negativa and via eminentiae lead to the same conclusion when applied to prime 
matter; this does not mean that prime matter is in any way ‘more perfect’ than finite 
beings, because it is not. Prime matter is really deprived of perfections and it is left with 
the most basic perfection of being non-nothing. By eminence Lunan does not mean 
metaphysical eminence (an absolute perfection, which belongs to God) but some sort of 
epistemological “aboveness” of the notion of prime matter with respect to the notions of 
compounds. 
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3. Prime matter: quid sit 
 
Prime matter exists: then, what is it? This question is addressed in many passages of the 
Theses philosophicae. The aim of this question is to find what the essence of prime matter 
is: what are, broadly speaking, its characteristics, once it has been established that it exists. 
This is the principal line of enquiry that the regents pursue with respect to prime matter and 
the question about the quod sit is merely preliminary to this enquiry. Nonetheless, 
answering the quod sit contributed to the clarification of some points which will be present 
in the discussion: 1) prime matter is not an object of our direct experience;4 2) it is not a 
substance like others, therefore the attributes of natural substances do not apply to it; 3) in 
establishing what prime matter is, the boundaries of natural philosophy are sometimes 
allowed to encroach on metaphysics. 
The centrality of prime matter is such that the answer that regents give to what its 
essence is will have an influence on their natural philosophy as a whole: this point will be 
explicit in part I, chapter 4. The importance they attribute to the subject is also shown by 
the succession of topics: usually, the discussion of prime matter comes first in natural 
philosophy, for metaphysical reasons (it is a principle of all bodies) and for logical reasons 
(clarifying what prime matter is enables us to go further in the analysis of natural bodies). 
Early modern Scholasticism as a whole inherited the doctrine of prime matter as pure 
potency (pura potentia) from medieval Scholasticism. It was famously endorsed in the 
thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas, who claimed that prime matter is pure potency in a 
strict sense, and by John Duns Scotus, who reformulated the doctrine in a very influential 
way. Scotus denied the intelligibility of the notion of pure potency per se, and introduced 
an act proper to prime matter in order to avoid the contradiction of something existing yet 
existing as a pure potency, a pure possibility-to-be. The influence of Scotus’s theory was 
enormous in Scholasticism, and considered by many as a definitive improvement in 
metaphysics. Usually, Thomists remain strong opponents of Scotus until today, even if 
                                         
4
 King 1620, TM VIII, integrates this point by saying that “intellectus noster tantum mensura est rerum 
artificialium”. This is a Scholastic slogan. Our intellect is the measure of artificial things only, namely, 
things that our intellect itself originated. When it comes to natural things, our intellect must adapt itself to 
the thing known, because it is passive in the act of knowing, understood as the reception of species and 
the abstraction of universals from them. In other words: the relation between knower and thing known is 
non-mutual: the act of knowing does not change the thing know, while it changes the knower. 
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there are a few cases of attempts to integrate Scotistic themes into Thomistic philosophy, 
as happened in the case of Suárez.5 
Regents are well aware of this struggle between schools within Scholastic philosophy: 
they often bring into the discussion Thomistic and Scotistic doctrines, and state which of 
them they favour. This never happens in the discussion of prime matter: we can argue that 
regents belong to the vast current of late Renaissance and early modern age Scotism.6 The 
claim that they are consciously Scotistic is a different one: it is a fact that their theory of 
prime matter is grounded in Scotus’s philosophy, but the thread linking the regents to 
Scotus is not exclusive. At the time of the regents, Scotus’s doctrines on prime matter were 
so widely accepted that a great number of philosophers not strictly ‘Scotists’ successfully 
employed them in their philosophies: I am thinking of the afore-mentioned Suárez, but also 
of the commentary on the Physics by the College of Coimbra. Coimbrans were Thomists, 
yet it has been pointed out that their theory of prime matter is influenced by Scotistic 
solutions.7 
 
 
3.1 Prime matter and God 
 
Regents regarded as atheistic the theory of the identity between God and prime matter. 
The history of Scholasticism shows few cases of such an identity coherently claimed: one 
of them is David de Dinant. Clearly, what the regents reject, alongside the obvious 
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 I will deal with the Suárezian notion of prime matter later on. Suárez seems to agree with Scotus in many 
respects: for example Suárez accepts the attribution of a metaphysical act to prime matter, which is a 
decisive reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of matter as pure potency. This is required by the very 
notion of creation, which cannot be directed towards a being which is merely pure potency and, according 
to Suárez, a pure nothing, given his identification of objective potency and pure nothing. “Quia ens in 
potentia obiectiva, ut ostendimus, est simpliciter nihil seu non ens actu”, DM, 31, III, 6. 
6
 It is now accepted by scholars that Scotism played a fundamental role in Renaissance and early modern age 
philosophy in general. In 2002, O. Boulnois, in his introduction to the issue of Les Études philosophiques 
on Scotus (Duns Scot au XVIIe siècle, Les études philosophiques, 2002, 1) wrote that: “étudier «Duns 
Scot au XVIIe siècle» est un choix insolite et insolent. Ce numéro des Études philosophiques porte sur un 
objet qui n’existe pas dans les études modernes, une véritable chimère historiographique [...] Il s’agit de 
produire ici l’histoire de certaines propositions de Scot, circulant anonymement, souterrainement, et 
pourtant massivement, dans la philosophie du XVIIe” (p. 1). Regarding the opposition between the 
philosophy of the Schools and that of the “independent philosophers”: “il n’est pas sûr que ces différents 
styles de vie philosophique modifient la nature des énoncés qu’ils produisent” (pp. 1-2); and finally, that 
they do not want to “faire l’histoire des perdants” (p. 2). For a survey of Scotism across Europe, J. 
Schmutz, L’héritage des Subtils. Cartographie du scotisme de l’âge classique, ivi, pp. 51-81. For the 
same topic in a closer relation to Scotland: A. Broadie, The Shadow of Scotus, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 
1995. 
7
 D. Des Chene, An Aristotle for the Universities: Natural Philosophy in the Coimbra Commentaries, in S. 
Gaukroger – J. A. Schuster – J. Sutton (eds.), Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2000, 
vol. I, ch. 2. 
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theological implications of this theory, is the misunderstanding at the basis of it. Thomas 
uses these words: 
 
Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem 
distinguuntur: non enim participant genus quasi 
partem suae essentiae: et ideo non est quaerendum 
quibus different, seipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam 
Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unus est 
actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo 
convenientiam habentes. [CG, I, 17, 7] 
 
And Lamb 1613 agrees with him: 
 
Materia [prima] maxime recedit a Deo, quippe pura 
potentia ab actu puro. [TP 3] 
 
It is clear that the identity between God and prime matter is unacceptable in Scholastic 
philosophy, which does not mean self-contradictory. Scholastic philosophy in its historical 
form is the product of many elements, the two most prominent ones being Aristotelianism 
and Christian revelation. But in the fifteenth century a ‘Scholastic philosophy’ started to 
gain separate dignity from ‘Scholastic theology’, the form of Scholastic reasoning 
dominant at the time of Thomas and Scotus. It is debated whether most of the Scholastics 
were theologians tout court or theologians and philosophers at the same time. What 
appears is that a Scholastic philosophy without the influence of Christian religion is hardly 
imaginable. What is arguable though, is that Scholastic philosophy appears to have started 
to detach itself from Scholastic theology, and develop on its own. The Aristotelian school 
of Padua may be a good example of this attitude.8 I shall suggest that Scottish regents 
belong to this category of ‘philosophical Scholasticism’. 
What regents reject in this identity theory is precisely what most of the Scholastics reject: 
what is pure act (God) cannot be identical with what is pure potency (prime matter): the 
two beings are as far away as possible from each other in the scale of being and reality. Yet 
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 On the Padua Aristotelians, G. Piaia (ed.), La presenza dell’aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della 
prima modernità, Rome-Padua, Antenore, 2002. On Paduan Scotism: C. B. Schmitt, Filippo Fabri’s 
Philosophia Naturalis Io. Duns Scoti and its Relation to Paduan Aristotelianism, in The Aristotelian 
Tradition and Renaissance Universities, London, Variorum Reprints, 1984, chapter X. Schmitt claims 
that Fabri’s attempt to create a textbook in natural philosophy ad mentem Scoti is important for two 
reasons: 1) it shows the increasing influence in Padua of metaphysics and theology from the sixteenth 
century on, in a curriculum which was traditionally oriented towards the arts and medical studies. 2) it 
reveals the importance of Scotus in the period, since Fabri sought to export Scotism in natural philosophy, 
an area to which Scotus did not dedicate extensive attention. Regarding the graduation theses, Schmitt’s 
intuition of the intrinsic difficulties of a ‘Scotistic natural philosophy’ reflects well the fact that Scotus is 
the main sources for the metaphysics of the regents, but is significantly less important in natural 
philosophy. 
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the ground for this identity is implicit in the interpretation of the terms ‘pure act’ and ‘pure 
potency’. Pure act is something undivided, simple, completely actuating its essence, devoid 
of change; pure potency could be described with the same words since it is absolutely 
simple, it is undivided, it is its own essence, it does not change in the sense that it is always 
identical with itself. In a Thomistic context the identity theory must be rejected because it 
is incompatible with the Thomistic doctrine that act implies form. In the wide family of 
Scotism (including the regents) there is the theoretical support for the theory in the claim 
that prime matter has its own act, before and without any form at all.9 
A further possible support for this claim is the argument by which both God and prime 
matter can be reached: the via negationis. If the negative theology is a proper way to speak 
about something which is unknowable in its essence, God, then it might also be a useful 
tool to analyse prime matter, given its metaphysical status. 
 
 
3.2 Prime matter and actus entitativus 
 
All regents agree on the notion of pure potency as essential to prime matter and their 
enquiry focuses on whether the attribute of ‘pure potency’ is the whole essence of prime 
matter. In Scholastic philosophy there is difference between the reason (ratio) and the 
essence of something (essentia): the reason is what our intellect perceives as belonging 
necessarily to something. It is what (quid) we understand something to be. Essence is the 
metaphysical counterpart of ratio: it is what (quid) something is. Regents tend to use these 
two terms as synonyms, justifying this behaviour on the grounds of the identity which, they 
say, holds between essence and ratio: for instance, in natural philosophy, given the 
epistemological theory of the species intelligibiles, our knowledge is reliable when 
correctly directed towards its proper object and in this case reason and essence can be said 
to coincide. Of course, this does not entail that we have an exhaustive knowledge of the 
essences: but it does entail an accurate one. 
When it comes to prime matter the problem is similar, yet made more complicated by the 
remoteness of prime matter from our senses. Baron 1627 claims that: 
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 “In hoc autem insania David de Dinando confunditur, qui ausus est dicere Deum esse idem quod prima 
materia, ex hoc quod, si non esset idem, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent 
simplicia; nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit.” This is 
Thomas Aquinas’ opinion on David de Dinant, in CG, I, 17, 6. See also D. Des Chene, Physiologia, 
Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press, pp. 94-95. 
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identica est haec praedicatio, Materia prima est 
pura potentia; qualis nempe est praedicatio 
definitionis de definito. [TP I.1] 
 
‘Prime matter’ and ‘pure potency’ are coextensive expressions: according to Baron, 
saying that prime matter is pure potency is merely the predication of the definition of the 
definiendum. 
Clearly, this is just a starting point. We can draw a parallel between the definition of man 
and the definition of prime matter: saying that ‘man is a rational animal’ does not tell us 
anything about its actual existence, we do not go beyond the essence, which implies 
existence only in the case of God. The further step is to enquire into how prime matter 
exists, once posited that it does exist and is pure potency. Regents do not accept the 
Thomistic framework, which would compel them to stop the enquiry at this point: 
according to Thomas, prime matter is pure potency and exists only in a compound of form 
and matter. On the contrary, regents put in place a metaphysics of essence. The question 
about prime matter does not move in the direction of the Thomistic ‘act of being’ (actus 
essendi), but in the direction of a deeper analysis of its essence. In fact, in a metaphysics of 
essence there is no real distinction between an essence and its being, as Thomas claims: the 
essence is its existence, as Scotus says in Ordinatio, IV, d. 13, q. 1, n. 38. Therefore, the 
question of the existence of an essence must be answered by the analysis of the essence 
itself. 
One more element is important: in the regents’ Scotistic approach, we can argue that they 
share Scotus’s theological concern about the nature of a positive object of the creative act 
of God, even if they never explicitly bring up this point. Scotus believes that for something 
to be the direct object of creation, it must be more than pure potency, it must be actual at 
least in a minimal sense.10 Scotus thinks that Thomas’s theory of prime matter as both 
created and receiving all its actuality from form leads to a contradiction. 
It is interesting to see how regents employ principles proper of Thomistic philosophy (as 
they openly admit) to make them their own, and reinterpret them according to their 
philosophy. Many regents quote the Thomistic principle potentia semper ad aliquem actum 
refertur: Thomas understands this principle as evidence for the necessary information of 
prime matter by form. Regents on the contrary apply this principle within prime matter, 
looking for an act proper to prime matter within prime matter. Contrary to the Thomistic 
metaphysics of the actus essendi, the regents’ metaphysics of essence leads them to prove 
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 “Omne ens pendens, et productum a Deo secundum esse aliquem habet etiam actum congruum ad ipsius 
esse.” Carr 1617, TP I. 
Part I, chapter 1. Materia prima: quod sit et quid sit 39 
the internal coherence of the notion of prime matter without appealing to anything external 
to it - as the act of form is. 
Potentia semper ad aliquem actum refertur conjoined with modus operandi semper 
sequitur modum essendi are the two key-principles in the search for the mode of existence 
of the essence of prime matter. How something operates must follow from what something 
is. Prime matter is 1) the object of a positive act of creation; 2) the subject of information 
by form. In both cases, prime matter must be ‘something’ in order to be passive in response 
to an act performed on it. Passivity is one of the ten categories, so ultimately one of the ten 
irreducible ways beings are. ‘Being passive’ is a ‘positive’ way of being. Regents claim 
that there is an act proper to prime matter: 
 
Actus igitur materiae primae non et formalis et 
perfectus (habet enim a forma quod sit hoc aliquid 
formaliter) sed objectivus seu entitativus, per quem est 
id quod est extra nihil et suas causas. [King 1612, TP 
2.IV]11 
 
This passage can be taken to represent many by other regents. Some key doctrines are 
being employed by King in few words. First, the tie between act and form is rejected: King 
speaks of an act which is not ‘formal and perfect’, therefore it does not come from form. In 
fact, regents do not deny that prime matter receives from form quod sit hoc aliquid, which 
means ‘to be something determined’: without form prime matter is still undetermined, 
essentially potential. Nonetheless, King explains that this indetermination of prime matter 
cannot signify the whole of its essence. Prime matter has an act proper to it, which is 
labelled entitativus or objectivus, by force of which prime matter est id quod est extra nihil 
et suas causas. This act (which is not the formal act) makes prime matter be non-nothing, 
makes prime matter be outside its own causes: these two aspects (being non-nothing and 
being independent of its own causes) are jointly the conditio sine qua non of even the 
weakest possible substance: for example, an accident does not have these characteristics, 
because its being is secondary and dependent on a subject. 
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 Eustachius holds the same theory: he writes that prime matter “non tamen esse ens completum in ullo 
genere, quia non constat ex actu et potentia ejusdem generis, sed ex potentia Physica et actu Metaphysico 
seu entitativo” (SPhQ, III, disp. II.I, quaestio III). 
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Robert Baron12 is the author of arguably the most complete metaphysical work written in 
Scotland in the first half of the seventeenth century: his Metaphysica generalis (1658, 
published after his death) is an exposition of general metaphysics; it draws heavily on 
Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae, and its main aim is completeness rather than 
profundity. Yet, the work is invaluable as providing a broader and more detailed view on 
the Scholasticism of the regents, whose Theses philosophicae are works written as 
handouts for oral disputationes, and not as exhaustive treatises. Baron helps us to define 
the concept of entitative act used by King: 
 
Absolute primus est esse Essentiae, et commode 
dici potest Actus entitativus; Actus secundum quid 
primus est esse Exsistentiae, id est, esse acceptum pro 
exsistere, et dicitur Actus entitativus: est autem ille 
Actus Entitativus vel rei completae et totalis, vel rei 
incompletae et partialis. Actus entitativus completus in 
rebus materialibus dici potest actus formalis, quia 
competit rebus materialibus ratione formae 
perficientis materiam et eam determinantis ad certam 
speciem corporis Naturalis; Actus incompletus, qualis 
est exsistentiae Materiae primae per se consideratae, 
non habet aliud nomen praeter generale nomen Actus 
entitativi. [sectio VII] 
 
So, the act proper to prime matter is proper to the essence of prime matter, because that 
act is proper to any essence whatsoever. Lundie 162713 explains this important theory: 
“essentia et quidditas alicujus est sufficiens intrinseca essendi ratio.” Every essence is 
intrinsically sufficient for existence, thanks to its internal non-contradiction, which makes it 
intrinsically possible. Regents do not accept the theory of the Thomistic actus essendi, 
which implies that essences participate in existence: they unanimously agree that existence 
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 Robert Baron (1596-1639) was a minister of the Church of Scotland, a theologian, a philosopher and a 
member of the Aberdeen Doctors. Baron graduated in 1613 at St Salvator’s College, St Andrews, in the 
class of W. Lamb: Baron’s name is listed in Lamb’s Positiones aliquot logicae, Edinburgh 1613. He 
taught philosophy at St Salvator’s, and graduated two classes: theses of 1617 and 1621 (the DNB reports 
Baron’s departure from St Andrews in 1619, inconsistent with the 1621 theses). Baron was appointed 
professor of Divinity in 1625 at Marischal College, Aberdeen, where he joined the Aberdeen Doctors, and 
supported the religious policies of the king against the National Covenant. He died in 1639 on his way 
back to Scotland after an exile due to his refusal to sign the covenant. His main works are: Philosophiae 
theologiae ancillans (1621); Disputatio de authoritate sacrae scripturae, seu, De formali objecto fidei 
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on the title page of Lunan’s Theses philosophicae, 1622. The DNB reports his appointment as regent for 
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regents, Lundie signed the National Covenant in 1638. He is recorded alive at least until 1655. OG, p. 54 
and DNB. 
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is a mode of an essence, not external to the essence. The essence of something has all it 
needs to exist, provided that it does exist.14 
Baron then adds an important qualification. The act proper to prime matter is incomplete, 
because the complete one “competit rebus materialibus ratione formae perficientis 
materiam”: in prime matter there is no form, consequently nothing flowing from form - that 
is, the perfection typical of natural things, which is due to form. 
In summary, regents agree on three general points about prime matter: 1) it is actual, in 
the sense that it has an act; 2) this act follows from the essence of prime matter, and it is not 
an actus essendi; 3) the essence is the sufficient cause for the existence of a being - 
provided that the being exists. The notion of pure potency considered alone in their 
metaphysics of essence leads to contradictions, the main one being “nulla potentia absque 
transcendentali ordine ad suum actum quidditative cognoscitur” [Barclay 1631, TP II.2]; 5) 
what we know about the essence of prime matter is enough to establish what prime matter 
is, and that it exists. 
 
 
3.3 Essence and existence 
 
The theory that the essence of a being is the sufficient essendi ratio of that being is deeply 
rooted in the metaphysical theory of the identity of essence and existence. Usually regents 
prefer to express this point in a negative way: ‘it is not true that essence and existence are 
distinct as thing from thing’ (distinctio realis), which is the kind of distinction which 
grounds the principle of separability and determines whether two beings (in general, not 
only two res) are two really separate things. Regents draw this theory from both Scotus and 
Suárez. Omnis determinatio est negatio: the negation of a real distinction is the affirmation 
of the identity: so, if the essence and the existence of two beings are not distinct as thing 
from thing, then they must be identical. Regents recognise some degrees of distinction 
within the identity of two beings: in fact, without having two really distinct things, there are 
distinctions between a mode and its subject (distinctio modalis) and distinctions only 
grounded in our concepts, which are not really in things (distinctiones rationis).15 
As I will argue in part I, chapter 4, about quantity and extension, the regents’ 
interpretation of the distinctio realis is a central feature of their philosophy. The identity 
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 This doctrine may lead to the position that the existence of essences necessarily flows from their essence. 
This is not correct, because finite essences do not enjoy a perfect simplicity with respect to themselves: 
because they are composite, any sort of ‘ontological proof’ must be ruled out. Essences, with the 
exception of the divine essence, are possible and never necessary. 
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 Suárez, DM, 7, I, 4 and 18-19. 
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between essence and existence is a fundamental point, but what also matters is the kind of 
identity between them. The regents’ theory of the distinction of reason between essence and 
existence is a qualification of such identity: I take this passage from the metaphysical 
section in Monroe 1632: 
 
Ergo essentia et existentia creaturae non differunt 
re sed ratione tantum, cujus fundamentum est 
imperfectio creaturae, quae hoc ipso quod a se non 
habeat esse sed ab alio participatum, intellectui 
humano praebet ansam praescindendi essentiam ab 
existentia, cum interim nec in statu potentiali, nec in 
statu actuali realiter distinguantur. [TM I.6] 
 
The existence of an essence (its esse actu, ‘being in act’) is the actuality of the essence, it 
is not something added to it (superadditum) as something different that an essence has; 
consequently, an essence is not distinct from its existence as thing from thing (distinctio 
realis). The essence of a being is the key notion around which everything revolves: it 
appears that we are, generally speaking, in a Scotistic framework. 
A similar theory is found in Eustachius, who claims that existence is a: 
 
modus quidam essentiae intrinsecus quo formaliter 
res dicitur esse actu sive extra suas causas [SPhQ, IV, 
II, II, IV].16 
 
Another passage by Suárez shows the extent of the agreement between him and the regents. 
Suárez affirms that: 
 
in creaturis existentiam et essentiam distingui aut 
tanquam ens in actu et in potentia, aut si utraque in 
actu sumatur, solum distingui ratione cum aliquo 
fundamento in re, quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute 
dicamus, non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere. 
[DM, 31, V, 13] 
 
The formal distinction with a foundation in things is enough to claim that having 
existence in act per se is not essential to finite beings: this avoids the metaphysical claim 
that existence is a necessary mode of essence, absolutely speaking. Only God has existence 
per se. This distinction suffices for the task because it has a fundamentum in re; which 
means that our concepts tell us about a distinction which is not really in nature (real 
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distinction) but which is still grounded on how things are. Thus, the essence is not its 
existence, yet it is not distinct from it in reality. 
When it comes to prime matter the same principle holds: the essence of prime matter is 
not its existence (that means, prime matter is not necessary), nonetheless, the existence of 
prime matter is distinct from its essence only by reason - the weakest degree of distinction. 
 
 
 
4. Prime matter as receptive entitative act 
 
According to the regents, the analysis of the essence of prime matter is not complete 
without a further qualification: prime matter is a receptive entitative act. 
Regents agree that: 1) prime matter exists (quod sit); 2) prime matter is actual in a 
metaphysical, non physical, sense of the term: it has a metaphysical, not a formal act; 3) 
prime matter’s existence is a mode of its essence. The essence of prime matter now requires 
a qualification which enables the regents to claim more precisely what it is (quid sit). In 
fact, saying that something is ‘actual’ does not convey any information about what this act 
is an act of. Being actual is a formal aspect of prime matter, still in need of a material 
aspect. 
The answer is once again agreed upon by the great majority of the regents, despite some 
variations in terminology. Prime matter is pure potency, actual in virtue of its essence of 
being pure potency; finally this pure potency is spelled out as ‘receptive’. The metaphysical 
role of prime matter is to receive forms, to be the subject of the information by forms. The 
concept of pure potency alone is not considered sufficient to express this essential openness 
of prime matter towards the form. The qualification of ‘receptive’ highlights again the 
difference with the Thomistic solution. In fact, according to Thomas the definition of prime 
matter as pure potency is sufficient to claim such openness towards the form: prime matter 
is devoid of all acts (which always come from form), therefore a ‘pure potency’ is always 
directed towards a form. On the contrary, the regents attribute an act to prime matter: thus, 
they have to introduce a further qualification to explain why prime matter is directed 
towards form. 
The opposition by the regents to the Thomistic slogan that an act is always related to a 
form becomes even more explicable when regents seek to expound the sort of pure potency 
that is proper to prime matter. The focus moves from the essence understood as an act 
(which grounded the claim that prime matter enjoys independent existence) to the essence 
understood as a potency (which introduces a better definition of this potency). There is 
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clearly no contradiction between being in act and in potency for prime matter, because 
prime matter is in act with respect to a metaphysical act, while it is in potency with respect 
to a formal (physical) act: there is contradiction only if the same subject is in act and in 
potency at the same time in the same respect. A Thomist would probably argue, on the basis 
of his own metaphysics, that in this case contradiction is avoided only in words, not de 
facto: prime matter, when informed in a compound, would obtain a physical act from form 
which would be added to the already existing metaphysical act. Then, the result would be a 
compound that is not essentially one, since from two beings in act no unity per se can be 
obtained, but only a unity per accidens. The Thomist’s objection only holds if we accept the 
theory that all acts come from form. Regents reply to this objection by accepting the idea 
that: 
 
ex duobus actibus imperfectis potest unus perfectus 
consurgere [King 1612, TP 2.III]. 
 
Where does the strength of this reply lie? Regents accept the distinction between perfect 
and imperfect act (or, to put it differently, complete and incomplete act). A complete act 
belongs to a complete substance, which is only the result of the union of form and matter. 
An incomplete act belongs to the components of the compound, which are in need of each 
other in order to yield a complete substance, but which are actual per se for the reason that 
only something actual (at least actual in a metaphysical sense) can get into composition 
with something else. If we accept the notion of incomplete act, then the claim that a 
component of a substance is both in act and in potency at the same time is not contradictory, 
because it is not in act and in potency in the same respect. 
A corollary of this theory is that: 
 
non omnis potentia subjectum praesupponit. [...] 
aliquam potentiam substantiam esse et non qualitatem 
[Reid 1614, TP 1, III-V]. 
 
This principle moves the analysis one step further. I am not sure how to read ‘quality’ in 
this context: I shall suggest two interpretations. 1) Reid is perhaps not taking the term 
‘quality’ in its categorial sense, but rather in a more general sense of ‘attribute’. In fact 
potency can hardly be reduced to the category of quality, which would restrict the 
predication of potency only to accidents falling under the notion of quality. 2) Perhaps Reid 
is here employing a Suárezian terminology. Suárez distinguishes between transcendental 
potency and predicamental potency: the former is the objective potency, proper to a 
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possible thing, which we have seen before; the latter belongs to the second species of 
quality, and is the real potency, either active or passive. This potency refers to quality 
because only qualities are proximate principles of the actions in creatures.17 
In both cases, the separation from the Thomistic theory is here complete: potency as such 
does not necessarily require a subject because potency can be a subject, as it is in the case 
of prime matter. This passage is not in contradiction with the principle that every potency 
must be referred to an act, because Reid holds that prime matter has an act on its own, and 
is also pure potency. 
A fundamental metaphysical distinction without which all the previous theories are in 
some sense groundless is to be found in many theses: the distinction between ‘pure potency’ 
and ‘in pure potency’ and conversely between ‘act’ and ‘in act’. Wemys 1612 writes that: 
 
distinguendum est itaque inter actum et esse actu, 
et potentiam et esse potentia. [...] dubium idcirco est 
an satis philosophice dici possit vel materiam esse 
potentia vel formam esse actu. [TP 6, III-IV] 
 
The second part of the passage is meant to be an explicit attack against Thomistic 
philosophy. The philosophical relevance of this theory is that the couples: form/act and 
matter/potency are finally overtaken in a metaphysics of essence. There cannot be an 
univocal sense of act and potency; act and potency are not coextensive with form and 
matter; according to the regent, it might be even possible to say that form is not act (because 
it is essentially open to potency) and that matter is not potency (because its potency relies 
on prime matter being a metaphysical act). It is then more accurate to say that prime matter 
is “pura potentia, non in pura potentia, in actu et non actus” (Wemys 1631, TP I.2). This is 
a distinction common to late Scholasticism: it was formulated to make sense of the specific 
metaphysical status of prime matter. 
One final qualification helps the regents to finally give a complete definition of the 
essence of prime matter: it is based on the distinction between potentia objectiva and 
subjectiva. This is how Baron addresses the point in his Metaphysica generalis: 
 
Sub hac Potentia Logica continetur Potentia illa 
quam objectivam vocant; ea enim a parte illius rei 
quae dicitur esse in potentia objectiva respectu causae, 
nihil aliud significat quam non-repugnantiam ad 
produci a tali causa, i. e. significat non impossibile 
esse ut illa res a tali causa producatur: unde patet 
                                         
17
 DM, 42, III, 10, quoted in Leopoldo Prieto López, Suárez, crocevia nella filosofia tra medioevo e 
modernità, Alpha Omega, IX, 2006, No. 1, pp. 3-38, pp. 29-30. 
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Potentiam hanc objectivam non esse realem, tum quia 
consistit in negatione impossibilitatis (negatio autem 
non est Ens reale, sed formaliter non-Ens) tum quia 
haec Potentia objectiva competit rebus antequam a 
Deo ipso producantur, nihil autem, absolute loquendo, 
reale rebus competit antequam a Deo accipiant esse. 
[sectio VII] 
 
Wemys 1631 integrates this passage by saying that prime matter is not an objective pure 
potency because this would prevent it being an entitative act. Thus, prime matter is 
subjective pure potency. This notion is indebted to the philosophy of Scotus. A subjective 
potency is a potency which already exists, while an objective potency, as Baron explained, 
is merely a logical possibility.18 This reminds us of the Suárezian distinction between 
transcendental and predicamental potency. Prime matter cannot be objective potency 
because it has a metaphysical act, has its own existence, and is not a mere logical 
possibility: rather it is the root of any predicamental possibility. Or, in other words, it is a 
metaphysical possibility. 
The essence of prime matter can now be stated in its full form: prime matter is subjective 
receptive pure potency. This definition is the product of the different positions we find in all 
the Theses philosophicae. Its philosophical content is shared by all regents, while its form is 
subject to some variations. As I said, I think that these versions differ in form, not in 
content: 
 
Ratio principis materialis est potentia universalis 
recipiendi omnes formas indistincte. [Adamson 1600, 
TP V] 
 
Materia prima essentialiter est substantia 
incompleta, et pura potentia subjectiva (cui tamen 
actus entitativus competit). [Forbes 1623, TP II] 
 
[Materia prima] est pura potentia receptiva, non 
potentia objectiva, cui opponitur actus metaphysicus. 
[Barclay 1631, TP I.3] 
 
[materia prima est] pura potentia passiva. 
[Dalrymple 1646, TP IIII] 
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 By ‘logical possibility’ Baron here means, alongside Scotus and Suárez, the sort of possibility which an 
essence has before existing, before being created. According to Suárez, this possible essence is still a pure 
nothing. After being created, an essence is a subjective possibility, or, which is the same, a real 
possibility. 
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One very interesting formulation is given by Fairley 1623, TP I.3: the causality of prime 
matter is ‘passiva actuatio potentiae.’ I suppose that this last quote clearly shows the level 
of sophistication reached by the regents in their metaphysical theories, and the difficulties 
that students had to master. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have dealt with the definition of the essence of prime matter in the Theses 
philosophicae. All regents agree on the definition of the essence of prime matter as 
‘receptive entitative act’. ‘Receptive’ because prime matter is essentially open to form. 
‘Entitative act’ because prime matter has a metaphysical act proper to it, an act which is 
prior to and independent of the act of form. Prime matter is pure potency, which means that 
its essence is being pure potency. Yet, the regents are influenced by Scotism, and go beyond 
the Thomistic definition. Just as something that is 1) the direct object of an act of creation, 
and 2) a component of a substance, must be actual, in the same way prime matter must 
necessarily be actual, because a pure potency devoid of any actuality is only a logical, not 
metaphysical, possibility. I believe that the regents are also influenced by Suárez, as is 
evident from terminological and doctrinal similarities. Suárez himself was influenced by 
Scotism, so that it can be argued that Scotism exerted influence on both the regents and 
Suárez. 
The analysis of the essence of prime matter, in particular with regard to the relation 
between essence and existence, has also shown that the regents hold a metaphysics of 
essence, once again departing from Thomism. 
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Part I, chapter 2 
 
 
 
De potentiis materiae primae 
 
 
 
In his Summa philosophiae quadripartita Eustachius a Sancto Paulo structures the 
analysis of prime matter around three philosophically distinct aspects which together give 
us a complete account: 1) that prime matter is, and what it is (quod sit and quid sit); 2) 
what the potencies (potentiae) of prime matter are; and 3) what the properties 
(proprietates) are. I intend to follow the same scheme for two reasons. First, it is clear and 
consistent. Secondly, this scheme mirrors the metaphysical structure proper to prime 
matter, which entails, in this order, the definition of its essence as pure potency, then the 
explanation of the notion of potency, with the introduction of the relationship between 
matter and form, then the analysis of the specific contribution of prime matter in the 
compound. Thus, the ordo expositionis follows the ordo essendi, the metaphysical order of 
the thing expounded. 
These are Eustachius’s words about prime matter’s potencies. Eustachius writes that: 
 
Materiam primam secundum se spectatam aiunt 
omnes omnium formarum expertem esse ac simul 
omnium capacem esse; sive, materiam esse in potentia 
ad omnes formas: Quare materiam ipsam appellant 
potentiam; est enim hoc essentiale materiae. Consistit 
autem in duobus passiva ista materiae potentia: primo 
quidem in eo, quod ex materia possunt formae 
materiales virtute naturalium agentium educi; secundo 
in eo, quod illae omnes et nonnullae aliae quae ex ipsa 
non educuntur, possunt in eandem recipi: Sicque 
potentia materiae partim Eductiva partim Receptiva 
dicitur. [SPhQ, pars III, tractatus I.II, quaestio III] 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Theses philosophicae agree on the 
definition of prime matter as pure potency. Further qualifications are that prime matter is a 
receptive entitative act and that it is in a state of subjective possibility towards existing, 
since it is a metaphysical act, not just a logical (merely non-contradictory) being. Regents 
engage in the exposition of what follows from this still general analysis, namely: 1) in what 
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way prime matter is indistinctly open towards any form; 2) what is the appetite (appetitus) 
of prime matter for form in general, and 3) what it means that forms are educed (eductae) 
from prime matter. This analysis is the intermediate moment between the analysis of the 
notion of prime matter as pure potency and the analysis of the proper contribution of prime 
matter in the compound (quantity, extension, incorruptibility, which is the subject of the 
next chapter). In a way, it is possible to say that in the first two chapters prime matter is 
regarded as passive towards form, while in the third it is regarded as “active” towards 
form. Inevitably, some aspects will be fully meaningful only at the end of the analysis, 
which is also one of the premises for the account of Transubstantiation, the subject of 
chapter 4. 
In this chapter, I follow Eustachius’s division of prime matter into ‘partim receptiva’ and 
‘partim eductiva’, ‘in part receptive’ and ‘in part eductive’. The powers of prime matter 
show its role of material subject of all forms, which is receptive when receiving forms but 
also eductive when forms are drawn from it. Only material forms are drawn from prime 
matter: the first problem that I shall investigate is the relationship between the rational soul 
and prime matter. The receptiveness of prime matter is then analysed in terms of appetite 
towards form. This raises the question whether the appetite of informed prime matter can 
be said to completely satisfy the potency of prime matter, which is essentially open 
towards form. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the concept of the eduction of 
forms. The last part deals with the Theses philosophicae by Dalrymple, written in 1646 for 
the students of the University of Glasgow: the regent puts forward an interpretation of 
eduction which I believe is influenced by the early modern philosophy of the period. 
 
 
 
1. Partim Receptiva: prime matter and form 
 
In Scholastic natural philosophy, prime matter cannot exist alone without form. We have 
seen in the previous chapter that some sort of existence must be attributed to prime matter: 
precisely the sort of existence of the material component of a physical substance. Prime 
matter is not a substance in the way that a physical substance is, because it is not a 
complete substance. Yet, in order to enter into composition with form, prime matter must 
have the incomplete existence proper to an entitative act, whose essence is pure potency. 
This means that form is the natural completion of prime matter, and conversely, that form 
can be truly form only when informing matter. This is a general Aristotelian principle, 
which regents do not reject. 
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1.1 The problem of the rational soul 
 
In the context of a Christian reading of Aristotelian philosophy one problem is 
immediately evident: the status of the rational soul (anima rationalis) with respect to 
existence independent from matter and with respect to its origin within the compound. The 
problem originates from the double relationship that the rational soul has towards matter as 
form-in-matter (the rational soul is the substantial form of a physical compound) and 
towards independent existence, as the human soul is said to be immortal in the Christian 
tradition.1 In fact, rational souls (or, the substantial forms of men) must survive the 
destruction of their physical compounds, if they are to resurrect from death and 
reincarnate. This is the doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies. 
The regents do not reject this view, which is shared by all Christians. This belief raised 
fundamental philosophical questions. The debate in Scholasticism included the 
interpretation of the most significant passages in De Anima III by Aristotle: the Stagyrite 
writes that some activities of the rational souls are independent from matter, in the sense 
that they reveal operations which do not depend on matter. They perform, for example, the 
knowing of the universals. In Scholastic epistemology, the knowledge of universals is 
obtained through the process of abstraction of the essence of things from their individual 
material being, an operation by the agent intellect which acts on the material offered by the 
possible intellect, which receives the notions from the common sense (sensus communis), a 
sort of unified sensorial perception posterior to the five senses. If only compounds are 
individual, and if only individuals really exist,2 then the process of abstraction goes beyond 
materiality and must be a sign of an immaterial principle of activity: the rational soul. 
Prime matter, as we have seen, is the root of potency, and potency implies corruptibility, 
because for a potency to be realised the former act must be corrupted. Therefore, 
immateriality goes with incorruptibility. Something incorruptible is immortal, and 
ultimately simple.3 
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 The theory that the rational soul is the substantial form of man received an official endorsement by the 
Roman Church during the ecumenical Council of Vienne, 1311-1312, chaired by Clement V. This 
council, famous for the condemnation of the Templar order, is also crucial for the acceptance of a 
philosophical and theological theory in the teaching of the Roman Church. One of the decrees states that 
the rational or intellectual soul is the form of the human body of itself and essentially. Whoever rejects 
this theory is to be considered a heretic. 
2
 King 1620, TP I: “nulla datur entitas in communi, nisi determinata per entitatem particularem alicujus 
speciei; nec potentia in communi nisi determinata per particularem potentiam.” 
3
 This is the case of the celestial bodies, part II, chapter 3. 
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Whatever the original position of Aristotle on this point was (there is in fact a vast debate 
on whether Aristotle agreed with the immortality of the individual soul or not),4 Scholastics 
interpreted his words as adaptable to the Christian dogma of the immortality of the soul. 
Regents show a twofold approach: on the one side, they hold that the human soul is 
immortal; on the other, they usually include the analysis of De Anima III in natural 
philosophy. They regard the analysis of substantial forms as belonging to natural 
philosophy, and this includes human souls. This Aristotelian approach is generally stronger 
than the distinction between substantial forms in material and immaterial based on their 
activities. These distinctions are not enough to dedicate a branch of philosophy to the 
exclusive exposition of the characteristics of the rational soul.5 
It may be noted that this analysis of the human soul as the substantial form of men does 
not include what today we call ‘theory of knowledge’, which is a part of logic in the theses. 
It appears that in Scholastic philosophy the immortality of the soul is justified in virtue of 
the investigation of our knowledge of the universals. In the natural philosophy of the 
theses, the regents do not attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, which is already 
proven through the revealed word. Rather, given the immortality of the soul, the regents 
seek to analyse the human soul according to each specific branch of philosophy: when its 
activity is knowledge, it pertains to logic, when it is the information of matter, it pertains to 
natural philosophy. I believe that this approach is a sign of a deep conviction by the regents 
that, in general, matters of faith are rarely if ever proven in philosophy. Thus, the 
separation of spheres between theology and philosophy is clear.6 
This could be regarded as a further claim for the independence of natural philosophy 
within its own sphere: in the theses, different areas of philosophy rarely overlap.7 
Necessarily, prime matter implies notions which are also dealt with in either logic or 
metaphysics, but this is due to the specific nature of prime matter, a component of physical 
compounds which is not given to us as a direct object of knowledge. The regents’ 
deployment, in natural philosophy, of rational souls as forms-in-matter allows for a general 
inclusive account of the relationship between forms and matter, without the need of 
making a distinction where regents did not want to. 
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 I will deal with the regents’ reception of Aristotle on this point in the Conclusions, section 2. 
5
 In the second half of the century, under the influence of Descartes, regents developed some themes that we 
find in St Andrews graduation theses in the first half of the century, regarding a metaphysics of separate 
substances. This branch of metaphysics is called pneumatology. 
6
 This theory is put to a test in two following chapters, first about Transubstantiation (part I, chapter 4), then 
about the role of natural theology in the theses (part II, chapter 3). In this chapter, I shall return to this 
point when dealing with the eduction of forms and the role of God, section 2.2. 
7
 I argued for a similar claim with respect to the importance of the argument from natural philosophy in the 
demonstration of the existence of prime matter, in chapter 1, section 1.2. 
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1.2 Prime matter as openness towards form 
 
‘Being open to form’, or ‘being open to information’, means that prime matter is a 
principle of the physical body. Not simply per accidens but essentially, because it is a 
necessary component of the compound. The other essential principle is form. The 
traditional third principle is privation (privatio): privation, according to the regents, is the 
absence of form. In a body in becoming, the actual form entails the presence of the absence 
of another form, and it also entails that no specific form can essentially belong to a 
compound: if it were so, a compound would be a necessary being. Regents usually 
consider privation as a third principle per accidens of becoming, in agreement with 
Aristotle. They also tend to include the analysis of privation in the analysis of form, 
because privation can also be regarded as the presence of the previous form. Mercer 1630 
stresses this last point: 
 
Privatio non tam est absentia formae subsequentis, 
quam praesentia formae praecedentis, non quidem qua 
forma est, sed qua materiam praeparat ad formam 
subsequentem accipiendam. [TP IV.2] 
 
The logical and metaphysical status of prime matter is thus fully understood only in the 
context of natural philosophy. This is why regents never deal with prime matter in logical 
or metaphysical sections, even if these are fundamental as introductions to key notions of 
natural philosophy. 
Prime matter is the passive principle, while form is the active one: despite the attribution 
to matter of an act and attributes, regents do not go beyond the Aristotelian viewpoint that 
all composite beings are the result of an active principle acting on a passive subject. From 
this point of view, it is interesting how close the definitions of matter and substance can be 
understood to be in their different levels. For instance, in Met., V, 8 1017 b 23-26 we read 
that substance is a) “that which is the ultimate underlying stuff, that is not predicated of 
anything else”, and b) “that which, being something determined, can also be separable, 
and this is the structure and form of any thing.”8 When making a parallel between this 
definition and the attributes of prime matter in Phys. I, the notion of ‘subject’ of 
predications is shared. In the first case, substance is intended in two senses, one logical 
                                         
8
 a) ‘[T]ov q´ uJpokeivmenon e]scaton, o} mhkevti kat´ a]llou levgetai’; b) ‘tovde ti o]n kai; cwristo;n h\·: 
toiou~ton de; eJkavstou hJ morfh; kai; to; ei\doß.’ My translation. 
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(subject), and the other one logical and metaphysical (something determined and separable 
[from something else]). Prime matter per se is only a metaphysical principle, because it 
does not belong to the category of substance: it cannot exist ‘separate’ from anything else. 
We will see that regents get away from this theory when claiming that prime matter too is a 
‘substance’. 
Two essential principles of the compound yield a unity per se. The tie between matter 
and form is as strong as an essential unity, yet it is in no way a relation of identity.9 This 
unity entails that form and matter cannot exist one without the other: 
 
Nulla forma physica habet modum essendi 
independentem a materia nisi anima rationalis. 
[Fairley 1623, TP III.2] 
 
Materiae essentiale est et necessarium formam 
semper appetere. [Wemys 1612, 5.III] 
 
These two passages are representative of the viewpoint of the Theses. In Fairley the 
terminology is proper to a metaphysics of essence (‘modum essendi’): it is not 
incompatible with what has been said about prime matter having existence per se in virtue 
of its metaphysical act. In fact, Fairley is referring to the physical world, where a 
metaphysical act is not enough to sustain existence. So, it is only the compound which 
really exists, even if prime matter has a mode of existence, which is not the mode of 
existence of a complete substance. In different words: 
 
Cum diversae numero formae non possint eandem 
numero existentiam tribuere, non omnis existentia 
materiae est a forma sed completa tantum. [Stevenson 
1625, TP XII.4] 
 
We find again the principle that form and matter are two distinct metaphysical entities, 
both actual, yet incomplete. Aedie 1616, TP I, expresses the role of matter with respect to 
becoming by saying that matter is the principle of being and non-being of all perishable 
things, and showing that forms cannot exist unless in matter but that prime matter is the 
root of potency. The metaphysics of act and potency of the theses seems to hold onto the 
traditional view of degrees of being, where the spectrum extends from God to prime 
matter. God as supreme being is pure act, creatures are a composition of act and potency, 
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 Rankine 1627, TP VI.5: “materia enim per formam determinata, et forma quatenus materiam determinat, 
non duo constituunt principia, sed unum.” 
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and prime matter is pure potency and the lowest degree of actuality. In this theory, the 
presence of potency is synonym with imperfection, according to the principle that: 
 
quae minus participant potentiae verius et magis 
proprie esse existimandum non est. [Wemys 1612, TP 
7.III] 
 
There are two interpretations of this principle, both accepted by regents: 1) in 
epistemology, it is true that the less something is in potency, the more we can get to know 
it [‘verius esse’]; 2) in metaphysics, the less the potency, the more the act [‘magis esse’]. 
As essentially pure potency, prime matter is the least known thing within the physical 
realm. Creatures on the contrary are open to our knowledge because of the balance 
between act (what they are) and potency (what they can become). The pure act is in itself 
the most knowable thing and the most ‘real’ thing, but as in the case of pure potency it 
extends beyond our limited comprehension, and it can only be object of a mediated and 
ultimately insufficient knowledge.10 
We can also better understand the role of the via analogica: prime matter is known not 
per se, but analogically with respect to finite beings: in absence of form, the analogy holds 
between the act of prime matter as “form” of the compound, and the pure potency of prime 
matter as “matter” of the compound. 
There is one respect in which matter is more perfect than form, a respect which 
illuminates the fundamental reason why forms cannot exist outside matter. According to 
Fairley 1623, forms are: 
 
perfectiores materiae secundum Entitatem et 
Essentiam, sed imperfectiores secundum essendi 
modum. [TP III.5] 
 
A compound is the result of the individual contributions of form and matter: forms 
contribute essence, to the extent that forms can even be called the ‘end’ of matter; yet, 
matter plays the fundamental role of sustaining forms, thus it is prior to them under the 
concept of the ‘mode of existing’ [modus essendi]. It is true that matter is ordered towards 
form as much as potency is towards act, “tanquam ad finem” (ibidem), but it is also true 
that “necessitas ad causalitatem materiae [est] ejus existentia” (Wemys 1631, TP II.4). In 
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 This relates closely to the problem of what sort of philosophical knowledge of God we can have. A wide 
debate took place in Scholasticism, while regents rarely take an explicit stand on this matter. We can infer 
their position from the broader context of their epistemology, as in this case, and in the analysis of book 
VIII of Physics, where Aristotle reaches up for the immobile motor on the basis of the analysis of 
physical movement. Regents object that this inference is ‘ill-based’, part II, chapter 3, section 4. 
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Scholastic natural philosophy, finality is a form of causality: it is evident that, for 
everything to be causally active, it must exist; on this basis prime matter is the existing 
potency directed towards its end, form. With respect to the openness of prime matter 
towards forms, forms are final causes. In this context, regents claim nothing more than a 
constitutive openness of matter towards form. Indeed, final causality is not rejected in the 
theses also on a purely physical level, as is clear from the discussion of movement. In the 
analysis of the structure of physical compounds, form, intended as the final cause of 
matter, only means that form makes matter perfect in its essence, which is otherwise 
incomplete. 
As well as matter’s priority over form in respect of the mode of existing, matter is also 
responsible for the endless becoming that we experience: this is another contribution to the 
structure of compounds. It is important to remember that so far matter is only regarded as a 
‘passive principle’, and in no way as a positive subject: we cannot say that matter 
positively acts on form, or that matter acts at all. The fact that matter can be said to be 
active is the consequence of the union with form, a union within which matter has 
characteristics it would not have were it able to exist alone.11 
In natural philosophy, following the act/potency theory, form is act and matter is 
potency: Scholastics interpret the natural becoming as the formal active principle affecting 
the material passive principle, but also being affected in return by the same material 
passive principle. The complete substance resulting from form and matter thus is the union 
of two substances incomplete though in different respects, the former attributing actuality, 
the latter attributing potentiality, both to the compound and to one another. As Fairley 1615 
claims, matter makes form patibilis. Form is not patibilis per se, but it is as form-in-matter 
[TP XX.2]. This term can be intended in two ways: 1) patibilis as ‘sensible’, belonging to 
the physical world; here matter is the principle of materiality and form is a material form; 
2) patibilis as ‘responsive to passivity’, something that form, considered alone, is not.12 
Here matter is the principle of passivity, which comes from materiality. The two meanings 
are thus connected: the result is that form in a compound undergoes changes because of 
matter. What sort of changes? Principally, and this is the key notion of becoming, the bond 
between one form and its matter is not necessary: different forms can inform the same 
matter in time. 
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 I shall argue in the next two chapters that the regents make an interesting claim for a positive predication of 
attributes to matter; that means that matter cannot be interpreted as receiving all attributes by form in the 
compound, but also as having attributes on its own, namely quantity, extension and divisibility. This 
theory stems from the Scotistic notion of prime matter that regents deploy. 
12
 Wemys 1612, TP 4: “forma omnis incorporea est et per se indivisibilis.” 
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From the point of view of the formal relationship between form and matter then, matter 
is indistinctly open towards form: form is needed by matter as an end, without which 
matter is not complete. The qualification of ‘indistinctly open’ underlines that any form 
can be an end of matter, there is no a priori reason for which ‘form’ generally taken cannot 
inform any portion of matter.13 
 
 
1.3 Prime matter’s potency as appetitus 
 
The notion of prime matter as a metaphysical act whose essence is receptive pure 
potency explains the genus and the difference (differentia) of it, the two terms which 
convey the definition. In this case, ‘metaphysical act’ is the genus and ‘pure potency’ is the 
difference: in virtue of these two qualifications the act of prime matter can be distinguished 
from any other act. The definition is in fact the predication of the essential attributes which 
locates something within its genus and differentiates it from other members of that genus. 
This is why both elements are necessary: the genus to identify the sort of being we want to 
define, the difference to predicate something proper to it and to nothing else in the same 
genus. Yet, as much as the difference ‘rational’ in the genus ‘animal’ is not enough to 
explain what man is, ‘receptive pure potency’ is not enough to explain prime matter. The 
notion of ‘appetite’ (appetitus) is the logically first characteristic of prime matter which is 
not dealt with in the definition. 
 
 
1.3.1 Appetitus and bonum 
 
Appetite is a key notion in Scholasticism. It is the second qualification of what we have 
so far termed ‘openness’ of matter towards form: the notions of receptiveness and appetite 
complete the analysis of the openness of matter towards form. This relationship between 
form and matter is just an individual occurrence of the universal appetite, which is a 
driving principle shared by all created beings. Thomas and the Scholastics hold that: 
 
                                         
13
 This is a principle of general natural philosophy, the branch of natural philosophy studying the principles 
of natural bodies in general I am concerned with in part I. In special natural philosophy, which studies 
natural bodies as having differences natures (naturae), only specific forms can respectively inhere in the 
two kinds of matter: sublunar and celestial. Scholastics usually accept the theory of the different nature of 
sublunar world and heavens (part II, chapter 3). 
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Appetere est commune animatis et inanimatis. [ST, 
I, 80, I] 
 
Anything created strives for (appetit) something else, no reality is static because 
“appetitus inclinationem ad bonum notat” (Stevenson 1629, TP VI). This is a debated 
claim. It entails three points: 1) the good (bonum) is what created beings seek, because the 
good is what makes them more perfect; 2) thus, the good is an end for created beings; 3) 
‘inclination’ (inclinatio) here means that leaning towards a good is not a fixed path from 
one determined starting point A to a determined final point B. Creatures, and rational ones 
above all, are open to different ends, which are all good formally (so the unity of the 
principle is preserved) but are different materially. Famously, Aristotle claimed that the 
nature of good depends on the substance, not vice versa. Christian theology inevitably 
translated the words of Aristotle in a different context, but the original idea of good is not 
superseded. Thus, God is the absolute good, equally good for any substance. 
In natural philosophy, all beings move towards their good, formally one, materially 
different as the beings are different, and this is a fundamental internal principle of 
movement that they have, and by the acquisition of which they are completed. Any being 
is good, because bonum is a transcendental attribute of beings, along with verum and 
unum. Without goodness, unity and truth the very concept of being becomes empty. Form 
is the ‘good’ of matter, consequently matter strives for its end; and conversely, form is an 
end and matter while attaining its end at the same time attains its good. Good and end are 
not separable. 
There is an essential directedness within all composite beings, which is due to the 
metaphysical structure of the compound of form and matter. Form alone would be unable 
to attain anything else from itself, being a good in itself (not ‘the’ good, of course). The 
union between form and matter is essentially ‘one’ because the composite is such per se, 
not per accidens, yet the union is not essential, because by constitution the potency of 
matter cannot be made completely actual by any determined form. This point in its 
relationship with appetite is addressed by Wedderburn 1608: 
 
formae accessu suo appetitum explere potest, 
potentiam non potest. [TP II.4] 
 
Matter is essentially potency, no form can change the essence of matter by simple 
information of it; what form does is to satisfy in each case the appetite that matter has for 
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form, which is the constant power of the essence of matter as potency. Or, in other words, 
it is the physical way in which the metaphysical potency is individuated in a compound.14 
Regents believed they had explained the metaphysical structure of natural becoming by 
these key notions: potency, appetite, form, matter and privation. It appears that the role of 
matter is both active and passive: passive in the specific sphere of natural philosophy (the 
appetite being the receptiveness of matter towards form), but active on the metaphysical 
level, because matter’s essential constitution as pure potency can never be restrained by 
form, and always seeks to replace the present form. Matter is truly the underlying active 
principle of physical becoming. 
There is a crucial objection made against the theory that prime matter is indifferent 
towards forms: the experienced directedness of natural phenomena. Creatures belonging to 
the same genus tend to behave in the same way under the same circumstances; if today we 
account for this evidence on the basis of the principle of uniformity of nature and the 
concept of physical laws, regents did not have anything resembling the latter. Physical 
directedness is thus seen as a consequence of the principle of uniformity of nature (‘nature 
does not move by leaps’) and of the constancy of natural essences, implying that things 
cannot do anything contradicting their essence. The objection based on the fact of natural 
directedness can be fully rejected only after the explanation of natural movement, because 
of the role played by form as nature of bodies (part II). From the point of view of prime 
matter, the objection is partially answered by the distinction between matter simpliciter 
spectata and determinate matter: 
 
Materia simpliciter spectata non ad unam magis 
formam quam ad aliam propensa est, neque unquam 
aliam formam appetit, quia praesentem fastidit. Quare 
cum determinatur ad certam formam, ad eam solum 
habet potentiam. [Strang 1611, TP III] 
 
Unfortunately this is the only passage clarifying the question from the point of view of 
matter alone. Strang seems to hold that after being determined by a form (which means, 
after being made the matter of a determined compound), until the compound exists this 
portion of matter cannot accept any other form to replace the present one. Form here means 
‘substantial form’, the sort of form giving essence and unity to a compound, not accidental 
form, which can always vary without causing the compound to dissolve. So, in matter is to 
be found the root of the constancy of becoming within the same compound; but also the 
ultimate root of one compound becoming another one. 
                                         
14
 I intend to leave aside the discussion of celestial bodies, which I deal with in part II, chapter 3. 
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1.3.2 Different theories on the nature of appetitus 
 
Regents offer different accounts of the nature of prime matter’s appetite. Appetite is 
analysed both in its relation to the potency of prime matter (an internal relation) and in its 
directedness towards form (an external relation): 
 
Materiae appetitus nihil aliud est, quam inclinatio, 
eaque passiva ad formam suscipiendam, eumque a 
privatione habet. Ex quo sequitur materiae appetitum 
re non differre a potentia. Et hinc quicquid explet 
appetitum potentiam perficere et contra. [Bruce 1614, 
TP IIII] 
 
Materiae appetitus est affectus habendi formam, ad 
quam propensione quadam suam inclinat. Appetitus 
igitur materiae potentiam non adaequat. [Wedderburn 
1608, TP II] 
 
These two passages differ on the issue of the relation between appetite and potency: in 
Bruce 1614 we read that the appetite perfects the potency of matter, because there is no 
real distinction between appetite and potency. In Wedderburn 1608 instead, the appetite is 
said not to match, satisfy (adaequat)15 the very potency of matter. From which we might 
wonder about the distinction between appetite and potency. If the real distinction were the 
only logically possible distinction between entities the two passages could be mutually 
contradictory. Wedderburn does not make his claim on this issue, but we can complete it 
thanks to further qualifications of the notion of distinction. 
Suárez holds that modal distinction between existence and essence is sufficient to ground 
the claim that the existence does not belong to the essence of something, because a modal 
distinction is not dependent on our intellect, but reflects a distinction in nature. So, it 
occupies the middle ground between the real distinction, between a thing and another 
thing, and the distinction of reason, which is between beings distinct only because an 
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 Adaequatio is a Scholastic term indicating equality, in terms of quantity or in terms of proportion. When 
equality is perfect, it does not admit degrees (‘more’ or ‘less’). In the debate on prime matter and its 
potencies, I translate this concept with ‘to match’ and ‘to satisfy’ because the the Latin adaequatio 
reminds us of both meanings. The question is whether the appetite is equal to prime matter (and vice 
versa), and whether this appetite satisfies the potency of prime matter: that is, whether it is equal to this 
very potency. Adaequatio is famously deployed in the definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus 
(for example: Thomas, CG, 1, 59, n. 2): I believe that the relation which occurs between prime matter and 
one of its potencies cannot be explained with the traditional translation of ‘correspondence’, because it is 
not the same relation as between the known thing and the intellect. 
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intellect perceives them to be so, and ceasing to be distinct were an intellect not thinking 
this distinction.16 This does not mean that the intellect in question creates the distinction, or 
makes it real in things by thinking it. In fact, the distinction of reason can be twofold: with 
a foundation in things (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae), when the intellect is reflecting 
some sort of distinction between components within the same thing, or without a 
foundation in things (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis), when the act of the intellect 
establishes such a distinction.17 The general realist approach of Scholasticism does not 
allow us to say that the object known is in any way affected by the act of the knower, 
because the relation of knowing is non-mutual, that is, directed from the knower to the 
known in a way that leaves the thing unchanged. 
Thus, Wedderburn would just need a modal distinction to maintain the distinction 
between appetite and potency and claim that appetite does not match potency. 
The two positions then underline different aspects of the same question: Bruce holds that 
appetite and potency are not really different and that appetite perfects potency; 
Wedderburn that appetite does not match potency and, if our argument is right, that they 
are not really distinct, because the modal distinction could suffice. And the modal 
distinction is not a real distinction. So, within the same theory of the non-real distinction 
between appetite and potency, two theories are possible, that 1) the appetite perfects 
potency and 2) that the appetite does not match with potency. 
What about the terms ‘perficere’ and ‘adaequare’? Regents are just expressing the same 
concept with different words: within the same identity, something perfecting something 
else is completely realised, and therefore adequate with the thing perfected. This would not 
follow in the case of the real distinction, for example, with a cause ‘a’ perfecting ‘b’: here 
the cause would not be a being adequate to ‘b’, but just the adequate cause of ‘b’. So, 
appetite entails both the perfection of the potency of matter, because the potency is 
actualised, and the ‘non adaequatio’ with potency, because the appetite does not match the 
whole of the potency of prime matter. Prime matter retains its potency towards another 
form. 
Appetite is treated by regents as not really distinct from potency, because they both flow 
from the essence of prime matter, and a subject is not really distinct from its attributes. 
Alongside a relation to potency, appetite is also understood in relation to form. I called this 
relation ‘external’ because form is a principle external to the matter which is informed. 
                                         
16
 Suárez also states the identity between the modal distinction and the formal distinction. Gilson argues that 
Descartes might have been influenced by Suárez in his theory of distinction (Index scolastico-cartésien, 
New York, Burt Franklin, 1964, text 148). 
17
 Suárez, DM, 7, I, 4. 
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When it comes to the qualification of this appetite in relation to form, regents vary their 
responses. Stevenson 1629 offers an interesting explanation of the concepts at work here: 
 
Desiderium est de bono absenti, complacentia de 
bono praesenti, privatio carentiam boni, appetitus 
denique inclinationem ad bonum notat. Ergo appetitus 
abstrahit a bono praesenti vel absenti. Adeoque a 
desiderio, complacentia et privatione. Appetitus est 
universalior privatione, et prior secundum rationem. 
Privatio, cum sequatur appetitum non potest esse eius 
causa. Et cum praecedat desiderium, medium locum 
tenet inter appetitum, et desiderium. [...] materia per 
naturam appetit bonum, divinum, et appetibile. Ergo 
primo et per se appetit formam, per accidens etiam 
privationem ei junctam. [TP VI] 
 
The context indicates the influence of moral philosophy in terminology. Modern 
philosophers who opposed the schools invariably pointed out how this “overlapping” of 
disciplines, due to the role in natural philosophy of concepts such as good, final causality, 
end and appetite, was an unacceptable anthropomorphic tendency. This terminology was 
abandoned outside Scholastic philosophy. Regents still consider these concepts as 
paramount in order to account for natural becoming. A possible reply to the criticism lies 
in the fact that moral and natural philosophy share some key notions because they share a 
common ground: that is, the structure of finite beings. Thus interpreted, moral and natural 
philosophy reflect the same nature under different aspects, in two distinct disciplines which 
are inevitably intertwined. It is true that Scholastic philosophy divided disciplines 
according to the method of enquiry proper to each; but also, the unity of a discipline is 
given by the unity of the subject. This shared terminology is not perceived as an illicit step, 
also because, I believe, regents had a strong awareness of the autonomy of natural 
philosophy.18 
Stevenson implicitly holds that the appetite of prime matter is appetitus perfectionis, a 
formula that we also find in Reid 1610 and 1622. This result is obtained by proving that 
other sorts of qualification, such as desiderij, complacentiae or privationis, do not apply to 
the appetite of prime matter. ‘Desire’ is about an absent good, something missing and 
willed for insofar as missing: the fulfilment of the desire immediately removes the cause of 
desire, initiating a feeling of pleasure (complacentia) due to the enjoyment of the now 
present object of former desire. Privation on the contrary is the condition of absence of 
                                         
18
 In part II I shall seek to offer more evidence for this claim by the examples of the careful ways in which 
regents treat the notions of final cause, of intelligence as the heavenly motor and of form as principles of 
falling bodies. I argue that regents can respond to the Moderns’ criticism in a sound way. 
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good: in moral philosophy it is not a feeling internal to the moral agent, but indicates 
something missing. In natural philosophy, as we have seen, privation is the absence of a 
new form (and the presence of the actual form), and is posterior to the appetite. It is not 
absolute but relative absence: matter can never be without a form, so the absence is always 
relative to a form. None of these descriptions applies to appetite, which is the natural 
inclination of prime matter towards form. 
Particularly interesting is the analysis of the differences between appetite and privation. 
Privation is the absence of the new form; matter is always in a state of privation, because it 
is essentially potency and no form can fully satisfy it. It is clear that appetite is different 
from privation, as a potency proper to matter from the state in which matter is. Appetite is 
prior according to reason because it is the potency of matter that permits us to talk of 
privation as a principle of becoming, not the opposite. Appetite is also prior according to 
reality, because appetite is more universal than privation, and what is more universal is 
always prior to what is less universal. 
 
 
 
2. Partim Eductiva: prime matter and eductio formae 
 
Eustachius identifies the second potency of prime matter in ‘being eductive’: “ex materia 
possunt formae materiales virtute naturalium agentium educi” (SPhQ, III, II, I, III). This 
concept introduces the aspect of prime matter regarded as the origin of forms, which 
integrates the notion of prime matter as receptive of forms. In fact, the two aspects are 
always conjoined, with one fundamental exception: the rational soul. In all cases but 
human beings, the matter of natural bodies is at the same time and in the same respect 
receptive and eductive, because it receives forms but also forms are coming out of, are 
taken out of matter (e-ductae). This is another case when Scholastic natural philosophy 
seems to rely on metaphors employed as technical terminology, as happens with ‘appetite’. 
Equally, the notion of ‘eduction’ does belong to natural philosophy, and it is the name of 
the process by which forms are immediately coming from matter and informing matter. 
The distinction between ‘informing matter’ and ‘being educed from matter’ is only logical: 
there is not a time when a form is first educed from matter and is then informing the same 
matter, or vice versa. The distinction is then one of reason, but it has a foundation in 
things, because the two terms actually refer to two distinct aspects of the same process. 
Rational souls are exceptions, as already noted. For a form to be educed from matter, as 
Eustachius observed, it is required that form is material (materiata), so endowed with the 
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corruptibility proper of material things. Rational soul is thus not educed from matter, 
because this would be a direct argument for its mortality; the rational soul is created at the 
very moment of the information of the matter of the newly conceived man. This happens 
by direct intervention of God, which compensates for the inadequacy of the material world 
for originating a human being. This act of God is an act of his potentia ordinata, as it does 
not take place above nature (supra naturam) or against nature (contra naturam) by 
absolute powers, but within nature. Concurring in the generation of men is one of the 
ordinary means by which God continuously keeps the created world perfect. 
The common formula we find in the theses has it that: 
 
licet forma educatur, non ex tamen materia 
gignitur. [Young 1613, TP 2.III]19 
 
There is then a difference between ‘being educed from’ matter and ‘being born from’, 
‘being brought forth from’ matter (gignitur). In the second case in fact, being born entails a 
dependency of form on matter which is unacceptable, because it would call in question the 
theory of form and matter as ‘principles’ of the composite. A principle originating from 
another principle would not be a principle anymore, for it would depend on something else, 
as Aristotle explains in Phys. I, 6. Form and matter must be preserved in their opposition as 
contraries, neither depending on anything else. Scholasticism reinterpreted this theory as 
well in the light of the Christian faith, making form and matter still mutually independent 
as principles, but ultimately dependent on God as first principle insofar as they are created. 
On the physical level though, the Aristotelian theory remains unchanged. 
We can distinguish in the theses two accounts of eduction: the first shared by the vast 
majority of regents, the second held by just one of them, J. Dalrymple, regent at Glasgow 
University, and author of the only set of graduation theses from Glasgow University in the 
first half of the seventeenth century. He is bringing forward a noteworthy theory of the 
direct intervention of God in the eduction of forms. 
 
 
2.1 Traditional theory of eductio in the Theses 
 
The most interesting passage is in Fairley 1619. The regent’s conclusion is:  
 
                                         
19
 On eduction see also, for example: Fairley 1619, TP II; Reid 1622, TP II; Fairley 1623, TP I, 3-4; and 
Martin 1618, TP XVII and King 1624, TP V, in particular in relation to the generation of a human being. 
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ergo et formam educi e potentia materiae duo 
postulat: 1. Ut forma fiat in actu, cum prius solum 
esset in potentia: 2. Ut sine materiae adminiculo nec 
effici nec permanere possit. [TP II.4] 
 
The connection between form and matter acquires its full evidence and depth in the 
process of eduction. Form and matter can initiate a compound which is one per se 
(including the rational soul and matter), which already indicates an essential unity. An 
even stronger claim is made when form is said to come from matter. In no way is form an 
accident of matter, or a mode of matter: regents hold onto the real distinction between form 
and matter as distinct principles. Eduction should not be misinterpreted as a derivation of 
form from matter, as regents warn with the words “ex materia tamen non gignitur”. 
According to Fairley, for a form to be educed from matter two things are required: 1) a 
passage from potency to act; 2) a dependence on matter limited to the mode of being, in 
virtue of which matter is prior to form. These two requirements explain eduction but also 
serve as a principle of distinction between formae materiales and formae immateriales: the 
second requirement does not apply to the rational soul, which can exist without its 
compound. 
A material form is such because it is educed from matter. Matter here gets as close as 
possible in Scholastic natural philosophy to some sort of activity, which is never attributed 
to matter. Even the grammar of Fairley’s sentences is revealing: the regent uses form as 
subject of a passive verbal form, and does not use matter as subject of an active one. 
Eduction is then something happening to form, not something caused by matter to form. 
Matter is a necessary component of the process (material cause), but is not the efficient 
cause of the existence of form. It is not a contradiction that form is materially caused by its 
contrary, matter: in fact, form is dependent on matter in exactly the aspect that is proper to 
matter, materiality, not in its own, formality. 
Fairley’s account includes the rejection of two objections raised against the theory of 
eduction: 1) that eduction implies that forms pre-exist in matter in order to be able to be 
educed from it; 2) that forms are created in matter. 
 
Si formae materiales nullo modo praecederent in 
materia, sed tantum in potentia activa agentis, 
crearentur. Hinc I. formae materiales praecedunt in 
potentia materiae. 2. Esse in potentia materiae est 
praecedere potentiam materiae a qua forma nata est 
dependere in Fieri et Esse. [TP II.1-3] 
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Forms do not pre-exist in the potency of matter because existence entails being actual 
from the side of forms: an actually existing form informs matter, and hence there is no 
room for eduction. The word chosen is ‘to precede’ (praecedunt): forms are in potency 
within matter, in the sense that matter is potentially informed by forms, not that forms are 
in potency to existence already within matter. This would lead to the coexistence of infinite 
potentially existing forms within matter, regarded as an absurd conclusion. 
By this claim, the objection of the continuous creation of forms in matter is rejected: if 
forms were just dependent on the active virtue of the agent, then they would be created in 
matter: but Fairley holds that material forms do originate from matter. So, in order to bring 
it about that there are material forms, three elements are required: 1) a material cause, 
matter; 2) a formal cause (a material form preceding in the potency of matter); and finally 
3) an agent, an efficient cause activating the preceding form and causing it to inform 
matter. This agent is identified in any other natural being acting on matter. It is the 
adequate physical cause for the eduction of form, because it alone is sufficient for form to 
be educed. It is not necessary for it to be the primary cause: in fact, an instrumental cause 
is enough. Instrumental causes are causes directly affecting something else, not by their 
own powers, but by the powers of the primary cause, by which they are used. An 
instrumental cause can thus be a real cause, even if it is not a primary cause. This is how 
Baron defines it: 
 
Instrumentalis vero, ut loquuntur Scholastici, est 
quae ab alio agente elevatur ad effectum 
producendum, quem non potest producere propria sua 
virtute. [Metaphysica generalis, sectio VIII] 
 
The case of the rational soul is again illustrative: no natural body can be the primary 
cause for the birth of a man, because God’s intervention is always required. In the natural 
course of events though, God requires an instrumental cause in place, not because his 
absolute power alone could not create a man, but because God’s intervention is inserted in 
the natural process of procreation. It is a principle in Scholastic natural philosophy that 
finite beings are endowed with actual powers of their own, so that they can act as primary 
causes and exert a real efficient causality. It is precisely against this theory that Dalrymple 
formulates his objection and his alternative solution. 
Before moving to Dalrymple, one last remark is important. Rankine 1627 introduces the 
notion of inherence in the analysis of eduction. Material forms are educed by an agent from 
matter, which is receptive of form and at the same time is acted upon by the agent. In order 
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to account for the essential unity of the newly former compound, the question about the 
identity between eduction of form and inherence of form must be addressed: 
 
Forma materialis non habet propriam subsistentiam 
sed inhaeret materiae. Ergo per quam actionem 
educitur de potentia materiae, per eandem materiae 
inhaeret. Et cum sit eadem actio, sit inhaesio formae 
in materia et unitio ejusdem cum materia (non enim 
potest inhaerere materiae, nisi uniatur) per quam 
actionem educitur de potentia materiae, per eandem ei 
unietur. [TP IV] 
 
Eduction and inherence are the same action, there is no real distinction. The three 
moments of eduction, inherence and information of matter are temporally one and are only 
logically distinct. 
 
 
2.2 Dalrymple 1646: criticism of regents on eductio20 
 
Dalrymple structures his criticism of the traditional position of regents on eduction on the 
basis of his low opinion of the potencies of matter. His set of theses is very interesting, 
first, as I mentioned, because it is the only existing set from Glasgow in the first half of the 
seventeenth century; secondly, because of the feeling of a breaking down of Scholastic 
philosophy that we get from his pages. It is possible that Dalrymple was more responsive 
than other regents to the challenges to Scholastic philosophy raised by the new philosophy. 
It is arguable that his set of theses represents an early Scottish attempt to incorporate 
themes of the ‘new philosophy’ within the body of the established Scholastic teaching in 
the universities. It is regrettable that no other sets of theses from the same period in 
Glasgow are available, for this limits our ability to judge the actual novelty of Dalrymple’s 
philosophy. 
His eclectism is well represented by his theory of eduction. He comes close to rejecting 
the whole notion as unintelligible: 
 
Originem et productionem formarum ascribere 
eductioni de potentia materiae, inextricabile latibulum, 
cum potentia materiae omnino inefficax, sit tantum 
passiva et receptiva, atque eductio saepe fiat per 
causam Instrumentalem, aut inferiorem effectu 
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 A translation of the Theses physicae of Dalrymple 1646 and biographical information are in the Appendix. 
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producendo. Productionem formarum nos DEO 
ascribimus, propagationem vero ejusdem formae 
productae unioni. [TP X-XI] 
 
I believe that Dalrymple brings about an interesting shift in the meaning of the concept of 
potency of prime matter, which makes the traditional reading of eduction unsustainable. He 
opens his passage by stating the difficulty of the subject (inextricabile latibulum), due to 
(cum) the ineffectiveness of the potency of prime matter to perform the eduction of forms. 
Prime matter’s potency is only passive and receptive, and must always be supported by an 
instrumental cause. Prime matter is here understood as a physical cause lacking the 
sufficient power (potentia) to perform: it is exactly this sense of prime matter which is in 
contrast with the Scholastic notion. Prime matter is a material cause, which by definition is 
the material principle of the compound. It is not uncommon to read about the 
ineffectiveness of prime matter, but its ineffectiveness is always related to prime matter’s 
metaphysical act being insufficient to grant independent existence. Dalrymple transfers this 
ineffectiveness to the sphere of natural causality, shifting from the metaphysical to the 
physical level. Furthermore, prime matter and its potency are treated in general as ‘causes’, 
without the due qualification of ‘material’. 
In a standard Scholastic doctrine, the fact that potency is “tantum passiva et receptiva” is 
never seen as a limitation of matter’s role in the origin of the compound, but it is precisely 
the role of prime matter as physical principle. Dalrymple seems to take ‘tantum’ in the 
sense of ‘just’, ‘merely’, thus implying a weak causality unable to cause on its own. I argue 
that this specific theory implies some sort of rejection of the idea that finite beings are true 
causal agents. 
The unsatisfactory potency of matter is thus compensated by a direct act of God: 
“productionem formarum nos DEO ascribimus” (ibidem). This is not a Scholastic doctrine 
stricto sensu, even if it is still formulated in Scholastic terminology. The doctrine of the 
autonomy of created beings in the natural world is always maintained by the regents, who 
are keen not to postulate God’s intervention. Ultimately, all of reality is dependent on God, 
who is the first or primary cause: it is possible to say, when holding the theological 
doctrine of analogical predication, that God alone is a true cause and consequently is the 
only cause. Yet, in Scholasticism this discourse never led philosophers to deny that within 
a context of natural philosophy it is correct to ascribe real causality to creatures. This is 
what Dalrymple seems to claim: if natural substances are not the primary causes of the 
production of material substances (because prime matter’s potency fails to educe material 
forms), then natural substances are deprived of physical causality, and are just instrumental 
causes. 
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I believe that a comparison with a standard account of the activity of secondary causes in 
the theses can shed light on Dalrymple’s own position, and in general on the afore-
mentioned ‘autonomy’ of natural philosophy as a discipline. Forbes 162421 deals with this 
question in the metaphysical section of his Theses philosophicae, III-V. The regent 
expounds two opposite views: 1) that causal efficiency does not belong to secondary 
causes, a theory ascribed to the ‘Arabs’; and 2) that the created substances are alone 
enough to bring about their effects, a theory ascribed to Durandus and his followers. [TM 
III]. Both theories are regarded as absurd and dangerous for philosophy and faith. In the 
former case, Forbes believes that the contingency of things and the freedom of our will 
would be annihilated, because God would be the only true cause of natural monsters and of 
our sinful behaviour. This is not all: these consequences are not less important than the fact 
that this theory: 
 
scientias destruat, rerum quidditates et facultates, in 
occulto naturae recessu abscondens, et communissima 
evertat axiomata, qualia: Sol illuminat: Ignis 
calefaciat. [TM IIII] 
 
If there is no real secondary efficient causation, natural philosophy as a science is in 
danger. The second theory is no less false, since it overturns the natural order of beings, 
and the nature of created substances, which always needs the concourse of the first cause. 
Forbes’s answer to the dilemma seeks to include dependence on the first cause and true 
efficient causality in the nature of created substances: 
 
Ita quicquid entitatis in operationibus est, id 
essentialiter a DEO pendet, et a summo Ente [...] 
dirigi, et in finem ordinari necesse. Potest quidem 
causa secunda, exclusis aliis ejusdem generis, simile 
sibi producere. [TM V] 
 
The power and presence of God is the same in respect of the action of the creature: “ut 
virtute et praesentia eadem etiam qua creatura actione” (ibidem). 
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 John Forbes of Corse (1593-1648), minister of the Church of Scotland, theologian, regent and member of 
the Aberdeen Doctors. Entered King’s College, Aberdeen, in 1607 and probably graduated in 1611. We 
have no graduation theses for that year. Forbes started a tour of European universities in 1612, which 
brought him first to Heidelberg, then to Sedan (1615), where he studied with Andrew Melville. Ordained 
in Aberdeen in 1620. He wrote the graduation theses for 1624 at King’s College. He refused to sign the 
National Covenant, and continued to act in support of episcopacy and of his own religious convictions. 
He was eventually forced to leave first his academic position in 1641, then Scotland in 1643. Died in 
1648 after returning to Aberdeen. One of the main figures among the Doctors, Forbes represents well the 
independent spirit of Aberdeen in matters of religion and ecclesiastical organisation. DNB. 
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Sibbald 1625 agrees with Forbes: he points out the contradiction between the freedom of 
our will and predermination, if all causality is from God. Therefore: 
 
Concursus DEI et actio causae secundae sunt una 
eademque numero actio. [...] effectum creaturae dici a 
concursu DEI pendere, actionem vero non item, cum 
actio et concursu DEI sunt idem, idem autem non 
pendet a seipso. [TM VII-VIII] 
 
It seems that Dalrymple disagrees with the other regents on eduction and causality of 
secondary causes. His theories then prompt a question about his sources: by 1646 it is 
likely that, as an educated member of a distinguished family in Glasgow, Dalrymple had 
become acquainted with the most recent novelties in philosophy, either by travelling or by 
having access to books locally, sometimes even before the university had bought them. As 
likely as this sounds, I am reluctant on the basis of the historical evidence at our disposal to 
support this claim. There is another passage by Dalrymple which again seems to break 
away from the Scholastic tradition: 
 
Toti materiae massae unam et intimam formam 
corporis DEUS in principio impressit, unde 
constituatur in ratione corporis, quaeque jam in 
omnibus manet eadem, nec contrariam habet unde 
expellatur, sed materiae coaeva est, et coaetanea. [TP 
XII] 
 
Dalrymple is very clear: God impressed an intimate, coeval, inseparable and unique form 
upon the whole of matter, by which it is constituted as body (in ratione corporis). The 
regent chooses to transform the traditional notion of prime matter into the notion of a body, 
essentially informed by direct act of God; thus Dalrymple is in opposition to the other 
regents. In this theory there are elements which resemble Descartes’ notion of matter as res 
extensa; or, alternatively, Zabarella’s of matter as body. Archival evidence shows that 
Zabarella’s works were held by Scottish universities, and his name is often mentioned in 
many theses; yet, Descartes seems a likelier source. To support my view, I wish to mention 
the opinion on Dalrymple by Skene, regent in Aberdeen in the 1680s, in his Positiones 
aliquot philosophicae, Aberdeen 1688: 
 
Sola cogitatio menti tribuenda est, ut extensum ad 
corpus, ita est et cogitans ad mentem. Substantia est 
immortalis, et immaterialis, cui repugnat existentia in 
loco. Rationem spiritus formalem posuit D. De Stair 
in perceptione. [VI.15] 
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Skene’s set of graduation theses expounds the most important philosophical schools: the 
longest sections are on philosophia peripatetica and Cartesii philosophia. The regent 
offers a historical analysis, to my knowledge unique in the Scottish universities, which 
might perhaps be regarded as an early work in history of philosophy. I shall return to it in 
the Conclusions, section 2.2. Dalrymple, later Viscount Stair, is the second most quoted 
authority after Descartes in the section on Cartesian philosophy. There is evidence that 
Skene regarded Dalrymple (probably basing himself on his Physiologia nova 
experimentalis, Leiden 1686), as if not a Cartesian, at least as a ‘new philosopher’. On the 
evidence of Dalrymple’s graduation theses and Skene’s interpretation, it is then arguable 
that Dalrymple had been investigating modern philosophy ever since his regenting years in 
Glasgow. This would explain why he is the most critical regent of Scholastic natural 
philosophy in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Following Eustachius’s analysis of the potencies of prime matter, I have structured this 
chapter in two parts: the first one on prime matter as receptive principle, the second one on 
prime matter as eductive principle. 
Receptiveness and eductiveness are the two potencies of prime matter. Qua potencies, 
they flow from the essence of prime matter (investigated in chapter 1) even if they are not 
included in the definition of the essence of prime matter. The analysis of such potencies is 
thus the first step into the analysis of prime matter as principle of the compound, and not 
simply as a metaphysical principle. 
The potencies of prime matter imply the relationship with form: all forms are either 
received by prime matter or educed from it. The first aspect of this relationship is that 
prime matter is receptive of forms: prime matter has an appetite towards form, which is the 
‘good’ and the end of prime matter. I have investigated the case of the rational soul as the 
example of a form which is independent from matter: the rational soul is received by prime 
matter, and not educed from it. This debate will be completed in the next chapter with the 
analysis of the bodily form. 
The second aspect is that prime matter is also eductive with respect to form; that means 
that material forms are educed (‘taken out of’) matter in virtue of a number of causes: 
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matter as the material form, the new form as the formal cause and an external agent acting 
on the material cause as the efficient cause. 
I have then investigated the set of theses by Dalrymple 1646. The regent puts forward an 
interpretation of the potency of matter and of the causality of secondary causes which 
seems to break with the Scholastic tradition in natural philosophy. 
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Part I, chapter 3 
 
 
 
De proprietatibus materiae primae 
 
 
 
Eustachius’s words can serve us well when introducing the analysis of the properties 
(proprietates) of prime matter as well. In pars III, tractatus I, disputatio I, quaestio IV of 
his Summa philosophiae quadripartita we are told about four properties: 
 
prima est, Quod sit quanta. Adeo enim materiae 
propria est quantitas, ut ipsi primo et per se competat; 
deinde per ipsam toti composito naturali. Adde etiam, 
formam, sive substantialem sive accidentalem, non 
nisi mediante quantitate in materiam recipi. [...] 
Secunda est, Quod sit ingenerabilis et 
incorruptibilis; licet mutabilis dici possit quatenus 
mutationum vicissitudines experitur, dum succedentes 
sibi invicem formas suo sinu excipit. [...] 
Tertia est, Quod materia nunquam possit esse nuda. 
[...] 
Quarta proprietas est, Quod materia sit omnino 
passiva, i. e. nullam habeat potentiam activam sed 
tantum passiva. 
 
Prime matter is thus endowed with four properties, in virtue of its essence: 1) being 
quantified; 2) being ungenerable and incorruptible; 3) being always informed; 4) being 
passive potency. The Theses philosophicae agree with Eustachius, whom I take here to be 
representative of the wide family of Scholastics, on this general account of prime matter’s 
properties. This agreement though does not mean that Eustachius’s explanation of these 
properties is the same as the regents’. Among the four types of properties, the one that is 
debated most is quantity, and it is from here that the regents part company with 
contemporary Scholasticism to build a theory compatible with their doctrine of the 
Eucharist. That doctrine is the topic of chapter 4, and part of the role of chapter 3 is to 
expound the crucial point that regents intended prime matter as essentially quantified; 
which point is the philosophical ground of the rejection of the Catholic dogma of 
Transubstantiation. The philosophical explanation of the dogma of Transubstantiation rests 
on the theory of the relation between substance and accident, of which the relation between 
Part I, chapter 3. De proprietatibus materiae primae 73 
prime matter and quantity is a case. The connection between the dogma and this 
philosophical theory is so strong that both Eustachius and Suárez feel compelled to 
mention the Eucharist when dealing with the properties of prime matter: 
 
una eademque materia variis sibi invicem subinde 
succedentibus formis subest; ita una eademque 
quantitas in illis perseveret; imo nonnunquam ipsius 
materiae vices gerat: ut contingit in augustissimo 
Eucharistiae sacramento. [Eustachius, ibidem] 
 
Approbatur sententia reipsa distinguens 
quantitatem a substantia. Atque haec sententia est 
omnino tenenda; quamquam enim non possit ratione 
naturali sufficienter demonstrari, tamen ex principiis 
theologiae convincitur esse vera, maxime propter 
mysterium Eucharistiae. [DM, 40, II] 
 
In my exposition, I shall focus mainly on quantity as the key property of prime matter, 
working as the copula between the philosophical analysis of prime matter and the 
philosophical rejection of a theological dogma; or, in other words, between philosophy 
somehow restricted to the sphere of a purely intellectual enterprise and philosophy engaged 
with one of the main features of the epoch-making event of the Reformation. I argue that 
all philosophical doctrines held by regents regarding prime matter must be seen in the light 
of the broader context of the clash between different confessions of faith. 
In this chapter, I intend to concentrate on prime matter still abstracting from the role that 
prime matter plays in the philosophical reading of this theological dogma. Also, I postpone 
the question of the priority of philosophy or theology in shaping the debate in the Theses 
philosophicae. This is an appropriate ordering because prime matter is first and above all a 
philosophical concept dealt with in a philosophical context: it is thus subject to analysis 
independent of any other discipline. Furthermore, the role of prime matter in the debate on 
Transubstantiation is relevant in proportion to its philosophical coherence and richness: in 
this sense, philosophy must be truly preparatory to theology. 
Quantity, though having primacy, does not overshadow the remaining three properties. In 
the previous chapter prime matter has already been analysed with respect to being ‘always 
informed’ and ‘passive potency’: in this chapter, these two notions are going to be 
integrated into a more complete account of the role of matter in the compound. In fact, 
contrary to potencies of prime matter, properties are fully intelligible only when analysed 
in relation to form. The order of exposition follows the structure of prime matter, and this 
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chapter is about the most specific of prime matter:1 its relation to form and its role in the 
compound. In the previous two chapters, the analysis was still on the general level of the 
essence of prime matter and on prime matter as receptive and eductive potency. 
On the basis of the analysis of the properties of prime matter, it is also possible to begin 
to form an account of the theory of substance, which helps to answer the question of what 
kind of Aristotelians the regents were. I shall focus on the reception of Aristotle in 
Conclusions, section 2. Given the importance of the notion of substance in any Scholastic 
philosophy, the account will have to be augmented by the analysis of movement in part II. 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first one is about the properties of 
ungenerability and incorruptibility of prime matter. An interesting theory is that of the 
resolution into prime matter:2 when a physical compound becomes corrupted, resolution 
occurs if the remaining accidents inhere in prime matter, immediately without a form. In 
this theory, prime matter is a substratum of accidents, and its property of being the root of 
physical becoming is best explained. The second part deals with the relation between prime 
matter and quantity. Scholastics held that matter is quantified, in the general sense that a 
form obtains extension in space in virtue of its union with matter. This general theory does 
not suffice: it is important to investigate what sort of relation is established between matter 
and quantity, for example, addressing questions such as whether quantity is essentially 
extension in place, or merely extension of parts beyond parts;3 or whether matter is really 
distinct from quantity. As I mentioned before, this account of quantity and matter cannot 
be fully understood without the reference to Transubstantiation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
1
 ‘Most specific’ is to be understood in the genus-species context: the analysis of the essence of prime matter 
is what is most general (like the genus); the analysis of the relation of prime matter with form is what is 
most particular (like the species). 
2
 I have decided to translate the Latin formula resolutio in materiam primam with the English formula 
‘resolution into prime matter’. Resolutio is a technical Scholastic term: “Resolutio est cuiusque rei ad sua 
principia, unde componitur, revocation: seu, est operis facti reductio ad principia, id est, ea, e quibus 
compositum est”, (R. Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, Frankfurt 1613, art. Resolutio). 
3
 Extension of ‘parts beyond parts’ (partes extra partes) means that an extended body has parts which are 
distinct among themselves by dimensions and mass. It is an extension in ordine ad se, which is a mode of 
a substance, not a mode of a quantity: therefore, it does not imply extension in place (space). Having parts 
beyond parts is a prerequisite to be extended in place. See, Ruvius, In universam Aristotelis Dialecticam, 
1603, cap. 6, q. I and R. Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, art. Extensio. 
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1. Prime matter as incorruptible and ungenerated 
 
Prime matter is a principle of compounds: as a principle, prime matter cannot depend on 
another principle, because principles are, by definition, the first components and 
explanations of something. Were prime matter explained by introducing another principle, 
it simply would not be a ‘principle’ any more. Likewise regarding form: form and prime 
matter are functional to one another; they are essentially open to one another, and thus 
depend on one another. It is not contradictory that two principles are mutually dependent: 
it is contradictory that one principle is explained by another principle. The analysis of the 
properties of prime matter is the analysis of prime matter as a principle in mutual 
dependence on form. 
It must be pointed out that in a Christian metaphysics prime matter and form are 
principles per se of compounds only secundum quid, namely within the sphere of natural 
philosophy. In fact, they are principles ultimately depending on God, who alone is a 
principle per se absolutely speaking of any reality. This is a fundamental revision of the 
Aristotelian theory of substance, which allows for the acceptance of prime matter and form 
as principles per se, and does not admit a higher level of dependence. In fact, in Aristotle’s 
philosophy there is no absolute efficient causality, and God (the prime motor) is the final 
cause of the universe. Scholastics differ from Aristotle not on the basis of a different 
definition of principle, but simply on a different application of the definition. 
So, the two properties of ‘incorruptibility’ and ‘ungenerability’ follow from the 
definition of prime matter as principle, and have been introduced already. Prime matter is 
then an incorruptible and ungenerated principle of compounds: these properties are not 
included in the definition of prime matter as ‘entitative act whose essence is being 
receptive pure potency’, but they nonetheless flow from the essence. They belong to the 
definition of prime matter as a principle of the physical compound, not as a metaphysical 
act. When further analysed as principle of a compound, prime matter is essentially 
incorruptible and ungenerated. 
Why is that so? In sum, regents explain this point implicitly during the quod sit analysis 
of prime matter. A demonstration of the existence of prime matter is obtained by means of 
the principle that nothing can come out of nothing combined with the rejection of the 
regressus ad infinitum. Things change, come-to-be and cease-to-be (fieri and desinere): in 
order to avoid an infinite regressus and a continuous creation of things from nothing, 
according to the Scholastics we are compelled to admit a first principle which underlies all 
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these changes and makes them intelligible.4 Aristotle claimed that the world and natural 
change are eternal, while Scholastics held that the world is created (that is, has a beginning 
in time), but they all argued on the basis of the rejection of the regressus and the 
acceptance of the principle that ‘nothing’ is not a principle. The properties of being 
‘incorruptible’ and ‘ungenerated’ (regents do not offer any analysis of the primacy of one 
property over another) are thus essential properties (yet not part of the definition), because 
they are not demonstrated in the course of answering the ‘utrum sit’ or in the ‘quid sit’ 
questions, but rather they are presupposed by them. In Aristotelian fashion, a science does 
not yield the definition or pre-comprehension of its object, but enquires into an already 
‘given’ object.5 
When it comes to compounds, prime matter cannot be deprived of any of its essential 
properties; what forms do is to make prime matter formally actual and make it the matter 
of such and such a compound; they do not change the essence of prime matter in any way. 
Again, a principle does not change the opposite principle, it simply unites with it. Regents 
hold that prime matter is an incorruptible and ungenerated component of compounds, and 
in respect of the theory of natural substances this qualification carries weight in our 
understanding of its relation with form. 
 
 
1.1 Resolutio in materiam primam and forma mistionis 
 
All regents agree on the idea that prime matter is an entitative act, whose essence is being 
a receptive pure potency.6 In other words, it is the purely receptive component of 
compounds. It is also the incorruptible and ungenerable purely receptive component of 
compounds: prime matter is a ‘something’ cooperating in the compounds by being 
receptive, incorruptible and ungenerable/ungenerated.7 These properties belong not only to 
prime matter considered as a principle, but also to prime matter considered as a 
component. That is, the actual, individualised matter of any compound is incorruptible and 
ungenerable, not just prime matter intended as a metaphysical principle. The theory of 
prime matter as entitative act within the framework of a metaphysics of essence is the basis 
                                         
4
 This is the backbone of the proof from natural philosophy as we have seen it in St Andrews 1629, part I, 
chapter 1, section 2.1. 
5
 J.-F. Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, Paris, PUF, 1990, p. 19. 
6
 As shown in chapter 1. See also: Fairley 1615, TP VI.4-6; Forbes 1623, TP I; Stevenson 1629, TP VIII.3; 
Barclay 1631, TP I.3 Wemys 1631, TP I. 
7
 If something is not in potency towards being generable, it follows that it is ungenerated. 
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for the regents’ analysis of matter as component and the essence of prime matter does not 
change whether we consider it abstracting from its union with form or not. 
The theory of resolution into prime matter (resolutio in materiam primam) that we find 
in the theses is closely related to the properties of incorruptibility and ungenerability. In 
Scholasticism, the debate concerns whether forms inhere in matter immediately or 
mediately: whether a non-substantial form needs a substantial form in which it inheres 
immediately and in virtue of which it inheres in matter mediately. In other words, whether 
prime matter can be the subject of non-substantial (accidental) forms, or not. Many 
proponents of the doctrine of a mediated inherence of accidental forms in matter through a 
substantial form reject the doctrine of resolution into prime matter. Thomas Aquinas is 
one: according to Thomas, all accidents inhere in a substantial form immediately, and in 
prime matter mediately. A corollary of this theory is that there is only one substantial form 
for each compound. Regents on the contrary take the side of Scotus, who holds that there is 
a plurality of forms in a compound.8 
We shall see that some regents, while accepting the Scotistic framework and the concept 
of bodily form, do hold that even accidental forms can inhere immediately in prime matter. 
The qualification of ‘accidental’ is important: there is no doubt regarding the immediate 
inherence of substantial forms. Substantial forms are the forms which alone originate a 
compound (like the rational soul in the case of men), while accidental forms are the forms 
of the accidents which qualify a compound (like the colour of the hair of a man). 
Substantial forms originate a substance (category 1), accidental forms originate accidents, 
the categories of quantity and quality, regarded as the two categories on which all the 
remaining seven categories depend. The question is thus whether accidental forms can 
qualify a compound which is not already qualified by a substantial form. 
Following Scotus, the regents distinguish between animate and inanimate beings. Reid 
1614 holds that: 
 
Viventia non resolvuntur in materiam primam; at 
non viventia resolvuntur omnia. [TP 24.2] 
 
and concludes that: 
 
non in omni corruptione resolutio fit in Materiam 
primam immediate. [TP 24.3] 
 
                                         
8
 J. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 45. 
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In the first passage Reid holds that animate beings do not resolve into prime matter; 
while inanimate beings do resolve into prime matter. In the second one it is claimed that 
such resolution does not occur immediately in all corruptions. Both quotes are the 
conclusions of longer passages. 
 
 
1.1.1 Resolutio and animate beings 
 
It seems that the difference lies in what sort of compound Reid is talking about. In the 
corruption of animate beings, no resolution takes place because, as we read in the majority 
of regents, including Reid, there is something added to the substantial form-matter relation, 
some sort of medium, which is missing from inanimate beings. The most apparent 
difference is that animate beings, by definition, have a soul (vegetative, animal or rational). 
Yet, Reid does not have this in mind when rejecting the doctrine of the resolution into 
prime matter: his reference is to the form of mixture (forma mistionis)9, which is defined 
by Baron 1627 as follows: 
 
Forma mistionis non est viventium forma generica 
nec ullum ijs essentiae gradum tribuit, sed constituit 
mistum illud incompletum quod est altera essentiae 
pars physica, et corpus viventis appellatur. [TP VIII.4] 
 
A definition which can now be coupled with the longer passage in Reid: 
 
Forma mistionis non est superaddita formis 
elementorum; sed Anima formae mistionis vere 
superadditur. Sublata Anima potest remanere mistum, 
at sublata forma mistionis, praeter Materiam primam 
nihil supponitur. Viventia non resolvuntur in materiam 
primam; at non viventia resolvuntur omnia. [TP 24] 
 
Baron and Reid agree on the notion of a form of mixture. Baron points out that: 1) this 
form is not the generic form of animate beings (generic form ‘man’ when talking about a 
single man) because regents hold that no generic being can exist, but only individuals; 2) it 
does not confer any degree (essentiae gradum) to the essence of animate beings, so it does 
                                         
9
 I shall translate forma mistionis with ‘form of mixture’, in the sense of a form ‘based on mixture’, even if it 
might be open to misinterpretation. A possible alternative translation is ‘form of compound’, which I 
already use to translate forma compositi. 
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not follow from their form; finally that 3) it is ‘the other physical part of the essence’ 
(altera essentiae pars physica), which we can call ‘body’. 
Reid’s account sheds some light on the relation between form of mixture and corruption. 
Soul in general (and therefore including all animate beings, not humans only) is said to be 
added (superadditur) to the form of mixture, in such a relation that: 1) the soul can be in a 
compound only posterior to the presence of the form of mixture; and that 2) the corruption 
of the soul does not entail the corruption of this form. The relation is clearly not that of 
identity, because the latter can be without the former, yet not conversely. And as a final 
remark, only once the form of mixture is corrupted can there be a resolution into prime 
matter, because there is no medium between this latter form and prime matter. What 
immediately inheres in prime matter is thus the form of mixture, not the soul. Therefore 
animate beings do not resolve into prime matter immediately when they corrupt (when the 
unity between the soul and the body corrupts), because the form of mixture remains. This 
is not the case of inanimate beings, which have no form beyond the form of mixture. 
Putting the two passages together, this is the general account of compounds that the two 
regents hold: 1) souls need the form of mixture in order to inhere in or inform matter; 2) 
what they need is matter already constituted as a body, in virtue of the form of mixture; 3) 
this form is thus present in any physical compound, and immediately inheres in prime 
matter.10 
Two words in these accounts should not pass unnoticed. First, the reference to ‘body’ in 
Baron 1627: it is not a novelty in Aristotelian philosophy, as Zabarella had previously held 
that matter constitutes itself immediately as body; yet, it is not a commonly accepted 
Scholastic doctrine. Regents claim something different though: it is not matter alone which 
can be called ‘body’, but matter when informed by the form of mixture. In order to obtain a 
body some form (some ordering of the underlying matter) must be provided. This ordering 
is not posterior to the soul and caused by it, but prior to it and necessary in order to have a 
soul informing a compound. Is this the form educed from matter? Baron and Reid do not 
make such a connection for us, but it is arguable that, with the exception of the rational 
soul, all forms, both souls and forms of mixture, are educed from matter. The form of 
mixture is a material form, therefore it is educed from matter. 
Form of mixture seems to be an unnecessary third element added to the structure of 
compounds, which could be intelligible with only two elements in play, matter and form 
for inanimate beings and matter and soul ( = substantial form) for animate beings; indeed, 
this is Thomas’s theory. Following Scotus, the regents introduce this third element in order 
                                         
10
 See also, Sibbald 1625, TP I. 
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to account for the empirical evidence of the preservation of the body of animate beings 
through the process of corruption, or better, to preserve the numerical identity between the 
body and the corpse of animate beings.11 It seems evident that we can identify the corpse of 
Socrates by its identity in appearance with the former living body of Socrates: the 
traditional example is the numerical identity of a scar on the corpse and on the body. We 
can say, regents argue, that the scar is the same; we can even say on this basis that the 
corpse is the corpse of Socrates by means of the physical identity with Socrates before 
death. There must then be something more solid than just resemblance if we are to 
formulate a judgment of identity. The preservation of the ordered bulk of matter that we 
call the corpse of Socrates is thus due to the preservation of the form of mixture of the 
body of Socrates, a form which is not corrupted in the very moment of Socrates’ death. 
The second remarkable element is the terminological shift from ‘substantial form’ to 
‘soul’: substantial form is virtually missing from these accounts, perhaps because it is too 
general a concept, and does not provide any explanation for the problem of resolution. The 
distinction between substantial form and accidental form is not in question; what regents 
do is to go beyond the identity between substantial form and soul when it comes to animate 
bodies. In fact, it is arguable that the form of mixture in the corpse of Socrates is the 
substantial form of the corpse. In principle, the objections that 1) the corpse does not act as 
a single unified body ( = it is not alive); or that 2) it is not a stable compound, because it 
quickly corrupts, do not prove the theory false, because point (1) is applicable to any 
inanimate body, and (2) is proper to both animate and inanimate bodies. Regents 
intentionally speak of ‘soul’ to clearly mark the difference between what makes a body 
alive and what makes a body such. 
 
 
1.1.2 Resolutio and corruption in general 
 
Reid 1614’s second quote is: 
 
non in omni corruptione resolutio fit in Materiam 
primam immediate. [TP 24.3] 
 
which is the conclusion of the following passage: 
 
                                         
11
 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 45. 
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Materia prima non est corpus sensile. An non ergo 
aliquid et per se quantum, insensile tamen erit. Non 
omnis quantitas est per se sensilis, nisi terminos 
habuerit. Arist. igitur corpus sensile tantum dicetur, 
quod actuatum est, et forma aliqua praeditum. Ideo 
materia prima sola, proprium est generationis 
subjectum idem sub utroque termino. Respectu 
subjecti unius et ejusdem sub utroque termino, non in 
omni Corruptione resolutio fit in Materiam primam 
immediate. [TP 23-24] 
 
This passage is quite complex. It touches on a few fundamental theories, and the 
conclusion rests on the not immediately clear qualification “respectu subjecti unius et 
ejusdem sub utroque termino”. The qualification has to be explained in order to understand 
the conclusion. Reid accepts the Aristotelian doctrine that prime matter is not a sensible 
body, because only a defined quantity (that is, with termini) can be called ‘sensible’. Thus, 
prime matter is sensible only when its quantity is given certain boundaries by form, and 
this only happens in a compound. The notion of sensible body falls under this description. 
The second part is more interesting: the regent introduces it by ‘ideo’ (therefore), but the 
sequitur is not too clear. Reid appears to be saying that prime matter is sensible only when 
informed; and therefore only prime matter can be the proper subject of generation identical 
sub utroque termino, with the termini of generation being the initial moment (terminus a 
quo) and the final moment (terminus ad quem). Prime matter can be such a subject because 
in itself it has no termini; it can receive them only from form. Thus, with respect to the 
same individual subject (the subject undergoing change), and with respect to both termini 
(a quo and ad quem), it appears that resolution into prime matter does not occur in all 
corruptions (where ‘corruption’ here is taken to mean ‘loss of all boundaries’ and 
‘acquisition of new boundaries’). It is then explained again why in the case of corruption of 
animate bodies resolution into prime matter does not occur: there is no such a thing as ‘loss 
of all boundaries’ since the form of mixture remains. 
 
 
1.2 Rejection of form of mixture: different theory of resolutio 
 
The passages quoted above are representative of a tendency among the regents, who 
usually accept the following central points: 1) there is such a thing as a form of mixture; 2) 
matter informed by it is constituted as body; 3) resolution into prime matter occurs when 
the totality of a compound is corrupted: in the case of animate bodies, the corruption of the 
union between soul and body leads only mediately to resolution into prime matter, after the 
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logically and metaphysically posterior corruption of the union between the form of mixture 
and the body; in the case of inanimate bodies, resolution into prime matter occurs 
immediately when the union between the only substantial form of the compound (form of 
mixture) and the body is corrupted; 4) there are thus two substantial forms within each 
animate compound, a soul and a form of mixture, and only one in each inanimate 
compound.12 We can also argue that regents include the form of mixture in the number of 
material forms educed from matter. 
There are nevertheless some regents who hold a different view on this subject, and 
contrary to the case of Dalrymple on secondary causality and the potency of matter, these 
alternative opinions do inscribe themselves within a more established Scholastic tradition. 
One case is Rankine 1627, who explains his view in a thesis under the heading: ‘Materia 
prius respicit formas substantiales, postea accidentales, 7. Metaph. text. 8.’ The passage is 
quite informative on some regents’ rejection of the idea that the scar in a corpse is the same 
as the one in the formerly living body. His conclusion runs as follows: 
 
Non igitur manet eadem numero cicatrix in 
cadavere, quae prius fuit in vivente, licet sensus ita 
manet, cum sensus circa obiectum commune 
(cuiusmodi est unitas aut diversitas numerica) etiam 
debite approximatum errare possit. [TP XIV.7] 
 
This passage is not the explanation why the scar is numerically different; Rankine is 
simply starting from the theory that senses can be wrong when apprehending a common 
object. In other words, senses are wrong when providing our intellect with the evidence of 
the resemblance between these two scars, which is then interpreted as the sign of the 
numerical identity of the scar. In Rankine, as much as in the other regents, the question is 
about the ‘numerical’ identity of the scar because the scar of the dead body does look like 
the scar of the living body. What differs is the type of identity. Rankine’s explanation is to 
be found in the previous lines. He agrees with the idea that accidental forms are in matter 
only in virtue of the substantial form they inhere in: substantial forms are not required by 
matter in order to be a material cause (matter is receptive by essence), yet they are required 
for matter to be receptive as a material cause of accidents: matter is receptive towards 
substantial forms, which enables matter to also receive accidental forms: 
 
                                         
12
 In the passages analysed, regents favour the expression forma mistionis: I believe that a perhaps more 
common expression for the same concept is forma corporis. Regarding the four points listed here, besides 
the texts already quoted, see also: points 1-2: Wemys 1612, TP 4; Baron 1617, TM II-III; Baron 1627, TP 
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Omnia igitur accidentia quae in materia generantur, 
praesupponunt in materia formas substantiales, per 
quas materia redditur ens actu, atque ita idoneum 
subiectum accidentium. 
Forma substantialis licet ad materiam non 
requiratur tanquam concausa receptionis passivae in 
eodemmet genere causae, necessario tamen requiritur 
tanquam causa formalis, per quam habilis redditur ad 
sustentanda accidentia quae in eo generantur. [TP 
XIV.1-2] 
 
The conclusion follows: 
 
Unio igitur substantialis, causa est unionis 
accidentalis. Ea igitur dissoluta, et altera dissolvetur 
necessario. [TP XIV.3-4] 
 
This is why the scar cannot be numerically one: the numerical identity of the compound 
is dissolved the very moment the compound corrupts. The accidental form of the scar 
inheres in matter only in virtue of the substantial form: when Socrates dies, his compound 
dissolves (his substantial form parts from his matter), so the remaining scar cannot be the 
same scar, contrary to empirical evidence, as other regents would say. Rankine does not go 
further in his analysis. Rankine seems to reject the account of the form of mixture, with all 
its consequences. In particular, he seems to intend ‘substantial form’ as the unique form of 
a compound (with the exception of accidental forms). It is then hard to say whether 
Rankine can be counted as belonging to a Scotistic approach regarding this subject. One 
solution might be that Rankine includes the form of mixture in the general expression of 
‘substantial form’: in that case, his theory would agree with that of Reid and Baron. 
Unfortunately Rankine does not clarify this point, so what his solution was is left open. 
 
On the more general level of the definition and analysis of the essence of prime matter, 
regents show a vast agreement; in the more particular account of powers and properties, 
however, some differences among them become apparent. This is hardly surprising: within 
the same metaphysics of prime matter as entitative act several theories of the structure of 
compounds are equally available and coherent. This is the case of the form of mixture: we 
cannot say that this theory represents the totality of the theses, because an equally valid 
tendency is to account for the corruption of a compound with the presupposition of the 
unicity of substantial form. Unanimity is reached again with respect to the rejection of 
                                                                                                                           
VIII.4; Murray 1628, TP XI; points 3-4: Craig 1599, TP 10; Baron 1621, Disputatio physica, I; Sibbald 
1625, De pluralitate formarum in eodem composito, TP I-V; Leech 1633, TP IX. 
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Transubstantiation, since it is not only a question of philosophical debate but primarily of 
confession of faith. As it appears, regents were then given autonomy in matters of 
philosophy; there was significant disagreement among them, and in the records of 
universities no mention of philosophical impositions can be found. The term ‘Scotistic 
Eclectism’ appears to describe the overall character of the Theses philosophicae quite 
accurately; but we are confronted with quite a number of regents in six different colleges 
across all Scotland, and perfect agreement among them is in any case unlikely. Their 
substantial acceptance, in general, of Scotism in natural philosophy13 explains the 
remarkable fact that it is possible to treat the theses as a unified corpus of philosophical 
teaching, and not just as a corpus of philosophy that is, in some sense, “Scholastic”. 
 
 
 
2. Prime matter and quantity 
 
Quantity is a fundamental property of prime matter. Chapter 4 will deal with the debate 
over the relationship between quantity, accidents and place. In this section the focus is on 
quantity as a property, and especially on the relation between quantity and prime matter 
with respect to the compound. 
As a property, quantity is not part of the definition of prime matter: rather, qua proprium, 
it is an attribute possessed in virtue of the essence of prime matter. In the Isagoges, 
Porphyry defines ‘proprium’ in four different ways. The last one applies to quantity in 
relation to prime matter: 
 
‘fourthly, what belongs to the totality of a species 
always and exclusively, like, for example, the ability 
to laugh belongs to a man.’ [12, 17-18]14 
 
A standard reception of this theory is found in Baron 1627, who writes that it is not more 
possible to separate the ability to laugh from the human nature than quantity from matter 
[TP III]. This passage will be relevant in the next chapter as a counterargument against the 
                                         
13
 We have seen so far that the regents accept, in general, these central doctrines of Scotism: 1) metaphysics 
of essence, which includes 2) prime matter understood as, in some sense, actual; 3) the form of a body, 
which informs prime matter for the reception of the rational soul, which implies 4) the plurality of forms 
in a human compound. We will see in part II how Scotism also shapes the theory of movement of the 
regents, even if it carries less weight than in metaphysics. 
14
 ‘[T]evtarpon dev, ejf´ou| sundedravmhken to; movnw kai; panti; kai; ajeiv, wJß tw·~ ajnqrwvpw· to; 
gelastikovn.’ 
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theory of the separability of quantity from matter that Catholic Scholastics bring forward 
when justifying the miracle of Transubstantiation. When dealing with Transubstantiation, 
regents focus on the analysis of the relation between matter and quantity, deploying a 
precise criticism of the view held by Catholic Scholastics. Apart from this context, the 
account of matter and quantity is usually centred upon what sort of contribution to the 
compound is proper to matter in virtue of its quantified nature. The focus on the compound 
as a substance is more evident here. 
As early as Stevenson 1596 (the first set of theses available),15 regents have it that form 
receives quantity from matter: this means that form, which is per se immaterial and 
indivisible, in virtue of the union with matter is made material and divisible. This is still a 
general statement, but sufficient to establish a logical and metaphysical tie between form 
and quality on the one side and matter and quantity on the other. Some regents claim that 
form and matter are two incomplete substances (category 1) from which respectively 
quality and quantity (categories 2 and 3) follow, somehow putting form and matter on the 
same level as subjects of accidents. 
Three points seem to be involved here: 1) quantity as primarily related to prime matter 
rather than to form; 2) matter as a subject of accidents; and 3) the question whether this 
relation of quantity to matter weakens the substantial unity of the compound. This latter 
point finally introduces the debate on the kind of unity that is proper to physical 
substances. We have seen that the majority of the regents accepts the notion of the ‘form of 
mixture’, drawn from the Scotistic tradition. Medieval Scholastics divided themselves most 
famously between Thomists and Augustinians on this topic: according to the Thomists the 
substantial form is unique to a compound and the plurality of substantial forms endangers 
the essential unity of the compound because a unity per se cannot be the result of the union 
of two acts, namely the soul and the form of mixture. It appears that this question mainly 
concerns the account of the unity of the human substance, and the related status of the 
body. We will see how the regents are not unanimous in their theory of the union of the 
compound, even if they seek to establish a unity per se. This debate will be central in 
modern philosophy as well, and will originate from the Cartesian account of matter as res 
extensa. 
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 A translation of the natural philosophy section of Robertson 1596 is in the Appendix. 
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2.1 Relation between prime matter and quantity 
 
Claiming that quantity is primarily related to prime matter does not tell us anything about 
the specific nature of this relation: within the theory of quantity as a proprium of matter, 
more than one direction is coherent with the premise. The standard Scholastic solution is 
that quantity, as an accident of prime matter, can also be separate from it, just like any 
other accident of a subject. Regents, as we will see, disagree with this: the explanation of 
this disagreement might lie in the different accounts of quantity as an accident or as a 
proprium of prime matter. So, prior to the qualification of this relation, which is the object 
of the next chapter, an as yet unqualified relation between matter and quantity may here be 
stated. According to the regents, natural compounds are quantified in so far as they are 
material, and the opposite holds too: material compounds are quantified. Consequently, 
forms acquire quantity as forms of material compounds. Considered alone, form is devoid 
of materiality and quantity: form is an indivisible and immaterial principle, and it can be 
regarded as material and quantified only when affected by the other principle of 
compounds. The union between matter and quantity is then stronger than the union 
between form and matter: this is evident because form and matter are independent 
principles, while quantity is a property of matter. Stevenson 1629 claims that the: 
 
species, quam forma tribuit materiae, adventitia est, 
et quasi extrinseca; quae cum ex se sit pars distincta a 
forma, ut potentia ab actu, habet per se speciem suam 
incompletam et invariabilem suamque unitatem 
specificam, quam non tollit diversitas specifica 
formarum quasi materialis et inadaequata, cum 
conveniant in una formali adaequata ratione sub qua 
referuntur ad potentiam materiae. [TP VII.3] 
 
With respect to matter, form is something ‘extrinsic’ affecting it ‘from outside’ 
(adventitia). Matter itself already enjoys a proper specific unity, so form cannot give 
specific unity to matter. Furthermore, this specific unity is preserved through the specific 
diversity conferred by form. This diversity is somehow added to the existing specific 
identity of matter. Thus, the theory that: 
 
major igitur est unio inter quantitatem hanc et 
materiam, quam inter materiam et formam 
substantialem, saltem secundum quid. [King 1612, TP 
3.V] 
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is grounded on the notion of a metaphysical act proper to prime matter and not dependent 
on form. The qualification ‘secundum quid’ is intended by King to limit the validity of the 
statement to matter and form considered alone, that is, not while in a compound. Without 
the qualification, the unity of the compound would result in being accidental, posterior to, 
for example, the unity per se between prime matter and quantity. Matter and form can 
never exist one apart from the other: the really existing being is always the compound, not 
the two components alone. Yet, ‘by consideration of the nature of matter’, the union with 
quantity is logically prior to the ‘extrinsic’ union with form. 
 
 
2.2 Prime matter: quantity and accidents 
 
Forma non est patibilis per se, sed quatenus in 
materia. Compositum patitur quidem; non tamen 
quatenus ex materia et forma constans, sed solum 
quatenus habet materiam. Nec sola forma, nec 
compositum, est subiectum cui inhaerent accidentia 
materialia quae de novo producuntur. Ergo in sola 
materia inhaerent. Materia ad recipienda accidentia 
non exigit formam, ut concausa receptionis passivae in 
eodemmet causae genere. [...] Forma accidentalis pro 
sui inhaerentia praesupponit formam substantialem, 
non tamen ei inhaeret. [Fairley 1615, TP XX] 
 
Regents hold that there are accidents which inhere directly in matter, in virtue of which 
they subsequently inhere in the compound.16 This theory should be understood in the light 
of claims that regents make concerning resolution and substantial form. In the process of 
natural corruption, if it is not true that all accidents inhere in the substantial form which 
gives actuality to the compound (this being the position of Stevenson 1629), then the 
problem arises of what the subject of these accidents is. 
The two main solutions offered by regents are the following: 1) a minority holds that all 
accidents inhere in the respective substantial form of the compound: thus, the corruption of 
a compound is the dissolution of the relation between a form and its matter. Accidents 
cease to inhere in matter since there is no form by means of which they can inhere in it. 
This might be the solution given by Rankine 1627. A more widely accepted solution is 2) 
that some accidents inhere in matter immediately, without a substantial form, qua accidents 
directly flowing from quantity. So, the corruption of a compound does not entail 
immediately that the totality of accidents is corrupted, but only that the accidents directly 
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 See also, for example: Adamson 1600, TP IIII.2-3; Fairley 1615, TP XX; Mercer 1632, TP XII.6. 
Part I, chapter 3. De proprietatibus materiae primae 88 
flowing from form are corrupt. The previous passage by Fairley opens and closes with a 
reference to heat (calor) and the way in which a compound can be said to receive heat: 
 
Si daretur calor separatus a materia nihil pateretur. 
[...] Ut materia possit calorem recipere satis est 
quaelibet forma specifica. [TP XX.1-10] 
 
Heat without matter does not affect a compound, indeed it is not a physical phenomenon. 
Heat requires matter in order to affect a compound, but also any material form is enough to 
make matter receptive to heat. Thus, heat does not affect matter insofar as matter is 
informed by a form specifically apt to receive heat; on the contrary, matter informed by 
any form whatever is receptive to heat. The role played here by form is simply to give 
formal existence to matter (which cannot exist without form), not to make matter in any 
way receptive to heat in virtue of some specific formality. We can say then that a 
compound is heated or cooled only in so far as it is material. 
Regents think that ‘being hot’ is a property of compounds immediately (because only 
compounds can ‘be hot’) but also that this property is grounded in matter, not in form. 
Matter in general provides the material cause of the process of heating; any material 
compound is potentially receptive to heating in the same way, because the underlying 
matter is the same. This is an important physical consequence of the identity of the 
material principle among all compounds.17 
It seems clear that matter can be the subject of accidents. Regents call the accidents 
flowing from matter ‘material accidents’, distinct from ‘formal accidents’, due to form. In 
the categories, accidents flowing from quantity are ‘material accidents’, accidents flowing 
from quality are ‘formal accidents’: quantity depends on matter, quality on form. Granted 
that only form can provide physical actuality to matter, it follows that accidents inhering in 
matter receive from form physical actuality. Before information, these accidents are said to 
be ‘interminate’ (interminata), ‘without a terminus’. Baron 1627 explains this point well: 
 
Cum omnis terminatio materiae, et quantitatis 
proveniat a forma, quantitas a materia profluens, ut 
talis, non alia esse potest quam interminata quae licet 
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 A question might be raised regarding the four elements: it is not possible to say that the matter of fire is 
receptive to heat in the same way as the matter of earth is. This is a general problem in the reception of 
Aristotle, and in the supposed unity of natural philosophy. In fact, commentators always pointed out the 
difficulty of reading the Physics in the light of the De generatione et corruptione and vice versa (G. 
Giardina, La Chimica Fisica di Aristotele, Rome, Aracne, 2008, chapter 1). The regents do not address 
this difficulty directly: I suppose that the answer might be that what has been said about matter and heat 
applies to physical substances as a mixture of the four elements, which are never found separate. Thus, 
prime matter would be the result of the mixture of the four elements. 
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in rerum natura semper terminata existit, spectata 
tamen in essentia sua et quatenus a materia profluit, 
nullis terminis definita est, sed indifferens ad omnes. 
[...] Quantitatem igitur interminatam, materiae 
coaevam a Thomae sectatoribus, immerito explosam, 
nos cum Averroe Zabarella, et alijs magis nominis 
Philosophis, jure merito retinendam censemus. [TP 
III.6] 
 
If all termini come from form, material accidents before information must be without 
termini; this does not mean (against Thomas), that all accidents come from form, or that all 
accidents are not actualised before information: in fact, these accidents qua interminate are 
rooted in the metaphysical act of prime matter and a compound is affected in such and such 
a way also because of these accidents. Among these accidents, extension is central, as will 
become clear in chapter 4. Regarding the relationship of quantity and form, Strang 1611 
tells us that: 
 
formam materiatam necessario extensionem ac 
quantitatem requirere, eidemque continuitatem non 
nisi ex accidente competere. [TP IV.2] 
 
A material form is the form of a compound: this form is necessarily quantified and 
extended by accident, not as form, but as form-in-matter. 
 
 
2.3 Unity of the compound 
 
Since compounds are the only natural beings which have existence in act, for this reason 
they are properly called ‘substances’. Form and matter are ‘incomplete’ substances, 
because they exist only as principles of complete substances: their union, which makes up 
for their respective incompleteness, yields a complete substance. It is then clear that any 
discourse in natural philosophy has the substances as proper objects, and form and matter 
as objects only insofar as they are principles of these substances. In general physics (the 
branch of natural philosophy which deals with the principles of the natural world) form and 
matter are analysed separately one from the other not because they can exist in such a way, 
but only because the knowledge of components instructs us on the nature of the 
composition. 
In reading graduation theses on general physics, the problem arises of what sort of unity 
is proper to natural substances: in the context of a metaphysics of essence, which ascribes 
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an act to both form and matter, the essential unity of the compound is granted by the notion 
of ‘incomplete’ acts originating a ‘complete’ act. The stress on the components does not 
entail the priority of the components over the compound. Nonetheless, when it comes to 
analysing the properties of form and matter, we might find the philosophical justification 
for a weak dualism within the compound: both form and matter are subjects of properties, 
mutually dependent with respect to a compound, mutually independent with respect to the 
essence. 
The influence of the philosophy of Aristotle is strong in the Theses philosophicae. 
Famously, Aristotle’s philosophy is centred on the concept of substance, as the first and 
ultimate being. A more thorough discussion of this matter will be possible after our 
analysis of movement. Regarding this first outline of the structure of substances, I believe 
that we can find two main tendencies among the regents, which are two sides of the same 
coin. First, only natural substances are complete substances, so proper activity and 
existences can only be predicated of them, not of their components. Secondly, regents 
sharpen the focus on form and matter as subjects of properties, in order to investigate the 
properties of the compounds in relation to their respective immediate substrata. 
These two approaches are not exclusive, and they are often present within the same 
regent. This is why statements as the following: 
 
Forma et compositum non terminant diversas 
actiones; sed unam tantum, quae intrinsece terminatur 
ad formam, extrinsece ad totum compositum. [King 
1624, TP VI.1] 
 
Nulla forma speciem, aut numerum dat materiae, 
sed toti composito. [Reid 1618, TP II.4] 
 
should not be seen as contradictory. In fact, form and matter, as functional concepts, 
always refer to the compound and to one another, because it is only in a compound that 
form and matter become complete. As in King 1624, the action of form is the same as the 
action of the compound; not simpliciter though, because the action of form must refer 
intrinsically to form, and only extrinsically to the compound. How should this 
‘extrinsically’ be understood? The stress on form does not endanger the unity of the 
compound; logically form is not the compound. In Reid 1618, in agreement with other 
regents quoted above, form does not specify matter, but does specify the compound of 
which matter is the material cause. Any activity of form on matter and of matter on form 
can only occur in the compound; nonetheless, the essences of its components entail an 
essential unity but not an essential identity between them. 
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Two distinct narratives are discernible here: some regents favour a stronger identity 
theory,18 thus stressing the role of substance prior to its components: usually this view is 
obtained by reducing the activity of substances to form. An evident case is the acceptance 
of the Aristotelian doctrine that form is the nature of a substance (which I treat in part II, 
chapter 2); otherwise, other regents underline the equally important role of the two 
principles of substances,19 as in the case of quantity extended per se, a significant 
contribution of the Scottish regents in response to the philosophical analysis of 
Transubstantiation (part I, chapter 4). One aspect does not prevail over the other, because 
the ultimate way in which forms and matter exist is as form and matter of a compound. The 
notion of forma mistionis can profitably be brought to bear here. At first sight the idea that 
matter and its accidents remain after the corruption of their substance could be interpreted 
as a strong statement in favour of the existence of matter independent of form. But it is not 
so, because a form proper to matter is still required in order to justify the ordered structure 
that we acknowledge in this portion of matter deprived of its substantial form. 
A proponent of the first narrative is Rankine 1627. He does not talk of form of mixture, 
and seems to hold that there is only one substantial form within each compound, as we 
have seen. He also holds that matter is nature not secundum se, but as form itself [ut eadem 
forma]: two natures in the same compound are not possible [TP VI.4]. Yet, in thesis IV.4 
Rankine touches on a much debated theory, once again of Scotistic origin: 
 
Licet igitur forma, compositum, et modus unionis, 
sint entitates realiter distinctae, non tamen requirunt 
distinctas actiones per quas producuntur, cum solum 
compositum habet esse per se. 
 
This passage is very dense. The regent expounds his theory of the unity of natural 
substances: 1) form, compound and mode of union [modus unionis] are really distinct 
entities; 2) yet, they are produced by the same action: that means, the eduction of form 
from matter is identical with the production of the compound and of the mode of union; 3) 
because only the compound has existence per se, form cannot exist independent of matter. 
The interesting remark is the talk of ‘mode of union’. The regents usually reject this 
notion, on the basis of the Aristotelian theory of substance, which does not accept a third 
                                         
18
 For example, Robertson 1596, TP 10; Reid 1610, TP 2 and 1622, TP 6; King 1624, TP VI; Baron 1627, TP 
3; Rankine 1627, TP VI (to be contrasted with IV); Wemys 1631, TP XIII. 
19
 For example: King 1612, TP 3; Rankine 1627, TP IV (to be contrasted with VI); Murray 1628, TP II; 
Mercer 1632, TP XII; Leech 1634, TP IV. 
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entity of such a kind within the compound: in order to yield a unity per se of a compound, 
a substantial form and matter suffice. 
Rankine seems to be close to the position of Suárez, who inscribes himself within the 
Scotistic tradition. Suárez writes that: 
 
distinguitur ergo materia a forma tamquam res a re. 
Et confirmatur nam compositio substantiae ex materia 
et forma est realis et physica [...] ergo ex duabus 
rebus. [DM, 13, IV, 5]20 
 
According to Suárez then, a third element is required in order to convey a unity: a ‘mode 
of union’ between form and matter, which are regarded as extrinsic principles. It is 
arguable that Suárez was influenced by the Augustinian tradition, to which Scotus 
belongs.21 Even if Rankine’s position is not accepted by many other regents, it is 
interesting to note that Rankine is still part of the Scotistic tradition: simply of a different 
one. I believe that this is further evidence for the influence of Scotus on the regents, and, 
more generally, on much of the Scholasticism of the seventeenth century. 
One final remark helps us to qualify the theory of substance of the regents as a 
metaphysics of essence. According to King 1616: 
 
differentia individuans, etsi quidditas seu essentia 
non appelletur, cum non attingatur in definitionibus, 
nihil tamen impedit, quo minus sit pars essentialis 
individui. [TL V] 
 
The individuating difference of a substance is part of the essence of the substance, even 
if it is not properly called ‘essence’ and it is not part of the definition. Only individuals 
exist, qua individual essences. 
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 Quoted in L. Prieto López, Suárez, crocevia nella filosofia tra medioevo e modernità, p. 15. The author 
claims that the account of the unity of the substance in Suárez anticipates and paves the way for the 
dualism of modern philosophy (in particular of Cartesian philosophy) because form and matter are 
different things and according to the Thomistic principle no unity per se is possible between two things in 
act. The interpretation of Prieto López is heavily influenced by Thomistic philosophy, and by the 
interpretation of modern philosophy as the historical moment of the breaking down of the unity of 
substances, of the forgetfulness of being and of the victory of phenomenalism. 
21
 Ivi, pp. 12-13. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
The majority of regents come close to attributing an ordered structure to matter without 
form, in virtue of the eduction of material forms, the metaphysical act of prime matter and 
the matter as subject of properties and accidents; yet, they could not bring themselves to 
adopt the theory of matter existing without form, since that would have required them to 
reject the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance. Dalrymple 1646 is an interesting case of 
breach of the Scholastic doctrine of prime matter as pure receptive potency. He reinterprets 
‘potency’ as an active internal principle of change within matter, not as the receptiveness 
and indeterminateness of matter towards form. I argued that on this point Dalrymple has 
moved beyond traditional Scholasticism, while most of the other regents thought and 
taught in the Scholastic way in natural philosophy. 
In this chapter I sought to expound the theories of the Theses philosophicae regarding the 
properties of prime matter. My focus has been on prime matter as a ‘quasi-substance’, 
namely as subject of properties in its own right, independent of form. The first part on 
resolution into prime matter has shown that regents accept the notion of form of mixture, 
which is the form proper to the body in the animate compound (including men) and the 
substantial form in inanimate compounds. In the former case, no resolution into prime 
matter occurs immediately in the corruption of the compound; in the latter, resolution 
occurs immediately. 
The second part has dealt with the introduction of quantity as the key property of prime 
matter. In virtue of quantity, prime matter is the subject of properties which flow from 
quantity: as we will see in the next chapter, these properties include extension per se in 
place and divisibility. The focus on form and matter in the theses prompted the question of 
the unity of the natural compound: regents seek to preserve the essential unity of the 
compound by overlooking the Scotistic talk of mode of union and haecceitas, even if their 
metaphysics of essence brings them close to these notions. 
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Part I, chapter 4 
 
 
 
De Transubstantiatione 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary remarks 
 
One of the most noteworthy features of the Theses philosophicae is the unanimous 
rejection of the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation. What the regents have to say on 
this matter is noteworthy historically and theologically, because it is a sign of the definitive 
fracture within the Christian world at the beginning of the modern era. It is also 
philosophically noteworthy, for, while rejecting a doctrine in itself theological, the regents 
not only employ philosophical tools, but also expound philosophical conclusions whose 
importance is paramount in order to understand the ‘Reformed’ character of the 
Scholasticism of the theses and also to shed some light on the relationship between 
Scholasticism in the early seventeenth century and modern philosophy. 
The doctrine of Transubstantiation is a historical product of Christian theology 
concerning the interpretation of the evangelical episode of the Last Supper. In the three 
synoptic Gospels, Jesus, at the offering of the cup and the breaking of the bread among his 
apostles utters these words: “This is my body which is given for you; do this in 
remembrance of me. [...] This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is shed for you” 
(Luke 22: 19-20, King James Bible). As far back as Thomas Aquinas, these words are 
usually interpreted by the Church of Rome to mean that bread and wine really became the 
body and blood of Jesus. In the words of Thomas: 
 
hinc autem manifestum est quod in conversione 
praedicta panis in corpus Christi non est aliquod 
subiectum commune permanens post conversionem: 
cum transmutatio fiat secundum primum subiectum, 
quod est individuationis principium. Necesse est 
tamen aliquid remanere, ut verum sit quod dicitur, hoc 
est corpus meum, quae quidem verba sunt huius 
conversionis significativa et factiva. Et quia substantia 
panis non manet, nec aliqua prior materia, ut ostensum 
est: necesse est dicere quod maneat id quod est praeter 
substantiam panis. Huiusmodi autem est accidens 
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panis. Remanent igitur accidentia panis, etiam post 
conversionem praedictam. [CG, I, 4, 63] 
 
Leaving the philosophical considerations aside for the moment, it is important to notice 
that Thomas underlines the importance of the words hoc est corpus meum as univocally 
meaning that the bread turns into the substance of the body of Jesus - and the same for the 
wine, which turns into the blood of Jesus. The doctrine of Transubstantiation entails that 
during the mass the officiant calls for God’s miracle of changing what originally are bread 
and wine into the real body and blood of Jesus: this change does not affect the external 
appearance of bread and wine, which retain some of their original characteristics, such as 
flavour and colour. 
Scholastic philosophers always faced the challenge of accounting for this miracle in a 
way which was intelligible in terms of philosophical rationality, without questioning the 
truth of the dogma based on the authority of the Gospel. This is a case of the broader 
debate revolving around the relationship between philosophy and theology: Scholastics 
hardly abandoned the Thomistic slogan of philosophy as the ‘ancilla theologiae’, ‘maid 
servant’ of theology.1 More precisely, they held that any true proposition in philosophy can 
be true only if in agreement (or not in contradiction) with an authoritative proposition in 
theology, while the opposite is not required. This way, philosophical propositions can be 
divided into propositions 1) in open contradiction with theology [for instance, ‘the world is 
eternal’]; 2) in agreement with theology [‘the world is created’]; and finally 3) neutral with 
respect to theology [‘world is composed of matter and form’]. Propositions of type 1 are 
not acceptable in Scholastic philosophy: much of the opposition to Aristotle from the 
twelfth century onwards highlighted those of his doctrines that contradict the Bible. 
Propositions of type 2 are acceptable and philosophically fruitful, because they show the 
inner harmony between natural reason and revelation. Propositions of type 3 are acceptable 
and can be fruitful: the example of the universal structure of matter and form is an 
Aristotelian cornerstone of many Scholastic systems.2 
The doctrine of Transubstantiation is surely a philosophical product because we do not 
find it in the scriptures in a philosophical form (namely, shaped in the form of Aristotelian 
philosophy). It took form first in the Eastern Roman Empire in a context of Platonism and 
Aristotelianism, and was then fully accepted and strengthened by Scholastics in the Middle 
Ages. Thomas’s formulation enjoyed great success also because of the official 
                                         
1
 Formula which is repeated in R. Baron’s Philosophiae theologiae ancillans, St Andrews 1621. 
2
 The relation between ‘natural light’ and ‘light of the faith’ is treated by Baron in exercitatio III of the 
Philosophiae theologiae ancillans, passim, in particular art. VII and arts. XXIV-XXVI. 
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endorsement by the Council of Trent (1543-1568), after which it became the official 
formulation of the Catholic Church, accepted until now. For this reason, the doctrine of 
Transubstantiation is also a historical product, which awaited only the decision of a church 
council to be definitive in words and spirit once and for all. Before that, many concurrent 
versions of the explanation of the dogma were available, all of them equivally valid insofar 
as they all referred back to the letter of the Gospel; yet all different, according to the 
individual philosopher who formulated them. For instance, Thomas’s and Scotus’s 
accounts of Transubstantiation are equivally valid theologically because both admit the 
real presence of the body and blood of Jesus, yet they are not the same account because 
they reach the same conclusion in different ways and within different philosophical 
systems.3 
It is not possible to prove that regents had Thomas’s account in mind when writing 
against the Catholic dogma of Transubstantiation: what appears from the texts is that their 
main (yet not unique) opponent is Francisco Suárez, who held a position similar to 
Thomas, and who was arguably the most important Catholic voice at the time of the 
regents. The position they address will be clear from their own criticisms, but a few 
preliminary philosophical remarks will be useful. In the passage quoted above we find in 
nuce all the most important features of the philosophical account of Transubstantiation: 1) 
the conversion takes place at the level of substance, so it is a total conversion of one 
substance into another, leaving no room for the coexistence of two substances (i.e. bread 
and body) in the host; 2) what remains after the conversion are the accidents of bread and 
wine, as Thomas explains it, ‘ut verum sit quod dicitur’: these words can be taken to refer 
to both the conversion and the preservation of accidents. This text explains the nature of 
the conversion and hints at the most debated difficulty about Transubstantiation, the 
preservation of accidents. 
According to the Medieval Scholastics, sense-data (sensibilia) when apprehended by 
their proper sense do not deceive us: in a formula, sensus circa propria sensibilia non 
decipitur. Experience testifies so firmly to the presence of the original characteristics of 
both bread and wine after the conversion that any account of Transubstantiation must 
include a justification of this preservation. The first step in this direction is taken when 
                                         
3
 “The doctrine of transubstantiation, first declared orthodoxy at Lateran IV, might be said to be fully 
explicated only among the theologians at the Council of Trent”, L. P. Wandel, The Eucharist in the 
Reformation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 219. The theologians of the Council of 
Trent did not accept Luther’s formulation of the distinction between the ‘real presence’ and 
‘transubstantiation’ in the host. John Knox’s position (ivi, 184-192), very influential in Scotland, accepts 
the ‘real presence’ but does not accept transubstantiation. It is noteworthy that in Knox and in the regents 
the same question of the sacrament of the host is answered in two different ways: one theological, the 
other philosophical. Knox seems to be content with a formulation which could not satisfy a Scholastic 
philosopher. 
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Thomas denies that the matter of bread (or of wine) could remain through conversion. He 
reasons as follows: matter could be the substance of these remaining accidents, 
preservation of matter would then explain the preservation of accidents. Yet, matter only 
exists in virtue of form, because the substantial form is the act of matter, which is pure 
potency. If matter remained, then its form would remain as well, since matter alone is 
nothing. In which case the conversion, far from being explained, would have been rejected. 
In CG, I, 4, 65, Thomas addresses the issue of the accidents: 
 
nec est impossibile quod accidens virtute divina 
subsistere possit sine subiecto. Idem enim est 
iudicandum de productione rerum, et conservatione 
earum in esse. Divina autem virtus potest producere 
effectus quarumcumque causarum secundarum sine 
ipsis causis secundis: sicut potuit formare hominem 
sine semine, et sanare febrem sine operatione naturae. 
Quod accidit propter infinitatem virtutis eius, et quia 
omnibus causis secundis largitur virtutem agendi. 
Unde et effectus causarum secundarum conservare 
potest in esse sine causis secundis. Et hoc modo in hoc 
sacramento accidens conservat in esse, sublata 
substantia quae ipsum conservabat. 
 
In the normal course of nature, no accidents can be without their substance; in the 
miracle of Transubstantiation ‘it is not impossible’ that God by potentia absoluta maintains 
these accidents once their substance is destroyed. God cannot create mutually contradictory 
effects but he can produce an effect without its (secondary) cause. This general principle 
implies more than Thomas spells out in this passage: the reference is to the theory of the 
dependence of all creatures on God as metaphysical primary cause of all things. This bond 
cannot be broken, while the bond between created things (viz. between a substance and its 
accidents, or between a cause and its effect) can be broken, even if only by God. 
Transubstantiation is therefore a substantial conversion of one substance into another, 
where the accidents of the former substance are preserved, as experience shows and 
philosophy explains. 
Quantity is an accident of matter. In the Scholastic sources of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the role of quantity in Transubstantiation is evident. Starting from 
the inclusion of quantity in the number of accidents which can exist apart from their 
substance, in the seventeenth century it was common doctrine that quantity acts somehow 
as a ‘quasi-substance’ in which the other accidents continue to inhere once their substance 
(the compound of form and matter) is dissolved. Suárez holds that: 
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in mysterio Eucharistiae Deus separavit 
quantitatem a substantiis panis et vini, conservans 
illam, et has convertens in corpus et sanguinem suum; 
id autem fieri non potuisset, nisi quantitas ex natura 
rei distingueretur a substantia. Neque sufficere 
potuisset distinctio modalis, quia substantia non potest 
esse modus quantitatis. [DM, 40, II] 
 
Quantity as an accident must be different from its substance (no substance is identical 
with its accidents); more precisely, by the truth of Transubstantiation, quantity must be 
different from substance ex natura rei, as thing from thing, because not even God can make 
it that a mode and its substance are separate.4 And it is true that in order to make 
Transubstantiation intelligible and not only accepted by faith, quantity is separate from its 
substance. 
The connection between the theory of prime matter and Transubstantiation is clear in 
virtue of the role played by quantity: quantity is an accident of matter, thus any relation 
between quantity and matter influences the possible account for Transubstantiation. 
Different relations imply different accounts. And clearly the regents and Suárez did not 
agree on this matter. The philosophical relevance of this seventeenth century debate is not 
limited to this question but it extends to other key Scholastic doctrines, such as the notions 
of accident, substance and place. I take the regents as intentionally distancing themselves 
from what they considered to be “ad hoc doctrines” that had been devised for the purpose of 
justifying a theological dogma, against what the regents call ‘good philosophy’. 
The entirety of the debate on Transubstantiation cannot be dealt with in this context. I 
shall follow the Theses philosophicae in order to expound the criticisms that the regents put 
forward but also to present the theories they oppose, when the regents themselves fail to do 
so. This account may not be inclusive of all the qualifications of the debate but it will cast 
light on the principal moves in the debate. The first notion to explain is that of accident: 
what is included in the definition of accident, whether its definition includes inherence in a 
substance and what sort of inherence it includes. I shall compare the definitions of accidents 
in standard seventeenth-century Scholastic texts with the definition that regents provide. I 
                                         
4
 “Si alterum extremorum ex illis duobus tale est, ut per potentiam Dei absolutam, non possit sine alio 
conservari, magnum argumentum est, illud essentialiter tantum esse modum quendam, et non veram 
entitatem; quia si esset vera entitas non posset habere tam intrinsecam dependentiam ab alia entitate, ut 
non possit Deus illam supplere sua infinita potentia: ergo solum potest id provenire ex eo, quod illud 
extremum in sua intrinseca essentia non est entitas, sed tantum modus”, Suárez, DM, 7, II, 7-8. A mode 
of a substance cannot exist without its substance and not even God can bring about that it does. I 
understand the expression ‘ex natura rei’, which in DM, 1, VII, 13-20 is employed to describe the modal 
distinction, to mean the real distinction, in order to make sense of the following: ‘neque sufficere 
potuisset distinctio modalis.’ In conclusion, according to Suárez, quantity is not a mode of a substance 
because God can bring about that it exists without its substance, therefore they are really distinct (DM, 40, 
II, 1). 
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will then move to the analysis of a particular accident, quantity, which, as we have seen, is 
the category in virtue of which other accidents can inhere in matter, such as the colour and 
the flavour of the bread of the host. In this analysis, the notions of extension and place will 
become central, because the regents disagree with Catholic Scholastics on both points. I 
shall argue that the regents develop theories of the relationship between matter and quantity 
and between quantity and extension in place which are coherent with their Reformed 
reading of the words hoc est corpus meum. 
 
 
 
2. Separability of the accidents 
 
The dogma of Transubstantiation famously influenced the development of the philosophy 
of Descartes, who took pain to ensure that his system was compatible with the teaching of 
the church in his replies to Arnauld. Scottish regents too dedicate many lines to analysing 
the philosophy Catholic Scholastics used to make sense of their faith. It is primarily a 
matter of faith: regents belonged to the Reformed Church of Scotland, which rejected the 
dogma of Transubstantiation, and offered a different reading of the passages in the Gospel 
that Catholics read as a verbatim proof of such miracle. The Scottish position was not 
accepted by all Reformed churches, but Scottish reformers developed their national church 
from Calvinist elements and offered a symbolic reading of the host.5 
Both the Catholic and the Scottish Reformed positions are inevitably influenced by a prior 
and pre-philosophical acceptance of a specific faith and the role of philosophy is to provide 
clarification of and perhaps also support for the faith. At bottom, regents and Catholic 
Scholastics go down the same path, and if scholars (often looking at Scholasticism from the 
standpoint of modern philosophy) criticised the Catholic justification of Transubstantiation 
as “ad hoc” or theologically motivated, I do not see why the same cannot be said about the 
regents. Yet, as we will see, the regents, in their criticism of the Catholic position, develop a 
theory which anticipates modern philosophy. The question is not whether these theories are 
theologically motivated or not: because all of them are; not even whether this is a licit move 
in philosophy. The question is rather how fruitful this relationship between theology and 
philosophy has been. I believe that the regents actively worked on their philosophy inspired 
by their faith. 
                                         
5
 For example, Robert Bruce, sermon The Lord’s Supper in Particular 1: 3. The things contained in the 
Sacrament, in R. Bruce, The Mystery of the Lord’s Supper, edited by T. F. Torrance, Edinburgh, 
Rutherford House, 2005, pp. 70-90. 
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The accusation that the doctrine was being sustained by ad hoc philosophical principles is 
not completely off-target. Consider, for example, Suárez writing about the separability of 
quantity from matter, therefore about their real distinction: 
 
Approbatur sententia reipsa distinguens 
quantitatem a substantia. Atque haec sententia est 
omnino tenenda; quamquam enim non possit ratione 
naturali sufficienter demonstrari, tamen ex principiis 
Theologiae convincitur esse vera, maxime propter 
mysterium Eucharistiae. [DM, 40, II, 8] 
 
Suárez’s opinion is that the separability of quantity from substance cannot be grounded on 
pure natural reason but is in need of a theological justification, which nonetheless opens up 
the way for philosophy in its attempt to justify it. Suárez cannot offer any other example of 
quantity deprived of its own substance, nor of substance deprived of its own quantity: all 
examples refer to Transubstantiation and related philosophical corollaries (for example, the 
presence in the host of the body of Christ without its actual dimensions). 
 
 
2.1 Definition of accident in a standard Catholic theory 
 
As mentioned earlier, quantity is an accident: when considered qua accident it must fall 
under the definition of accident, traditionally established by Porphyry in Isagoges 12, 23-
25: “Accident is what can be present or absent in a subject”, without implying the 
destruction of the subject.6 This definition is found in an introduction to Aristotle’s 
Categories and it inevitably reflects the vast debate over the real nature of this treatise. 
Whether the Categories are originally a logical or a metaphysical work, or both, Scholastics 
used to interpret it as an ontological work that shows how we classify things and how things 
really are, and establishes a harmony between knowing and being. Porphyry’s definition is 
generally accepted by Catholic Scholastics. Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is clear about this 
point. In the logical part of his Summa philosophica quadripartita (I, II, V) Eustachius 
makes this definition his own from a logical point of view, without moving any further. In 
the metaphysical part instead, he takes on the problem of the separability of accidents in 
metaphysical terms, arguing that: 
 
                                         
6
 ‘[S]umbhbekovß ejstin o} ejndevcetai tw~· aujtw~· uJpavrcein h] mh; uJpavrcein.’ My translation. 
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inhaerentiam quidem aptitudinalem in formali 
ratione accidentis contineri; verum inhaerentiam 
actualem saltem ex natura rei ab accidentis natura seu 
essentia esse diversam. [...] Quod autem inhaerentia 
proprie dicta, quae est actualis, diversa sit ab 
accidentis essentia, ex eo liquet, quod ratio accidentis 
posita sit in eo quod sit forma subjecti completi seu 
totius compositi actu existentis. [...] Ex quo intelligis 
inhaerentiam non esse rationem formalem accidentis, 
sed modum existendi ipsius naturalem. [SPhQ, pars 
IV, Tractatus de principiis entis, II, VIII] 
 
In logic, the difficulty concerning separability is overcome by distinguishing between 
proprium and accidens and ultimately, when it comes to inseparable accidents (such as the 
whiteness in a swan, following Eustachius’s example), Eustachius claims that they are 
separable when we consider the subject as species, not as an individual.7 In metaphysics the 
appeal to species is not available, because the separability of accidents concerns one single 
individual in its own structure. The philosophical tool by which this solution is acquired is 
the Scholastic notion of inhaerentia, divided into actualis (actual) and aptitudinalis 
(aptitudinal). An accident inheres in its substance in the vast majority of cases: more 
precisely, in all physical cases. Yet, actual inherence cannot be mistaken for inherence per 
se, neither for the formal reason of the accident, because in no way can the accident be 
defined by its inherence in a particular substance. Eustachius holds that “the reason of the 
accident is that it is the form of the complete subject or of the whole compound existing in 
act.” The actual inherence is only a mode of existence natural to the accident, not its 
definition. It is a mistake to take a mode for the definition, since it goes against the logical 
principle e dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter non valet illatio. The more correct 
notion (more correct because coherent with all the possible instances of the existence of 
accidents) is that of ‘aptitudinal’ inherence, which refers to actual inherence as not included 
in the essence of the accident. While actual inherence is different from the essence of the 
accident as thing from thing, aptitudinal inherence cannot be separated from the accident; it 
is included in the essence of the accident: 
 
sicut enim fieri nequit ut accidens non sit aptum 
inhaerere, sic etiam evenire potest ut interdum actu 
non inhaereat, licet nihil, quoad ad ejus essentiam 
attinet, immutetur. [ibidem] 
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 Scotus raises the question of the identity between inseparable accident and proprium in the quaestio 32 of 
his Quaestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge: ‘Utrum proprium sit distinctum universale ab accidente.’ 
Scotus’s answer is that proprium and accident are two distinct universals because they do not have the 
same definition: the proprium cannot adesse and abesse. 
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So, accidents are separable from their substance because it is not actual inherence but only 
aptitudinal inherence that is part of their essence. Therefore, Scholastics developed a theory 
of accidents compatible with the non-natural occurrence of an accident not inhering in its 
substance, as in the case of Transubstantiation. 
Eustachius is not directly mentioned in the theses, while Suárez is. Suárez will play a 
major role later on, while Eustachius’s exhaustive style proves very useful for clarifying the 
starting point, and made the fortune of his main work which I am quoting, the Summa 
philosophica quadripartita. Due to the nature of the Theses philosophicae, in this case as in 
many others the regents do not dedicate much room to the exposition of theories other than 
theirs, and this work is left for the reader. I consider Eustachius a useful source for an 
exposition of what can be taken as the general framework of a Catholic account of 
Transubstantiation. 
 
 
2.2 Definition of accident in the Theses philosophicae 
 
Regents usually treat the notion and definition of accident in the Theses logicae, the 
section dedicated to logic, in accordance with the origin of the debate, Porphyry’s 
introduction to the Categories. They never treat it in metaphysics, and when it comes to 
physical theses all the work is done on the basis of what has been previously said in the 
logical theses; in the theses we do not see the shift in analysis from logic to metaphysics as 
in Eustachius. 
The definition of accident is usually expressed in traditional terms and the definition by 
Porphyry is never rejected. In principle, regents agree that the characteristic of accidents is 
that it can be or not be in a substance, without changing the definition of the substance 
itself. Where they stand apart from Catholic Scholastics is not with respect to the general 
notion of separability of accidents, but the separate existence of accidents. By ‘separate’ 
regents do not mean ‘an accident existing in a substance other than its original substance’, 
or more generally, ‘an accident without its own substance’. They seem to shape the problem 
around the very idea of a separate accident with ‘separate’ meaning ‘without any 
substance’. 
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The words of Leech 16388 are very clear: “Accidens existere posse se solo extra 
subjectum, manifeste implicat [contradictionem] / Ad accidentis solidiorem realitatem 
stabiliendam actualem in subjecto inhaerentiam adscribimus” [TL 26-27]. In this passage 
the regent is expounding two key features of his notion of accident that many other regents 
agree on: 1) an accident cannot exist se solo, by its own powers, outside a subject; 2) an 
accident has actual inherence in a subject, the same actual inherence denied to it by 
Eustachius. We find in Seton 16309 a similar theory, appealing to the authority of Averroes: 
“Inhaerentiam actualem, quam ab aptitudinalis nihil differre putant, de accidentis 
(quantitatis nimirum aut qualitatis) esse essentia, Averroes ejusque sequaces affirmare non 
verentur” [TL 17]. 
In particular, I wish to focus on two longer passages, the first one by Stevenson 1629: 
 
Ad realem omnis accidentis existentiam, requiritur 
actualis inhaerentia in subjecto, nec sufficit 
aptitudinalis [...] / Licet multa dentur accidentia 
separabilia, sine quibus subiectum potest existere, 
nullum tamen datur separabile, quod sine subiecto 
existit, aut existere potest. / Adeo, ut illud, accidentis 
esse est inesse, de actuali inhaerentia, et reali 
existentia praecipue intelligatur. [TL XVI] 
 
and the second one by Baron 1627: 
 
Essentia rei non recipit magis et minus, sed omnino 
in indivisibili consistit. Ergo inhaerentia actualis non 
est de essentia accidentis: haec enim admittit 
intensionem et remissionem. / Cum igitur accidentis 
esse sit inesse, inhaerentia aptitudinalis erit propria 
ratio et essentia accidentis. / Ut subsistentia se habet 
ad Substantiam, ita inhaerentia actualis ad Accidens, 
h. e. non est ipsa ejus existentia, et longe minus 
                                         
8
 David Leech (ca. 1600- ca. 1657/64), minister of the Church of Scotland and regent. MA at King’s College 
in 1624, under John Forbes. Leech’s name is listed in the Latin form ‘David Leochaeus’ in Forbes’s 
Theses philosophicae. According to the DNB he was appointed regent in 1628, while the FAM reports 
1627. We have Leech’s graduation theses for the years 1633, 1634, 1635, 1636, 1637, the same year 
when he published the academic oration Philosophia Illachrymans, and 1638 (the DNB does not list the 
1638 theses, and reports the wrong title for the 1637 theses). He initially refused to sign the covenant and 
his later conversion to it was not fully convincing. After leaving university due to his initial rejection of 
the National Covenant, Leech lived between the army and the church. Created DD by Aberdeen 
University in 1653, he never returned to Scotland, and died after 1657, when he is last recorded in 
London. DNB. 
9
 John Seton, MA in 1616, probably at Marischal College, Aberdeen, as a ‘Iohannes Setonus’ is mentioned in 
the list of graduants in Aedie 1616. Seton took the position of James Sibbald as Professor of Natural 
Philosophy in 1626, at Marischal College. As for his predecessor, we have a list of graduation theses 
written by Seton which do not follow the four-year curriculum: 1627, 1630, 1631, 1634, 1637 and 1638. 
Seton graduated classes which studied under different regents as well. FAM, p. 34: the graduation theses 
of 1638 are not included in the list in FAM. 
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essentia, sed tantum existendi modus. / Non minus 
impossibile est accidens existere extra omne 
subjectum inhaesionis, quam substantiam non 
subsistere, sed alteri inhaerere. / Aptitudinalis 
inhaerentia accidentis, non vel per ipsum Dei 
potentiam absolutam, separari potest ab ejus 
inhaerentia actuali; quoniam hujusmodi separatio 
implicat contradictionem. / Nullum igitur praebet 
patrocinium absurdo Pontificiorum commento 
Transubstantiationis, et accidentis existentiae extra 
omnem substantiam. [TL X-XI] 
 
Read alongside the two points mentioned before concerning accidents always being in a 
subject and concerning the ascription of actual inherence to accidents, these two passages 
yield important insights in the regents’ position. Stevenson is intentionally using the word 
‘separabilis’ in two different senses, one logical, the other metaphysical. He claims that 
even if there are separable accidents according to the definition of accident, yet there is no 
separate accident in the metaphysical sense, that is, an accident which exists without a 
subject, and more generally an accident which could exist without a subject. Stevenson is 
even clearer when saying that ‘accidentis esse est inesse’, de facto eliminating from the 
definition of accident the reference to ‘adesse et abesse’. In a metaphysical sense, accidents 
cannot exist without a subject because their being is defined as ‘being-in-something’ to 
which they are related by actual inherence. The relation between an accident and its 
inherence in its own subject is one of identity. 
Baron shows his knowledge of contemporary Scholastic texts by hinting at Eustachius’s 
passage at length, until just before the definitive reference to Transubstantiation. Baron 
bases his idea that actual inherence does not belong to the essence of accidents on the fact 
that essences are immune from intension and remission, while actual inherence is not:10 
what Baron is saying is that the actual inherence of an accident can undergo degrees of 
change which cannot be included in an essence - by definition immutable. We find again 
the expression ‘accidentis esse sit inesse’, which is typical in the Theses philosophicae. 
Despite the similarity in words and the agreement on aptitudinal inherence as the reason of 
accidents, Baron’s stress on the inesse of accidents distances him from Eustachius. 
The relation between inherence and accident is explained by an analogy of proportion 
presented as follows: 
 
                                         
10
 Intension and remission (intensio and remissio) are the addition and subtraction degree by degree (gradus 
ad gradum), which imply a more and a less (magis and minus). They only occur in the category of 
quality, therefore they are qualitative ‘more’ and ‘less’. In the category of quantity addition and 
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Subsistentia : Substantia = Inhaerentia actualis : Accidens 
 
whose meaning is that actual inherence belongs to an accident just as subsistence does to a 
substance, that is, as a mode of existing, not as part of the essence. A substance does not 
entail existence in its essence, because it is a created and finite being. Existence is 
ultimately something which happens to a substance, not something a substance does 
essentially. What the substance does is be both in logical non-contradiction within itself 
(since a contradictory being cannot exist) and also in metaphysical subjective potency to 
being (the openness to existence of a substance before its coming into being). In the same 
way, actual inherence happens to an accident, but it is not something which the accident 
either is or does.11 
In the second part of the passage, the differences with Eustachius become even more 
remarkable, and unbridgeable. Baron holds two theories Eustachius cannot agree with: 1) 
the separate existence of an accident is paralleled with the attribution to a substance of 
modes of existing which are per se a negation of the very definition of substance: both not 
subsisting and also subsisting in something else. This would turn a substance into an 
accident: it is a categorial mistake, as is a separate accident, which would become a 
substance. 2) The inseparability of aptitudinal inherence from actual inherence. These two 
inherences are not equivalent, because actual inherence is not part of the essence, while 
aptitudinal inherence is. Yet, they cannot be separated, the former being a mode of the 
second, as their separation implies a contradiction. Baron refers to God’s absolute power, 
which is unable to perform the separation, while it was enough in Eustachius to ground the 
separate existence of accidents from their substances. I do not think that here the notion of 
absolute power is being questioned by Baron; the difference lies in the sort of task do-able 
by the exercise of God’s absolute power: separating a mode from its substance is beyond 
God’s powers, as also Suárez claims. The main point made here by Baron is the 
inseparability of actual inherence from aptitudinal inherence, which sets him apart from the 
philosophy structured with a view to justifying Transubstantiation. 
I also believe that the analogy proposed by Baron is best explained by reference to the 
metaphysics of essence. In fact, just as subsistence flows from the essence of a substance, 
actual inherence flows from the essence or reason of an accident. Subtracting subsistence 
from a substance is as contradictory as subtracting actual inherence from an accident. 
                                                                                                                           
subtraction are called augmentation and diminution. In this context, intension and remission are not 
predicable of essences because they are unchangeable, if absolutely considered. 
11
 Young 1613, TL 7.II: “nullum accidens inseparabile subjecto suo necessarium est.” The actual inherence 
understood as part of the definition of the accident does not imply that an accident inheres in a substance 
necessarily: an accident is, by definition, accidental to whatever substance it inheres in. 
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All the four texts mentioned make use of a specific interpretation of the word ‘separate’ 
which is taken to mean, as I said, ‘without any substance’. It is clear that this meaning is 
what regents see in the words of Catholic Scholastics, and this is the point that they reject. 
The regents’ rejection both of Transubstantiation and of this notion of separability of 
accidents are not exclusively based on this strong interpretation of ‘separate’, which is 
likely to be rejected by Catholics too, since it seems to imply the idea of accidents really 
existing per se as substances. What regents reject is, more precisely, the process by which 
accidents are separated from their own substance and sustained without it by God’s power: 
for the Catholics, this is the only way to account for Transubstantiation (in a sense, a breach 
in the normal course of nature). For the regents, this is an illicit move that contradicts the 
definition of accident. As Stevenson writes, “accidens ex Porph. semper existit in subjecto, 
et ex Arist. non potest seursum existere ab eo in quo est” [ibidem]. 
In conclusion, regents seem to include in the definition of accident the notion of the 
existence of accidents in their own natural substance, a notion which per se is not included 
in a traditional Scholastic definition. In fact, even if the reason of accidents prescinds from 
existence, their nature absolutely considered implies that they can only exist in a 
substance.12 What regents do is to stress this characteristic and extend it to the reason of any 
individual accident. As we have seen, this has a dramatic effect on the concept of 
Transubstantiation, an effect which the analysis of quantity clarifies even more. 
 
 
 
3. Quantity: its role in Transubstantiation and its relation to extension 
 
Quantity in relation to prime matter has been treated already in part I, chapter 3. The 
conclusions reached there can be summarised in two key points: 1) quantity is a primary 
attribute of matter, which matter has independently of form; and 2) prime matter can be the 
subject of accidents in virtue of quantity. 
These conclusions can be expanded by saying that quantity is essentially extended, that 
means that it has ‘parts beyond parts’ (partes extra partes): any quantum must be divisible 
into different parts. On this very general basis shared by all Scholastics differences are then 
developed by individual philosophers. The regents’ debate over Transubstantiation starts 
from and expands the theory of the relation between matter and quantity. 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis, I, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1, corp., quoted by M. Henninger, Relations: 
medieval theories 1250-1325, Oxford, Clarendon, 1989, p. 16. Thomas is referring to the ‘absolute’ 
accidents, quality and quantity. 
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As already remarked, what makes Transubstantiation special in Scholasticism is its 
having the nature of a breach in the natural course of events, a breach which has to be 
accounted for within the theory of natural substances. In Catholic Scholastic natural 
philosophy, the miracle of Transubstantiation cannot be left unaccounted for: the theory of 
natural substances seeks to explain the theological evidence of the separability of the 
accidents of bread and wine, even if Catholic Scholastics agree that Transubstantiation is 
not a natural event. 
When it comes to quantity, one more question becomes central: quantity is what matter-
related accidents inhere in, such as extension: thus, what does it mean that quantity is by 
essence spatially extended? The solutions that regents give to this question set them 
definitively apart from their contemporary Catholic colleagues. 
 
 
3.1 Traditional views on quantity and extension 
 
While the ten categories are usually divided into substance and nine remaining 
‘accidents’, modern Scholastics further distinguished the nine accidents into quality and 
quantity as primary accidents and the remaining seven categories. The distinguished role of 
quality and quantity has been acknowledged since the thirteenth century, as we find it in 
Thomas and Scotus. Scotus calls them ‘absolute accidents’, introducing a terminology 
accepted up to the time of the regents, for example by Eustachius. Specifically, Scotus, 
while defending the notion of Transubstantiation, claims that absolute accidents can exist 
without a substance because they are not identical with their relation with their substance. It 
is then a case of real relation in which it is not contradictory that the foundations of the 
relation (viz. substance and absolute accidents) can exist without the existence of the 
relation.13 Scotus’s contributions in defence of Transubstantiation will be useful to us later 
on while we seek to clarify the theory of the regents. 
Let us accept that quantity, as an absolute accident, enjoys the condition of being the 
subject of inherence of other accidents, namely those depending on matter. In the words of 
the apocryphal Thomistic text Summa logicae: “quantitas autem licet sit fundamentum 
aliorum accidentium, tamen sequitur materiam” [4, 5]. These accidents following from 
matter include the category of place, important for further aspects of Transubstantiation. 
With regard to quantity, the Coimbrans affirmed that: 
                                         
13
 This is an application of the principle of separability (two things are really distinct if it is not contradictory 
that one exists without the other) which Scotus definitively linked to the real distinction. M. Henninger, 
Relations, pp. 71-74. 
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essentialem ac propriam quantitatis rationem 
consistere in extensionem partium, hoc est, ut 
quantitas ipsa in ordine ad se habet partem unam extra 
aliam [...] ita effectus formalis quantitatis est 
extendere partes materiae easque in toto ipso inter se 
ordinare ac distinguere. [In Phys., 4, 5, 4, 2] 
 
This general point is not questioned by the regents, who however raise many doubts with 
respect to further qualifications of quantity and extension, particularly by Eustachius and 
Suárez: 
 
Verum cum duplex esse possit extensio rei quantae: 
altera velut externa et sensibus perspecta, nempe 
extensio partium in ordine ad locum, altera vero 
interna, a sensibus plane remota, nempe extensio 
earumdem partium in ordine ad se, gravis hic 
difficultas oritur, quaenam extensio sit essentialis et 
intima ratio quantitatis. [...] Repugnet enim aliquid 
esse sine eo quod ad ejus essentiam pertinet;14 quare 
necesse est rationem quantitatis in alio positam esse, 
nempe in extensione partium in ordine ad se. Et certe 
natura prius est partes rei quantae extensas esse 
simpliciter, seu in ordine ad se, quam in ordine ad 
locum, cum locus sit quid extrinsecum rei quantae. 
[SPhQ, I, III, II, I] 
 
Secunda ratio principalis ex mysterio sumpta est, 
quia sub speciebus consecratis est corpus Christi 
Domini cum sua naturali quantitate, et tamen non 
habet extensionem partium suarum in ordine ad 
locum, ut ex fide constat; ergo actualis extensio 
partium substantiae in ordine ad locum non est ipsa 
quantitas substantiae. [DM, 40, II, 14] 
 
To avoid the evident problem of the body of Christ converted into a host with a much 
smaller extension in space, Eustachius and Suárez (among others, of course) develop the 
distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ extension. The former is the type of extension 
that a thing has in ordine ad se, within itself; the latter is the type of extension we usually 
experience, in ordine ad locum, extension extended in place. Eustachius and Suárez agree 
that, in order to save the miracle of Transubstantiation, we must include in the essence of 
quantity only the internal extension, despite the fact that Transubstantiation could be the 
only occurrence where this distinction between internal and external extension actually 
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 The implicit reference is to Christ’s body in the Eucharist without extension in ordine ad locum. 
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carries weight. Eustachius also reminds us that we can not include in an essence something 
extrinsic: in this case, place with respect to quantity.15 The relation between place and 
quantity is between really distinct things. It is not contradictory that quantity is without 
place, nor therefore that the extended body of Christ is deprived of a fixed relationship with 
its extension in place, while retaining extension in ordine ad se. 
 
 
3.2 Regents on quantity and extension 
 
Essentia et formalis ratio quantitatis in extensione 
partium consistit, seu in eo quod est habere partem 
extra partem secundum extensionem et molem. / Quod 
quantitas sit loco extensa [...] quodque sit 
impenetrabilis et hujusmodi, ei tantum conveniunt in 
ordine ad extrinsecum nempe locum. / Distinguenda 
igitur erit essentialis extensio partium quantitatis inter 
se, qua distinctam obtinent magnitudinem et molem, 
ab hac extensione in ordine ad locum, cum sine hac 
prior servari possit. / Et nihilominus substantia a 
quantitate separata esto a se, et ex se partes entitativas 
habeat, partes tamen extensionis et molis non haberet. 
/ Quare cecutiunt ad lucem veritatis, qui asserunt 
separata quantitate a substantia corporea eam in eadem 
dispositionem permansuram [...] cum substantia 
corporea quantitate spoliata ad modum indivisibilem 
ratione loci reducatur, ita ut nullum prorsus locum 
occupet. [King 1612, TL 11] 
 
Quod itaque quantitas primo substantiae tribuit, 
non est extensio partium entitatis, sed molis, quae ex 
propria natura loci sunt occupativae. / Ideo essentialis 
ratio quantitatis ponitur in hac extensione partium 
molis. [Reid 1622, TL XIV.3-4] 
 
Quantitatem materiae inseparabili nexu cohaerere. 
[Baron 1627, TP III] 
 
Nec aptitudinalis extensio in loco, ut somniant 
Metusiastae, nec actualis, est essentia quantitatis, sed 
ponitur in extensione suarum partium, et partium 
substantiae, inter se et in toto. / Inconsiderate 
distinguunt quantitatem in internam et externam, prout 
partes in entitativas et quantitativas, qui quantum 
illocaliter esse volunt. [Mercer 1632, TL IX.4-5] 
 
                                         
15
 I believe that this remark is similar to the exclusion of actual inherence from the essence of accidents. It 
will be important later on in the chapter, when dealing with the role of Julius Caesar Scaliger in the theses 
(section 5.1). 
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The relations between accident/actual inherence and quantity/extension in place are 
treated by the regents in the same way. They hold that actual extension must always be 
predicated of quantity: when it comes to physical bodies, it is always possible to pair off 
actual extension with extension in place and conversely potential extension with extension 
within itself. King 1612 is more sympathetic to a Catholic Scholastic phraseology when he 
writes that we must distinguish between extension of parts among themselves and extension 
in place: yet, his conclusion is that extension without being extended in place is not real 
extension, with a reasoning similar to Baron 1627 on actual inherence and accident. The 
shared view seems to be that extension in place is part of the essence of quantity; in 
particular, quantity provides matter with extension in place, not simply with extension. To 
obtain a body actually extended in place, quantity is all that is required. There is no need for 
a further actualisation of the internal extension. To underline the similarity with the 
question about accidents, Mercer 1632 uses the expression ‘aptitudinal extension’ instead of 
‘potential extension’.16 
The link between quantity and extension in place is so strong that every quantified body is 
per se extended in place. The relation between quantity and extension in place is one of 
identity: it does not occur that quantity is without the qualification ‘extended in place’ 
because ‘extended in place’ is part of the definition (therefore of the essence) of quantity. 
Mercer 1632 is the only regent to name the theory of Transubstantiation by reference to 
‘Metusiastae’, the ‘proponents of µετουσία’, the Greek name for Transubstantiation. The 
problem addressed in these passages by the regents is the impossibility for an extended 
body to exist without its actual extension, as it is required by the presence of Christ in the 
host. This remark inevitably leads to the question of the relation between extension and 
place. 
As a conclusion of sections 2 and 3 of this chapter, we can argue that: 1) accidents cannot 
exist without a substance, because their essence is to be in a substance (inesse). According 
to the regents, Catholics want us to believe that in the miracle of Transubstantiation 
accidents are preserved without their substance; 2) quantity is an accident, thus it cannot 
exist without its substance. Furthermore, quantity is interpreted by Catholics as a ‘quasi-
substance’, in which other accidents inhere. Even if this is the case, accidents inhering in 
quantity cannot be without quantity. But regents argue that quantity without its actual 
extension in place breaks this principle; 3) quantity must always be actually extended, 
because extension in place is part of its essence. And this is rejected by Catholics, who 
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 See also, for example: Forbes 1624, TP XVII; Stevenson 1625, TL XI; Armour 1635, TL VII; Wemys 
1635, TP VII. 
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claim that Christ’s body can fit in the host because his body does not have extension in 
place, though it retains its internal extension and proportions. 
 
 
 
4. Quantity and place 
 
The final concern regents have about the traditional account of Transubstantiation regards 
the theory of place implied by the real presence of Christ in the host. In order to make sense 
of the words of the Gospel, hoc est corpus meum, Catholics interpreted the corporeal 
presence of Christ as referring to the whole substance, which thus retains all its 
qualifications but one, inevitably, the extension of its parts in place. Extensio partium in 
ordine ad locum is thus considered as not identical with the extension of Christ’s body, 
therefore it is separable from it without any changes occurring in what it is. The philosophy 
behind Transubstantiation is made coherent with the nature of the miracle. 
Regents deploy against the core doctrines of this philosophy precise arguments aimed at 
showing its philosophical inconsistency:17 the theory of place is simply derived from 
quantity as intrinsically extended in place. 
 
 
4.1 Quantity and place as independent 
 
To understand better the positions of the regents, a few remarks about the Catholic 
version of the problem are in order. I shall again follow Eustachius and Suárez, both of 
them for their clarity, and the latter on account of the direct references to him made in the 
theses. 
The first concern is about impenetrabilitas, the power of quantity to resist the presence of 
another substance in the same place. The presence of the enduring accidents of the matter of 
bread and wine raises the question about their impenetrability with respect to the incoming 
substance of the body and blood of Christ. Eustachius makes a clear distinction between 
active and passive impenetrability. He affirms that: 
 
                                         
17
 I am clearly not concerned with the theological rejection of Transubstantiation, which follows patterns 
different from what we read in the Theses philosophicae and with which it is arguable that all regents 
agreed. 
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duplex esse munus quantitatis respectu loci; nempe 
locum replere, et ab eodem loco quodvis aliud corpus 
removere: Quod posterius praestat quantitatis 
penetrationi obsistendo, non quidem active, sed 
negative [...] Hoc autem posteriori officio privatur 
quantitas, cum duo corpora in eodem situ et loco 
ponuntur. [SPhQ, III, I, III, III] 
 
In a now familiar way, Eustachius picks out what really belongs to the essence of quantity 
and what does not, to establish what must remain during the conversion. The distinction 
utilises the notions of activity and passivity, ‘locum replere’ (filling a place) and ‘aliud 
corpus removere’ (removing another body [from the same place]). The latter is said to 
belong to quantity only negative: it is not something that quantity does per se, but only 
something that follows from what quantity does per se, which is filling a place. Eustachius 
then concludes that it is this negative power which is subtracted from quantity during the 
conversion, when two bodies are placed in the same place. 
Suárez openly states the connection between place and Transubstantiation: 
 
Quamvis autem Deus penetret duo corpora in 
eodem loco, non reddit illa non quanta, nec ex duobus 
quantis facit unum quantum, sed servata distinctione 
quantitatum constituit ea in eodem spatio. Sic ergo, 
licet Deus corpus bipedale constitueret in spatio 
pedali, non per condensationem, sed per partium 
penetrationem, non redderet illud minus quantum, 
neque duas partes in unam redigeret, sed in eodem 
spatio eas collocaret, quod longe diversum est. [...] 
Nego tamen substantiam sic constitutam in spatio 
indivisibili non fore quantam, nam corpus Christi 
quantum est etiam in sacramento, licet sit etiam in 
punto indivisibili. Et ratio est quia, ut dixi, quantitas 
non est actualis extensio in spatio, sed aptitudinalis, et 
hanc retinere potest corpus, etiamsi actu non sit in 
spatio extenso. [DM, 40, II, 22] 
 
It is clear that both Eustachius and Suárez are here dealing with a non-natural occurrence 
from the expression ‘Deus penetret duo corpora in eodem loco’. In the normal course of 
nature impenetrability is a constant attribute of quantity, only a direct act by God can make 
two different things occupy the same place. Thus, the solution is that the quantities of two 
things occupy the same place; alternatively put, the quantity of two things, one of which is 
penetrated by the other one, is not eliminated, nor does one single quantified thing emerge 
from two distinct quantified things. What happens is that God can constitute these two 
things in the same place, while preserving the distinction of their respective quantities. The 
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agreement with the dogma is complete because quantity can preserve the body, the whole 
body. The particular existence of this quantified body without its natural extension in place 
is that of an indivisible point, what has been called by some scholars ‘ghostly matter’ 
because it is all there yet it is deprived of its extension in place. 
Two corollaries of this position are: 1) extension is not essentially measurable; and 2) the 
simultaneous presence of two bodies in the same place is not contradictory. 
 
 
4.2 Regents’ rejection of ‘ghostly matter’ 
 
On this matter more than on others, regents refer directly to their chief opponent, Suárez. 
His theory of matter as shrinkable to a single point while retaining all of its qualifications,18 
thus its essence, was perceived as a very well-argued one, and unanimously criticised by 
regents. The fact that they mention Suárez directly shows that this theory was regarded as 
the best argued and clearest account offered by Catholic Scholastics. 
Forbes 1624, one of the Aberdeen doctors, sharply states his two main concerns in one 
brief sentence: “Docentes [pontificij] accidentia esse posse quamvis subjecto non insint, et 
corpus extensum, loco non mensurari. Quorum alterum accidentium naturae, alterum 
corporis quanti conditioni ita adversatur” [TL XVII]. His objection is that the three 
fundamental philosophical premises of Transubstantiation (accidents not inhering in a 
subject, extended bodies not extended in place and, implicitly, quantity without its subject) 
are against both the nature of accident and extended body, thus are contradictory theories, 
not grounded in any essences of really existing things. 
His colleague at Aberdeen, Seton, comments in 1637 on Suárez’s theory of simul 
praesentia with the same words: “Alii [Suárez] quantitativam individui corporis in pluribus 
locis simul praesentiam, corporis naturam plane evertere contendunt” [TP IV]. 
Suárez’s theory is seen as contradictory with respect to the natures of things involved. By 
extension, we can say that regents would consider in the same way a notion of place which 
is not the only extended portion of space where a body can extend itself. 
Wemys 1635 has Suárez in mind when he writes that: 
 
Nullum corpus potest esse in loco definitive, nisi in 
eodem sit etiam localiter et circumscriptive. / Si 
corpus Domini non sit praesens in altari localiter et 
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 Apart from extension in place, as we have seen. 
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circumscriptive, neque in eodem erit illocaliter, et (ut 
aiunt) sine modo quantitativo. [TP VII.1] 
 
This is a direct reference to DM 51, VI, 2, where Suárez engages with the notion of being 
in place definitive and circumscriptive. Something is in place definitive when “ita est 
alicubi, ut intra definitum spatium contineatur, nec simul possit extra illud naturaliter 
esse”; while it is circumscriptive “quando ita ibi est, ut sit tota in toto, pars in parte spatii 
quod occupat” (ibidem). Suárez then affirms that: 
 
est autem subintelligenda negatio extensionis, nam 
alias etiam id quod est circumscriptive in loco, erit 
etiam definitive, quia non potest naturaliter simul esse 
in alio ubi; quo sensu illud esse definitive potest 
generice sumi prout distinguitur ab esse ubique, quod 
est proprium Dei. Ut ergo illa sit ratio specifica, 
subintelligenda est negatio, videlicet, ut res illa dicatur 
esse definitive in loco, quae licet non habeat in loco 
extensionem partium, intra certos tamen limites ita 
continetur, ut extra illud ubi naturaliter esse non 
possit. [ibidem] 
 
Regents reject the possibility of ‘negatio extensionis’ when it comes to bodies: a body 
cannot be in a place definitive (that is, a body cannot have its ubi) unless it is also in place 
circumscriptive: which means, when a body is somewhere in space, it cannot obviously be 
in two places at the same time, it must also be in the same ‘somewhere in space’ in respect 
of all its proportions and parts, the whole as a whole, the parts as parts. The qualification 
circumscriptive cannot be subtracted from definitive. According to the regents, Suárez’s 
qualification of how something is in place is in contradiction with the notion of extension, 
because he does not include the extension of parts in place. 
 
 
 
4.3 Scotus’s rejection of the negation of Transubstantiation as applicable to 
the Theses philosophicae 
 
M. Henninger, in his work Relations, investigates the criticism made by Scotus of 
Thomas’s theory of relations: according to Scotus, it leads to the absurd conclusion of the 
negation of Transubstantiation. The argument is presented by Henninger as follows: 
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i) before Transubstantiation, the accident of 
quantity inheres in its subject (bread), while 
afterwards this accident does not inhere in this subject; 
ii) but the same accident of quantity remains both 
before and afterwards; 
iii) suppose (i) [Thomistic view], i.e. that a real 
relation is really identical with its foundation; 
iv) then that the accident of quantity is identical 
with its relation of inherence in the bread [situation 
before conversion]; 
v) THEREFORE, the quantity is really united to or 
informs the bread throughout Transubstantiation 
[consistent with ii and iv, inconsistent with i].19 
 
Henninger reminds us that Ockham, despite opposing Scotus’s theory of relations, found 
this argument so compelling that he admitted that at least in Transubstantiation accidents 
are not identical with their relation of inherence in their substances. It appears that Ockham 
finally rejected a position very similar to that of the regents. 
It is noteworthy that the majority of the regents holds, as does Thomas, that a relation 
does not have a formal real entity, that a relation does not change the relata between which 
it occurs, and finally that a relation is identical with its subjects.20 It seems that in the theses 
the few references to relations are often coherent with a Thomistic position, which 
according to Scotus fails to justify the dogma of Transubstantiation, as it appears from 
Henninger’s account of Scotus. I argue that in general the regents are closer to Scotus than 
to Thomas, and indeed this is not a novelty in the seventeenth century, given the wide 
diffusion of the Scotistic school, which might even have outnumbered all the others.21 If we 
may fail to identify a precise relationship between Scotus and the Theses in terms of being 
part of the ‘Scotistic school’, at least we are justified in saying that the Theses 
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 Ivi, pp. 75-76. At point (iii) the bracketed words are mine. 
20
 For example: “Potest Relatio ad subiectum accedere, vel ab eodem recedere, sine omni mutatione subiecti. 
/ Ideoque cum nobilibus Philosophis Relationem a fundamento non realiter differre statuentes, nisi 
adversa ratione, in quorundam verba iuremus, formaliter acceptam realem entitatem nullam habere 
asseremus.” Adamson 1600, TL VIII.1-2; “Relatio quum minimae sit entitatis, ut nihil reale ponit in 
subjecto, ita formaliter acceptam entitatem realem non habet. [...] Adeo ut haec sit distinctio rationis 
inter relationem et fundamentum, quod in conceptu relationis includitur terminus, qui non includitur in 
conceptu fundamenti.” King 1612, TL 14.1 and 5; “Relatio non distinguitur realiter aut modaliter; sed 
sola ratione ratiocinata a suo fundamento proximo. et hinc est quod relationem subjecto advenire sine 
ejus mutatione, doceat Arist. 5. Phys. contex. 10.”, Barclay 1631, TL VII.4. Sibbald 1625 [TL IX-XII] 
and Seton favour the Scotistic theory: for example, Seton 1634, TL XL: “Celebris, Thomae cum Scoto 
controversia est, eadem ne numero relatio, ad diversos numero terminos terminetur. Divi (hominis hic 
infirmi) Thomae affirmantis castra, succumbentis quippe, (Athletae alias insignis) deferentes, Scoti 
victoris vexillum sequimur.” 
21
 ‘The school of Scotus is more numerous than all the other schools taken together’, Johannes Caramuel y 
Lobkowitz, quoted in A. Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010, p. 1. 
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philosophicae reflect the eclectism of Scholastic philosophy of the early modern era, which 
is heavily influenced by Scotistic themes. 
Thus, a Thomistic doctrine in a generally non-Thomistic context requires an explanation. 
I conjecture that the regents were motivated by their rejection of Transubstantiation. I am 
not arguing for an intentional allegiance to Thomism on this matter because of the rejection 
of Transubstantiation; but more simply, that because of the rejection of Transubstantiation, 
the regents found Thomas’s theory of relations more appealing than others’, and 
appropriated it without regard to other characteristic features of Thomism.22 
On a theoretical level, regents seem to see the point of Scotus’s attack on Thomas on 
relations, because 1) they do reject Transubstantiation; and 2) they share Thomas’s theory 
of relations, which Scotus argues to be incompatible with Transubstantiation. 
 
 
 
5. Protestant Scholasticism and Catholic Scholasticism 
 
In the passages regarding Transubstantiation, regents usually do not mention any 
Scholastic source on their side, with the exception of Julius Caesar Scaliger and his 
Exoticarum Exercitationum Liber XV de Subtilitate, ad Hieronimum Cardanum, first 
published in 1551. All other philosophers are quoted with a view to criticising their 
position.23 
The continuous presence of Scaliger throughout the theses, although not regarded as a 
fundamental source of inspiration, nonetheless sheds light on the historical question of the 
sources of Scottish Scholasticism. This question must be answered mainly on the basis of 
textual evidence of the Theses philosophicae, but also by doing a survey of library 
catalogues of the period: the sum of this information can give us the spectrum of the 
readings and of the philosophical knowledge available to the regents. In the case of 
Transubstantiation, no Scholastic authority seems to enjoy the favour of the regents, for the 
obvious reason that no traditional Scholastic philosopher ever attacked the dogma of 
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 I wish to point out that the regents distance themselves from Scotus on another important matter: the 
reference to inherence in the definition of accidents. We read in DM, 37, II, 5 that “secunda sententia, 
praecedenti extreme opposita, est inhaerentiam nullo mode esse de essentia accidentis, neque actu neque 
aptitudine. Ita tenet Scotus, In IV, dist. 2. q. 1.” The regents include actual inherence in the definition of 
accidents: as Suárez reminds us, this is Aristotelian [DM, 37, II, 2]. 
23
 With one remarkable exception: Durandus de Saint-Pourçain. Murray 1628, TP I.5: “Rectius Durandus, 
qui dicit materiam panis eandem manere in corpore Christi.” Regents look favourably at his claim that in 
Transubstantiation the matter of bread and wine is preserved through conversion. Suárez also quotes 
Durandus on this point, with the opposite intention. Despite this favour, regents cannot agree with the 
defence of Transubstantiation they find in Durandus’s works. 
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Transubstantiation. On the side of the still much underexplored Protestant Scholastic 
philosophy, regents seem to focus mainly on Scaliger, even if not exclusively so.24 From 
this individual case, it may be possible to draw some general conclusions about Scottish 
Scholasticism: philosophers in Scotland were very well versed in Scholasticism, and made 
extensive use of Scholastic terminology and theories, but this philosophy was of little help 
to a Protestant scholar who wanted to find a philosophical analysis of their belief in the 
rejection of Transubstantiation. It is plausible to suppose that regents had to develop their 
criticism much on their own. 
Theological criticisms were abundant in the early modern era, but one of the key aspects 
of Protestant theology is precisely the attempt to do without the vast Scholastic philosophy 
added to it during the Middle Ages.25 This does not mean that this enterprise was 
straightforward and accomplished from the very beginning; yet, at least in Scotland, a form 
of Scholastic theology is virtually absent in the seventeenth century. 
Thus, the Theses philosophicae are an interesting example of Scholastic philosophy, 
intimately influenced by the faith of the Reformed Church of Scotland, but not on that 
account less Scholastic than equivalent Catholic Scholastic texts. More precisely, the theses 
develop the criticism of Transubstantiation as they do precisely because they are still a 
product of Scholastic philosophy. 
 
 
5.1 Scaliger’s Exercitationes: a possible source for the philosophy of the 
regents 
 
Scaliger and a few other philosophers26 offered to the regents extensive works in 
philosophy on the Protestant side of the debate, and this inevitably attracted their attention 
and favour. Scaliger above all others is always quoted with approval. Narrowing down his 
                                         
24
 The second most quoted Protestant Scholastic is Bartholomeus Keckermann, Dutch philosopher renowned 
in the period for his textbooks on logic and natural philosophy. 
25
 In Scotland for example, the theological theses by Andrew Melville of 1599, despite the title Scholastica 
Diatriba de rebus divinis, do not qualify as ‘Scholastic’ in the Catholic sense of a deep relation between 
theology and philosophy, and do not offer philosophical theories similar to those of the graduation theses. 
On Melville’s theses, S. Reid, Humanism and Calvinism, pp. 191-193. See also Muller, Post-Reformation 
Reformed Dogmatics, passim, on the relation between Protestant theology and Scholasticism. 
Interestingly, R. Baron, in his Philosophia theologiae ancillans (St Andrews 1621), does not mention the 
philosophical criticism of the Catholic account of Transusbtantiation. Even if both Melville and Baron are 
influenced in form and contents by Scholastic theology, it seems that they clearly perceive the difference 
in themes and arguments between theology and philosophy. Particularly remarkable is a regent such as 
Baron, who does not fail to stress his agreement with Thomas, Scotus, Suárez, Ruvius and the whole 
Society of Jesus (1617, TP XXV). 
26
 I am referring to Keckermann and, secondly, to Ramus. On Keckermann and Ramus in Scotland, S. Reid, 
Humanism and Calvinism, passim. In particular, pp. 259-264 for Keckermann. 
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contribution to the debate over Transubstantiation, two references are important. The first 
one is in Murray 1628: 
 
Ideo quia locus est spatium in quo necessario 
extenditur quicquid habet partes extra partes, sequitur 
quantitatem extendi non posse nisi extendatur in 
ordine ad locum: ut merito subtilis Scaliger subtilem 
Doctorem damnaverit, inquiens modum quantitativum 
non esse accidens per accidens, sed proprium proprio 
modo dictum. [TP VI.5] 
 
The regent approves of Scaliger’s remark, directed against Scotus, that the quantitative 
mode of a thing is not predicated as an accident (which can then be subtracted from its 
subject), but as a proprium, which, by definition, cannot be subtracted from its substance. 
We find this passage in Exercitatio V, 7, where Scaliger writes about the modus 
quantitativus, indeed not without irony, that “Barbari nostri vocarunt id, quod rationem 
quantitatis dicere possumus. Non tamen ratio, qua quantitas est quantitas: sed est 
praescriptio corporeitatis in praedicamento quantitatis.” ‘Proprium’ is defined by 
Porphyry as “what belongs always and exclusively to the totality of one species [...] always 
present in it by nature.” [Isagoges, 12, 17-19].27 The proprium is something following from 
the essence of something, directly depending on it for its existence, yet not part of it. A 
traditional example is risibilitas predicated of man: it does not signify man’s essence, but it 
follows from it and man cannot be without it. Scaliger’s response to Scotus is precisely that 
quantity must be predicated as a proprium of its substance, not as an accident which is able 
to inhere in it and also able not to. In the competition for subtilitas, on this matter regents 
favour Scaliger over the Subtle Doctor. 
The second reference is an implicit one, in King 1616, who paraphrases a similar passage 
in Scaliger’s Exercitationes, V.6: 
 
Licet habitus, actio transiens et locus sint extra 
subiectum denominationis, extra tamen subiectum 
suae existentiae subsistere nequeunt. [King 1616, TL 
IX.4] 
 
Tametsi quod non includitur in definitione, abesse 
potest a definito, in definitione: non omne tamen 
abesse potest ab ipsa re definita. [Scaliger] 
 
                                         
27
 ‘[E] jf´ ou| sundedravmhken to; movnw kai; panti; kai; ajeiv.’ My translation. 
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The Exercitatio V quoted here deals with matter and void and related topics, such as 
extension and place. Scaliger is referring to place when writing that “neque locum esse 
corporis necessarium, quatenus corpus est” (ibidem). Indeed, the definition of body does 
not include that of place, indeed each one of the two can be defined without the other one. 
Nonetheless, Scaliger claims that if we go beyond the level of definition, it is impossible to 
find a body existing without a place, and (less evidently though) a place existing without a 
body. Concentrating on the latter (which is the object of King’s passage), Scaliger and King 
agree on the fact that a place cannot be without the subject of its existence. 
I take these passages to be coherent with the philosophy of the regents. In this debate, the 
most evident philosophical tool employed by proponents of the reality of Transubstantiation 
is the principle of separability, based on the real distinction between res (to be taken in the 
Scotistic sense, not necessarily as independently existing creatures). On the other side, 
regents exploited more (without naming it though) the possibilities of the distinctio modalis, 
the kind of distinction that exists between a thing and its mode, two things that cannot exist 
separately even if they have distinct essences. Thus, matter is not quantity, quantity is not 
extension, extension is not place, but none of them can exist without the other, even if each 
one of them can be conceived without the other. If we recall one of the conclusions of 
chapter 3, namely that matter is per se quantified, that conclusion is now better qualified by 
the analysis of Transubstantiation: regents seem to imply that matter is per se extended in 
place. In no passage do they explicitly refer to matter as body (which is for instance 
Zabarella’s position), which is a theoretical step further in the direction of the attribution of 
positive powers to matter, and, ultimately, a dualism between soul and body. I think that 
regents did not go as far as that. Be that as it may, they claim that 1) matter is a substance, 
quanta per se; 2) that quantity is not conceivable if not extended in place; 3) and finally that 
this extended matter is per se occupativa loci. 
I believe that the debate on Transubstantiation has shown some features which might be 
regarded as the most important contributions of the graduation theses in natural philosophy: 
1) the definition of accident, revised to include inesse; and 2) the consequent move in the 
direction of the identity between proprium and accident. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I shall end with a brief statement regarding the ground for the theory of substance in the 
Theses philosophicae, which anticipates the analysis of the reception of Aristotle, in section 
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2 of the Conclusions. The analysis of Transubstantiation enables the regents to expound 
their theory on central themes of natural philosophy, logic and metaphysics, with 
repercussions in all their philosophy. The principle which unifies their approach originates 
in the definition of accident combined with the relation that an accident has with its subject. 
The context seems to be an overlapping of logic and metaphysics: this is not illicit in 
Scholasticism, because of the original identity between a definition and the essence of 
something. The case of prime matter is instructive: prime matter is actual (not formally 
actual) since it has an essence. The presence of an essence is enough to make prime matter a 
‘something’, thus it is enough to make it actual. In this context, and indeed the regents show 
this little terminological ambiguity, talking of ‘substance’ is equivalent to talking of 
‘subject’. 
The general approach in the regents’ rejection of Transubstantiation is set when they hold 
that an accident cannot have an existence separate from its substance. Their view almost 
inevitably leads to the negation of the separability of quantity from matter, extension from 
quantity, place from quantity (this last point being more controversial, since place is not an 
accident of extension). In order to claim the reality of Transubstantiation, Catholic 
Scholastics are drawn in the opposite direction, allowing for the separability of accidents 
from the subject. 
A corollary of this theory is the identity of an accident with its relation of inherence in its 
subject: if an accident is the same as its inherence in its subject (say, if extension is the 
same as its inherence in quantity), then this accident cannot be separated from itself, and 
consequently cannot be separated from its subject - preserving the distinction between 
accident and subject, because it is not identical with its subject, only with its inherence in 
the subject. 
How far did the regents go in following this train of thinking? If the standpoint from 
which we look at the Theses philosophicae is the so-called modern philosophy, then the 
resemblance of their theory of matter with the notion of res extensa (despite unbridgeable 
differences) seems convincing.28 My aim is not to impose a comparison which was clearly 
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 R. Ariew, in his Descartes and the Last Scholastics, Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press, 1999, part 
I, chapter 2, remarks the importance of Scotism in the Scholasticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, and raises the question of the absence of Scotism in scholarly works on the period, notably 
Gilson’s Index. Ariew lists seven points on which Thomas and Scotus disagree: 1) the proper object of the 
human intellect, 2) the concept of being, 3) the human compound, 4) prime matter, 5) the principle of 
individuation, 6) space and 7) time and motion (p. 46). Ariew claims that “Descartes leans toward 
Scotism for every one of the Scotist theses, as long as they are at all relevant to his philosophy.” (p. 55): I 
believe that the same can be said about the graduation theses. The difference between Thomas and Scotus 
on prime matter is particularly important in relation to the graduation theses and, as I suggest here, it is 
probable that the acceptance of Scotism paved the way to the reception of Descartes in Scotland. 
Regarding prime matter, D. Des Chene (Physiologia, p. 86) believes that between Descartes and the 
Scholastics “the difference is this: the Aristotelians believed that God, according to his absolute power, 
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unknown to the regents: the majority of the Theses were written before Descartes published 
his theory. The analysis must then be conducted within the limits of Scholasticism in order 
to get a fair impression of how “new” the philosophy of the regents was. Regents performed 
a substantial reinterpretation of key Scholastic doctrines: for instance, it is not completely 
accurate to say that “that unintelligibility [of the notion of an accident existing apart from 
its substance] is [...] a by-product of the struggles of the new sciences against the Schools”29 
because the regents claimed this unintelligibility and developed an answer to this problem 
still within a Scholastic framework. This opinion makes sense only if we take Scholastic 
philosophy to mean Catholic Scholastic philosophy. The regents could not accept the 
philosophical consequences of the belief in the dogma of Transubstantiation. Thus, they 
formulated a Scholastic philosophy whose specific Reformed character is, I argue, well 
exemplified by the theory of the actual inherence of an accident in its natural substance. The 
Theses philosophicae are an example of Reformed Scotistic Scholasticism. 
 
                                                                                                                           
could allow matter to subsist without quantity, while Descartes did not.” Now, the choice of only 
Catholic Scholastic sources leads Des Chene to this conclusion: we have seen how the regents do not 
believe that God can allow matter to exist without quantity; and, in general, that there is no matter without 
quantity, and no quantity without actual extension in place. I argue that a deeper understanding of 
Protestant Scholasticism can shed light on our understanding of the Scholastic influence on and 
relationship with Descartes. 
29
 D. Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 132. 
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Motus: general features of movement 
 
 
 
Natural substances are composed of form and matter: form is the principle of actuality, 
prime matter is the principle of potency. All natural changes occur in virtue of the 
openness of prime matter towards form, form which can never fully actualise the appetite 
of prime matter. Even when informed, prime matter always retains the possibility of being 
informed by a form different from the present one. The relation between a form and its 
respective portion of matter is never necessary, therefore that portion of matter can be 
related to other forms (that is, informed) and will probably come to be so. This is why 
prime matter is said to be the root of becoming and ceasing-to-be. 
The realm of ‘nature’ is limited by Scholastics precisely in terms of the notion of motus: 
everything which is ‘natural’ is in motu, and conversely everything which is in motu is 
‘natural’. The term motus is commonly translated with ‘movement’: I do not wish to 
engage with this commonly accepted translation, but I think that the semantic field of the 
word ‘movement’ as we intend it today may lead us astray from the original Scholastic 
context. In Scholastic natural philosophy motus refers to any change taking place within a 
substance or to a substance: a man’s hair changing colour is a change in the category of 
quality, taking place within a substance, while a man walking is a change in the category of 
place, occurring to the substance ‘man’. In today’s terminology we rarely, if ever, describe 
the former change as a ‘movement’ and we tend to treat ‘movement’ and ‘local movement’ 
(locomotion) as equivalent. We no longer share the Scholastic worldview in natural 
philosophy, and hence, I think, this shift in meaning of the term ‘movement’. 
To Scholastic eyes, our contemporary meaning of movement is then restricted to one 
aspect only, namely, the changes occurring in the category of place (ubi). Traditionally, 
change is also in the category of quality (a change in a property of a compound depending 
on form), in the category of quantity (a change in a property depending on matter) and in 
the category of substance (the change of the whole substance). All these changes are 
movements. It appears that movement relates to categories, but is not in a category: 
movement is the process in virtue of which substances change; ultimately, movement is the 
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very substance while changing. It is not a perfect (physical) act, so it has no proper 
category. 
The Theses philosophicae expound a Scholastic doctrine of natural movement. Regents 
seem to agree with what we may call a standard account of movement which is proper to 
Scholastic natural philosophy, and which I summarize in three points: 1) movement is the 
process of change undergone by a substance; 2) it is structured and explained by act and 
potency; 3) it is a directed process, in which it is always possible to identify a terminus a 
quo and a terminus ad quem. 
Other features are corollaries of these three points: for instance, the talk of ‘natural 
places’ and the role played by the ‘agent’ in causing natural movement. In principle, 
Scholastic natural philosophy accepts natural places to explain the perceived directedness 
of the movements of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire): earth and water are 
perceived to go downwards and air and fire to go upwards because their ‘natural places’ 
are respectively down at the centre of earth/universe and up at the first sphere, that of the 
moon. The first couple of elements is then ‘heavy’, the second ‘light’. This theory will be 
deployed in chapter 2, during the analysis of the movement of heavy and light bodies. 
When it comes to the role of the agent in causing the movement, it is a Scholastic 
principle that omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, ‘everything which is moved, is moved 
by something else’. In principle, there is no such thing as an essential state of movement 
proper to bodies: all movements are directed, which means essentially limited to and ended 
by the acquisition of their end. The end of movement is quies (rest). Thus, every movement 
requires a cause, an agent. These general features will play a major role in the analysis of 
celestial movement, in chapter 3. A strong tradition has it that the sublunar world (the 
world of material substances, of the four elements and of natural corruption) is essentially 
different from the celestial world; that the components of celestial compounds are not the 
same as those of sublunar compounds. I shall argue that regents do not go beyond this 
traditional distinction, and propose an interesting reinterpretation of the principle omne 
quod movetur, ab alio movetur. 
This chapter will focus first on the definition of movement and give a preliminary 
account of the relation of movement to its terminus, and secondly on the question of the 
relation between movement and the Aristotelian categories. 
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1. Definition of movement 
 
Movement is so important in Scholastic natural philosophy because the very realm of 
what is ‘natural’, and therefore the object of natural philosophy, has to be accounted for in 
terms of the notion of movement. All substances constantly change, which is equal to 
saying that all substances are in constant movement. Movement is a necessary 
consequence of the materiality of substances, in fact the world of materiality appears to be 
the world of substances in constant movement. Scholastics go one step further than this 
claim when they attach a normative interpretation to ‘nature’: only substances in 
movement are properly called ‘natural’, and natural philosophy only deals with substances 
included in this notion of ‘nature’. 
The notion of movement is present in the very definition of nature, as it is traditionally 
taken from the works of Aristotle. Natura is famously the inner principle of movement of 
bodies: ‘inner’ because it must be proper to the body and not external to it; ‘principle’ 
because it must be the physical origin and explanation of the movement. This notion of 
nature appears to be normative: it is true that all substances move in virtue of their nature 
as principle, but it is also true that they move according to their nature as normative for 
their movement. A substance cannot naturally do anything which does not follow from its 
nature: otherwise stated, every substance behaves according to its nature.1 
While introducing this theory of movement, it must be remembered that nature intended 
as normative of movement does not imply that Scholastics grasped the modern idea of 
physical law. In a metaphysics of substance, physical regularities are understood in terms 
of natural genera, not in terms of natural laws. A natural substance behaves according to its 
nature, which is what a substance is: substances belonging to the same species will 
consequently behave in a similar way, while substances belonging to the same genus will 
behave in proportion to the degree of similarity between the same substances in the genus. 
The Aristotelian theory of the immutability of natural genera is the final warranty of the 
universality of the notion of nature. 
This is the only sort of normativity that we find in the natural world considered per se. In 
fact, a law in Scholasticism is always a law thought of by a mind, or a law present in 
somebody’s mind: the Theses philosophicae, for example, accept the notion of lex naturae 
in moral philosophy, taken to be the law given to creatures (in particular to rational ones) 
                                         
1
 This is another instance of the principle operari sequitur esse, which is ultimately the warranty for the 
regularity and the intelligibility of the natural world. The principle claims that the behaviour of a 
substance indicates the being of the substance, what a substance is. Therefore, our knowledge of the 
behaviour of a substance leads us to the knowledge of the nature and essence of a substance. 
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by God. Being God-given, this law is not a positive law: it is a natural law, because it 
mirrors how things are, and respecting this law is equivalent to respecting the nature of 
things. Thus, natural law is not a mind-independent set of norms which affects natural 
bodies, enables predictions of their behaviour, or is in any way mathematisable. It is a 
matter of dispute whether Scholastic philosophy is potentially open to the modern idea of 
laws in nature. It is however commonly acknowledged that a standard version of 
Scholasticism does not show any sign of such a deep and revolutionary shift of 
perspective.2 
The normativity of nature implies the directedness of natural movements. When dealing 
with the relationship between form and matter, form has been qualified also as the ‘end’ of 
matter: matter has an appetite which is satisfied by form. The process of information is a 
movement, whose end is form. As we will see, it is debated whether form is equivalent to 
nature, or whether matter must be included in nature as well.3 
The importance of movement is also highlighted by the different ways in which the 
subject of natural philosophy is usually expressed: Scholastics may offer a variety of 
answers, such as ens mobile, corpus mobile, corpus naturale, mobile qua mobile, ens in 
quantum mobile. In Scholastic philosophy, the accurate definition of the subject of a 
branch of philosophy is not a secondary task. Aristotle declared that each discipline has its 
proper subject of enquiry and that each specific discipline must follow its own rules, which 
are in a way dictated by the object itself. Thus, the subject of natural philosophy is, in 
general, the natural substance as it undergoes movement/change. 
 
 
1.1 Movement as way, tendency and flux 
 
John Case in his Epitome in Octo Libros Physicorum (Oxford 1599) chooses the formula 
ens mobile. He follows Thomas Aquinas’s words in the commentary on the Physics: 
 
Et quia omne quod habet materiam mobile est, 
consequens est quod ens mobile sit subiectum 
                                         
2
 See W. Ott, Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009. The author claims that “the notion of law in this contemporary sense is alien to the Aristotelian 
family of positions. Where the notion does appear, it is in the context of a divine command theory of 
ethics” (p. 21). Ott also investigates the position of Suárez, who claims that God concurs in secondary 
causation ‘by an infallible law’ (DM, 22, IV). Yet, Suárez only claims that God acts in a lawlike way; 
therefore, Descartes appeal to laws as secondary causes breaks with Scholasticism and it “is a decisive 
point in the history of mechanicism” (pp. 52-53). 
3
 See below, chapter 2. If nature is what a substance is and does, the question whether form alone or form and 
matter together determine the nature of a substance is the same as the question of what a substance is. 
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naturalis philosophiae. Naturalis enim philosophia de 
naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum 
principium est natura; natura autem est principium 
motus et quietis in eo in quo est; de his igitur quae 
habent in se principium motus, est scientia naturalis. 
[In octo Physic., I, l. 1, n. 3] 
 
Thomas can be considered as representative of standard Scholasticism regarding this 
theory, despite all the terminological differences with other Scholastics. The starting point 
is that everything which is material is mobile; therefore, the mobile being is the subject of 
natural philosophy (conclusion 1). Natural things (naturalia) are those things whose 
principle is nature, which is the principle of both movement and rest (quies); therefore, 
natural science deals with those beings which have the principle of movement in 
themselves (conclusion 2, qualification of conclusion 1). Even if the stress here is on 
movement, because movement is a natural state of mobile substances, it must be recalled 
that all natural things also have in themselves their principle of rest, which is of the exact 
same nature as the principle of movement. What makes something move, for the same 
reason eventually makes it rest. 
The work by John Case is particularly interesting because it is geographically and 
chronologically close to the graduation theses. Case was an eclectic Aristotelian who lived 
and wrote in England in the sixteenth century.4 The accessibility of his Epitome makes it a 
perfect work for the representation of a commonly accepted theory of movement in 
Scholasticism later than Thomas’s. Case’s definition is: “actus entis mobilis in potentia 
quatenus fiat tale” (chapter 10, De motu in genere), a slight rephrasing of the famous 
Scholastic definition “actus entis in potentia quantenus in potentia est”: movement is the 
act of a mobile being in potency insofar as it is in potency.5 What Scholastics mean by it is 
that a being moves when it is in potency towards some end which it eventually reaches, 
and its ‘being in movement’ is precisely this ‘being an act of a potency in quantum in 
potency’. Movement is the name of the passage from potency to act while still being in 
potency. When potency is actualised, movement is over and the end is reached. The 
difficulty inherent in defining something as ‘act of a potency’ is evident, but Scholastics 
                                         
4
 John Case (1540-1600), philosopher. BA and then fellow of St John’s College, Oxford, in 1568. MA in 
1572 and MD in 1590. He published a number of philosophical works, mainly commentaries on Aristotle, 
including: the Speculum moralium quaestionum in universam ethicen Aristotelis (1585), the first major 
publication by the Oxford University Press. His natural philosophical works, Lapis philosophicus and 
Ancilla philosophiae, seu Epitome in Octo Libros Physicorum (1600), are his latest works. Case was an 
influencial lecturer in Oxford with sympathies for Catholicism, and contributed to the Aristotelian revival 
of the late Renaissance time. DNB. The main text on John Case is C. B. Schmitt, John Case and the 
Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983. 
5
 For a survey of the different versions of this definition, D. Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 26, footnote 11. 
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are the first ones to consider the notion of movement obscure and difficult to define. Case 
adds some qualifications which make the definition clearer: 1) movement is an act, 
inchoatus (begun with, sketched, outlined), not a perfect act, since only form is a perfect 
physical act: in movement, a complete form is not yet attained; 2) the act is of a real being; 
3) the act is of a mobile being, a being apt to move; and finally 4) the act is of a mobile 
being which is in potency towards something (ch. 10). 
Among other definitions, Case favours this one as the clearest and most inclusive. 
Regents do agree with this traditional definition, even if their debate is mainly over a 
different definition of movement: 
 
[motus] est acquisitio ipsa, et tendentia ad formam, 
cujus natura adeo mobilis est. [Forbes 1623, TP VIII] 
 
[motus] est tendentia mobilis ad formam, et via 
inter duos terminos. [Baron 1627, TP IV.5] 
 
The notions of via, tendentia, and acquisitio are recurrent in the graduation theses.6 
Regents seem to agree on the general idea that a movement is a process from the terminus-
from-which to the terminus-to-which. It seems that the three terms via, tendentia, 
acquisitio are regarded as synonymous. 
The broad debate is about the opposed notions of fluxus formae and forma fluens: is 
movement the flux of form, or is it the form itself while ‘flowing’? Reid 1622 lists fluxus 
(flux) along with via and tendentia: 
 
[motus] nihil aliud est, quam via, fluxus, seu (ut 
loquuntur) tendentia de termino in termino. [TP X.1] 
 
while Forbes 1623 and Barclay 1631 hold that: 
 
[motus] non est forma per se, nec forma pariter 
cum fluxu, seu acquisitione, sed est acquisitio ipsa, et 
tendentia ad formam. [Forbes 1623, TP IX] 
 
 Motus non nisi imperite statuitur forma fluens: et 
inadaequate fluxus, seu successio formae. [Barclay 
1631, TP 3.11] 
 
                                         
6
 See also, for example: King 1620, TP VIII; King 1624, TP VII; Rankine 1627, TP VIII; Armour 1635, TP 
IV.4; Leech 1636, TP V.V. 
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The concept of forma fluens is of Scotistic origin.7 Regents are almost unanimous in 
rejecting Scotus on this matter8 and they side with the majority of late Scholastics in 
considering the movement as the flux of form. Barclay is an exception, for he says that the 
term ‘flux’ is inadequate to the explanation of movement. Scotus’s theory is that 
movement is a succession of forms from the terminus taken to be the beginning of the 
movement until the final terminus. In the case, for instance, of a man getting from youth to 
old age, all intermediate steps are taken too: all intermediate forms are present in 
succession. Considered as a unitary movement (because the ageing man is the same man) 
we can say that the form of this man is flowing from youth to old age. We then have an 
enduring substance man whose ‘parts’ (different forms) are successive in time. 
Forbes’s passage seems to be a quite close quote from the Coimbrans’ commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics, in III, c. 2, q. 1, a. 1: with the important evidence of the regent 
agreeing with the Coimbrans’ solution of movement as acquisition and tendency. This 
passage is as follows: 
 
Motus secundum suam propriam rationem non est 
forma per se, nec forma pariter cum fluxu seu 
acquisitione, sed est acquisitio ipsa tendentiave ad 
formam. 
 
Regents are disappointingly silent regarding their mutual differences in terminology. I 
believe that regents did consider little changes in the definition secondary, as they all imply 
a more fundamental agreement on movement as a ‘process’ from terminus to terminus. The 
late Scholastic debate over the fluxus formae9 witnesses a substantial agreement between 
the regents and their continental colleagues. The general idea is that form cannot change, 
so movement is not a form, rather, it is the way towards form, the tendency towards form 
and the acquisition of a new form. Movement is not form, movement is something 
                                         
7
 Ordinatio, II, 2, 1, 4. 
8
 Stevenson 1629, TP XIII.1, claims that “motus materialiter est forma fluens, formaliter fluxus formae.” 
This is a partial acceptance of Scotus, and perhaps an attempt to bring two different theories together. 
Unfortunately the passage is unique in the Theses, and Stevenson does not explain his claim any further. 
The idea that movement formally is flux of form is usually accepted; the claim that the matter of 
movement is a form ‘flowing’ towards the terminus is more debated. What Stevenson has in mind is, 
perhaps, a twofold account of movement: the form (that means, the reason) of movement is the flux of 
form, the matter (that means, the subject undergoing change) of movement is a flowing form. 
9
 D. Des Chene, Physiologia, pp. 30-31. The author claims that the Scholastics prefer the definition of 
movement as ‘flux of form’ rather than ‘flowing form’, for the reason that movement is not “the form 
itself acquired in passing”, but rather “the “way” or “tending” of that form toward another” (p. 30): the 
regents are no exception. Regarding the translation of fluens with ‘flowing’, the author explains that form 
does not flow in the sense in which, for example, a liquid flows. ‘Flowing’ is rather a mode of existence 
of the form on the way, or towards the end of its movement. The difficulty and the regents’ criticism of 
Scotus consist in the fact that a form is by definition unchangeable. 
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occurring to form; in order to avoid the perceived contradiction of a form changing, 
regents choose way, tendency and acquisition. 
The Coimbra commentary on the Physics seems to be influencing the regents regarding 
the definition of movement. It is not surprising to find references to the school of Coimbra 
in the Catholic world, especially in those studia or orders which closely followed the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas; yet, it should not be unexpected in a Reformed 
environment like the Aberdeen colleges, in a Reformed country like Scotland in the 1620s. 
I believe that the general picture is one of ongoing and careful study of continental 
philosophers by the regents. As already mentioned when dealing with Transubstantiation, 
library evidence shows great attention devoted to Catholic Scholastic sources, attention 
which is not simply the collector’s attention paid to relevant works: it is the attention of 
readers who actually made use of those works.10 In matters of purely philosophical 
concern, the evident confessional gap seems to be carrying no weight. 
This is an important point. While it might be supposed that regents limited their 
investigation of Catholic Scholastic philosophy to highly polemical and controversial 
doctrines for the purposes of the inevitable struggle between the opposed parties which 
followed the outbreak of the Reformation, the case of the definition of movement, which 
concerns on the contrary a rather neutral and a-confessional physical doctrine, shows how 
deep was the Protestant engagement with Catholic philosophy in Scotland. It must be said 
that the Coimbrans seem to enjoy a good reputation in natural philosophy, since regents 
from King’s and Marischal in Aberdeen in particular commented with favour on another 
theory present in the Coimbra commentary: the exclusion of generation from the number 
of kinds of movements. 
Prior to the analysis of how many different movements there are, and how many 
categories are directly involved, there is a question regarding the relation between 
movement and the termini, to which I now turn. 
 
 
 
                                         
10
 MS M 70 in Aberdeen University Library is the oldest list of books in the library of Marischal College: it 
contains the list of books bequeathed by Thomas Reid in 1624 to the college, books which formed the 
core of the seventeenth-century library. Reid donated to the college an excellent philosophical library. 
Library catalogues are important because they show the range of sources at disposal of the regents, who 
are often quoting the relevant Aristotelian passages in the theses, but are rarely quoting their secondary 
sources. Thus, even if we should not exclude that books were available also via private acquisitions, the 
university library catalogue provides solid evidence. In Reid’s list the following entries for Coimbra are 
listed: 1) In Dialecticam Arist. 1607; 2) In 8 libros Physicorum 1609; 3) In libros de gen. et corr. 1606; 4) 
In libros de anima 1609; 5) In libros de coelo 1606. All the texts were published In Cologne, apud 
Bernardum Gualtherium. 
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1.2 The distinction between movement and its termini 
 
We have seen that movement is a process from a starting point (terminus a quo) to a final 
point (terminus ad quem) at which the movement ceases and the acquisition of the new 
form is complete. Regents reject Scotus’s forma fluens on the basis that movement is not 
identical with form;11 movement is not formally a form undergoing change, it is rather the 
change undergone by form (flux). This way, regents seek to make sense of the key 
reference to ‘act of being in potency’ that we find in the traditional definition of 
movement. 
What about the difference (if there is any) between movement and its termini? King 1620 
in theses VIII and IX makes the explicit link between movement as flux of form and the 
termini: 
 
Omnis motus successivus est, cum forma non simul 
acquiratur sed per partes: Et etiam continuus, quia est 
via et tendentia ad formam quae continuitatem 
importat. 
Cum motus nil aliud sit quam via ad formam quae 
absque successione concipi nequit, successio erit 
essentialis motui. [...] 
Motus non habet diversam existentiam ab existentia 
termini. Ergo nec diversam realitatem, cum nil aliud 
sit, quam termini acquisitio. 
Nihilominus motus cum sit formaliter fluxus 
formae et sua natura quid successivum, formaliter et 
essentia a termino distinguetur. Haec distinctio 
formalis sufficit, ut multa enuncientur de uno quae 
non de altero, imo attributa contradicentia. Nihil 
prohibet quo minus ea quae sunt eadem re, formaliter 
vero differunt; a se invicem separari et separatim 
subsistere possint. 
 
King holds the theory that movement is the way to form, a way essentially continuous in 
space and time. The existence of movement is not different from the existence of the 
terminus, since movement is the acquisition of the terminus. The regent justifies this 
conclusion on the basis of the principle sicuti res se habet quoad productionem, ita quoad 
existentiam, which figures as the heading of thesis IX. So, movement and terminus are not 
really different. Now, King is not explicit about which one of the two termini movement is 
                                         
11
 As we have seen in section 1.1, the most open rejections are in Forbes 1623, TP IX and Barclay 1631, TP 
3.11, as well as in Baron 1621, TP 16. In general, the regents do not mention forma fluens, and the 
rejection of this theory is apparent from the endorsement of the opposite view (that of flux of form), or 
from the choice of a different terminology: way, tendency and acquisition. Stevenson 1629, TP XIII.1, 
speaks favourably of forma fluens even if he accepts it only in a material sense. 
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not different from: clearly, the more important terminus is the end of the movement (ad 
quem), because it is this terminus which is going to be acquired by the movement, while 
the terminus a quo (which is itself identified only when movements begins) is identical 
with the substance which is in movement. 
We can then argue that silence on this matter implies that the regent is talking about the 
final terminus of movement. Yet, real identity and real difference are not the only two 
possibilities: it is true that movement is the acquisition of the terminus (so it is not really 
different from it) but it is also true that movement is formally the flux of form: the formal 
reason of movement is not the same as that of the terminus, therefore some degree of 
distinction between the two is required. According to King, the Scotistic formal distinction 
suffices in this case: the explanation rests on the idea that nothing prevents two things 
which are really the same thing (movement and terminus) existing one without the other, if 
they are formally distinct.12 
This passage addresses some of the key aspects of the late Scholastic debate on the 
difference between movement and terminus. King’s central idea is that a movement cannot 
be really distinct from its terminus, given that a real distinction only occurs between two 
things which can really exist one without the other. It is not the case that a movement, 
which is the acquisition of a terminus, can exist without its terminus. Thus, the answer 
must be found in a difference within real identity: real identity can happen (for instance, 
Coimbrans, In Phys. III, c. 2, q. 3, a. 2) also when the properties of two things are not 
entirely identical. It is in fact true: a difference in property does not entail that two things 
are entirely different.13 This seems to be the case for movement and terminus. The majority 
of regents either deny that movement and terminus are really different or claim that they 
are formally different.14 While the latter formula is to be preferred as more precise, the 
former is compatible with the latter. 
I am not sure what sense to make of King’s final remark that “ea quae sunt eadem re, 
formaliter vero differunt; a se invicem separari et separatim subsistere possint” if we take 
‘separatim’ to mean ‘real separation’. In this case, this remark would be in contradiction 
                                         
12
 I find this remark a little troublesome: really separate existence is usually brought up by supporters of a 
real distinction between movement and terminus, such as Buridan. A possible interpretation of this 
remark is that, as Scotus would say, two formally distinct things enjoy separate existence in the intellect 
which think them separately; yet, King seems to exclude this when writing that two things which are the 
same “separatim subsistere possint”. In his theses of 1612, TP 6.III, King writes that: “non est firmum 
illud Scotistarum: quorumcunque unum potest esse sine altero illa re distinguuntur.” The regents has a 
mode and its substance in mind: he seems to admit an independent existence which does not imply real 
distinction. 
13
 Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 39. Quoting Coimbrans, Des Chene gives the example of a mode and the 
substance of this mode. 
14
 For example: Reid 1622, TP X.2; Baron 1627, TP V.1; Stevenson 1629, TP XIII.2; Leech 1636, TP V.V. 
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with what has been said before, namely that the existence of a movement is not different 
from the existence of terminus. In fact, a formal distinction does not occur between really 
separable things. I also do not see what role this remark should be playing in the economy 
of the argument: the regent seems to prove the formal distinction by showing that the 
definition of movement as ‘flux of form’ is not the same as that of terminus. 
Although dominant, the deployment of the formal distinction between a movement and 
its terminus is not the only route to a solution that we find in graduation theses.15 This 
passage is taken from Wemys 1631: 
 
Motus est actus imperfectus ordinans et promovens 
subjectum ad actum perfectum, qui in ordine ad 
diversa aliam atque aliam induit rationem formalem. 
Realiter distinguitur a termino ad quem a quo sumit 
suam distinctionem specificam. [TP VI-VI.1] 
 
The passage is regrettably too short to grasp Wemys’s complete theory on the subject. It 
is perhaps significant that Wemys defines movement without the usual talk of way, 
tendency and flux. He stresses the act of movement in opposition to the act of the terminus: 
the act of movement being ‘act of being in potency as it is in potency’ is essentially 
different from the act of the terminus, which is physically perfect. The two formal reasons 
of the acts are different as much as ‘imperfect act’ is different from ‘perfect act’. One more 
relevant absence in Wemys’s words is the traditional philosophical argument by which real 
difference is usually established: God’s powers. Two things are said to be really different 
even if they are not perceived as existing as two separate things so long as God could bring 
it about that they exist separately: in this case, Wemys could have told us that there is no 
contradiction in God sustaining the terminus without the movement, or vice versa. I 
believe that the reason for this absence lies in the afore-mentioned aversion that regents 
show for the appeal to God’s powers in natural philosophy. This argument is considered an 
illicit appeal to something external to the realm of natural bodies, and therefore an appeal 
which ultimately endangers the autonomy both of natural philosophy as a discipline and 
also of the natural world as based on regularities to be found within the natural world itself. 
As I pointed out when dealing with Transubstantiation, Catholic philosophers in the 
seventeenth century on the contrary would accept this argument as philosophically 
relevant. 
 
 
                                         
15
 For example: Sibbald 1623, TP 11; Lundie 1626, TP VII. 
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2. Movement and categories 
 
Movement is not a substance: this means that movement is not a thing existing 
independent of a substance. It is then something happening to substances, and as with all 
such things the logical and metaphysical frame is that of the ten categories. Six of the 
categories are involved in the analysis of movement: four in a direct way, two only 
indirectly. 
The four categories directly involved are: substance, quality, quantity and place. Any 
movement is traditionally thought to belong to one of these categories. As Wemys pointed 
out, movement is towards a terminus “a quo sumit suam distinctionem specificam” (TP 
VI.1): movement, being an imperfect act, is understood and categorised on the basis of the 
category of the terminus. This is ultimately why the terminus ad quem is prior to the 
terminus a quo, not in terms of existence, because no end of movement is possible without 
a beginning of movement, but in terms of reason: if we know the end of a movement, we 
know the category of movement and thus the kind of movement. 
The two categories indirectly involved are actio and passio (action and passion). These 
two categories tell us whether a substance is being active or passive: for instance, 
‘walking’ is an action, ‘being touched’ is a passion. The question concerns the relation of 
movement to action and passion: is movement properly posited in either of these 
categories? The regents address the debate mainly in reply to Suárez’s claim that 
movement is identical with passion, except in reason. 
Within the category of substance, two qualifications of movement are possible, one 
positive, generation (going towards a greater perfection), one negative, corruption (going 
towards a lesser perfection). Generatio is the formation of a new substance, corruptio is 
the dissolution of a previously existing substance. It appears that these two processes are 
the two sides of the same coin, according to the principle generatio unius, est alterius 
corruptio: from the corruption of a substance a new substance can be generated, and this is 
what happens in nature. Nonetheless, generation is prior to corruption by reason and 
existence, because in order to have corruption we must have something generated first.16 
In the remaining three categories, 1) in quantity we have augmentation and diminution; 
2) in quality, alteration; 3) in place, local motion, or locomotion (latio). Only quantity 
knows of a ‘more’ and ‘less’, while alteration and locomotion are presented as movement 
neutral to ‘more’ and ‘less’. We will see how this is not entirely true of locomotion, as the 
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 Or rather, something created first. I address this point below, chapter 3, section 4. 
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qualifications sursum and deorsum (upwards and downwards) are not just accidents of 
locomotion but essential properties of movement (chapter 2). 
 
 
2.1 Generation and movement 
 
Regents debate over the inclusion of generation in the number of movements. Aristotle in 
book XI of Met., 11, 1067 b 15-35 denies that generation is a movement. In fact, 
generation is the passage from a non-subject (a non-existing subject) to a subject: a non-
subject cannot be in movement because it does not exist, thus the generation of a subject is 
prior to movement and is somehow the condition for movement to occur. This Aristotelian 
theory is the ground of the regents’ discussions, as we are reminded by Lesley 1625, TP 
X,17 who also, interestingly, quotes Scaliger’s Exercitatio 290 as supporting the same 
theory. The authority of Aristotle who does not consider generation a movement does not 
convince the regents to endorse his view: indeed, it is a majority view but not at all the 
only one.18 Here is how Forbes 1624 expresses the point: 
 
Forma omnis substantialis (cujus esse in 
indivisibili) per instans, ejus durationi intrinsecum, 
seu primum sui esse incipit, et ultimum sui esse 
desinit, quod est oriri, et corrumpi in instanti. [...] 
Unde errare eos patet, qui generationem 
substantialem, motui proprie dicto annumerant. Motus 
quidem est, in quantum motus a mutatione successiva 
et instantanea separat: at qua actum successivum 
ponit, ubi aliud post aliud, quod motui intrinsecum, 
vere motus non est, licet sumatur cum connexis 
alterationibus. Ita enim vel manet generatio, quae quia 
tempore non mensuratur, motus non est, vel ad 
duorum motuum confusionem in alterationem 
transibit: quo, quid absurdius? [TP VII] 
 
The core of the difference between movement and generation is that the latter takes place 
in an instant, while movement takes place in time. It seems then that generation, which is 
only of a substantial form and so, of a whole substance, is rather called mutatio (mutation). 
                                         
17
 William Lesley (d. 1654), university principal. Studied at King’s College, and became regent there in 
1617, sub-principal in 1623 and principal in 1632. We have one set of graduation theses by Lesley, the 
Propositiones et problemata philosophica, Aberdeen 1625. In 1638 Lesley signed the opposition to the 
National Covenant written by the Aberdeen Doctors, and was forced to resign from principal in 1640. 
OG, p. 54 and DNB. 
18
 For the exclusion of generation from the number of movements, see also, for example: Carr 1617, TP 
VIII.2; Reid 1618, TP I-II; Forbes 1623, TP XIII; Ramsay 1629, TP III.12; Stevenson 1629, TP XIII.4; 
Wedderburn 1629, TP III.12. 
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Inevitably, generation brings about connected alterations (movements in the category of 
quality), but the regent warns us against taking these alterations to be the whole ongoing 
process. Forbes 1623, TP XIII, recalls the theory of Democritus as the traditional example 
of misunderstanding of alterations for generations, which Aristotle distinguished in a more 
careful way. 
A similar view is held by Young 1617, in TP V: 
 
Motus est actus mobilis quatenus est mobile. Ergo 
generationi proprie dictae non competit definitio 
motus. 
 
According to Young, the definition of movement is sufficient reason to discard the 
theory that generation is a movement: the conclusion is linked with the definition directly 
by ‘ergo’. Generation cannot be a movement because movement is an act of a mobile as 
mobile: in generation instead, we have the coming-to-be of the mobile, not any sort of 
passage from potency to act of the mobile itself. It is remarkable that no regents mention 
the absence of contraries in generation as a fundamental difference between generation and 
movement. Aristotle himself first set out that a movement always occurs between 
contraries of the same species: according to the regents, a non-subject and a subject are 
contradictories, not contraries.19 
The Theses philosophicae offer other examples of endorsement of this view, which is the 
most common one in late Scholasticism and which is also grounded in Aristotle’s work. 
Yet, a small number of regents hold the opposite20 view that what is going on in generation 
can be included in the definition of movement, as in Fairley 1619, TP V: 
 
Generatio sic actuat materiam ut non solum 
relinquat eam in potentiam ad formam, sed ut eam 
ordinet ad illam tanquam via ac tendentia ad eandem 
formam, et tanquam fieri ejusdem formae. [...] Ergo 
generatio stricte sumpta est actus entis in potentia 
quatenus est in potentia ad ulteriorem actum, qui est 
forma. [...] Definitio motus convenit etiam 
mutationibus instantaneis. 
 
Now, generation is described by Fairley with the same words employed in the definition 
of movement: generation is an act of being in potency as it is in potency; it is a way and a 
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 “Generatio essentialiter, est mutatio inter duos terminos, contradictorie distinctos.” Rankine 1627, TP 
III.6. For Aristotle’s view, Phys., I, 7. 
20
 For example: Lundie 1626, TP VI; Barclay 1631, TP III.9; Mercer 1632, TP IX.2; Armour 1635, TP IV.6. 
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tendency towards form. If this were not enough, at the end of the thesis it is stated that 
mutations in an instant are movements. This passage is opposed to the standard theory of 
which Forbes and Young are representative. Even more interestingly it is also opposed to 
the set of theses written by the same Fairley in 1615 for the end of the curriculum of his 
previous class. In TP VII he writes: “quod generatur non movetur. Generatio proprie dicta 
non est motus.” The textual evidence goes in the direction of a change of mind by Fairley, 
which happened some time during the four years after 1615, years spent in teaching 
undergraduates and studying. Such evidence is rare in the whole corpus of graduation 
theses probably because regents rarely took up teaching as a long-term job and they usually 
produced not more than two or three sets of theses each. It is then less likely to witness 
significant changes in the span of time of few years. The Arts Faculty of Edinburgh from 
around 1610 to 1625 is a good candidate for evidence of such changes, since philosophy 
teaching was conducted by the same regents, Young, Reid, King and Fairley, for quite a 
number of years. They produced some of the most complete sets of theses; of which, five 
sets of these are by Reid, five by King and three by Fairley, with no missing theses. 
Fairley quotes Aristotle’s Physics III, 1 at the opening of his 1615 TP VII, in Greek: H 
kinhvsiß ejsin ejnteleceiva tou~ dunamei~ ontoß, h| toiouton.21 These exact words do not 
appear in the Physics.22 Fairley probably intended to express in his own words Aristotle’s 
thinking, which is not uncommon in the Theses. This definition of movement as ‘act of 
being in potency qua potency’ is the ground for the denial in 1615 that generation is a 
movement (as in Young 1617); while in 1619: 
 
Ad motum definitum libro tertio non est necessaria 
successio vel latitudo gradualis formae per eum 
acquirendae, ut mutatio dicatur convenire subjecto, 
quatenus est in potentia: sed satis est quod mutatio et 
forma sint duo actus, forma quidem perfectus, mutatio 
vero imperfectus et ad eam ordinatus, et eadem 
mutatio sit natura saltem prior forma. [TP, V.4] 
 
Fairley is rewriting his own interpretation of the same passage of Aristotle. We are now 
told that the succession or gradual latitude of form (to be understood as the flux of form 
which is the movement) is not necessary for movement, also according to Aristotle’s 
definition. Thus, what we call ‘mutation’ can be included in the definition too. Yet, Fairley 
                                         
21
 I always transcribe the quotations respecting the regents’ choice of accents, spirits and spelling of words. 
In the original, characters follow the style of sixteenth-seventeenth century printing. 
22
 Fairley is slightly misquoting Phys. III, 1, 201 a 9-10: hJ tou~ dunavmei o[ntoß ejntelevceia, h·| toiou~ton, 
kivnhsivß ejstin. W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford, Clarendon, 1936. 
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feels compelled to identify a passage from an incomplete to a complete act, which is 
precisely what Aristotle denies in Met. XI, 11 in the case of generation. Fairley believes the 
solution to be that mutation is an incomplete act, ordered towards form which is a complete 
act, and that mutation is prior to form. In this way, granted the definition of movement, we 
also have the passage from incomplete to complete act, and not a passage from a non-
subject to a subject. 
The issue is not whether Fairley’s solution in 1619 follows the letter of Aristotle or not. 
Two elements are evident though: Fairley deploys an Aristotelian theory, and Lundie 1626, 
who supports the idea that generation is a movement, exploits the same strategy as 
Fairley’s.23 The regent reads generation as falling under the definition of movement: 
 
mutatio enim materiae, a forma in formam actus 
quidam eius necessario est (per illam enim de potentia 
in actum educitur) non tamen perfectus (quippe non 
forma, sed ad formam via) ergo tou~ dunavmiß o[ntoß 
e[nteleceia hJ toiou~ton, natura saltem actu perfecto 
prior. [TP VI] 
 
In mutations too, a passage from act to act takes place; there is a ‘non-perfect’ act, which 
is the way towards form; therefore, there is an ‘act of a potency as potency.’ 
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 I treat the central topic of the reception of Aristotle in the graduation theses in the Conclusions, section 2. 
It appears that the regents substantially agree on the interpretation of Aristotle, in particular in relation to 
the adaptability of Aristotle to the Christian faith. This is not surprising, because this approach is central 
to Scholasticism as a whole, and the regents do not follow the path of some Renaissance Aristotelians, 
such as Zabarella or Cremonini, who, following the tradition of the medieval Faculty of Arts (in particular 
in Paris) read Aristotle as an alternative to Christianity. Nonetheless, differences among regents surface 
when it comes to the literal interpretation of some Aristotelian passages. Leaving the Christian 
interpretation of Aristotle aside for the moment, King 1616, TP II.1, writes that “materia prima non est 
Aristotelis commentum” (also quoted in Conclusions, section 2.2), while Stevenson 1625, TP VII, reading 
Physics II, 1, 193 b 9-12, claims that “ut in artificialibus lignum se habet ad lectum, ita in naturalibus 
materia prima ad substantiam compositam.” It seems that Stevenson identifies in Aristotle a theory of 
prime matter, while Reid does not. Another example is taken from passages of the graduation theses in 
chapter 2, sections 3.1-2. Adamson 1600, TP VI and Lesley 1625, Problemata physica 9 read Physics 
VIII, 4, as claiming that, according to Aristotle, heavy and light bodies are moved by an external mover. 
Again, King 1616, TP XIII.4, corrects Adamson and Lesley by saying that Aristotle denies that inanimate 
bodies move themselves only in order to stress the difference between inanimate bodies and animate 
bodies. Another controversy arises on the matter of the interpretation of Physics VIII: I deal the regents’ 
positions in chapter 3, section 4. The regents reflect two opposite approaches to Aristotle’s passage: 
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2.2 Augmentation, alteration and movement 
 
With regard to the relation between categories and movement, the debate over generation 
is the most relevant one but by no means the only one. One regent brings up the question 
whether augmentation can be properly called movement as well. This reference is unique 
in the Theses, yet it is remarkable for the philosophical arguments deployed in support of 
the claim that augmentation is not a movement. The passage is taken from a late Aberdeen 
set of graduation theses, Seton 1637: 
 
Accretio, motum localem non includit, cum illa 
momentanea, hic sit successivus. [TP XIV] 
 
The regent finds support in another Catholic Scholastic, Ruvius, without referring to a 
specific passage. Seton’s argument is the same as in the case of generation: movement 
always occurs in time, it is a successive and continuous process (successive by essence, 
continuous by accident) and this is the key qualification of movement, not a more general 
notion of passage from imperfect act to perfect act. If we compare this passage with Fairley 
1619 for instance, these two regents hardly have the same theory of what is specific to 
movement, even if they agree on the terms of the analysis: act and potency, change in an 
instant, and termini. 
The result is that local movement is not included in augmentation, because local 
movement and augmentation are different changes. 
Now: the exclusion of local movement from augmentation does not itself mean that 
augmentation is not a movement. Local movement is not the only kind of movement, so 
Seton 1637 could be saying that augmentation and local movements are both movements, 
and simply different kinds of movement. I believe however that this is not what the regent 
had in mind. First of all, the opposition between ‘change in an instant’ and ‘change in time’ 
is usually deployed as a mark of the distinction between generation and movement. So, if 
we are to use the same opposition here, Seton is saying that augmentation is not a local 
movement because local movement is the only movement which really falls under the 
definition of movement. Augmentation is then another kind of change, similar to 
movement yet different from it. 
Secondly, Seton seems to go against the traditional idea of local movement as the ‘first’ 
movement, which is prior to the other kinds of movement and, in some sense, their 
                                                                                                                           
according to some, like Sibbald 1623, TP 14-16, the contents of book VIII fall within the scope of 
metaphysics; according to others, like Wemys 1612, TP 13.I, they are part of natural philosophy. 
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foundation. It is true that Scholastics usually take local movement to be the archetype of 
movement,24 but it is by no means the ‘only’ movement. And also, he seems to object to a 
less well-established but equally interesting idea that alteration is the ‘first’ movement. On 
these two points: 
 
Terminus (ad quem) sicuti speciem et 
distinctionem, ita nobilitatem motui absolute confert. 
Alteratio omnium motuum est praestantissimus, sicuti 
qualitas quantitate praestat. [King 1624, TP XIII] 
 
Principia lationis elementorum, posteriora sunt 
principijs generationis. Et consequenter ipsa Latio 
posterior est generatione in eodem, quamvis absolute 
in Universo, omnium mutationum prima sit. [Reid 
1618, TP VIII 1-2] 
 
Both positions exploit traditional arguments. King 1624 is basing his idea on the priority 
of quality over quantity, which implies the priority of form over matter; and on the 
qualification of movement given by the end of movement, qualification which includes 
some sort of ‘nobility’ of movement itself. 
Reid 1618 on the contrary emphasises that local movement is not possible without 
generation, yet, generation is prior in respect of the temporal order but not by reason, 
because on a universal scale local movement is the first movement. Indeed, this is what 
Thomas writes in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: 
 
Circa primum ponit duas rationes: circa quarum 
primam sic procedit. Primo enim proponit quod 
intendit: et dicit quod cum sint tres species motus, 
unus quidem qui est secundum quantitatem, qui 
vocatur augmentum et diminutio; alius autem qui est 
secundum passibilem qualitatem, et vocatur alteratio; 
tertius autem qui est secundum locum, et vocatur loci 
mutatio: necesse est quod iste sit primus inter omnes. 
Et hoc secundo probat sic: quia impossibile est quod 
augmentum sit primus motus. Augmentum enim esse 
non potest nisi alteratio praeexistat; quia illud quo 
aliquid augmentatur, est quodammodo dissimile et 
quodammodo simile. Quod enim sit dissimile, patet; 
quia illud quo aliquid augmentatur est alimentum, 
quod est in principio contrarium ei quod nutritur, 
propter diversitatem dispositionis. Sed quando iam 
additur ut augmentum faciat, necesse est quod sit 
                                         
24
 “Ille motus localis inter alios primus erit qui solus potest perpetuus esse et continuus. [...] propterea ille 
solus omnium erit primus et hoc motu movebit primus motor.” Toletus, Commentaria in octo libros 
Aristotelis de Physica auscultatione, Venice 1573, lib. 8, cap. 7. 
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simile. De dissimilitudine autem non transitur ad 
similitudinem, nisi per alterationem. Necesse est ergo 
quod ante augmentum praecedat alteratio, per quam 
alimentum de una contraria dispositione mutetur in 
aliam. Tertio vero ostendit quod ante omnem 
alterationem praecedat motus localis: quia si aliquid 
alteratur, necesse est quod sit aliquid alterans, quod 
potentia calidum faciat esse actu calidum. Si autem 
hoc alterans semper esset eodem modo propinquum in 
eadem distantia ad alteratum, non magis faceret 
calidum nunc quam prius: manifestum est ergo quod 
movens in alteratione non similiter distat ab eo quod 
alteratur, sed aliquando est propinquius, aliquando 
remotius; quod non potest contingere sine loci 
mutatione. Si ergo necesse est motum semper esse, 
necesse est loci mutationem semper esse, cum sit 
prima motuum. Et si inter loci mutationes una est prior 
alia, necesse est, si praemissa sunt vera, quod prima sit 
sempiterna. [In octo Physic., VIII, l. 14, n. 3] 
 
In this passage Thomas is outlining a scale of movements, which justifies the pride of 
place given to local movement, and places alteration prior to augmentation. Thomas’s 
arguments are strictly physical in this text, but I suppose he would not reject King’s 
parallel solution of the problem. 
 
 
2.3 Movement and the categories of action and passion 
 
The principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur is central to Scholastic natural 
philosophy. It is the premise for two of the most influential passages in the history of 
philosophy: book VIII of the Physics of Aristotle which proves the existence of a first 
motor and Summa theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3, where Thomas introduces the five ways to the 
affirmation of the existence of a first cause, which is usually called ‘god’. Regents do 
endorse this principle, even if I think that they put forward an interpretation of it which 
strays from traditional Scholasticism. I will examine this interpretation later on, in chapter 
3, section 4. 
What is relevant now is that this principle directly entails the existence of an agent as 
cause of movement, and this relates to the Aristotelian categories. The agent acts on a 
patient (category of action) and the patient is acted upon by the agent (category of passion). 
Thus, despite the absence of the agent/patient distinction in the definition of movement, it 
is generally accepted that there is no movement without an agent and a patient. Movement 
is in the moved thing as in its proper subject (sometimes movement is called an affectio 
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[affection] of the moved thing) and it is in the mover as in its principle. The movement has 
its beginning in its principle, the mover, and its realisation in its subject, the moved thing. 
How does this activity of the agent (action) and the reception by the patient (passion) 
relate to movement? Regents are divided on the distinction between passion and 
movement: 
 
Actio et passio distinguuntur formaliter a motu per 
ordinem et habitudinem, haec quidem ad subjectum, 
illa ad principium. Motus in actione et passione 
includitur, vel tanquam quid superius et transcendens. 
[...] Aegre nobis persuadebit Suarez motum ut est 
actus mobilis non differre a passione, ne quidem per 
actum rationis; sed passionis et actionis nomina esse 
synonima. Creatio formalem rationem actionis 
transeuntis et motus, non autem passionis participat. 
[Barclay 1631, TP 3, 5-8] 
 
Non recedendum est a recepta Peripateticorum 
doctrina asserentium haes tria, motum, actionem, et 
passionem, inter se non distingui realiter, sed tantum 
distinctione rationis (ut vocent) ratiocinatae. Etsi actio 
et passio possint esse sine motu, ubicunque tamen est 
motus, ibi necessario adsunt et actio et passio. [Baron 
1627, TP V. 1-2] 
 
Baron and Barclay taught in the same years in St Salvator’s College, St Andrews, so their 
disagreement is particularly revealing. As is often the case, Suárez is the target of the 
regents’ attacks: the theory that passion is only different from movement ratione 
ratiocinata is peculiar to him and did not have great success in late Scholasticism. Suárez 
goes even as far as saying that movement belongs to the category of passion [DM, 49, II, 
4]. 
A distinction of reason occurs between two things which are not formally and actually 
different which are nonetheless different in our conception of them. The qualification 
ratiocinatae entails that such distinctions in our concepts are not entirely ours, but have 
some ground in reality; if they have no ground, the distinction is rationis ratiocinantis. 
Baron does not refer to Suárez on the alleged passion-movement identity; yet, the regent 
holds Suárez’s theory that movement and passion do not differ really or formally, but only 
by reason, and he even ascribes this theory to the whole of a vaguely defined ‘peripatetic 
school’. The identity is not complete because action and passion are without movement, 
even if the contrary is not true. 
Barclay opposes this view with an argument for the existence of movement without 
passion. According to the regent, movement, action and passion always go together in 
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natural philosophy, but we cannot infer from this a difference less than the formal one 
because there is at least one case, creation, where there is movement without passion. 
Creation’s formal reason is said to be of the same sort of a transeunt action (a transeunt 
action is an action whose effect is different from the action itself or from the cause of the 
action: in this case, creation is different from God and his creative act) but also of 
movement. This objection rests on the idea that movement in general is the passage from 
potency to act: otherwise, I do not see how it can prove what Barclay intends to prove. It is 
accepted that in creation there is no passion, because there is no passive subject (since the 
subject, a created being, is brought about in creation, it does not exist before the creative 
act) and nothing passive can be referred to God. If we follow Barclay’s example, Baron 
should be committed to hold that creation also involves passion, because there is 
movement in creation and movement is always with passion. 
Yet, if generation is not a movement, because it is a passage from a non-subject to a 
subject, creation is even “less” of a movement. In fact, creation is prior to generation in 
existence and by reason, since its antecedent is pure nothing, not simply a non-subject. 
These considerations seem to carry no weight in Barclay’s example. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have investigated the general features of the theory of movement of the 
graduation theses. ‘Movement’ is a ‘process’ (a way, a tendency) from the terminus a quo 
to the terminus ad quem: that is, from one form to another form. This is why the regents 
call it ‘acquisition of a new form’, which takes the place of the present form. 
The notion of movement is very general, since it includes all natural bodies. In Scholastic 
natural philosophy, a body is properly called ‘natural’ when endowed with a nature, which 
is the inner principle of the movements of bodies. Each body moves according to its 
nature, thus, different bodies move in different ways. We will see in the next two chapters 
two particular occurrences of this notion: the movement of heavy and light bodies and the 
movement of the heavens. In particular, celestial bodies are of a different nature from 
sublunar bodies, therefore some features of sublunar movement are absent, such as 
corruptibility. 
Despite these differences, the features of movement investigated in this chapter have set 
the theoretical framework for an understanding of the theory of movement of the theses. 
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The main points are: 1) movement takes place in time. The regents exploit this feature to 
mark the difference between changes in time, properly called movements, and changes in 
an instant, properly called mutations (mutationes). Generation and creation are not 
movements because they occur in an instant. 2) Movement is predicated of substances, it is 
not a substance itself. The majority of the regents deny that the change in the category of 
substance is a movement, ergo movement can happen only in the remaining nine 
categories: in particular, in the categories of quality, quantity and place. 
My enquiry into the general features of movement will be completed in some central 
aspects by the investigation of heavy and light bodies and celestial bodies: in particular 
regarding the finality of movement and the role of the agent. 
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Movement of gravia and levia 
 
 
 
The movement of heavy and light bodies (gravia and levia) is a case of the fourth type of 
movement, local movement (latio, motus localis). Local movement is the acquisition of the 
terminus in the category of place (ubi). Since movements are specified by their respective 
termini, movements are also categorised by the category of their termini. Local movement 
is the only type of movement which has an external terminus, namely the place where the 
body is; contrary to the other types, whose termini are something of the body itself: 
quality, quantity and of course substance are internal to the body in movement. This 
characteristic will be important when highlighting the differences between local movement 
and other movements. Nonetheless, the ubi of a body is truly predicated of the body: place 
is also a relational notion, but first of all a categorial notion. 
A heavy or light body is a body which is drawn by nature respectively towards the centre 
of the world, downwards, or towards the lower limit of the sublunar sphere, upwards. 
Inherent in this cosmology are the two doctrines of natural finality and natural place. The 
upwards and downwards movement is also explained by the causal power of the end (finis) 
of such bodies, naturally (thus necessarily) driven towards their end. The natural place is 
the end: a respective place in space where all bodies would cease any further downwards 
or upwards movements. 
The structure of this chapter is then divided into: 1) the analysis of the notion of 
heaviness and lightness; 2) the analysis of natural places; 3) and the explanation of finality 
and movement of heavy and light bodies in terms of nature. 
 
 
 
1. Heaviness and lightness 
 
The Scholastic notions of heaviness (gravitas) and lightness (levitas) are foreign to our 
contemporary worldview. In our scientific language only the word ‘gravity’ has been 
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retained, while taking on a meaning different from its original one. The other side of the 
Scholastic coin, ‘levity’ today only has a relational meaning: something is light only 
relative to something else which is heavier. Taken in a non-relational way, ‘being light’ 
does not mean anything. On the contrary, in Scholastic natural philosophy heaviness and 
lightness are positive properties of bodies: a body can be heavy or light absolutely 
speaking.1 This means that these terms tell us something about how things are in 
themselves, not in relation to something else, or in relation to a scale of measurement. 
Relations and degrees are admitted, but only as relations and degrees among substances 
with different properties. 
The background of this theory is the doctrine of the four elements:, which are, in order of 
heaviness: earth, water, air and fire. These elements are the fundamental components of 
every body within the sphere of the moon, and hence of every body which is subject to 
generation and corruption. Traditionally, Scholastic natural philosophy accepts the 
difference in nature between the so-called sublunar world and the heavens, incorruptible 
and eternal. Even when the distinction does not entail a difference in nature between 
sublunar matter and celestial matter, the sphere of the moon is always intended as the limit 
of the world composed of the four elements, with all the consequent properties. 
In this chapter the relevance of the theory of the four elements is due to the grounding of 
heaviness and lightness of bodies in the proportions between elements in each body. 
Aristotle dealt with this cosmology in his De generatione et corruptione, usually referred 
to by regents in the Renaissance version De ortu et interitu.2 The influence of this work in 
the Theses exceeds the scope of the analysis of movement: it must be noted that regents 
dedicate much attention to elements and their mistio/mixtio (mixture) in natural bodies, and 
also that much of the special physics (for instance, nutrition and theory of heat) is centred 
on the theory of elements. 
Elements are the origin of heaviness and lightness. This means that a heavy body, say, a 
stone, is predominantly composed of heavy elements (in this case, earth); conversely, a 
                                         
1
 ‘Being cold’ and ‘being hot’, ‘being wet’ and ‘being dry’ are similar cases: as in King 1624, TP XXI. A 
contemporary notion similar to ‘absolute cold’ could be the point of absolute zero: yet, the other side of 
the scale, heat, does not have a limit. 
2
 In Aristotle and the Renaissance, pp. 86-87, C. B. Schmitt explains the origin of this alternative translation. 
De generatione et corruptione is the usual form in the Middle Ages; De ortu et interitu began to be 
preferred from the time of the Vatable translation of Aristotle, in 1519. Among others, Coimbra 
commentators choose this version. Cicero was the first one to introduce ortus and interitus into 
philosophical Latin, later to be changed by medievals into generatio and corruptio. In the sixteenth 
century, the Ciceronian translation is preferred, as more coherent with the idea of going back to a purer 
Latin than the one inherited from the Middle Ages. Regents too prefer this version, but I do not think that 
this alone can be taken as evidence of a ‘Humanist’ agenda in the Scottish universities in the seventeenth 
century: in fact, by this century this translation was somehow parallel to the medieval one. A similar point 
can be made about the use of Greek quotes from Aristotle in the Theses: these elements are a heritage of 
Humanism more than a sign of an enduring Humanist approach. 
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light body, fire, has a predominance of light elements. A sort of half-way case is a feather: 
it is a heavy body, because its natural movement is downwards, yet its behaviour testifies 
for a different elemental composition from a stone’s. Regents usually see heavy and light 
bodies as opposed cases of the same movement, as is proved by the formulae ‘gravia et 
levia’ or ‘gravium et levium’. In a way, explaining the behaviour of heavy bodies is also 
explaining the behaviour of light bodies. Despite this parallel, heavy bodies enjoy a 
privileged position in the theory, because in our experience the downwards movement is 
predominant. 
A general picture of graduation theses shows that regents did not reject the Scholastic 
cosmology based on the distinction between sublunar world and heavens and between 
upwards and downwards as natural directions of different elements. In this chapter and in 
the next one on the movement of the heavens it will be clear that regents put this general 
framework to a test: a significant case is the set of theses of 1626 by Reid, who puts 
forwards a substantially revised version of the Scholastic theory of movement. 
 
 
1.1 Definition of heaviness and lightness 
 
A proper definition of heaviness and lightness is missing from the Theses. This is 
explained by the fact that these notions are taken to reflect a basic, non-theoretical fact 
from our experience, thus a starting point for explanation rather than a conclusion of an 
argument. Definition must provide an account of the essence of the defined thing: in terms 
of heavy and light bodies, regents do not see how this can be any different from saying that 
heavy bodies are heavy and light bodies are light. Speaking in terms of elemental 
composition does not convey a definition either, but simply a description. As late as 1629, 
Stevenson makes this point clear: 
 
esse gravius nihil aliud est, quam per naturam 
alteri substare, et esse levius est alteri superminere. 
[TP XXII.1] 
 
The regent gives us a description of the behaviour of heavy and light bodies in relation to 
one another: heavy bodies are below, light bodies are above, by nature. As I said earlier, 
relation is included in the notion of heaviness and lightness, yet by ‘per naturam’ 
Stevenson indicates that this behaviour tells us something about the nature of these bodies, 
about what they really are. So, by nature heavy and light bodies have their own place in the 
structure of the universe, and reference here is not made to natural place. This is due to the 
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difference between, on one side, the actual structure of the universe and, on the other, how 
the universe would look if 1) the elements were the only existing thing, and 2) they were 
left free to attain their ends. This is a passage from Reid 1618 which follows the already 
quoted passage that local movement if the first of all changes: 
 
Elementa per gravitatem et levitatem primo 
Mundum suo ordine constituunt: deinde per primas 
qualitates in se invicem permutantur. Iure igitur Arist. 
ordinem servans naturae, prius in libris de Coelo, de 
gravitate et levitate disseruit: posterius in libris de 
Ortu, de quatuor primis qualitatibus. Elementa prius 
sunt mobilia ad locum, quam generabilia. Non solum 
simpliciter, et in universo, latio omnium mutationum 
prima est, sed etiam prior est generatione in eodem 
sicut in elementis apparet. [TP IX] 
 
Reid holds that elements are essentially heavy or light and that they immediately 
structure the universe in an orderly way by finding their place according to nature. This is 
one of the rare passages in which gravitas and levitas are used as nouns: the usual phrasing 
favours gravia and levia because the adjective respects more the notion of heaviness and 
lightness as properties of substances. 
One more aspect is important: downwards and upwards movements are types of local 
movement, and this is why local movement is said by Reid to be the first type of 
movement in general. This conclusion can then be attained in two ways: either by showing 
how local movement is implied by any other type of movement, or, as in this case, by 
means of a basic cosmology, in which elements by local movements immediately compose 
the universe in an ordered structure. This local movement is also prior to generation, 
because elements concur in originating the fundamental stuff (prime matter) which is itself 
prior to generation and corruption. An interesting view, which completes the account of 
prime matter in a way that seems similar to modern philosophy.3 If it completes the 
account of prime matter, it surely does not substitute it, since Reid seems to be the only 
regent who holds this view. In the history of Aristotelianism, this passage hints at the long 
debate over which book between the Physics and the De generatione et corruptione is prior 
by order of knowledge and/or order of being.4 
                                         
3
 Reid is putting forward a brief account of the organisation of the universe by heaviness and lightness which 
might remind us of Descartes’ famous mental experiment in Le Monde, where the passage of the universe 
from chaos to order is explained by natural laws only. I believe that both Reid and Descartes consider 
these accounts as logical and not chronological, since the world was created by God instantly. 
4
 On this aspect, E. Kessler, Metaphysics or Empirical Science? The two Faces of Aristotelian Natural 
Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century, in M. Pade, Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum, 
Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum, 2001, pp. 79-101. One of Kessler’s conclusions is that the different 
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2. Natural places 
 
Elements get into union in a mixture, whose result is, with different proportions, the 
totality of natural bodies. These bodies are heavy or light in consequence of the 
proportions; and also behave according to their nature of being heavy or light. Heavy 
bodies move downwards towards the centre of the earth (which is also the centre of the 
universe, in a geocentric cosmology), light bodies go upwards, towards the sphere of the 
moon which is the first sphere of the heavens, and is the limit and first container of the 
sublunar world. The natural place of heavy bodies is the centre of earth, the natural place 
of light bodies is the upper limit of the sublunar world. 
The notion of natural places is of Aristotelian origin, and up to the regents’ time it 
seemed to account successfully for the apparent directedness of natural bodies. The 
movement of heavy and light bodies qua movement follows the patterns outlined for any 
type of movement: 1) it is from one terminus to another; 2) it eventually comes to a rest 
(quies); 3) it is the acquisition of a new terminus (a new ubi) by a mobile put into motion 
by a mover. 
Point 2 concerns natural places; point 3 is the subject of the last part of this chapter, 
where I deal with the principle of movement of heavy and light bodies. 
When a body in motion reaches its end, the movement is over: a new form is acquired, 
the particular potency triggered by the mover is now actualised and the body undergoes 
another movement. Rest is not an absolute achievement for sublunar bodies, it is always a 
relative notion: rest is relative to this or that particular movement. We appreciate again the 
importance of the idea of materiality as perennial principle of movement: in cases of 
generation, corruption and local movement, materiality is a potency never ‘extensively’ 
(extensive) satisfied by formal acts: that means, no form can turn material potency into a 
pure act. A body can be in complete rest only in its natural place, a state which is subject of 
speculation, not experience, since the actual structure of the universe does not allow for 
                                                                                                                           
approaches based respectively on the Physics and on the De generatione et corruptione eventually led to 
“the modern distinction between natural science and philosophy of nature” (p. 100), in the sense that the 
reading of the De generatione et corruptione provided the ground for a ‘naturalistic’ approach to natural 
bodies, as opposed to the ‘philosophy of nature’ of the Physics. I believe that the graduation theses do not 
fall in the categorisation deployed by Kessler for Renaissance philosophy. In fact, there seems to be no 
apparent shift between two different accounts of nature in the interpretations of the two texts. The natural 
body is explained in terms of substantial form, which determines the essence but which is also received in 
matter in virtue of a certain mixture of the elements: Kessler considers this approach as proper to 
medieval Scholastics (ivi, pp. 80-81). 
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such a polarization of elements, which would tear natural compounds apart. In Scholastic 
natural philosophy, the universe is constantly held together by the intrinsic rationality of its 
components and their arrangement: each body is made for a purpose, its particular nature 
(natura particularis) is to be understood within its general nature (natura universalis), 
which aims at the harmony and coherence of the whole. In the next chapter, the analysis of 
the movement of the heavens will inevitably draw from this cosmology: for the moment, 
this briefly sketched theory works as the background for the theory of natural places. 
So, even if the particular nature of a heavy body dictates that it goes downwards, its 
universal nature is also affected by other principles at work: 1) the principle that everything 
which moves is moved by a mover; and 2) the famous Scholastic fear of the vacuum 
(horror vacui) which entails that all bodies always move in order to prevent the occurrence 
of a vacuum. These principles, the elements, the mover and fear of the vacuum determine 
the movement of natural bodies, which are usually called ‘mixed’ (mixtum). ‘Mixed’ 
because every movement is the result of: 1) the action of the mover, which triggers and 
gives direction to the movement; 2) the nature of heavy and light bodies, which drives 
them respectively downwards and upwards; and 3) the physical need for continuity and 
proximity of matter: all these together explain why bodies behave as they do. Rankine 
1631 offers an insight into this complex doctrine: 
 
Sicut corpus grave, remotis impedimentis sponte 
descendit, ita ob metu vacui, aut turbatum ordinem 
universi ascendit, absque ullo extrinsecus impellente. 
Non magis naturaliter corpus grave ordinarie 
descendit, quam in hisce casibus extraordinariis 
ascenderet. 
Non dicitur corpus grave in his casibus contra 
naturam particularem, et secundum naturam 
universalem ascendere, quasi natura universalis esset 
quid distinctum et superadditum naturae particulari, 
sed potius secundum particularem, sed appetentem 
bonum universi. [TP XVI] 
 
Provided that Rankine rejects the notion of universal nature as anything ‘added to’ the 
individual nature,5 we can interpret universal nature as part of the individual nature in what 
pertains to the good of the universe (bonum universi): every body then reflects in itself the 
grander structure of the universe, and concurs to its preservation. Thus, an upwards 
                                         
5
 I believe that Rankine’s remark is another case of the theory that only individuals exist, coherent with the 
regents’ theory of substance: thus, the so-called ‘secondary substances’ (the universals) and the universal 
nature of bodies are not something existing outside the individuals. 
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movement which appears to be in contradiction with the heaviness of a body is as natural 
as the downwards movement. 
 
 
2.1 Natural places and quies 
 
In Reid 1614, TP 3, we read that: 
 
Motus est perfectio non perfecti, sed perfectibilis: 
quies autem perfecti perfectio est, et cujus gratia 
moventur mortalia. 
 
Generally taken, rest is more perfect than movement because actuality is more perfect 
than potentiality. Being the actualisation of a potency, rest is also the end of movement, 
and all ‘mortal’ beings (or, in other words, all natural beings) move towards rest. Rest, as 
actualisation of a potency, is the state in which natural bodies would be if they were not 
natural, that means, if they were not act and potency. It is then clear that rest is only 
provisional, relative to a particular movement. It holds true that if a relative rest is ‘the 
perfection of something perfect’, the rest following from the acquisition of a natural place 
is even more perfect than relative rest. 
It is also accepted that: 
 
duo motus contrarii magis pugnant, quam motus et 
quies. Ergo motus motui magis opponitur, quam 
quieti. [...] Corpora subcoelestia moventur ut 
requiescant. In iis quies est finis, ideoque motu 
praestantior. Et cessare a motu praestantius, quam 
moveri. [Young 1613, TP 16] 
 
Young states the connection between rest and end clearly: all sublunar movements are 
essentially directed towards rest, and this is why rest is more perfect than movement. In 
consequence of rest being the perfection of movement, two contrary movements are said to 
oppose one another more than movement and rest. 
Natural places have the power of attracting and preserving (vis attrahendi et 
conservandi) their respective elements and bodies composed of those elements, and this is 
precisely what distinguishes them from place in general. Regents usually accept a 
traditional definition of place, taken from Aristotle’s Physics. Among slightly changing 
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definitions in other Theses,6 Stevenson 1629 includes the powers of the natural place in the 
definition of place: 
 
Locus est corporis continentis terminus primus et 
immobilis, eiusque proprietates sunt attrahere ad se 
locatum, illud conservare, et continere. 4. Phys. 4. 
[TP XV] 
 
This definition is almost word for word taken from Phys. IV, 4, 211 b - 212 a 20 ff., 
where Aristotle writes that place is the first immobile limit of the containing body and 
immediately after states the natural relation between contained bodies and place, divided 
into downwards and upwards, because the limited thing always goes together with the 
limiting thing. I believe that regents accept this Aristotelian account linking the definition 
of place with the doctrine of natural places: the two sides of the coin cannot be taken 
separately. 
Natural places have powers that places in general do not have: elements (and the bodies 
they compose) tend towards their natural places by nature while they do not have any 
natural preference with respect to any one of the accidental places they move to. It might 
be said that a heavy body prefers to be somewhere in a straight line between where it is and 
the centre of the universe, rather than be anywhere above where it is. When a moving body 
reaches its new place, the terminus of this movement is a new ‘whereness’ (ubi). Regents 
have it that this ‘whereness’ is the intrinsic terminus of local movement, not the surface of 
the containing body:7 this remark will appear in all its importance in the next chapter, when 
dealing with the negation of resistentia medii in the heavens. For the moment, whereness 
and natural place can be taken as synonyms. 
Once a body has reached its natural place all its natural movements (downwards or 
upwards) are actualised, and reach a stop. The regents seldom talk about the state of a body 
in its natural state, because it is not a possible object of our experience: what we can say is 
a matter of deduction, not experience. Reid, in two sets of theses, 1614 and 1626 offers 
more insights than the other regents, who limit themselves to listing the attractive and 
preservative powers of natural places. In 1614, TP 3.7, he writes that: 
 
si manere in suo loco sit quiescere, omne corpus 
naturale sine exceptione quiescere potest. 
 
                                         
6
 For example: Robertson 1610, TP 7; Bruce 1614, TP IX; King 1616, TP V; Baron 1617, TP XIX; Martin 
1618, TP XXI-XXII; Reid 1626, TP VI; King 1628, TP VIII. 
7
 Eustachius holds the same theory: SPhQ, pars III, tractatus III, disputatio II, quaestiones I-II. 
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The identity between ‘remaining in place’ and ‘resting’ is accepted, yet it is introduced 
by a conditional: ‘si manere...sit quiescere’. In 1626, Reid will revise this theory by 
making a distinction between the two terms of the identity.8 One question is prompted by 
the concept of rest. Attaining a natural place is natural to bodies, rest in a natural place is 
the most perfect actualisation of the potency of movement: is this rest completely 
actualising all potency to move? Regents do not address this problem, even if we can 
formulate an answer on the basis of their philosophy. I suppose that the idea that no act 
whatsoever can completely satisfy the potency of natural bodies is a stronger principle, and 
that natural rest must be interpreted within the philosophical framework of act and potency. 
It is thus conceivable that bodies in their natural place retain potency towards movement, 
because a complete actualisation of their potency would bring about that bodies are not 
what they are: they would be a different type of compound. 
 
 
 
3. The movement of gravia and levia 
 
Regents dedicate most attention to the analysis of the third point concerning heavy and 
light bodies: how they move, and what the mover is. The regents’ century was closed by 
the grand Newtonian picture of a universe structured and held together by the law of 
gravity, an epoch-making revolution, which heavily influenced teaching in Scottish 
universities. Until 1650 we still find a predominant Scholastic view, which surfaces from 
time to time up to the 1720s. In a graduation thesis by Anderson 1720, XIX, we read the 
following words: 
 
Scholasticorum Commenta de Fuga Vacui et 
Levitate Corporum absoluta, certissimis 
experimentis, eliminata sunt; quippe demonstratum 
est ipsum Aerem, aliaque omnia Corpora Terram 
ambientem versus ejus centrum gravitare; ea vero, 
quae Levia dici solent, sursum pelli, propterea quod 
fluido Aeris, cui innatant, minus sunt gravia. Eadem 
gravitate, tanquam universali Naturae Lege, omnia 
Systematis mondani Corpora, versus se mutuo urgeri, 
demonstravit praedictus Eximius Auctor.9 
 
                                         
8
 I deal with the interesting set of 1626 Theses in the concluding part of this chapter. 
9
 John Anderson, Theses philosophicae, Aberdeen 1720. The Eximius Auctor is Isaac Newton. 
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What I find interesting is the threefold grammatical form that the word gravitas takes on, 
to which three aspects correspond: 1) ‘gravitare’, line five, in verbal form, denoting an 
action of bodies; 2) ‘minus gravia’, line seven, an adjective referring to bodies; 3) 
‘gravitas’, line eight, noun: the Newtonian concept, referring to a physical law. Until 1720 
we find evidence of an enduring Scholastic heritage, despite the enthusiastic reception of 
Newton in Aberdeen, where Anderson was a regent.10 
In the seventeenth century, the theoretical development regarding the movement of 
heavy and light bodies saw a shift from movement as directed and caused by an agent, to 
movement as a natural and inseparable state of bodies.11 The nature of the mover of heavy 
and light bodies was widely debated in late Scholasticism and it is one of the doctrines 
destined to undergo the deepest changes in the following decades. What matters now is the 
Scholastic antecedent of the Scottish reception of Newton. 
Regents usually divide themselves on the nature of the mover, which can be either 
internal or external. An internal mover is the very form of a substance, say, the form of a 
man is the mover of the substance man; an external mover is instead something external to 
the moved substance causing it to move, say a man tossing a stone. On a general level, the 
former movement is called natural and belongs to things which are self-moved, the latter 
belongs to inanimate things, and it is called violent (violentus). The spectrum of possible 
movements is not restricted to these two types: regents believe that while we have an 
absolutely natural movement, we never experience an absolutely violent movement. In 
fact, whatever a thing can do is somehow permitted by its nature: this way, violent is not to 
be understood as in contradiction with a body’s nature, or negating a body’s nature while 
occurring. In the example of a stone tossed upwards, this movement is violent because a 
stone never jumps upwards alone, yet it is natural because it is not contradictory that a 
stone goes upwards when pushed with sufficient strength. Some regents conclude that 
every natural movement is in the end a mixed movement.12 
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 David B. Wilson, Seeking Nature’s Logic, University Park (PA), Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2009, ch. 1. 
11
 As in Galileo, or in Descartes, To Debeaune 30 April 1639, AT II, pp. 543-544. 
12
 “Esse naturalem aut violentum sunt tantum accidentales differentiae motus ex parte principij, a quo non 
sumitur unitas vel distinctio specifica.” Stevenson 1625, TP XVI.4. 
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3.1 Generans as external principle of movement 
 
The doctrine that the principle of movement of heavy and light bodies is external is 
Aristotelian, and, among others, was held by Thomas Aquinas and the Coimbra 
commentators. Adamson 1600 and Lesley 1625 both refer to book VIII, 4 of Aristotle’s 
Physics as a key passage: 
 
Et sibi, et veritati consentaneus est Philosophus, 
dum cap. 4 lib. 8. Phys. contendit Gravia et Levia 
moveri ab externo generante, et impedimentum 
removente, nec ullum habere internum sui motus 
principium activum: Cap. autem ultimo, ab internis et 
propriis formis ea asserit agitari. [Adamson 1600, TP 
VI] 
 
An gravia et levia ab externo tantum principio 
moveantur? Aff. Arist. 8. Phys. c. 4. [Lesley 1625, 
Problemata physica 9] 
 
Setting aside the contradiction that Adamson sees between the two Aristotelian accounts, 
the strength of this theory lies in the distinction between animate and inanimate beings, as 
Coimbrans claim in their commentary on book VIII, 4, 1-3: 
 
Haec controversia tribus conclusionibus dirimenda 
est. Prima sit: gravia et levia, cum in naturalia loca 
tendunt, non moventur ab se, ut a principe causa sui 
motus. Haec ita probatur: movere se simpliciter et ut 
principalem sui motus causam, est proprium munus 
vitae; atqui elementa non vivunt; nequeunt igitur eo 
pacto sese movere. [...] 
Sit secunda conclusio: gravia et levia, quoties 
naturalia loca petunt, moventur a generante ut a 
principe causa effectrice sui motus. [...] Hoc medium, 
praeter alia est ipse corporum gravium et levium 
motus; ergo a generante efficiendus erit eidemque 
attribuandus. [...] 
Sit tertia conclusio: gravia et levia non habent in 
se principium passivum duntaxat suorum motuum, 
sed moventur effective a propria forma, ut a 
principali instrumento generantis, itemque ab insita 
gravitate et levitate, ut a minus praecipuo 
instrumento. 
 
We will see what replies regents have for the Coimbrans’ conclusions. The strongest 
argument in favour of an external principle of movement is conclusion 1: if we accept that 
the form of heavy and light bodies is the principle of their movement, there seems to be no 
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strong distinction between animate bodies and inanimate bodies. Consequently, the 
definition of ‘nature’ would equally apply to animate and inanimate. In conclusion 3 the 
Coimbrans grant some sort of causal power to the form, but only the causal power typical 
of instruments: in this case, these are instruments whose power comes from the mover 
(generans). Fairley 1623, TP XIIII, defines instrumental cause as follows: 
 
Causa principalis, et instrumentalis, quod ad 
modum operandi, in hoc distinguuntur; quod causa 
principalis operetur per virtutem propriam, et non ut 
virtus alterius, instrumentum vero praecise in 
quantum virtus alterius. 
 
What the Coimbrans have in mind is that the mover (generans) sets heavy and light 
bodies into motion not directly, but by giving them their actual form: “ideo causa motus 
ipsorum dicitur esse generans, qui dedit formam.”13 A cause has in itself all the causal 
power that is transferred to the effect: thus, the mover is the principal cause of the 
movement of the effect, even if the effect’s form (the form of heavy and light bodies) acts 
as instrument. An instrumental cause is a true cause, it is simply not the primary cause.14 
 
 
3.2 Form as internal principle of movement 
 
A more successful theory among the regents is that the form of heavy and light bodies is 
properly called the principle of their movements.15 Regents offer replies to the position of 
the Coimbrans concerning the distinction between animate and inanimate and the role of 
the mover. 
Adamson, directly after quoting Aristotle’s theory, puts forwards his own: 
 
Ordine naturae primum movetur Grave (de Levi 
iudicium idem) a sua forma agente per emanationem: 
secundo totum Grave suo motu movet medium, ut 
agens per transmutationem. [1600, TP VII] 
 
The talk of causality is not available anymore, since the form of heavy and light bodies 
cannot be in the relation of cause and effect towards its own substance: rather, heavy and 
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 Thomas Aquinas, CG, l. 3, c. 67, n. 2. 
14
 Schewer 1614, TP XXIV agrees with the Coimbrans, and his thesis closely resembles In Phys. VIII, 4, 1-3. 
15
 On this view, see also: King 1620, TP XIII.3; Wemys 1631, TP XV; Leech 1638, TP 30. 
Part II, chapter 2. The movement of gravia and levia 156 
light bodies are moved ‘by emanation’, a relation which can occur between a form and its 
accident (or, in another context, between the object known and the intelligible species 
emanating from it, not caused by it). With respect to the sort of relation that is in place in 
the movement of heavy and light bodies, Adamson’s and the Coimbrans’ theories are 
deeply different. 
King 1616 broadens the spectrum of the analysis even further: 
 
Elementa non moventur ab aliquo externo, sed 
proxime et per se a suis formis, ac motorem internum 
habent. 
Non est necesse, ut quicquid per se movetur 
constet ex parte movente, et parte mota: sed solum 
quae perfecte, et per se a se ipsis moventur, 
cujusmodi sunt animata. 
Elementa ab animantibus in hoc distinguuntur, 
quod haec non solum motus sui principium activum, 
verum etiam (ut loquuntur) initiativum in se habent, 
cum a se moveantur, et a se incipiunt moveri: illa 
vero etsi moveantur a se, nempe a propriis formis, 
non tamen a se incipiunt moveri, sed ab externo, 
generante nempe, aut removente impedimentum. 
Cum Aristoteles negat elementa a se ipsis moveri, 
nil aliud vult, quam ea non eo modo moveri quo 
animantia, quae undecunque, quocunque, et 
quandocunque volunt seipsa movere possunt. [TP 
XIII] 
 
We can take this passage by King as the standard reply in the Scottish universities to the 
Coimbrans. There are a number of aspects to underline: 1) elements (and consequently 
bodies) do move themselves in virtue of their forms, like an ‘inner motor’. 2) The 
objection can be raised that self-movement contradicts the principle omne quod movetur ab 
alio movetur, and that if forms move heavy and light bodies, a further mover is required for 
forms: King replies that it is enough to assume the same scheme for animate and inanimate 
beings. Animate beings are in movement as a whole, in virtue of their form as essential 
part of the moving whole. 3) The analogy between animate and inanimate does not hold 
any more when it comes to what King calls the ‘initiative’ of movement: animate beings 
can decide when and how to move, while inanimate heavy and light bodies are forced in 
their rectilinear downwards or upwards movement and cannot decide when to move.16 It is 
their nature which enables them to move, yet they need something external to them to 
move: a mover acting, or the removal of an impediment (remotio impedimenti). If a cup is 
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 Reid 1622, TP XX.4: “Facultas loco motiva non constituit gradum vitae a sensitivo distinctum, in ordine 
ad principium, sed duntaxat ad subjectum, in quo quandam perfectionem (sed accidentalem) importat.” 
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on a table, the table is the impediment to the cup falling: this impediment is preventing the 
cup from following its nature as a heavy body. Were the table removed, the cup would by 
its nature move downwards. Yet, the removal of the impediment is the cause of movement 
only by accident. In contrast, a cat sitting on the table always has it within its powers to 
move down from the table:17 in normal conditions, a cat does not require the intervention of 
an external factor. 
Regents and Coimbrans do agree on one aspect: gravitas and levitas are natural powers 
following from the essence of bodies. What they disagree about is how determinant these 
powers are in causing movement. 
Sibbald, regent at Marischal College, wrote in 1626 a set of theses almost ad hominem 
against Thomas Aquinas. There he rejects Thomism on the distinction between existence 
and essence, on resolution into prime matter, on the principle unius generatio est alterius 
corruptio, and on the role of generans in the movement of heavy and light bodies. The 
passage on forms is interesting in the rejection of a Thomistic doctrine that we have seen 
accepted by the Coimbrans: 
 
Neque gravitas et levitas proprie dici possunt 
generantis instrumenta, sed geniti, cum ab ejus forma 
emanent, ab eadem conserventur, et ab illa tanquam 
principali causa immediate agendum applicentur quae 
tamen in generantem minime quadrant, quae tantum 
dedit necessaria ad finem (formam producendo) 
virtualiter et in radice, non formaliter et in se, ut 
loquuntur. [1626, A quo moveantur gravia et levia, 2] 
 
The key remark is that gravitas and levitas cannot be called instruments of something 
external to their form (the generans), because they inhere as powers in their form, on 
which they depend. The only dependence Sibbald acknowledges is the dependence of the 
substance on the generans, which causes a substance to exert all its movements on its own. 
Being heavy and being light are thus instruments of the form of their substance: in other 
words, a heavy or light substance does move itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
17
 In this case the movement of the cat would not be rectilinear. The example holds because the stress here is 
on where the ‘initiative’ of the movement is: within or outside the moving body. 
Part II, chapter 2. The movement of gravia and levia 158 
3.3 Form as nature, nature as finis 
 
The analysis of the regents’ theories of movement in general and local movement in 
particular allows us to understand the context of the doctrine of the identity between form 
and nature. Aristotle in Phys. II, 1, 193 a 27 ff. reaches two conclusions: nature can be 
intended both as matter and as form. Matter is the subject of all substances, and hence 
something all substances are from: and this is one meaning of nature. Yet, the prevailing 
meaning is nature as form, because the thing all beings aim at is more important than the 
thing all beings come from. Thus, form is nature, and nature is the end of beings. 
Regents often comment on this theory, endorsing it. It is a famous and non-controversial 
Aristotelian passage, which in turn does not raise a debate in the Theses.18 Yet, the theory 
of form as nature is required to complete the account of movement. We have seen that a 
significant majority of regents holds that heavy and light bodies are moved by their own 
forms, which are the nature of the substances they inform, and which are also the end of 
their substances. The identity form-nature-end is expressed throughout the Theses. When a 
body is in movement, its aim is the acquisition of a new form (terminus ad quem): 
alongside the formal distinction between movement (flux of form) and its terminus, we can 
affirm the identity between form and terminus once the movement is complete. Rest is the 
acquired acquisition of a new form, so it is ultimately more perfect than movement.19 
One important aspect is that the definition of nature as ‘internal principle of movement’ 
must make room for the inclusion of passivity. The result is that nature is not only an 
‘active principle of movement’ but both an ‘active and passive principle of movement’. 
The case of the movement of heavy and light bodies makes this point clear. A further 
application of this theory is evident in the analysis of the movement of the heavens: their 
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 For the most explicit passages on form as nature: Robertson 1596, TP 10; Carr 1617, TP V.5; Forbes 1623, 
TP VI; Rankine 1627, TP VI.2. The theory of form as nature inscribes itself in the general picture of the 
natural philosophy of the theses: in fact, form is the end of matter, nature is the end of the compound, and 
form is what gives the essence to the compound: therefore, form is nature. Also, form can be interpreted 
as the mover of inanimate bodies, and nature is the principle of movement: therefore form is nature. The 
theory of form as nature thus surfaces in all the regents who hold any one of these theories. 
19
 The question can be asked whether local movement can be included in this picture. In fact, as we are 
reminded by Reid 1614, TP 6: “motus localis a caeteris distinguitur, quod terminus ipsius quod externum 
sit, aut saltem respectum ad extrinsecum includat.” The theory that local movement enjoys characteristics 
on its own is present in a minority of graduation theses, but the objection to the general view that local 
movement is not of a different type from the others still holds. The end of local movement is a whereness, 
which is not something ‘of’ a substance (like, say, quality) rather something external to a substance. If 
this objection is to be brought to its extremes, ‘whereness’ would not be a category any more, but a 
relational position in space. On the contrary, if we still consider ‘whereness’ as a categorial predication, 
we can still say that an ubi is predicated ‘of’ a substance. 
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movement is said to be natural even if it is originated by the external intelligence 
(intelligentia).20 
Regents argue that the movement of heavy and light bodies is natural independently of 
whether they consider the nature of heavy and light bodies as an active or passive principle 
of movement: thus, the stress is on ‘natural’, more than on ‘active or passive’.21 Now, some 
regents hold that the principle of such movement is to be found in an external agent, with 
the forms playing the role of instrumental causes: also in this case, this movement is 
natural. Thus, we must expand the definition of nature as Craig 1599 does in TP 6.1: 
 
Motus etiam ille, qui ab externo est agente, cuius 
passivum principium est internum, naturalis est 
dicendus. 
 
The reason for the need for expansion is that in the presence of an internal passive 
principle, the conditions for a violent movement per se are not met. The body in movement 
in this case is naturally open to receiving the determination towards this particular 
movement, so that the agent causing the movement does not coerce the nature of the 
moved. It is simply the case that the moved body alone does not have the power to bring 
about such movement. In conclusion, nature can include both an active and a passive 
principle of movement.22 
Scholastic natural philosophy exploits the notion of finality at many levels: from the 
individual directedness of the movement towards its terminus, to the general directedness 
of matter towards form, up to the universal directedness of the universe towards perfection, 
and ultimately towards God. The regents perceive the intrinsic finality of creation as 
something more than just a successful explanatory theory. In King 1612 we find a 
reference to the behaviour of the wise man whose echoes extend as far as the eighteenth 
century, in the words of George Turnbull, regent at Marischal College and teacher of 
Thomas Reid: 
 
Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate: 
debet enim sapiens naturam imitari quae nihil frustra 
facit. [TP 6] 
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 See below, part II, chapter 3. 
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 For example: Young 1613, TP 1.VI; Forbes 1623, TP VI; Rankine 1627, TP VI; King 1628, TP V.1. 
22
 Reid 1622, TP XI.7, mentions the case of blood, whose movement is by an external principle (vital spirits) 
and also natural. 
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Omnino fatendum est mundi corporei ordinem 
elegantissimum maximeque concinnum esse. Illoque 
certe nobis optimum vitae et morum exhibetur 
exemplar.23 
 
With respect to generation, the directedness of natural processes includes any individual 
being, animate or inanimate, which is brought about in order to exert some operation 
(Stevenson 1625, TP VI): in nature, no being is produced without an end, and the totality 
of beings is one per se, not merely by accident. The totality is unified, for instance, by the 
universal end of sustaining life (human life above others), which, we will see in the next 
chapter, is the end of the heavens. Graduation theses are one example, among many others, 
of the interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine in Phys. II, 8 of the finality of nature in a 
Christian philosophy. 
One theoretical aspect of Scholastic natural philosophy is the endorsement of final 
causality. We find some detailed passages in many theses in which the regents express 
their view on a subject which, by the time the earliest theses were written, was under attack 
by the so-called Moderni. In fact, final causality has been generally rejected outside of 
Scholasticism as a consequence of its being taken as an anthropocentric approach, in 
conflict with the new science.24 It is thus interesting to see what regents believe final 
causality to be. Once again King is one of our main sources: 
 
Tevloß ejsin to; ou| e{neka. [sic] 2. Post. 11. 
Finis igitur non est causa, nec habet rationem finis 
prout actu jam agenti adest ab eo acquisitus. 
Quumque finis sit qui explet appetitum agentis, 
quo praesente cessat actio, et in cujus possessione 
                                         
23
 G. Turnbull, Theses philosophicae de scientiae naturalis cum philosophia morali coniunctione, Aberdeen 
1723. It is arguable that similarities do not stop here: despite the stress we find in King on the fallibility of 
human will and intellect due to the original sin, both regents share the confidence in philosophy as 
“medicina morborum animi” [King 1612, TP 1]. I believe that these words are not a novelty per se; still, 
the continuity in Scottish universities of these themes over more than a century and amidst great changes 
in philosophy is remarkable. 
24
 Final causality shapes Scholastic natural philosophy as a whole: from the form-matter structure of the 
compound, to the nature of the celestial movements. It seems that the modern philosophical reaction 
(especially Descartes’) to final causality in natural philosophy focused primarily on the movement of 
inanimate bodies and of the non-rational animate bodies; and secondarily on all the other occurrences of 
finality in Scholastic philosophy - with, of course, the exception of rational beings and intentional finality. 
The graduation theses underline the difference between efficient and final causality in the light of ruling 
out the theory that final causes act as physical causes. Wemys 1631, TP V pursues a different strategy, 
similar to Buridan’s (Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 187): granted that the final cause is active only when 
apprehended by a mind, Wemys claims that: “Finis non influit in effectum, nisi mediante efficiente.” This 
is an attempt to understand finality in terms of efficient causes, without holding that they are the same 
kind of causality. Yet, this is the only case in which final causality can be “downplayed” without 
endangering the general structure of Scholastic philosophy: in fact, as an example, the concepts of 
appetite, good and form as the end of matter are the foundation of the very notion of substance. 
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agens conquiescit, non erit causa secundum esse 
intentionale quod habet in mente agentis. 
Quare finis proprie et per se causat, secundum esse 
reale extra animam futurum et possibile acquiri ab 
agente. 
Nihil igitur impedit quo minus non ens actu, quod 
tamen esse et a nobis parari potest, etsi effective 
causare non potest, nec Physice movere, causet tamen 
finaliter movendo agens motione quadam 
metaphorica. [1612, TP 8] 
 
Finis vere impossibilis, apprehensus tanquam 
possibilis; movet voluntatem ad veros actus reales et 
physicos. 
Ad essentiam causalitatis finis, sufficit bonitas 
realis apprehensa, licet ad terminationem requiritur 
vera. [...] Motio finis ejusque causalitas, non est 
intelligenda ad modum causarum modo materiali 
causantium. [1628, TP VI] 
 
In these dense passages King accepts the validity of final causality in natural philosophy 
by offering an account of its essence. In fact, final causality is different from material, 
formal and efficient causality, since it does not act in the way these natural causes act: 
ergo, it is not a natural cause. Yet, there is still a role for it: final causality requires the 
mediation of a mind which apprehends the good of an aim and consequently brings about 
physical actions in order to acquire this good. An end is always (whether it is per se or 
because it is thought to be such) a perceived good. This ‘being apprehended’ by the agent 
suffices to have a final causality, since the agent acts in order to acquire this good. To 
complete the acquisition though, an apprehension of the good is not enough because the 
acquisition of the good must be real and physical. 
This is the account we find in King, mainly based on the example of a mind perceiving a 
good, and prompting the agent to move accordingly. Needless to say, final causality is 
more problematic if there is no mind. Descartes’ famous objection was exactly that 
Scholastic inanimate bodies would resemble rational ones by actively aiming at an end.25 
The only acceptable notion of end should be an end perceived as such by a mind within a 
natural process which per se does not entail finality. Finality would then be reduced to 
causal efficiency. 
And indeed late Scholasticism was not far from this account of natural finality. If we also 
consider the position of Suárez, the Coimbrans, Fonseca and Goclenius we realize that the 
‘intentional being’ of an end is considered a conditio sine qua non of the causality of an 
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 In a letter to Mersenne in 1643 (AT III, p. 648) Descartes expounds his reading of Scholastic real qualities 
as “petites âmes à leur corps”, which entails the notion of anthropomorphism. 
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end: an end does not cause by its intentional being though, rather the good of the end sets 
will in motion in order to acquire it.26 Between a perceived end and will there is not a 
relation of cause and effect, unless we intend it ‘metaphorically’. The shift from final to 
efficient causality is realized when the agent acts to acquire the end. 
When regents speak of final causality they accept this general framework of mind-
perceived good (esse intentionale), and in no cases has final causality a place in non-
rational beings. On a universal scale, thus including inanimate bodies, the same structure 
holds: we have seen that heavy and light bodies act in virtue of their forms, which are their 
natures. These natures are given by God in the act of creation. We can appreciate now one 
of the strongest reasons in favour of the theory of generans as principle cause of 
movement: heavy and light bodies do act in such and such a way because they are given 
such and such a nature by God: this also explains the actions of inanimate beings according 
to final causes. 
Despite being mutually opposed in respect of what the principle of movement is, the 
generans theory and the form theory entail a deeper agreement on the nature of final 
causality and movement in general. 
 
 
3.3.1 An exception? Strachan 1631 on medium demonstrationis and intentio 
metaphorica 
 
Andrew Strachan, regent at King’s College between the late 1620s and early 1630s,27 
deals with natural finality in a complex passage, both on a theoretical and a grammatical 
level. According to Strachan, Aristotle’s original doctrine has it that the heavy and light 
bodies are the intrinsic causes of their movements28 and Thomas and Scotus corrupted 
Aristotle on this matter [TP IV]. I now quote the first part of his own theory: 
 
Nihil proficiunt, qui demonstrare laborant gravium 
et levium naturam, esse causam principalem motus 
ipsorum: argumento petito a natura demonstrationis: 
quia viz. per naturam eorum demonstrari potest 
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 D. Des Chene, Physiologia, pp. 186-200. 
27
 We have little information regarding Andrew Strachan: regent for the graduates of 1628-29, 1629-30, 
1630-31, 1631-32 at King’s College, Aberdeen. His only extant theses are 1629 and 1631. Later on 
Professor of Divinity. OG, p. 55. 
28
 Strachan quotes De Coelo I, 4, and offers a reading of Aristotle incompatible with that of Lesley 1625 and 
Adamson 1600 [above, section 3.1], who quote Physics VIII, 4. In TP IV.4, Strachan claims that Aristotle 
interpreted the generans as principal cause of movement only with regards to causes operating by 
emanation, thus not absolutely speaking. 
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ipsorum motus: in omni autem demonstratione 
potissima medium debet esse causa principalis: 
absque qua foret ut non ingeneraret perfectam 
scientiam. Non enim motus sed mobilitas 
demonstratione potissima concludi potest de gravibus 
et levibus per ipsorum naturam. [1631, TP IV.1] 
 
The key passage is that the theory that nature is the principal cause of the movement of 
heavy and light bodies is proved false by the very nature of demonstration: there is no 
demonstration starting from the nature of heavy and light bodies which proves their 
movement. Why is this so? In a scientific demonstration (potissima demonstratione), the 
middle term must be the principal cause. The conclusion about heavy and light bodies on 
the ground of their nature thus can be ‘mobility’ (mobilitas), not movement. 
More elements are required to understand what Strachan has in mind. In a demonstration 
delivering perfect science, that is a universal and necessary conclusion, the role of the 
middle term of the demonstration (medium demonstrationis) is unique and universal; it 
must convey a proper knowledge of the thing to be demonstrated, and somehow the 
conclusion is posited as soon as the middle term is posited. If these conditions are not 
respected, then no conclusion can be reached. Strachan holds that the nature of heavy and 
light bodies cannot play the role of middle term, because, and this is his claim, the nature 
of heavy and light bodies only lets us conclude about the mobility of these bodies, and not 
about the type of movement they undergo. In addition, some sort of finality is required, 
which specifies the mobility as ‘movement downwards or upwards towards a natural 
place’. 
In the same year 1631 a set of graduation theses by Wemys addresses the same subject as 
follows: 
 
Medium in demonstratione dioti [sic] est 
principalis causa affectionis demonstratae. 
Forma ergo gravium et levium sunt principales 
causae eorum motus. Idem est movens et mobile 
potestate et actu. [TP XV] 
 
According to Wemys, forms are the principal causes of movement and can be the middle 
of a scientific demonstration of movement. The two regents do agree on the structure of the 
perfect demonstration: they differ on what can be accepted as the middle of such a 
demonstration. Wemys speaks of ‘form’, Strachan of ‘nature’ and perhaps the 
disagreement lies in this terminology. In fact, Strachan seems to hold that form alone is not 
the nature of bodies and that matter must be included as well. Given that matter is 
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essentially open to any movement because matter is the unique subject of all natural 
bodies, it is then coherent to say that the nature (form and matter) of heavy and light bodies 
just allows us to infer their mobility, and not the kind of their movement. 
The second part of Strachan’s passage is the most complex, and touches the notion of 
metaphorical intention: 
 
Intentio metaphorica (quam generantia inanimata 
alunt, ad perficiendum omnibus numeris ea quae ab 
ipsis generantur, quod tum demum praestant quando 
illis in loco naturali contingit esse, quem per motum 
consequuntur) non magis abjudicat naturis gravium et 
levium rationem causae principalis: quam intentio 
animatorum quae formalis est (qua in generatione 
proponunt sibimet conferre genitis a se ea omnia quae 
ipsorum naturae debentur) aut intentio causae 
universalis et primae (qua omnium entium 
perfectionem intendit per media ipsorum naturis 
consentanea) ponit, aut probat generans animatum aut 
primam causam esse causas principales, et proximas 
earum actionum quae a genitis animatis, aut causis 
secundis producuntur. [ivi, TP IV.2] 
 
It might be useful to quote the passage without the parts in parentheses: “Intentio 
metaphorica [...] non magis abjudicat naturis gravium et levium rationem causae 
principalis: quam intentio animatorum quae formalis est [...] aut intentio causae 
universalis et primae [...] ponit, aut probat generans animatum aut primam causam esse 
causas principales, et proximas earum actionum quae a genitis animatis, aut causis 
secundis producuntur.” 
Strachan’s point is that just as the apprehension of a good as an end does not necessitate 
our will to pursue the end, so the ‘metaphorical intention’ does not deprive the natures of 
heavy and light bodies of their being principal causes. The generans of animate bodies is 
the first cause (God), yet we do not say that it is the cause of animate bodies’ actions: the 
same holds for heavy and light bodies. 
Metaphorical intention is a hapax legomenon in the Theses just as Strachan’s theory is. In 
a bracketed line, the regent tells us that metaphorical intention is given to inanimate bodies 
by generators (quam generantia inanimata alunt): this would mean that finality is within 
the inanimate body, not because the first cause has externally intended it to act in a 
finalised way; rather, inanimate bodies are intrinsically finalised. And also, the notion of 
‘metaphor’, usually employed in a mind-object context, is accepted by Strachan with 
regards to inanimate (ergo mindless) bodies. 
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4. Reid 162629 
 
Reid 1626 is the last set of graduation theses by this regent, who taught in Edinburgh 
university from 1606 (the beginning of his first four-year curriculum) to 1626. It is a very 
important work to understand some of the changes which were occurring in the philosophy 
of the regents. The most interesting field is movement, but other features are remarkable as 
well. For example, a change in the format of graduation theses is clear if we compare 1614 
with 1626: The 1614 Theses are written in the form of a commentary on the Physics of 
Aristotle, each thesis usually consisting of a quote of Aristotle that the regent is 
commenting on with a number of corollaries and notes. 1626 instead is structured more as 
a little treatise, still very much focused on the Physics, yet with a unity more thematical 
than expository. Interestingly as well, the only two authorities mentioned in 1626 are 
Aristotle and Scaliger, which gives us an idea of what philosophers Reid draws inspiration 
from.30 The combination of ‘the Philosopher’ and one of the most recent Renaissance 
philosophers is not rare in the Theses, seen when discussing Transubstantiation. 
I think that Reid 1626 is still fully within the Scholastic tradition. The regent does not 
reject Scholastic natural philosophy in its key aspects, as he accepts the analysis of prime 
matter, of heavy and light bodies, of natural places and the subordination of philosophy to 
theology in those subjects in which a conflict is possible. Nonetheless, Reid’s theory of 
movement shows some unique features which are at odds with the work of the other 
regents. The central feature seems to be a different account of the relationship between 
movement and rest, and consequently nature and rest. 
Here are his words on the subject: 
                                         
29
 The translation of the Theses physicae of Reid 1626 is in the Appendix. 
30
 As we can also understand from the translation of Reid’s physical these in the Appendix, the strategy 
adopted is to make use of Scaliger in the interpretation of Aristotle: it does not seem to be the case that 
Reid sees Scaliger as in opposition to Aristotle. I believe that the same attitude is present in all the 
references to Scaliger in the Theses. In general, Scaliger is the most quoted non-Scholastic Renaissance 
philosopher. The regents usually quote Renaissance Scholastics: Suárez, Zabarella, Gabriel Biel, the 
Coimbrans, Ruvius, and Cajetanus are the most quoted. The favourite non-Scholastic Renaissance 
sources are Scaliger and Ramus, even if the latter has a very minor impact on the regents’ natural 
philosophy. In general, the regents’ sources are still much in the style of medieval Scholasticism: 
Thomas, Scotus, Durandus, Albertus Magnus, Averroes, Avicenna, Plato, Augustinus, the Nominales, 
Porphyry, the Greek physicists. Yet, the post-Humanist character of the Theses is clear in the constant 
references to the Greek commentaries of Aristotle and to Classical Latin authors: in particular Alexander 
of Aphrodisia, Simplicius, Plyny, Seneca, and Cicero. The overall picture seems to be one of continuity 
with medieval Scholasticism in terms of references and debates; nonetheless, Scaliger is the most 
apparent example of the assimilation in the Scholastic philosophy of the regents of some innovations of 
Humanism. 
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Terra non majorem habet propensionem ad 
quietem, in infimo loco, quam ignis ad motum, in 
supremo. Natura terrae tantum motus, non quietis 
ipsius, principium et causa est. Et terra tantum 
mobilis, non immobilis est sua natura, ac conditione 
naturali. 
Cum itaque omnis quies, etiam qui motum 
naturalem sequitur, ejusdem motus privatio sit: natura 
ut quietem proprie non expetit, ita nec eandem 
intendit. 
Unde inferimus primo, longe differre, 
unumquodque in suo loco naturali manere, et in 
eodem quiescere: nam illud omni corpori naturali 
naturale est, hoc nulli corpori naturali naturale est. 
Inferimus secundo, naturam nihilominus, etiam 
principium et motus et quietis dici copulative, si 
quies fundamentaliter non formaliter, hoc est pro ipsa 
possessione ac fruitione formae ac termini, non 
simpliciter pro motus privatione accipiatur. Atque 
hoc sensu, idem est kinei`sqai kai; i{sasqai, et idem 
est kinei`sqai kai; hjremivzesqai ex Arist. 6. Phys. 8. 
text. 67. [TP II] 
 
These extracts are Reid’s comments on De Coelo I, 3, quoted as the heading of the thesis, 
where Aristotle writes that heavy bodies are those which are underneath and go 
downwards, while light bodies are above and go upwards. A traditional Aristotelian 
doctrine, whose comments lead us away from it. 
In the first lines, Reid claims that rest for earth is equivalent to movement for fire. This 
theory is not new to the Theses: Lesley 1625, TP XIV, has it that fire “movetur ut 
moveatur, non ut quiescat”, and quotes Zabarella in support of this view. As we will see in 
the next chapter, the movement of heavens is also thought to be an essential condition, not 
a movement towards a greater perfection. In sum, regents speak of movement as an end in 
itself in specific contexts. What Reid does differently, is predicating movement as proper 
to fire in parallel with rest proper to earth, as if an analogy of proportion ‘rest : earth = 
movement : fire’ were available here. 
The following lines clarify the point: the nature of earth is the principle and cause only of 
movement, not of rest: earth is, by its nature and in a natural condition, mobile. To make 
things more explicit, Reid openly claims that ‘nature by itself does not strive for rest.’ I 
believe we are allowed to see in these words a rejection of the traditional doctrine of the 
directedness of natural movements: if rest is not the end of movement but just a privation 
of movement, then what is natural to bodies is not the movement towards an end but 
precisely movement as movement. A Scholastic could agree that the natural condition of 
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bodies is movement, but would not give up on the idea of rest as the end of movement, 
rather than simply a temporary ‘suspension’ of movement. 
The first inference from this theory reminds us of an earlier point made by Reid, in 1614, 
TP 3.7 (section 2.1), where he assumes that ‘remaining in place’ is the same as ‘resting’. 
Now it is made clear that this is not the case: remaining in place (manere) is natural to 
bodies, while resting (quiescere, which implies a full realisation of the nature of bodies, 
not simply an actualisation of potency) is never a natural state of bodies. The second 
inference is that nature can be called a principle and cause of both movement and rest only 
if rest is understood fundamentally as possession of the form, and not formally as privation 
of movement. In this sense, Reid explains, it is the same ‘to move and stop’ and ‘to move 
and to rest’. If we look at the form of movement, stopping is no different from resting; if 
we look at the matter of movement, in this case nature is also the principle and cause of a 
movement-towards-form (and natural places retain their importance). 
Despite a general adherence to Scholastic natural philosophy, Reid brings forward some 
considerations innovative in the context of graduation theses. I believe that his case is not 
dissimilar to Dalrymple 1646. It is a matter of speculation what Reid’s possible sources of 
inspiration are. His reference to Aristotle’s text does not help much: Physics VI, 8 is in fact 
about the analysis of moving and stopping in relation to the instant, not in relation to the 
natural places: Reid’s theory does not seem to be Aristotelian. I will address the question 
of the role of Aristotle later in chapter 3 and in the Conclusions. What so far appears to be 
the case is that regents looked back at the Greek texts of Aristotle as still the most relevant 
and inspiring works in philosophy. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The notions of the heaviness and the lightness of bodies are central to Scholastic natural 
philosophy. A body moves according to its nature: heavy and light bodies move according 
to, respectively, their natures as heavy and light bodies. A heavy body moves towards the 
centre of the universe, while a light body moves towards the upper limit of the sublunar 
sphere, limited by the sphere of the moon, the first celestial sphere. 
The regents are not committed to an isomorphic concept of space: in fact, bodies tend 
towards their natural places, where their movement naturally reaches its end, and where the 
substance reaches a state of rest. This is the most general notion of an ‘end’ of movement. 
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Since movement is also the acquisition of form, each time that a new form is acquired, a 
determined movement ends and rest is reached. In this particular sense, the new acquired 
form is the end of a determined movement. Nature, which, according to the regents, is the 
same as form, acts as the final cause of movement. Form/nature is fully realised in its 
natural place. 
The regents answer the question of what is the primary cause of the movement of heavy 
and light bodies: in response to the Scholastic tradition according to which the generans 
moves heavy and light bodies, the regents reply that heavy and light bodies move 
themselves, even if not in the same way as animate bodies move. 
We have seen that the regents do not understand the final cause as acting as a physical 
cause: yet, they still find place for the natural directedness of movements in their natural 
philosophy. 
Reid 1626 seems to put forward a theory of the finality of the movement of fire which 
breaks with the Scholastic tradition: in fact, the regent claims that fire does not move 
towards rest, but rather moves in order to move. The end of fire is movement, ergo the rest 
of fire is movement as well. Reid seems to hold that rest is not a natural state of bodies, 
and that it is nothing different from privation of movement. 
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The movement of the heavens 
 
 
 
In the seventeenth century the understanding of the movement of the heavens saw 
dramatic developments in both epistemology and metaphysics. In the former field, the 
increasing use of mathematics progressively drove the enquiry on celestial bodies away 
from a purely philosophical reading; in the latter, the traditional framework of the 
distinction in nature between sublunar and celestial world gave way to a unitary analysis 
based on common laws and properties. In a broad scheme, the shift took place from 
traditional Scholastic accounts to the first forms of modern science. The analysis of the 
movement of the heavens is one of the most apparent elements of the so-called ‘scientific 
revolution’, the great scientific paradigm-shift which paved the way to what modern 
science is. 
This phenomenon falls within our scope since we have to investigate what graduation 
theses say with regards to cosmology. Such an investigation will enable us to establish the 
extent of the Scholastic influence and the extent of the possible early penetration of the 
new science in Scottish universities up to 1650. Scottish Scholastic natural philosophy on 
this matter is heavily indebted to Scholasticism, as was much of the European philosophy 
as a whole. Indeed, even before the scientific revolution, the Scholastic approach was not 
the only available approach to cosmology, as Renaissance philosophies developed 
alternative ways to give answers and raise problems about the nature and movement of the 
heavens. But if Scholasticism was not the only system available, it was certainly the most 
widespread, inclusive and influential. 
In Scottish universities in particular there is no evidence of the acceptance of 
philosophies other than Scholasticism, even if philosophers such as Pico della Mirandola 
or Giordano Bruno were read and studied: the background is then Scholastic. What of the 
outcome? I shall argue that graduation theses show examples of proximity to some theories 
of the Moderni while still being deeply rooted in the Scholastic tradition. I do not intend to 
read graduation theses in parallel with contemporary scientific works: this approach would 
find little textual evidence in the graduation theses and the very choice of contemporary 
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authorities would inevitably be arbitrary.1 What I set out to do is to offer an account of 
cosmology in Scottish universities against its Scholastic background. The voice of modern 
science, though not absent, is barely audible. This is, I believe, an interesting 
historiographical point: Scholasticism, in all its confessional, national, school-based forms 
offered so many solutions and alternatives that, for instance, the Scottish regents could 
accept the notion of a void and still be Scholastic. If we want to draw a parallel with 
Descartes, can we say that regents were more ‘scientific’ or more ‘modern’ than Descartes 
on this matter? Clearly not; yet, the rejection of the theory of void is arguably one of the 
most evident ‘Aristotelian’ elements in Descartes’ philosophy. 
In my opinion, the historiographical category of the ‘old’ Scholasticism facing the ‘new’ 
philosophy must be dropped if by ‘old’ and ‘new’ we mean anything more than 
chronological succession. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, various philosophies 
were confronting each other from different if not totally opposed standpoints, nonetheless 
some theories were in fact shared, and same conclusions reached from different premises. 
Going back to the example of void: does the rejection of a void make a philosopher 
Aristotelian, and vice versa? The answer is again ‘clearly not’. If we limit Scholasticism to 
either a narrow or broad set of doctrines that a philosopher must commit to in order to be 
‘Scholastic’ (and the same can be stated about Aristotelianism), we risk losing sight of the 
historical variety of Scholasticism in favour of a merely philosophical and 
historiographical unity.2 
The movement of the heavens is a form of local movement. In the Scholastic theory of 
movement, local movement is the type of natural change occurring when a substance 
acquires a new ubi, a new presence in space. The heavens were traditionally intended to be 
immutable, which means not subject to generation and corruption, thus not subject to any 
movement which implies the corruption of an old form and the acquisition of a new one. 
Ergo, the heavens are not directed towards an end, since the end of natural movement is the 
new form. Local movement of the heavens is of a type of movement which does not 
include directedness. This chapter is then about 1) the nature of the heavens; 2) their 
movement, with particular attention to the theory of void; and finally 3) the extrinsic 
finality of their movement. One last point is about the reception of Aristotle’s proof of the 
                                         
1
 What I mean is that the new or modern science was itself a vast spectrum of sometimes mutually divergent 
and incoherent theories, not a unitary body. Why then prefer, for example, Galileo to Descartes, or vice 
versa, in absence of historical evidence in the graduation theses? 
2
 This seems to be the approach of the otherwise valuable introduction to a standard version of Scholasticism 
in W. Ott, Causation and Laws of Nature, ch. 3. The author seeks to sketch the most widely held 
positions by an almost exclusive reference to Thomas Aquinas and Suárez. If this approach can be 
theoretically fruitful, it is nonetheless historically reductive. 
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existence of the prime motor, which is the archetype of the Christian demonstration of the 
existence of God by its effects (per effectus), otherwise called ‘a posteriori’. Some regents 
reject this demonstration and I will argue that they do so also on the basis of their 
confession. The analysis of the reception of Aristotle will continue in the Conclusions. 
 
 
 
1. Nature of the heavens 
 
The doctrine according to which the heavens are of a different nature than the sublunar 
world is the product of a number of theories, assumptions, and arguments all concurring in 
the same conclusion. It is an example of what we might call a paradigm (scientific, 
philosophical, cultural) proper to Scholasticism and Aristotelianism, or better, deeply 
coherent with the historical forms of Scholasticism and Aristotelianism. It is a theory 
which shaped the cultural world for many centuries in Europe, to be fully rejected only 
during the seventeenth century. Indeed, regents still subscribe to it in large numbers. 
Perhaps more than other theories, this doctrine illustrates the idea of a “paradigm” 
applied to the history of philosophy, and consequently, to philosophy.3 Scholastics 
employed a variety of arguments to prove this doctrine, arguments whose form is based on 
a number of assumptions and other theories proper to Scholasticism itself and derived from 
Aristotelianism. Outside this context such arguments are ineffective, if contrasted with 
many other Scholastic arguments, which may retain their validity. On a deeper level, it is 
also arguable that such a doctrine is never proved in a satisfactory way: for the reason that, 
in Scholastic natural philosophy, this doctrine sometimes works as a conclusion, and some 
times as a premise, and, more importantly, for the reason that every argument within the 
same paradigm always confirms the paradigm, either directly or indirectly.4 
                                         
3
 For the reception of T. Kuhn’s paradigm theory in the humanities, Paradigms and Revolutions, edited by G. 
Gutting, Notre Dame (IN), Notre Dame University Press, 1980. 
4
 In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago - London, University of Chicago Press, 1996, Kuhn 
claims that the achievement of classics of science, such as Aristotle’s Physics, “was sufficiently 
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific 
activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined 
group of practitioners to resolve. Achievements that share these two charcteristics I shall henceforth refer 
to as ‘paradigms’, a term that relates closely to ‘normal science’” (p. 10). In the practice of ‘normal 
science’, the paradigm sets the nature and direction of research, and “when the individual scientist can 
take a paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, 
starting from first principles and justifying the use of each concept introduced” (pp. 19-20). In some 
sense, this picture applies to philosophy as well: for example, the difference in nature between sublunar 
and celestial world shares the characteristics of a paradigm, including the resistance against the paradigm-
shift in the direction of modern science. 
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This doctrine shaped philosophy so profoundly that no Scholastic until the Renaissance 
really doubted it. It was a paradigmatic doctrine, and only a ‘revolution’ in philosophy 
could bring about a true contender to it. Given this picture, natural philosophy was not the 
only discipline involved: in different ways, moral philosophy and theology benefited from 
the idea of the universe and man’s place in it that would be derived from this paradigmatic 
doctrine. For instance, in astronomy the geocentric theory was hardly doubted: theologians 
and philosophers interpreted this scientific evidence of the earth as the centre of the 
universe to strengthen the Christian idea of the creation made for the advantage of 
mankind, in a universe ordered by a benevolent maker. 
This doctrine and the following scientific revolution have been used by many as a case-
study for the shift which occurred in the western world. My intent is much more limited: I 
intend to show what the Theses philosophicae say about the heavens, the form of the 
arguments employed and how deeply this doctrine is rooted within Scholasticism. But also, 
how within Scholasticism itself arguments were available for the theory of the identity of 
celestial and sublunar matter, movement and consequently nature. 
The structure of this chapter could have followed the reverse order, with the movement 
of the heavens dealt with before the analysis of the nature of heavens: this is, indeed, a 
logical order of exposition, if we accept that the movement of a body tells us about the 
nature of the body. Or, in a regent’s words: 
 
motus adeo cum natura est complicatus, ut 
quicquid facit per illum faciat, per illum etiam se 
nobis patefaciat. [Knox 1605, TP 3] 
 
If when the heavens move they manifest characteristics specific to them, then also the 
nature of the heavens must be only specific to them. 
I shall follow a different order, one which is more secundum naturam, for two reasons: 1) 
the nature of the heavens is logically and metaphysically prior to our knowledge of their 
movement. Once the nature of such movement is grasped, what is prior according to us 
(that is, in the order of knowing) must give way to what is prior according to nature (in the 
order of being); 2) this way of reasoning is Scholastic. I believe this point to be central. 
Graduation theses are a product of a long tradition, which stretches back to the Middle 
Ages. The complexity, and wide range of influences (Aristotelianism and Christian 
revelation above all) in Scholastic philosophy did not allow for a systematic method of 
discovery in philosophy, much praised and sought after by the Moderni. Scholasticism has 
always been an inclusive way of philosophizing, an exposition of truths either obtained in 
other disciplines such as theology or possessed for so long that no new proof for them was 
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required. This does not entail that no philosophical progress was ever made: on the 
contrary, Scholasticism is rich in debate. Yet, philosophy was not about discovering, but 
about expounding in a more and more inclusive and coherent way. 
Putting the nature of heavens first in the order of exposition enables us to make a point 
about the Scholastic way of philosophizing, and to underline the paradigmatic role of this 
doctrine.5 
 
 
1.1 Heavens different in nature from the sublunar world 
 
Regents disagree on whether the nature of the heavens differs from that of the sublunar 
world. The majority says that the two natures are different. The doctrine of the difference 
in nature is more traditional and more strongly rooted in the works of Aristotle, who 
dedicated two distinct and complementary works to the sublunar world (Physics) and to the 
heavens (On the heavens). 
We have seen that sublunar bodies are compounds of form and matter and the subject of 
all such bodies is the same prime matter. Prime matter thus confers some sort of identity on 
all sublunar bodies, due to the identity of one of the two principles: prime matter is in fact 
of the same species in all bodies.6 Now, ‘difference in nature’ between sublunar bodies and 
celestial bodies can mean either one of these two options: 1) celestial bodies are not 
composed of matter and form, and are not compounds at all; 2) the matter of celestial 
bodies is a different matter from sublunar bodies.7 The first option was Averroes’s 
solution, unanimously rejected by the regents: according to Averroes, celestial bodies are 
pure forms devoid of any matter, hence the difference from sublunar bodies. When regents 
state this difference, they always conclude that the difference is due to matter; namely that 
celestial matter is not made of the four elements, and consequently that it is not subject to 
upwards and downwards movements, which means not subject to finality. In brief, the 
compounds of form and matter are also to be found in the heavens. 
                                         
5
 The Scholastic way of philosophizing is heavily influenced by the reception of Aristotle’s Posterior 
analytics. Yet, in the light of the paradigm theory, it might be asked whether the Scholastics failed to 
respect the Aristotelian principle that the premises and the conclusions of an argument cannot be 
interchangeable. 
6
 “Omnis materia sublunarium est ejusdem speciei ex natura sua, utut formae toto genere distinguantur.” 
Reid 1622, TP IV.2. 
7
 It is important to underline the difference between nature as form (inner active and passive principle of 
movement) and nature in this context, where nature is taken to signify the structure and essence. The 
question here is not about the principle of movement of celestial bodies; rather, about what sort of bodies 
they are. 
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A body which is not subject to finality is a body which never acquires a form other than 
its current form. A new form is always the end of movement, it is also said to be its 
perfection, granted that it is a perfection of something perfectible, not a perfection of 
something already perfect [which is rest, Reid 1614, TP 3]: this latter case is not available 
to sublunar bodies, since they are always in movement and unable to fully satisfy their 
potency. On the contrary, celestial bodies always retain their same forms: celestial 
compounds are thus necessary, because they are what they can be, and they cannot be any 
different from what they are. Of course, they can be said to be necessary secundum quid, 
that is, if they are considered from the standpoint of natural philosophy: absolutely 
speaking only God is necessary. 
So, being devoid of potency towards any form different from the current form (no 
finality) implies that celestial bodies are not corruptible, since the present compound is 
never going to be dissolved and replaced. Not being corruptible implies not being 
generable. Celestial bodies are above the natural vicissitudes of generation and corruption, 
and this is explained by the application of the principle omnis generatio est alterius 
corruptio: if there is no corruption in the heavens, then nothing can ever be generated in 
the heavens either. Heavens were created by God directly as they are, and were not 
generated by any created secondary cause. 
Fairley 1623 makes an explicit connection between matter and corruption with regards to 
the heavens: 
 
Materiae eiusdem speciei habent potentiam 
passivam essentialem eiusdem rationis, ad easdem 
formas recipiendas essentialiter ordinatam. 
Ergo si materia coeli et sublunarium esset eiusdem 
speciei eaedem formae continerentur in potentia 
utriusque, ut forma Solis contineretur in potentia 
materiae ignis, et viceversa. [...] 
Ergo ex eodem posito sequeretur coelestia esse sua 
natura generabilia, et corruptibilia, quod Arist. 
repugnat Lib. I. de Coelo Cap. 3. [TP VII, 1-4] 
 
Regents seldom speak of fifth essence or quintessence (quintessentia), the famous fifth 
element the heavens were thought to be composed of. Nonetheless, despite this rare use of 
the word, when they hold the theory of the difference in nature, they implicitly refer to 
quintessence. We have seen that the four elements are essentially either heavy or light, the 
property from which movements proper to each one of the elements follow: heavy 
elements go downwards, light elements upwards. Quintessence is of a different nature, it 
cannot be said to be either heavy or light: as a consequence, it does not move downwards 
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or upwards. The movement proper to the heavens is circular: celestial bodies rotate around 
the centre of the universe (which is the centre of earth), and never acquire a new place, 
contrary to sublunar bodies. In fact, every segment of a circular movement is recurrent in 
time and equal to itself, there is no natural place for celestial bodies for they are not 
directed anywhere, and simply repeat the same movement. From a different perspective, 
finality is again not applicable to celestial bodies. In this paradigm, circular movement is 
thus the most perfect of movements, since it is endless and not directed. It is then a 
movement of a different nature from rectilinear movement (downwards and upwards), 
which is proper of sublunar bodies. With regards to circular movement, King 1624 writes 
that: 
 
Motus circularis non fit ad terminum in quem 
exeat, sed recurrit in sese, et partium tantum est totius 
quiescentis, quieti simillimus. 
Nec incipit nec desinit, sed in se reflexus 
recolligitur, continuitate sua uniformis; etsi durationis, 
et spatij terminis nullis definitur. [TP XII] 
 
In the Theses philosophicae we never find a single argument taken as the principal 
argument for the demonstration of such difference in nature, contrary to what happens in 
the case of prime matter. In fact, from the theses written in 1629 in St Andrews, we know 
that regents favour the argument for the existence of prime matter which is based on 
natural philosophy alone, which is considered stronger than others precisely in virtue of its 
purely natural philosophical nature.8 Rather, the demonstration of the difference in nature 
can be obtained from different perspectives, all of them equally valid as starting points, all 
of them equally valid as background theories, depending on the case. The empirical 
evidence for the difference in the nature of the heavens is circular movement, which is 
absent from our experience of sublunar bodies in movement. Yet, circular movement alone 
cannot prove any of the properties of celestial bodies, just as, in the view of some regents, 
the nature of heavy and light bodies cannot prove (that is, it cannot be a middle term in a 
demonstration) the downwards or upwards movement, and only leads to prove mobility.9 
Circular movement becomes the empirical support for a number of theories supposed only 
proximately by this evidence. This does not entail any illicit passage; it simply shows how 
some Scholastic theories are the result of a number of mutually sustaining premises. 
                                         
8
 I analysed this argument in part I, chapter 1, section 2.1. The argument is labelled ‘ex naturali rerum 
generatione’. 
9
 Strachan 1631, TP IV.1. Part II, chapter 2, section 3.3.1. 
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Recent philosophy of science has shown, thanks to the works of T. Kuhn, P. K. 
Feyerabend and I. Lakatos among others,10 the strength of paradigms in shaping the 
philosophical world and in somehow validating or refuting evidences and theories. 
Moreover, the very notion of ‘empirical evidence’ and ‘proof’ seems to be weaker than 
commonly believed. Sibbald 1623 makes the only reference in graduation theses to a very 
recent innovation in astronomy, destined to dramatically change natural philosophy: 
 
Coelum recte statuitur quinta essentia, ab elementis 
distincta iisdem nobilior. 
Nec contrarium ex optica demonstrari potest. [TP 
19-20] 
 
It is clear that the regent is referring to the telescope. It is possible that Sibbald read of it 
directly from Galileo’s Sydereus Nuncius, published in 1610. As a matter of fact, the 
regent refers to “Iohannes Pena et alii” as supporters of this view. It seems that Galileo’s 
reasons did not convince Sibbald, who rejects the idea that optics can play a role in 
discovering the nature of the heavens, or better, in changing what we know of the nature of 
the heavens. We have thus evidence of an endorsement of traditional cosmology after the 
beginning of the so-called scientific revolution: Sibbald does not expand his point any 
further, but we can argue that he would favour the vast body of Scholastic literature 
supporting the quintessence doctrine over the observations of Galileo. 
What Sibbald may not have favoured is a theological interpretation of the quintessence 
doctrine. Another unique passage is found in King 1624, who, in a way uncommon in the 
seventeenth century debate, exploits the biblical reference to Joshua fighting against the 
Amorites: 
 
And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until 
the people had avenged themselves upon their 
enemies. Is not this written in the book of Jasher? So 
the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted 
not to go down about a whole day.11 
 
Non solum Sacrae literae, quae testantur [symbol 
of sun] pugnante Iosua 3. horis constitisse, ad 
orationem Hezekiae 15. grad. regressum esse, Stellam 
novam Magis apparisse: sed etiam novorum syderum 
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 For example, I. Lakatos, Philosophical Papers of Imre Lakatos, 2 vols., J. Worrall - G. Currie (eds.), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978; P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, London, Verso, 1993 
3rd edition; T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Chicago and London, University of 
Chicago Press, 1996 3rd edition. 
11
 King James Bible, Book of Joshua, 10:13. 
Part II, chapter 3. The movement of the heavens  177 
procreatio, unius, Anno 1600, in Cygno juxta eam 
stellam quae in ejus pectore lucet, alterius, quod Anno 
1604, in [symbol of Sagittarius] visum est: 
Cometarum etiam in Aetherea regione supra [symbol 
of moon] situs, coeli mutabilitatem arguunt. [TP XIV] 
 
King is quoting the passage in Joshua to prove that the heavens are mutable: not simply 
‘in movement’, but mutable, which means that God can create new stars, or change the 
position of stars by means of his absolute power. The use of this passage is interesting for 
three reasons: 1) in the struggle between the Roman Church and some philosophers and 
scientists, such as Galileo, the sun stopping to allow the Jews to win their battle was 
usually mentioned on the side of geocentrism, as a proof that the sun is orbiting around the 
earth. King instead employs it as biblical proof of the mutability of the heavens. 2) The 
biblical passage is quoted alongside recent astronomical observations:12 both the Bible and 
experience, according to King, convince us that heavens are not immutable. Yet, King is 
the same regent I quoted regarding circular movement: in his philosophy a quite innovative 
acceptance of the mutability of the heavens does not entail identity of nature between the 
heavens and the sublunar world. 3) The Bible is regarded as a source of information about 
the universe: this is, again, unique to this passage for its explicitness. Regents hold that the 
Bible provides support for philosophical doctrines when philosophy might be in conflict 
with revelation. A question arises as to what disciplines this conflict extends to, and natural 
philosophy is usually respected in its autonomy. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the heavens 
(as much as the relation between accident and substance) cause debates which call 
theology into question. 
 
 
 
2. Movement of the heavens 
 
Celestial bodies are of a different nature from sublunar bodies, with all that is thereby 
implied: no finality, no generation and corruption, no natural places, no four elements. Yet, 
celestial bodies do move, and regents dedicate much attention to the analysis of this 
movement. Celestial movement seems to be local movement: this is proved by the fact that 
local movement is the only movement which does not entail a change in the moving 
                                         
12
 King refers to event of 1600 and 1604, two supernovae explosions (stellam novam), the latter also recorded 
by Kepler. For a survey of the cosmology of the theses: J. L. Russell, Cosmological Teaching in the 
Seventeenth-century Scottish Universities, part 1, in Journal for the History of Astronomy, V (1974), pp. 
122-132. 
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substance, a change that is impossible for celestial substances. Change in local movement 
is still a categorial change (in the category of ubi) but it is somehow extrinsic to the 
moving substance, which can change presence in space or whereness without a change in 
its (other) accidents. Scholastics hold that by movement alone no new relation to things is 
acquired, as we are reminded by Fairley 1623, TL III, commenting on Phys. V, 2. A new 
relation is established when there is a change in a substance, since a relation is an accident 
in a substance: local movement does not bring about any change in a substance, so no new 
relation either. 
Local movement is predicated of celestial bodies, and it is the only type of movement 
which they share with sublunar bodies. The nature of this movement raises questions 
about: 1) the applicability of the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur; and 2) the 
possibility of movement in a void. 
 
 
2.1 The principle of movement of the heavens 
 
The principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur plays a central role in the analysis of 
the movement of heavens, as much as it did for the movement of heavy and light bodies. 
Everything which moves is moved by something else: this ‘something else’ does not 
necessarily have to be an external cause, as we have seen that animate bodies and (at least 
according to some regents) heavy and light bodies do move themselves. In those cases, 
form as nature is what moves the substance. For inanimate bodies, such as a stone, the 
mover is easily identified with the external substance setting the stone in motion. The 
question is about what model applies to celestial bodies. 
Regents almost unanimously hold that celestial bodies do not move themselves: there is 
no inner active principle of movement, and in particular the form of celestial bodies is not 
the principle of such movement.13 They are instead moved by an external cause, the 
‘intelligence’ (Intelligentia, identified with angels), which acts on the inner passive 
principle of celestial bodies, so that their movement follows their nature and is not violent. 
The role of this intelligence will be fully appreciated later on, when dealing with the 
finality of celestial movement: in fact, the regents respect the Scholastic principle that 
finality is always connected with an intellect which apprehends the end as good. King 
writes about the intelligence in a passage of his theses in 1616: 
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Unanim<i> Philosophorum consensu, Coeli motus 
fit ab intelligentia, quae est substantia immaterialis 
Coelo assistens, libera et voluntaria intellectione 
movens. 
Motus Coeli non est pure naturalis, sed potius 
voluntarius: nec data est Coelo forma naturalis ad 
movendum ut perficiatur, sed forma voluntariae 
intellectionis ad movendum [...] [TP VII] 
 
The heavens only have a sort of inclination towards movement, so that an external mover 
is required for them to be in movement. Other regents call this movement ‘above nature’ 
(praeternaturalis), not in the sense that it is unnatural (that is, violent) but simply that it is 
of a different type from sublunar movement. King also claims that the heavens do not 
move in order to acquire a greater perfection (unlike sublunar bodies), rather, Rankine 
1631 states that “coelum moveri ut moveatur” [TP XIV.4], an expression identical to one 
used by Lesley 1625 that fire “movetur ut moveatur, non ut quiescat” [TP XIV]. In both 
cases, movement is conceived as a natural state for the heavens and the element fire, for 
both the heavens and fire do not move towards rest. 
Intelligence is the principle of the movement of celestial bodies both as cause of their 
movement and explanation of their movement, as Robertson 1596 claims: 
 
Coelum materia est in se actuata. Non differt itaque 
coelum a natura coeli. Natura coeli, medium 
demonstrationis motus coelestis de coelo esse nequit: 
sic enim non differet medium et subjectum. [TP 11] 
Medium demonstrationis motus coelestis est 
intelligentia. Medium demonstrationis motus coelestis 
est causa externa, quoad informationem: nisi quis 
putet assistentiam causam internam constituere. [TP 
12]14 
 
A consequence of the different nature of the heavens is that matter is completely 
actualised: the heavens do not differ from the nature of the heavens, while sublunar bodies 
do differ from their nature, and this difference triggers movement towards a greater 
perfection. Heavens’ matter is not in potency, it has no appetite towards form other than its 
current form. Robertson claims that this is the reason why the nature of the heavens cannot 
be the middle term of the demonstration of the movement of the heavens: if it were, the 
middle term and the subject would be one and the same. In other words, we would be 
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 See also, for example: Craig 1599, TP 6; Wemys 1612, TP 16.II; Forbes 1624, TP XI; Seton 1627, TP 
XXXII. 
14
 A translation of the Theses physicae of Robertson 1596 is in the Appendix. 
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explaining the movement of the subject (heavens) by means of a middle term identical to 
the subject itself: this would hardly give any explanation. Thus, the middle is the 
intelligence, an external assisting cause. In sum, intelligence has a threefold role with 
regards to the heavens: 1) as a metaphysical cause; 2) as an epistemological principle; 3) as 
providing finality [section 3]. 
 
 
2.2 Resistentia medii and void 
 
Vacuum vero, quia rerum unionem, et naturas 
destruit, ipsa Natura maxime abhorret: nec si daretur, 
ullus esset in eo motus. [Forbes 1624, TP IX] 
 
Natura vacuum abhorret is a famous principle of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy 
in general: it is not exclusive to these philosophies (Cartesianism for example) and it is not 
a necessary principle, since some Aristotelians and Scholastics (including some regents) did 
not exclude the possibility of a void. Yet, the vast majority of Aristotelians and Scholastics 
considered that a void would be a dangerous breach in the fabric of reality, for it breaks 
down physical continuity and contact between substances. Forbes’s passage can be taken as 
representative of this position. Scholastics hold that there cannot be action at a distance, 
which means, an agent always acts either through a medium which somehow conveys the 
causal power of the agent, or through direct contact with the patient. The presence of a void 
(which is the absence of substance) would inevitably interrupt this chain of causality, 
making natural causality ineffective. Later on in the seventeenth century, one of the 
innovations of Newtonianism will be a picture of reality in which void as a place and action 
at a distance (i.e. gravity) are intelligible. 
Many Scottish regents seem to accept the notion of a void and integrate it into their 
philosophy. Their talk about a void usually has three options: 1) a void is not natural and 
cannot exist; 2) a void is not natural, yet we can speculate on what would happen if it 
existed; 3) void is natural and it exists. Options 2 and 3 are most common in the theses, and 
Forbes 1624 can be said to have submitted a minority report.15 
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 For example, the theory that a void is unnatural and that it does not exist is held by Forbes 1624, TP IX 
and, perhaps, Rankine 1631, TP VIII. A variation of this theory, that a void is unnatural and that it does 
not exist, yet that we can speculate about a movement occurring in it, is held by Adamson 1604, TP 2; 
King 1612, TP 10; Fairley 1619, TP VI; Sibbald 1623, TP 12-13; Lundie 1627, De vacuo seu inani TP II; 
The third theory, that a void is natural and that it exists, is held by Reid 1614, TP 12; Lesley 1625, TP 
IIII; Stevenson 1625, TP XVI; Wemys 1631, TP IX. 
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Aristotle makes a direct connection between movement and void. In Phys. IV, 8 he claims 
that in a void the local movement of a substance would be infinitely fast, since no substance 
would resist the moving substance. With no opposition, the substance would move at 
infinite speed, since according to Aristotle the movement of a substance is the result of the 
impetus contrasted by the resistance of another substance. It appears that every movement is 
brought about at a finite speed, and we have no perceptual experience of a void: then, this 
infinite speed is impossible. It appears that the absence of a void is the condition for 
movement to occur as experience shows that it does, with finite speed in a finite period of 
time. This consideration includes both sublunar and celestial bodies, all identical when it 
comes to local movement in a medium. Thus, void is rejected on two grounds: 1) movement 
would occur at an infinite speed due to no resistance by the medium; 2) a void would bring 
about gaps in the natural world. 
I think that these considerations are most intelligible when referred to celestial bodies. 
Contrary to sublunar bodies, celestial bodies do seem to move at a regular and constant 
speed in an empty environment (the heavens), evidence which pushes regents to open up to 
the idea of void and to rewrite the Aristotelian theory of resistance of the medium. These 
are Fairley 1619’s words on the matter: 
 
Circularis Coeli motus est continuus et successivus, 
cum tamen fiat absque ulla resistentia ex parte medii. 
Resistentia ex parte medii, quae est extrinseca, non 
requiritur necessario ad motum localem. Alia igitur 
ratio est successionis in motu locali, eaque duplex, 
scilicet latitudo distantiae in medio repertae seu 
intercapedo et distantia extremorum, ac latitudo 
extensionis ipsorum corporum ob quam repugnat 
partes priores et posteriores simul praesentes esse 
eidem puncto aut parti spatii. 
In vacuo, si daretur, non modo fieret motus localis, 
sed et in tempore. [TP VI] 
 
Fairley starts from the evidence of the regular movement of the heavens despite the 
absence of a medium. In the sublunar world, where we have no evidence of void, the 
regularity of movement can be referred to the regular resistance of bodies, so that a body 
can move in a medium according to its impulse (how strongly it is in movement) and to the 
resistance of the medium (how strongly it is contrasted). In the heavens there is no medium: 
thus the perceived regularity of celestial movement (indeed the most regular of all 
movements) must be accounted for according to some other principle. 
This is Fairley’s argument: resistance is not a necessary principle. Movements do occur in 
the absence of a medium. A body in movement (whether sublunar or celestial) is 
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necessarily extended in space and the distance it covers while moving is necessarily an 
extension in space as well. It is impossible that parts of the moving body occupy the same 
portion of space; that means, a moving body necessarily retains its internal division and 
proportion between parts. Therefore, the sufficient principles of movement are the spatial 
extension of moving bodies and the spatial extension of the space in which the movement 
occurs: every time there is extension in space, then movement is successive and regular, and 
also in time, not instantaneous. Fairley calls this extension in space ‘latitude’ (latitudo). 
Resistance of the medium is an external principle which concurs with movement, but is not 
the condition for movement. 
In other words, we can imagine a body in a space, moving from point A to point B. The 
moving body is itself extended in space, because no natural bodies can be without extension 
in space. The distance between A and B is a finite distance, just as the extension of the 
moving body is finite: no infinite bodies or distances can exist in nature, according to 
Aristotle. The body will move from A to B in time, with a regular and successive 
movement: in this picture, movement is about extension and dimensions of the moving 
body and of the distance covered, it is not about a proportion of resistance of the medium 
and impulse of the moving body. Even in an empty space, distances retain their value, and 
distances cannot be overcome except over a period of time. 
I believe that Duns Scotus influenced those regents who accept this theory of movement. 
Scotus in fact surpassed the Aristotelian account of movement in a void by claiming that the 
sufficient condition for regular movement is distance, not plenum.16 Lesley 1625 compares 
the Aristotelian and Scotistic versions, and then expounds his own theory: 
 
In natura vacuum non est, 4. Phys. in quo et, si 
esset, non esset motus; qui cum omnis fiat in tempore, 
ibid. t. 129 adeoque tempore sit continuus, ib. t. 99. 
absque pleni resistentia nullus est, Averr. 4. Phys. 
com. 71. et seqq. Resistentia, in qua, medii externa: 
quippe interna, quam ponit Scot. 2 Sent. dist. 2. q. 9. 
nulla, nisi kata; sumbebhko;ß, Zab. I. de Mot. Grav. 
12. Atqui in natura vacuum est; et si non esset, non 
esset motus: cujus quasi principium est vacuum, quod 
cum semper sit plenum, fit vacuum, ut impleatur, Scal. 
ex. 5. n. 2. [TP IIII] 
 
A very interesting passage. In Aristotelian philosophy, a void breaks down the 
relationship between time and movement, because without resistance of the medium 
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 On the Scotus’s theory of void: A. Broadie, Duns Scotus on Ubiety and the Fiery Furnace, in British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 13 (2005), No. 1, pp. 3-20, in particular pp. 12-13. 
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movement takes place in an instant: and this is in contradiction with the principle that 
‘everything takes place in time’. Lesley mentions Scotus’s theory of the internal resistance 
of the moving body, the very theory which Fairley accepts: this internal resistance is a 
principle only by accident, as Zabarella claims, because an external principle is required as 
well. Once again Scaliger is quoted with approval, and Lesley takes his own theory of 
movement from Scaliger’s Exercitationes. The void is said to be a ‘quasi-principle’ of 
movement, because it makes movement possible by being filled by a body moving into an 
empty space. Were all space filled (that is, occupied by substances) no movement would 
occur. Lesley claims that void does not exist in nature as an empty dimensional space, but 
that it is immediately occupied by a substance. He retains the finalistic principle that nature 
rejects void, and that somehow void exists in order to be filled by substances. What can be 
said with regards to both theories is that a new ubi is a mode intrinsic to the moving body, 
independent of void and plenum.17 
Lesley’s theory is different from Fairley’s. Both accept the notion of void: Fairley seems 
more familiar with the Scotistic idea of an empty dimensional space, while Lesley still 
holds that all reality is a plenum. This is why he rejects the Scotistic notion of internal 
resistance. These are, therefore, two different theories, which have in common the idea that 
void has a role to play in nature. 
 
 
 
3. Finality of the heavens 
 
The heavens are all the celestial spheres which surround and contain the sublunar world, 
and all the substances within: inevitably, talking of ‘finality’ of the heavens is talking of 
finality of the universe as a whole. We have seen that celestial bodies do not undergo 
movement in the way sublunar bodies do: there is no such directed change towards a new 
form intended as the end of change. Celestial bodies are what they have to be, the only 
change which affects them is the change in whereness (ubi). King 1620 even downplays 
this change in the celestial movement by saying that the proper terminus is not a new ubi 
but simply a new mode of whereness (modus ubicationis) of celestial matter: this way, the 
difference from sublunar bodies is even stronger, since no categorial talk is accepted. 
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 “Terminus quem latio per se requirit non est locus, sed ubi, qui modus est quidam intrinsecus, et 
independens a pleno et vacuo.” King 1612, TP 10.I. 
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The question about finality of the heavens is similar to that about heavy and light bodies: 
how it is possible to account for the evidence of finality in respect of inanimate bodies.18 
Some regents endorse the Thomistic view that heavy and light bodies are directed by the 
mover (generans) who gives them such and such forms which determined whether they are 
heavy or light, as we are reminded by Stevenson 1625, in good Aristotelian fashion: 
 
Movens semper secum fert aliquam formam quae 
sit principium et causa motus. 3. Phys. 2. [TP XIV] 
 
Other regents hold that finality is found within forms themselves of heavy and light 
bodies, asking why we cannot conceive of a model for heavy and light bodies’ movement 
similar to that of animate bodies. 
There is no such debate with regards to the heavens: regents unanimously claim that 
intelligence moves the heavens, so whatever finality the heavens show or act towards, is 
from the intelligence which moves them. The presence of intelligence as principle allows 
the regents to avoid the problem of finality because the model ‘intelligence-finality of the 
universe’ is structured on the basis of the model ‘intellect-perceived good’, proper to the 
analysis of human being. In fact, a perceived good always requires an intellect which 
perceived the good as such, and consequently moves towards it. For heavy and light bodies 
Strachan 1631 tried to introduce the notion of metaphorical intention, which is commonly 
used by Scholastics to express the sort of causality that a final cause has. 
The heavens have no ‘internal’ finality, regents say:19 they do not move towards any 
greater perfection than the one they already possess. If they did, they would not be different 
from perishable bodies. Yet, they move to the advantage of sublunar bodies: the endless 
vicissitude of generation and corruption is the ‘external’ end of the heavens’ movement. 
 
Non movetur coelum totum, nec ulla ipsius pars 
propter sui conservationem; nihil sane acquirit novi 
propter se. 
Quare moveri propter nostram generationem 
putandum est. [...] [Reid 1610, TP 11] 
 
Sibbald, regent at Marischal College in the 1620s, in two sets of theses, 1623 and 1625, 
puts forward his own interpretation of celestial movement, which involves the finality of 
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 ‘Evidence of finality’: none of the regents doubts that finality is apparent and omnipresent, and determines 
what the universe is like. 
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 For example, Sibbald 1625, TP IX, A quo coeli moveantur: “Quod nimirum motu illo circulari nullam 
perfectionem intrinsecam, et debitam sibi adipiscantur, cum nulla tamen forma active inclinet ad motum, 
nisi per illum acquirenda fit aliqua mobili debita perfectio.” 
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movement. The regent argues against the possibility of proving that intelligence moves the 
heavens: 
 
In coelis nullum est vitae indicium, praeter motum 
localem qui seclusa cognitione et amore per se vitam 
non arguit. 
Coelum non est animatum. 
Coelum non ab intrinseca forma, sed ab extrinseco 
moveri demonstrare nulla ratio potest. Probabiliter 
tamen ostenditur ab extrinsecis motoribus cieri. Hi 
intelligentiae sunt. [1623, TP 24-28] 
 
At cum generans se moveat dum generat, non ob 
perfectionem suam, sed speciei debitam, omniaque ad 
omnes positionum differentias motu vacui moveantur, 
cur non coelum a seipso propter conservationem 
universi potest moveri? [1625, TP X] 
 
In both sets of theses, Sibbald raises the doubt regarding the role of intelligences: he 
claims that it is simply ‘more probable’ that it is in fact an intelligence which moves the 
heavens. Sibbald is the same regent who rejects optics as a useful discipline in enquiring 
into the nature of the heavens: his overall theory of the heavens is not against Scholastic 
tradition. It is perhaps more interesting that a regent like Sibbald conceives of the 
hypothesis that the heavens move themselves, in an attempt to bridge the metaphysical gap 
between celestial and sublunar bodies. 
 
 
 
4. Aristotle on the eternity of the world and the demonstration of the prime 
motor 
 
Aristotle is without any doubt the main inspiration for the regents. The Theses 
philosophicae are often structured as commentaries on Aristotle’s doctrines, he is 
ostentatiously quoted in Greek and his authority is required in almost all philosophical 
contexts. This is not surprising evidence: regents were teaching during a period of 
Scholastic renaissance and Aristotelian vigour (the two aspects do not always go together) 
following the Humanist reformation of philosophy. It is hard to say if Scholasticism 
prevails over Aristotelianism or vice versa in the theses: I believe that in this case the 
question is rather what interpretation of Aristotle the regents bring forward. I intend to 
address this point in this last section and then at the beginning of the Conclusions. I identify 
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two approaches: in the Conclusions, I deal with the reception of Aristotle in general, 
seeking to show, in particular, in what cases the regents expound a Christianised version of 
Aristotle and whether we can conclude that they ultimately endorse an Aristotelian theory 
of substance. I will argue that Aristotle does not appear to be a cause of traditionalism in the 
Scottish universities: rather, as the case of the rejection of Transubstantiation shows, in the 
name of Aristotle regents went beyond contemporary Scholasticism.20 
In this section I deal with a particularly interesting aspect of Aristotelian philosophy, 
which, I believe, is revealing of deep motives behind the philosophy of the regents: the 
interpretation of the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur and its role in the proof 
of the existence of the prime motor. 
Most famously, Thomas Aquinas introduces his five ways for the demonstration of the 
existence of God by the principle that ‘everything that moves is moved by something else’ 
[ST, I, q. 2, aa. 1-3]. This also seems to be on Aristotle’s mind in book VIII of the Physics, 
which leads to the proof of the necessity of a prime motor. Despite the fundamental 
difference between the two deities (Thomas’s God is the giver of essence and existence, 
Aristotle’s prime motor is the final and efficient cause of the movement of the world), the 
principle by which these two conclusions are reached is the same. Scholastics hold in fact 
that in respect of each of the four kinds of cause, material, formal, final and efficient, there 
is a first cause. Regents do not disagree with this fundamental point: we have seen that the 
existence of prime matter is also proved, a priori, by appealing to the existence of a first 
cause in the genus of material causality. 
The validity of this principle rests on the assumption that an infinite regress is not a valid 
option: 
 
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum omne quod 
movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non potest in 
infinitum procedere, necesse est dicere quod non 
omne movens movetur. [ST, I, q. 75, a. 1, ad 1] 
 
In a series of efficient causes, the latest effect is caused by its immediate cause, which is 
itself the effect of its immediate cause, and so on, to infinity. The logical problem is that in 
order to have the latest effect we also must have an infinite series of causes, which 
ultimately make it possible for the latest effect to be actual. Yet, an infinite series cannot be 
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 A similar consideration is made by I. Düring (The Impact of Aristotle’s Scientific Ideas in the Middle Ages 
and at the Beginning of the Scientific Revolution, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 50 [1968], pp. 
115-133) regarding the appreciation for the “real” Aristotle, rediscovered by modern philosophers and 
scientists (p. 129). Regarding the Scottish context, the opposite theory is found in R. S. Rait, Andrew 
Melville and the Revolt against Aristotle in Scotland, reprinted from The English Historical Review, 
London, April 1899. 
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actual in time, because it is always possible to posit an ulterior cause further back in time. 
This is why Thomas tackles the problem without the temporal succession.21 His proof deals 
with a series of contemporary causes all concurring to the existence of the latest effect 
(which is not ‘latest’ in time): if we imagine a man throwing a stone, the series of present 
causes leads us up until God, first efficient cause. This is also why Scholastics hold that the 
difference between creation and conservation of the world is only a distinction of reason: in 
Descartes’ narrative, God’s activity is constantly required. 
Now, in Aristotle’s philosophy, the world is believed to be eternal: there is no concept of 
‘creation from nothing’, the divine is the principle of “organisation” of an eternal world. 
The concept of creation made its entrance in philosophy during the first centuries of the 
Christian era, thanks to the thinking of Philo of Alexandria, Philoponus, the fathers of the 
church and the late Platonists. A profoundly influential change in the philosophical 
interpretation of the world. Thomas believed that, on purely philosophical ground, we must 
commit to Aristotle’s conclusion that the world is eternal.22 Our natural reason alone cannot 
decide against it, nor can it decide for it. Yet, creation in time is philosophically possible, 
and revelation tells us beyond any doubt that the world was created in time. After the 
acquisition of this truth by means of revelation, natural reason can find arguments in its 
favour and can show that revelation is not in contradiction with reason. 
Where do regents stand in this grand debate, just briefly sketched here? Regents are 
Christian Reformed philosophers, they believe in the Christian revelation and this faith is 
reflected in their philosophy. As I had occasion to point out earlier, the natural philosophy 
of the Theses philosophicae is consistently regarded as an autonomous discipline, where the 
appeal to God’s intervention is very limited. To be more precise: God is the ultimate and 
first warrant of the order and existence of the universe by its potentia ordinata, no regents 
would deny this; where they stand away from Catholic Scholastics and a number of modern 
philosophers is in their search for an explanation of the created world without involving 
God’s potentia absoluta or a reiterated divine intervention in the natural course of events: 
the only example is the creation of the human soul at the moment of conception. We have 
seen that regents reject the miracle of Transubstantiation in the graduation theses not on the 
basis of biblical authority but on the basis of, as they say, ‘good philosophy’. It is arguable, 
and I believe it is correct, that both a Protestant reading of the Bible and an understanding 
of Aristotle on the relation between a substance and its accidents make them inclined to find 
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 The example is that of a hand that moves a stick that moves a stone: three movements in a causal sequence, 
and perceptibly simultaneous. 
22
 As in Seton 1627, TP XXX: “Creatura secundum naturam suam potuit esse ab aeterno”. The eternity of 
natural species is an Aristotelian theory, which Seton accepts as a conclusion of a purely philosophical 
enquiry. 
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philosophical arguments to deny the miracle of Transubstantiation: it is remarkable that 
they achieve such a rejection by ostensibly appealing to philosophical arguments. 
Similarly, a significant number of regents explicitly reject both the truth of the principle 
omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, and also the conclusions based on this principle. 
Regarding the eternity of the world, Reid 1622 writes that: 
 
Si nulla forma introducatur nisi ex materia privata, 
ex Arist. qui mundum falso aeternum esse putavit, 
utrum forma privationem, an privatio formam 
antecedat, nequit determinari. 
At ex veritate, qua nos Christiani mundum a DEO 
ex nihilo conditum fuisse credimus, absolute 
loquendo, forma tempore etiam praecessit omnem 
privationem Physicam et particularem. [TP VI] 
 
Reid’s idea, also stated in 1610, is that natural reason alone cannot prove whether form or 
privation came first in time; which means that Aristotle was wrong by his own logic in 
believing the world eternal. Christian revelation tells us that the world is created in time, 
which means that form precedes privation in the series of generation and corruption: first 
there are substances, then the beginning of the series of corruption and subsequent 
generation (unius generatio est alterius corruptio), a series which is posterior by nature to 
the creation of substances. When natural reason stops, revelation provides ground for 
finding truth. 
Two regents are particularly clear in rejecting book VIII of the Physics: King 1612 and, 
again, Sibbald, in his theses of 1623. 
 
Omne agens ex naturae necessitate secundum 
ultimum suae potentiae gradum, ac tantum quantum 
potest, agit. 
Deus igitur, cum sit infinitae virtutis, nec effectum 
produxerit infinitum, non agit necessario. 
Quum itaque illa Aristotelis opinio de mundi 
aeternitate his duobus principijs innitatur tanquam 
fundamentis, necesse est ipsa etiam corruat, adeo ut 
mundus etiam a Deo in tempore creari potuerit, vel ex 
principijs Philosophiae. [King 1612, TP 16] 
 
Propositio haec, Omne quod movetur, ab alio 
movetur, aut falsa est, aut licet vera infirmum nimis 
fundamentum demonstrationis primi motoris. 
Verius et evidentius principium illud 
Metaphysicum: Quicquid fit, ab alio fit. 
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Recte Avicenna non Physici, sed Metaphysici esse 
demonstrare ens dari aliquod primum et increatum. 
[Sibbald 1623, TP 14-16]23 
 
King and Sibbald attack Aristotle from two different viewpoints, and reach the same 
conclusion: the Aristotelian theory of the prime motor is ill-based. 
King focuses on the powers of an agent. Even if the agent is of infinite power (virtus) like 
God, it does not act by necessity and does not produce an infinite effect. This is explained 
by the notion of the free act of creation and by the impossibility of an infinite (created) 
being, as Aristotle himself would confirm (King quotes Met. VIII on this matter, few lines 
above, TP XV.1). According to King, Aristotle’s demonstration of the eternity of the world 
is precisely based on these two wrong assumptions; which inevitably make the conclusion 
wrong as well. Even according to Aristotle’s principles then, creation in time is possible 
[TP 15]. 
Sibbald includes in his criticism of Aristotle the very principle omne quod movetur ab 
alio movetur, regarded as evident and solid by traditional Scholastics. He presents two 
possibilities: either 1) the principle is false; or 2) even if it is true, it does not provide 
ground solid enough for Aristotle’s demonstration of the prime motor. Both possibilities 
imply a rejection of the relevant passage in book VIII of Physics. I believe that an 
antecedent of this position can be found long before Scholastic philosophy, during the very 
initial moments of the appropriation of the Christian revelation by philosophers: in the De 
Aeternitate Mundi Contra Aristotelem by John Philoponus.24 
Philoponus’s original books have long since vanished. His ideas on the eternity of the 
world are now known to us because of the polemic he started with Simplicius, who 
transcribed long passages by Philoponus in his reply to him.25 Philoponus opposes Aristotle 
on many physical doctrines. What matters here is book VI of his Contra Aristotelem, where 
he sets out to criticise the arguments for the eternity of movement and where he puts 
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 To be contrasted with Wemys 1612, TP 13.I: Primi ergo motoris in 8. Phys. ex motu primo demonstratio 
Physica est, non Metaphysica.” 
24
 Philoponus, Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the world, edited by R. Sorabji, translated by C. Wildberg, 
London, Duckworth, 1987; R. Sorabji, Philoponus and the rejection of Aristotelian science, London, 
University of London, 2010. On the Renaissance reception of Philoponus: C. B. Schmitt, Philoponus’ 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics in the Sixteenth century, in C. B. Schmitt, Reappraisals in 
Renaissance Thought, chapter VIII. The author underlines the fact that the commentaries by Simplicius 
and Philoponus provide a criticism of Aristotle which is not far from that offered by the ‘new science’ of 
the seventeenth century. Schmitt believes that the Renaissance re-discovery of Simplicius and Philoponus 
provided more arguments to the anti-Aristotelian philosophy and science. I believe that, at least in part, 
this is the case for the graduation theses as well, whose natural theology does not seem to be according to 
the Aristotelian principles. 
25
 Against Aristotle, p. 24 ff. The two main works from which we can attempt to reconstruct Philoponus’s 
theory are Simplicius’s commentary on de Caelo and on the Physics. 
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forward the idea of creation from nothing. What is particularly interesting in Philoponus is 
that he criticised Aristotle from an early Christian viewpoint; this allows us to appreciate a 
reading of Aristotle before his “Christianisation” operated in the Middle Ages. Furthermore, 
Philoponus was never completely forgotten in the western Christian world, even if we must 
wait until the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century to see signs of growing interest in 
his philosophy.26 Library records in Aberdeen university dating back to 1624, catalogued as 
MS M 70, show that at least one copy of two commentaries by Simplicius were available: 
precisely Simplicius in quatuor Libros Aristotelis de Coelo, published in 1527 by Aldus 
Manutius in Venice and Simplicius in tres Libros Aristotelis de Anima, 1527, for which no 
publishing place is noted. It is then probable that some of the Aberdeen doctors, for 
example Sibbald, would be acquainted with Simplicius’s reports on and criticism of 
Philoponus. 
Leaving the important archival evidence aside, I believe that Sibbald’s short argument can 
be explained by Philoponus’ criticism of Aristotle. In book VI of his Contra Aristotelem 
Philoponus argues against Physics VIII, 1 where Aristotle claims that if two bodies have not 
always been in movement, then there must be a movement prior to them, in virtue of which 
later movements occur. This is also true of this ‘prior movement’, so that it is impossible to 
posit a ‘first’ movement in time. Philoponus sets out to resolve this difficulty by the means 
of creation from nothing, which breaks the series of mover-moved bodies to reach a first 
absolute unmoved mover.27 Philoponus’s critical argument rests on the sequence of 
movements being in time: a qualification he ascribes to Aristotle and which Thomas, for 
instance, refutes in his own interpretation of Aristotle. 
This might be what Sibbald has in mind when claiming that the principle omne quod 
movetur ab alio movetur is either false or insufficient to prove the existence of the prime 
motor. The principle appears to be valid only in natural philosophy, and Sibbald holds that 
proving the existence of the prime motor is a task of metaphysics, not of natural philosophy. 
Sibbald seems more sympathetic towards book XII of Met., 6, 1071 b 2 - 1072 a 18, where 
Aristotle reaches the conclusion of book VIII of Physics in terms of act and potency 
(“Verius et evidentius principium illud Metaphysicum: Quicquid fit, ab alio fit.” TP 15). In 
natural philosophy it might be true that everything that is moved is moved by something 
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 As Sorabji interestingly points out, Philoponus is quoted by Galileo more often than Plato. Ivi, p. 2. 
27
 Ivi, p. 131, fragments 117-120. The innovation of the arguments of Philoponus lies in pointing out an 
apparent flaw in traditional Aristotelianism and, in general, in the worldview of antiquity. Simplicius, 
among many others, argues for the eternity of the world; that means, an infinite number of years has 
passed until now. Philoponus points out the decisive contradictions: a world infinite in time contradicts 
the Aristotelian principle that nothing infinite can be actual, and an infinite number of years passed until 
now has to be increased, as more years follow from now on. R. Sorabji, Philoponus, pp. 213-214. 
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else, but it is also true that by force of this principle alone the natural philosopher cannot 
demonstrate the existence of a prime motor, and must instead limit their enquiry to the 
physical world. 
How to interpret the open rejection of this principle in the light of the Theses 
philosophicae as a whole? No other regent is as clear as Sibbald on this subject; yet, 
contextual evidence can be given for what I believe is the very limited role for natural 
theology in the philosophy of the regents.28 No proof for the existence of God is present in 
the theses until the 1650s: this includes proofs from our knowledge of the physical world. If 
we look further in the seventeenth century, we find an increasing interest in the Cartesian 
arguments of the Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. With the arrival of Cartesianism in 
the Scottish universities, the demonstration of the existence of God is, in ‘Scottish 
Cartesian’ fashion, a preliminary step to philosophical enquiry, alongside the argument of 
the ‘cogito ergo sum’. This profound shift in exposition is striking. It is clear that Cartesian 
philosophy stimulated an interest for this argument which is missing in earlier theses: 
regents in the 1660s-1670s fully endorsed Cartesianism. The demonstration of the existence 
of God cannot be said to be the centre of heated debate in late Scholasticism, nonetheless it 
is a central part of most Scholastic works. The Theses philosophicae belong to the textbook 
Scholastic tradition, works written with the specific idea of providing an accurate yet not 
fully exhaustive account of philosophy, for the purpose of educating young students. The 
absence of this argument alone cannot lead us to definitive conclusions about the role of 
natural theology in the regents’ natural philosophy. Nonetheless, this absence becomes 
more meaningful if interpreted in the light of an almost total absence of the discourse about 
God in natural philosophy. God’s intervention is also denied (with the interesting exception 
of Dalrymple 1646) in the causality of secondary causes. 
It might be the case that Sibbald makes explicit what is implicit in all other regents: the 
existence of God is not a subject of philosophy, it is a subject of theology and faith. John 
Calvin famously expressed his theory of the ‘sense of god’ (sensus divinitatis) according to 
which awareness of divinity and belief in God are well-nigh universal.29 In Calvin a 
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 For the analysis of natural theology in Reformed Scholasticism: R. A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed 
Dogmatics, ch. 5. Muller indentifies natural theology as part of revealed theology, and claims that the 
idea that there is no role for it in Reformed Scholasticism is the product of later theology (such as Karl 
Barth’s), and is thus foreign to the Reformers. In relation to the graduation theses, I think that one aspect 
is important: the distinction between philosophy and theology. If it is true that natural theology is part of 
revealed theology, it is also true that the development of natural theology was perceived as an excess in 
the direction of rationalism (ivi, p. 170). The graduation theses seem to belong to this faction of Reformed 
Scholasticism: the distinction between philosophy and theology is strong, and natural theology does not 
belong to the area of enquiry of the philosopher: in particular, of the natural philosopher. 
29
 T. F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics of John Calvin, Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1988, in particular 
pp. 84 ff. 
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‘Scholastic’ demonstration of the existence of God is missing, and he prefers the Pauline 
doctrine that God is revealed in nature: 
 
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven 
against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, 
who hold the truth in unrighteousness; 
Because that which may be known of God is 
manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. 
For the invisible things of him from the creation of 
the world are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made, even his eternal power and 
Godhead; so that they are without excuse. [King 
James Bible, Romans 1: 18-21] 
 
It is then possible that regents reflect an approach to philosophy influenced by the 
Calvinist origin of their confession, in which the existence of God cannot be the conclusion 
of a philosophical argument. Mutatis mutandis, I believe that this position is consistent with 
the rejection of Transubstantiation: regents deny that philosophy can account for theological 
matters, either the miracle of the conversion of bread and wine into body and blood of 
Christ, or the existence of God. A matter of faith is not a matter of philosophy, even if faith 
always leads our philosophical interpretation of the world. 
The Theses philosophicae until the 1650s do not commit to any discourse on God which 
is not either moral or metaphysical: God is present in philosophy, but natural philosophy is 
treated as a discipline independent of our knowledge of God, other than the faith in a 
benevolent, rational and free act of creation. Inevitably, the faith of the regents shapes their 
natural philosophy: they diverge from Catholic Scholastics with regard to the accounts of 
substance, extended matter, inherence of accidents and also the limits of natural philosophy: 
within a Scholastic philosophy, regents show a clear respect for the autonomy of natural 
philosophy. I believe that this is a clear example of the way in which the religion of the 
regents both influenced their philosophy, and also prepared the ground for the success of 
the scientific revolution in the Scottish universities in the later seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The regents are still committed to the distinction in nature between the sublunar and the 
celestial world. Thereby, they reveal how deeply they are influenced by the tradition of 
Scholastic natural philosophy. 
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The celestial world is different in nature from the sublunar world because it is not subject 
to corruption. Sublunar bodies come to be and cease to be, while celestial bodies are eternal. 
Ergo, they are in movement, but in a different type of movement. Celestial bodies, for 
example, do not move towards an end in the way sublunar bodies do; more precisely, 
celestial bodies only have an ‘external’ end, which is the preservation of the sublunar world. 
If we abstract from this external end, the celestial bodies have no finality, that means, they 
are fully actual, and perfectly realize their nature. 
I have called this theory of the difference in nature a ‘paradigm’, since the regents do not 
seek to prove it, but rather consider it as a starting point of their cosmology. 
The heavens are moved by the intelligence; unlike the heavy and light bodies, the 
principle of movement of the celestial bodies is external. Yet, it is natural, because an 
internal propension towards a movement triggered by an external agent suffices to qualify 
such movement as natural. Unlike heavy and light bodies, celestial bodies are not the 
primary cause of their movement. 
The regents make an interesting case for the movement of the celestial bodies in a void: 
probably influenced by Duns Scotus and against Aristotle, they claim that a movement in a 
void is possible, and takes place in time, because a moving body is extended in place, even 
in a void. They seem to accept the Scotistic notion of a void as a geometrical space potential 
occupied by bodies. 
The investigation of movement has raised the question of the interpretation of the 
principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, traditionally exploited in natural theology. 
The regents seem to reject the validity of this principle beyond the physical world, and to 
rule out natural theology from their natural philosophy. I have argued that they might be 
influenced by a Calvinist form of Protestant philosophy.30 In turn, this analysis has 
prompted the question of the reception of Aristotle, to which I turn now. 
 
                                         
30
 As I have sought to prove, the philosophy of the regents is shaped by a form of Calvinism: in the cases of 
the definition of the accident and of natural theology, philosophical doctrines are rejected or approved on 
the basis of the Scottish Calvinism of the regents. Another interesting example of how Calvinism directly 
influenced philosophy is presented by C. H. Lohr in The Calvinist Theory of Science in the Renaissance, 
in G. Piaia (ed.), La presenza dell’aristotelismo padovano nella filosofia della prima modernità, pp. 123-
132. According to Lohr, Calvinist philosophers distinguished themselves from both Catholics and 
Lutherans in terms of the conception of scientific knowledge, of the distinction of the philosophical 
disciplines and of the role of natural theology. Lohr ascribes to these differences the very origin of the 
idea of a “system” in Christian teaching, of an “organic” conception of knowledge and, ultimately, of the 
end of metaphysics as the “queen” of the sciences (p. 131). See also: C. H. Lohr, Latin Aristotelianism 
and the seventeenth-century Calvinist theory of scientific method, in D. A. Di Liscia - E. Kessler - C. 
Methuen (eds.), Method and order in Renaissance philosophy of nature, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997, pp. 
369-380. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
1. Outline of the conclusions 
 
The analysis of the cosmology of the regents has shed some light on the distinction 
between natural philosophy and natural theology in the theses. The regents seem to reject 
natural theology and the application of its principle ‘omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ 
beyond the limits of the natural world. Most famously, Aristotle concluded the Physics 
with the application of this principle to the discovery of a first mover, regarded as the final 
and efficient cause of the universe. We have seen how regents put forward an 
interpretation of the principle which seems to exclude its use in natural theology, and, 
without the support of the Christian revelation, leads to the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
eternity of the world. Thus, it is in virtue of the revelation that regents go beyond Aristotle 
and hold that the world has a beginning in time. 
The question of the reception of Aristotle in the theses is historically central: the 
importance of Aristotle is obviously not limited to natural theology. I shall here highlight 
two main aspects of the question: 
1) Aristotle is the fundamental philosophical source of the theses. The result is the 
appropriation of Aristotle in a Christian philosophy. The two most debated doctrines are 
the eternity of the world and the immortality of the soul. I shall seek to enrich the previous 
discussion of these doctrines by reference to how the regents read the relevant Aristotelian 
texts. 
2) We have seen in part I, chapter 4, section 2.2 that, according to Stevenson 1629, 
Aristotle and Porphyry do not accept the notion of an accident existing without a subject. 
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the passage in Stevenson 1629 is the only 
explicit connection between this theory and Aristotle that we find in the theses. We will see 
two more references later on in the century, by Forbes 1684 and Skene 1688, which will 
help to clarify how later regents looked back at the philosophy of their colleagues. It seems 
that, at least until the 1680s, the interpretation of Aristotle on this matter did not change, 
and that regents invoked the authority of Aristotle in the debate on the separate existence 
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of the accidents, prompted by the Catholic reading of the Eucharist. It follows then that 
also this later interpretation of Aristotle is in agreement with the Reformed Scholasticism 
of the theses. 
In the final part of the Conclusions I shall expound the main aspects of each chapter, 
offering a general account of which can be considered the key features of the Scottish 
Scholasticism of the graduation theses. I shall finally seek to contribute to the answer to the 
question of the relevance of Scottish Scholasticism in contemporary research. 
 
 
 
2. The reception of Aristotle in the Theses philosophicae 
 
The philosophy of Aristotle is a major source of inspiration for the regents. The analysis 
of the reception of Aristotle is a preliminary question before drawing conclusions 
regarding the Reformed Scholastic character of the Theses philosophicae. As noted in part 
II, chapter 3, section 4, some regents are critical of the Scholastic principle that everything 
that moves is moved by something else, a principle which is traditionally used as a basis 
for the demonstration of the existence of God. This principle is also fundamental with 
respect to the Scholastic theory of movement, which entails that the natural state of bodies 
is rest. Bodies in movement naturally seek rest and tend towards it: in Scholastic natural 
philosophy, movement, not rest, requires an explanation. Therefore for every movement 
there must be a cause. As we have seen, regents do not reject this principle tout court: they 
reject a certain use of it. They believe that by the powers of this principle alone we cannot 
offer a demonstration of a non-empirical proposition such as ‘God (or what we usually call 
‘god’, to accept Thomas Aquinas’s formulation) exists’. I argue that in rejecting that use 
regents commit themselves to a theory which is close to the doctrine brought forward by 
Philoponus against the Aristotelian Simplicius; namely, that the principle is to be 
understood in a temporal series of causes and effects, which can extend in infinitum, thus 
failing to provide the first cause in the natural series (which Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
believed himself to have provided). 
A consequence of this theory appears to be the rejection of natural theology, understood 
as the attempt to prove the existence of God by means of our experience of the natural 
world: the regents’ position fits well with the form of Calvinist confession they adhered to. 
In the Reformed Scholasticism of the theses, the proof of the existence of God based on the 
‘omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ principle is not subject to philosophical scrutiny. 
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This prompts the more general question of the reception and interpretation of Aristotle in 
the theses. The example of natural theology is perhaps the most evident sign of the fact that 
the reception of Aristotle is always followed by an interpretation of Aristotle, and 
consequently that the philosophy of the regents cannot be labelled “Aristotelian” without 
qualification.1 In fact, even if we set aside the question whether Aristotle himself applied 
the ‘omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ principle or not, it is a fact that within 
Scholasticism (just as within the Aristotelianism of the early Christian era) philosophers 
employed this principle in different ways, yet always believing their reading to be faithful 
to Aristotle. 
The philosophy of the theses, if we accept this broad notion of Aristotelianism, is indeed 
Aristotelian. Aristotle is by far the most quoted authority; some theses are structured as 
commentaries on Aristotle’s works; and he is always referred to with the utmost respect as 
‘the Philosopher’. One might object that these elements were features of philosophical 
writing and academic teaching widely standardised in Europe in the seventeenth century. 
Two considerations help to clarify the point: first, the acceptance of Aristotelian 
philosophy did not end with the arrival of the Reformation and the Renaissance 
reformation of philosophy. There is evidence of an enduring and successful Aristotelianism 
in post-Reformation Scotland, at least in the practice of university teaching. Along with the 
intrinsic philosophical merits of Aristotelianism, in the regents’ eyes a Scholastic 
Aristotelianism was still the best pedagogical option, to such an extent that some scholars 
have suggested calling Scholastic philosophy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries ‘academic Scholasticism’. Despite acknowledging the advantages of this 
formula, I believe that it overlooks the importance of Scholastic philosophy outside the 
academies: if it is undeniable that the backbone of Scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth 
century was an established academic practice, it cannot be forgotten that some of the 
greatest Scholastic works of the period were not directed towards academic teaching and 
exerted much influence in the public philosophical debate. 
Secondly, I argue in section 2.1 that the regents’ allegiance to Aristotle is also qualified, 
and regents were not afraid to interpret Aristotle in the light of what they believed was 
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 What I seek to provide here is qualification. From the 1970s on, thanks to the work of Charles Schmitt, 
Brian Copenhaver and others, scholars became familiar with the idea that each historical period had its 
own form of Aristotelianism. Schmitt thus suggested the expression ‘Aristotelianisms’ (Aristotle and the 
Renaissance, ch. 1) in order to account for the variety within Aristotelianism. I believe that E. Gilson held 
a different view on this matter: according to him, Thomas Aquinas, and more generally Thomism as a 
faithful interpretation of Thomas, is the true Catholic philosophy, and the best expression of Scholastic 
philosophy. This entails that the Thomistic Aristotle is the best possible interpretation of Aristotle for a 
Catholic scholar. I believe that Gilson knew the variety of the interpretations of Aristotle, along with the 
variety within Scholasticism, but only took one seriously: É. Gilson, Descartes et la Métaphysique 
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‘good philosophy’. In section 2.2 I seek to outline the position of the regents in terms of 
their interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of substance, which follows the debate on 
Transubstantiation: regents thought themselves good interpreters of Aristotle in claiming 
that it is impossible for an accident to exist without its natural substance. In sum, 
references to Aristotle are never just motivated by tradition, since Aristotle was still 
regarded as a powerful source of philosophical debate and progress. 
A related question is about the relationship in the theses between Aristotelianism and 
Scholasticism. This question can perhaps be raised for any form of Scholasticism. In the 
theses, it appears that Aristotelianism and Scholasticism are much intertwined, to such an 
extent that it is impossible to detach one aspect from the other. Regents were Scholastic in 
the same terms as they were Aristotelian, and vice versa. Whatever interpretation of 
Aristotle the regents have, it is a Scholastic interpretation: whatever Scholasticism they 
have, it is an Aristotelian form of Scholasticism. We should not be misled by the 
Renaissance claims for the return to the ‘authentic’ Aristotle (which is part of the overall 
Renaissance attempt to return to the ‘authentic’ Classics), because in the seventeenth 
century in Scotland this claim was present in university teaching, but did not bring about a 
rejection of the Scholastic way in philosophy. 
 
 
2.1 Aristoteles Christianus: Christian interpretation of Aristotle in the Theses 
philosophicae 
 
As one might expect, the Theses philosophicae are not a case of an Aristotelianism which 
opposes Christian faith. All interpretations of Aristotle are kept within the boundaries of 
the Reformed religion of the regents: regents believe that the highest ‘tribunal’ for their 
philosophy is true religion, and they show no sign of the so-called ‘doctrine of the double 
truth’, as it is traditionally ascribed to Siger of Brabant. Yet, natural philosophy is indeed 
regarded as an autonomous discipline, but in no way can natural philosophy propose a 
truth which is incompatible with the Christian faith. When such conflict is evident, the 
regents resolve it in favour of the contents of revelation, either in terms of natural 
philosophical theories (as in the case of the rejection of Transubstantiation), or in terms of 
a ‘suspension of judgement’: a proposition which is left undecided in philosophy finds its 
answer in revelation (as in the case of the theory of the creation of the world in time). I 
believe that regents are truly Scholastic in this regard. The autonomy of natural philosophy 
                                                                                                                           
scolastique, Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles, No. 2, 1924 and Introduzione alla filosofia cristiana, 
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is also coherent with this approach, insofar as natural philosophy is not understood as a 
‘mathesis universalis’ which extends to the whole of philosophy: regents follow the 
Aristotelian principle that each philosophical discipline ought to follow the rules dictated 
by its subject-matter, and be defined by the limits of its subject-matter. 
I also believe that the regents did not understand themselves as belonging to any 
philosophical school, for example, the Thomistic or the Scotistic school. What is true of 
most other countries in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, namely that 
philosophical studia and universities were structured either in via Thomae or in via Scoti, is 
not true of Scotland. I believe that the regents considered themselves as working within the 
Scholastic tradition, yet not bound to a specific form of Scholasticism. This said, the 
influence exerted by Duns Scotus cannot pass unnoticed: some major natural philosophical 
themes, such as prime matter as metaphysical act, formal/modal distinction, void as 
quantifiable extension, bear the mark of Scotus’s philosophy. ‘Eclectic Scotistic Reformed 
Scholasticism’ seems an adequate description of the philosophy of the theses.2 
In my analysis of the ‘Christian Aristotle’ in the natural philosophy of the theses I am not 
concerned with every theory in which the influence of Aristotle is felt. Most of the 
philosophy originates from the texts of Aristotle, and benefits from the long activity of 
interpretation and comment carried out from Simplicius and Philoponus onwards. What I 
have done is to offer an account of the most relevant passages in which the regents 
explicitly expressed reservations about the coherence of Aristotle with Christian revelation, 
and where the regents followed the practice of interpreting Aristotle as an ante litteram 
Christian philosopher.3 This analysis can shed light on the question of which Aristotelian 
theories were understood as most in conflict with revelation, and which Christian doctrines 
Aristotle could hold on the basis of natural reason alone, Aristotle being the highest 
example of a philosopher unassisted by revelation. 
From the viewpoint of a Christian natural philosophy, the two most debated Aristotelian 
texts are those regarding the eternity of the world and the immortality of the soul. With 
regard to the former, Aristotle held that the world is eternal, and that the first motor is the 
first final cause, not the Christian first efficient cause on which the whole existence of the 
                                                                                                                           
Milano, Massimo, 1986, forword. 
2
 I believe that the qualification ‘Scotistic’ is necessary, and not included in a general account of Scottish 
Scholasticism as ‘eclectic’. The graduation theses are a form of ‘eclectic Scotism’, rather than just, in 
general, a form of ‘eclectic Scholasticism’. In fact, Scotism appears to be the thread linking all the 
graduation theses together, even if the regents’ approval of Scotism is never uncritical. 
3
 John Mair, in the liminary letter of his commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics, Ethica Aristotelis 
peripateticorum principis, Paris 1530, holds this opinion of Aristotle: “Denique in tanto et tam multiiugo 
opere vix placitum unum Christiano homine indignum, si ut a nobis explanatum est legatum, offendas.” I 
owe this reference to Alexander Broadie. 
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world depends. Christian commentators of Aristotle perceived the problem of the absence 
of a theory of creation in Aristotle; this absence was usually explained by the claim that 
Aristotle’s philosophy, as a purely human enterprise, had to stop where revelation was 
needed to provide further truth and advancement beyond philosophy. Thomas Aquinas, 
following Avicenna, developed a whole new metaphysics of the act of being which paved 
the way for a more mature interpretation of Aristotle within a Christian framework. An 
alternative solution is that the theory of creation was implicit in Aristotle’s philosophy, 
even if Aristotle did not openly state it. This is what Forbes 1624 seeks to prove. After 
dealing with Aristotle’s theory of the elements, the regent writes, regarding the universe, 
that: 
 
Quod Aeternum statuat, id licet homine Christiano 
indignum, Philosopho tamen Natura duce 
concedendum: quamvis verisimile sit, Creationem, 
qua ex Aeternitate, ut ipse putabat, universum condidit 
DEUS Aristotelem non latuisse: cum 12. Metaph. 
agnoscat Coelum et Naturam, a DEO pendere. [TP X] 
 
The regent refers to book XII of the Metaphysics, perhaps to 6, 1071 b - 1072 a 20, 
where Aristotle proves the existence of an immaterial, eternal and immobile substance, 
mover of the universe. Forbes uses the Latin term ‘pendere’, which is philosophically 
ambiguous, since it may signify various forms of ‘dependence’, not simply the relation that 
a created universe has with respect to the creator. It is interesting that Forbes would read 
this passage, and arguably misread it, as implying a creative act by the first mover. His 
main argument is to be found in the preceding lines. Forbes holds that the eternity of the 
world is not an acceptable doctrine for a Christian man, and that some credit must be given 
to Aristotle, since he was solely guided by human reason. Yet, it is likely that Aristotle 
himself was not unaware of the possibility of creation, which is implicit in the description 
of the first motor provided in book XII of the Metaphysics. 
A similar point is made by King 1612: 
 
Quumque inter solum nihil et aliquid, seu ens et 
non ens, sit infinita distantia: sequetur, vel ex 
principijs Aristotelis Deum ex nihilo aliquid creare 
potuisse. [TP 15.II] 
 
This passage is part of a longer thesis which deals with the relation of an agent of infinite 
power (virtus) to its finite effect. An infinitely powerful agent can create either an infinite 
effect, or a finite effect in an infinite way (infinito modo). King claims that there is 
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universal philosophical consensus that no creature can be infinite in act, as Aristotle 
himself claimed. The only option is therefore the creation of a finite creature in an infinite 
way. This is the introduction to the passage quoted above. In this passage King exploits the 
Aristotelian doctrine that being and non-being are opposed as contradictories, and between 
them there is an ‘infinite distance’. This distance, namely, the possibility of a passage from 
non-being to being, is infinite because the opposition of contradiction between two 
elements is the strongest possible opposition, and it can be overcome only by an infinite 
power. In this context, ‘non-being’ and ‘being’ must be understood in an absolute sense: in 
the natural world, we only experience relative non-being and relative being. Natural 
generation and corruption occur between forms inhering in and informing prime matter, so 
that all forms can be said to be ‘contraries’ to one another in relation to prime matter, 
understood as the underlying principle of inherence, in the same way as colours are 
‘contraries’ to one another in relation to the substance they are accidents of. In other 
words, prime matter is potentially open to forms, which are taken on successively by prime 
matter. This does not mean that two substantial forms can inform the same portion of 
prime matter: this is contradictory. It is not contradictory that two substantial forms inform 
the same portion of matter in temporal succession. 
An infinite distance can only be covered by an infinite agent. There is an infinite distance 
between non-being (absolute nothing) and created being: the regent concludes that by the 
logic of Aristotle creation is possible. The following passage in King 1612 deals with the 
traditional principle ex nihilo nihil fit: 
 
Commune igitur illud Philosophorum classicum, 
Ex nihilo nihil fit, nedum ex principijs veritatis 
christianae, verum et ipsius Philosophiae, evertitur et 
corruit. [TP 15.III]4 
 
The regent does not ascribe this theory to Aristotle. Yet, it appears that the conclusion 
reached in TP 15.II by the logic of Aristotle implies the interpretation of the principle ex 
nihilo nihil fit only within the limits of natural philosophy, thus excluding the creation, 
which is a passage from absolute non-being to being. 
The passages in Forbes 1624 and King 1612 are two different forms of the same attempt 
to credit Aristotle with, at least, the intuition of the philosophical theory of creation before 
                                         
4
 Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, q. 45, a. 2, arg. 1: “Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid creare. Quia secundum 
philosophum, I Physic. antiqui philosophi acceperunt ut communem conceptionem animi, ex nihilo nihil 
fieri.” Thomas Aquinas is expounding here the theory of the Greek natural philosophers. 
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its historical formulation within the development of a Christian reading of Aristotle and 
Plato. 
 
The theory of the immortality of the soul, which regents discuss with a direct reference to 
Aristotle, originates from their reading of De Anima III. Aristotle investigates the nature 
and the faculties of the soul, and concludes that a particular activity of the soul, namely, 
that of the agent intellect, which works out the universal on the basis of the impression on 
the possible intellect, is evidence for the immateriality of the soul. The external objects of 
our knowledge are individuals, and are perceived as such: Aristotle argues that the 
universal is the product of the agent intellect because the universal is not to be found in 
sensation. The work of the agent intellect is required in order to ‘ascend’ to the universal. 
Thus if the universal is not to be found in nature, then it does not come to our knowledge 
from nature. If our agent intellect can ascend to the universal, the agent intellect cannot be 
material; therefore, it is immaterial. The scholarly debate over the interpretation of this 
theory is vast: Scholastics favoured the interpretation that Aristotle either laid out the basis 
for the proof of the immateriality of the soul, or that he effectively proved that the soul is 
immaterial. 
As noted in part I, chapter 2, section 1.1, the regents unanimously claim that the soul is 
immaterial, ergo immortal, since generation and corruption only affect material substances. 
The immortality of the soul is part of the Christian tradition, and it is no surprise that 
regents believe in it. What is more interesting is the argument deployed by, for example, 
Aedie 1616 in order to prove that Aristotle himself believed in the immortality of the soul. 
 
Philosophus. I. de Anima, cap. I. et 4. Tum etiam 
cap. 5. lib. 3. Animam dicit esse cwrivsthn epiv tou 
swvmatoß, et I. cap. lib. 2. de Anima vocat movrfhn, et 
qua talem eam ibi definit.  
Immortalitatem igitur animae cognovisse et 
approbasse Philosophum constat. 
[...] Resurrectionem igitur mortuorum 
Philosophicis, quodammodo rationibus probabilem 
esse dicimus. [TP VII]5 
 
Aedie’s reading of Aristotle is that the soul is ‘separable’ (cwrivsth) from the body and 
form (morfhv) of the body: therefore, soul is a separable substantial form. This means that 
soul is a form of the body but not a material form of the body; therefore the existence of 
the soul is not dependent on the existence of the bodily compound. The conclusion is that 
                                         
5
 A translation of the Theses physicae of Aedie 1616 is in the Appendix. 
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Aristotle acknowledged the immortality of the soul and approved of it. The following step 
is the entirely non-Aristotelian notion of the resurrection of the bodies, a step dependent on 
the argument for the immortality of the soul. We have here a Christian reading of Aristotle. 
Setting aside the question of the faithful interpretation of Aristotle just as in the case of the 
eternity of the world, there is evidence that regents considered the Aristotelian passages 
quoted above by Aedie 1616 as convincing proof that Aristotle endorsed the theory of the 
immortality of the soul, and that he laid out the fundamental philosophical groundwork for 
such demonstration. 
Another interesting example of a Christian interpretation of Aristotle concerns the 
doctrine of the unicity of the human soul. We read in Fairley 1615 that: 
 
Pluralitas animarum (ut de Theologia taceamus) in 
eodem composito, vel ex Philosophia Aristotelis 
absurda judicamus. [TP XXIV.1] 
 
The heading of this thesis is the claim by Aristotle, in De Anima II, 3, 414 b 29-30, that 
the antecedent term is always included in the posterior, just as the vegetative soul is 
included in the sensitive soul, so that we must investigate case by case which is the soul 
proper to each species: a plant, a beast and a man (Aristotle’s own examples). What the 
regent seeks to prove with this quote is that what is posterior (and arguably more eminent) 
includes what is anterior (and arguably less eminent), just as the rational soul includes both 
the vegetative and the sensitive souls. 
All regents agree on the doctrine of the unicity of the human soul. We have seen in part I, 
chapter 3, section 1 that some regents hold the theory of the plurality of forms within the 
same compound. For example, regents take up Scotus’s remark that the corruption of a 
human compound does imply two corruptions that occur in time: first, the corruption of the 
soul-body substantial union (what we properly call the ‘death’ of a man); secondly, the 
corruption of the bodily form-matter compound, that is, the dissolution of the body. The 
latter corruption is a process distinct from the former: the identity of the body with itself 
(the body of a dead man is still recognisable as the body of that dead man) does not depend 
on the union of the soul with the body, rather, on the union of the bodily form with matter. 
Therefore, two distinct substantial forms are present in the same compound. I argued that 
this theory is deeply influenced by Scotus, who holds that the soul is the substantial form 
of man, but also that the body has a form on its own. 
Now, Fairley 1615 ascribes the theory of the unicity of the soul to Aristotle. The unicity 
of the soul is a necessary corollary of the immortality of the soul and of the Christian 
doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. In fact, in order to achieve the resurrection of the 
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individual person, which is what the Christian religion claims, what makes a person an 
individual person must be regarded as immaterial and incorruptible in its entirety. Early 
Christians, in their attempt to establish an orthodox version of the notion of human soul, 
struggled against the ‘Platonic’ idea of a superindividual soul (for example, the notion of 
an agent intellect equally shared by all men, which found its way into Scholastic 
philosophy), which would not provide sufficient ground for the claim of the resurrection of 
individuals. Thus, Fairley seeks to ascribe the rejection of the plurality of souls to Aristotle 
himself, in order to gain his authority on the side of the Christian faith. 
 
The eternity of the world and the analysis of the separability of the agent intellect are two 
Aristotelian doctrines that regents arguably over-interpreted in order to minimise 
disagreement with the Christian faith. The two cases present some differences: 1) with 
regard to the eternity of the world, Aristotle’s doctrine is clear. The regents seem to offer 
an implausible interpretation in claiming that creation is not ruled out by the words of 
Aristotle. 2) With regard to the immortality of the human soul, De Anima III is not entirely 
convincing in proving it, and regents arguably carry out an interpretation ex mente 
Aristotelis when they claim that passages in De Anima III offer solid ground for the 
Christian doctrine. 
Regents are still entirely within the Scholastic tradition in their attempts to find an 
interpretation of Aristotle which is coherent with the revelation. There is evidence to 
support the claim that the Humanist reformation in philosophy did not exert much 
influence in shaping the teaching in the Scottish universities in the first half of the 
seventeenth century for the following reasons: 1) Aristotle was still central in teaching, 
representing a uniform and coherent body of doctrines, whose pedagogical value was 
widely recognised; 2) until the 1650s the regents favoured the reading of Aristotle (among 
others) in the original language, as is proved by the number of Greek quotations in the 
theses; yet 3) Aristotle was still regarded as a ‘Scholastic philosopher’; there is no evidence 
that regents abandoned the practice of commenting Aristotle in a Scholastic way; 4) when 
compared to the Scholasticism of the previous centuries, regents gave Aristotle an even 
greater role. I believe that this is a consequence of the Humanist reformation and of the 
separation of Scholastic philosophy from Scholastic theology; and also, a characteristic of 
Scottish Scholasticism in the seventeenth century. I shall qualify this claim in the next 
section. 
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2.2 Aristoteles Reformatus: a Reformed Scholastic aspect of the 
interpretation of Aristotle 
 
In the seventeenth century, the fate of Aristotle’s natural philosophy is linked to that of 
Scholastic natural philosophy. I argue that in the Theses philosophicae Aristotelianism and 
Scholasticism are two sides of the same coin. One attempt to assess the philosophical 
merits of Aristotelianism without reference to the traditional Scholastic reading of Aristotle 
was made later on in the century by an Aberdeen regent, George Skene, in his graduation 
theses entitled Positiones aliquot philosophicae, written for the class of 1688 at King’s 
College. To my present knowledge, this set of theses is unique in contents. It is structured 
around an exposition of the main philosophical schools: Platonism, Stoicism, 
Epicureanism, Scepticism, peripatetic philosophy and Cartesian philosophy. What strikes 
the reader of these theses is the attention paid by the regent to the analysis of each 
philosophical school in its own right, thus offering what I believe to be the first work in the 
Scottish universities in the history of philosophy. 
The section on peripatetic philosophy is of the utmost interest for the investigation of the 
interpretation of Aristotle. The section opens with the remark that:  
 
Philosophia peripatetica, magni quidem nominis 
olim, dum in scholis viguit Stagyritae authoritas, nil 
nunc nisi Magni nominis umbra est, quae subobscuris 
distinctionum involucris perplexa, anfractuosas rerum 
essentias intricatiores reddit. [V.1] 
 
Skene is clearly under the influence of the enthusiastic endorsement of the ‘new 
philosophy’ which stemmed from Descartes’ works and became increasingly important in 
Scotland after Descartes’ first mention in Andrew Cant’s Theses philosophicae, Marischal 
College, Aberdeen, 1654. The regent understands the philosophy of Aristotle to be 
essentially linked to the ‘schools’, and by his time is completely disregarded because of the 
excessive number of obscure distinctions in which it became involved. There is no doubt 
about the preference of the regent for the Cartesian philosophy, which alone is credited 
with the merit of providing a method for the acquisition of true knowledge (ivi, VI.1). 
Despite the claimed identity between the philosophy of Aristotle and that of the schools, 
it is not entirely clear to what ‘schools’ Skene is referring. I believe that he has in mind 
Scholasticism in the form it took in the Scottish universities in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, since his idea of peripatetic philosophy coincides with the philosophy 
of the theses. In natural philosophy, two passages are revealing: 
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1) [prime matter] Non est Pura potentia objectiva, 
quicquid deblaterint Thomistae, realiter existit; ex re 
etenim non existente, nequit corpus componi. Non est 
Forma, nec in suo conceptu essentiali formam 
includit, licet naturaliter, absque omni forma existere 
nequeat. [V.11] 
 
2) Accidens substantiae inhaeret, estque de ipsius 
essentia inhaerentia actualis. [V.6] 
 
We have seen in part I that the regents hold the theory that prime matter is a 
metaphysical act, and that their reading of the Eucharist prompts the definition of accidents 
as essentially inhering in their natural substance. When ascribing these two theories to the 
‘schools’ in general,6 Skene cannot be referring to the Thomistic school (which rejects both 
claims), nor to the Scotistic school (which rejects the latter claim). I believe then that the 
peripatetic school as outlined by the regent concurs with the teaching of the theses in the 
form of a Scotistic Reformed Scholasticism. It is noteworthy that Skene ascribes to the 
‘Thomists’ in general the doctrine of prime matter as ‘pure objective potency’, which is in 
fact a Scotistic notion. 
Skene 1688 is not the only later set of theses which supports the direct implication 
between Aristotle and the claim that actual inherence is essential to the definition of 
accident. Robert Forbes, in his Theses philosophicae, King’s College, Aberdeen, 1684, 
deals with the notion of accident in relation with Transubstantiation: 
 
Accidentia realia, quae divinitus existere possunt 
sine omni subjecto, comminiscuntur Doctores 
Pontificii, ad defendendam doctrinam suam de 
Transubstantiatione in Eucharistia: At nullum tale 
accidens reale admittit Aristoteles, cum ullus ex ejus 
germanis discipulis: illis enim (sicut et nobis) omnis 
forma materialis, sive essentialis sive accidentalis est 
Modus subjecti, cui ita unitur et inest, ut impossibilis 
sit esse sine illo. [XIX] 
 
In 1684, the analysis of the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation does not differ from 
that of the first half of the century. Regents were very consistent with their criticism, which 
is based on the understanding of the definition of accident as mode of a subject which 
                                         
6
 Regarding prime matter, Skene claims that prime matter ‘really exists’. The regent seems to interpret earlier 
Scholasticism in the light of Cartesianism; yet, his remark that no composition is possible with something 
which does not exist echoes the Scotistic criticism of the Thomistic notion of prime matter as pure 
potency, which, as we have seen, plays a role in the attribution of a metaphysical act to prime matter. 
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cannot exist without its subject. I find three elements in Forbes’s passage particularly 
relevant: 
1) Forbes read the Catholic philosophers as holding that by divine power (divinitus) 
accidents can exist ‘without any subject’. I argued in part I, chapter 4 that this theory seems 
not to have been held by any major Catholic Scholastics. I believe that regents 
misinterpreted, perhaps for polemical reasons, the Catholic notion of the aptitudinal 
inherence of accidents, which does not imply that accidents can exist ‘without any 
substance’, but only that accidents can, on a particular occasion, exist without ‘their natural 
substance’. Catholic Scholastics and regents agreed on the traditional definition of accident 
as ‘inhering in a subject’, but disagreed on the notion of inherence: for the Catholic 
Scholastics it has to be aptitudinal, for the regents actual. 
2) Forbes talks of ‘accidentia realia’, those accidents which can, according to the 
Catholic Scholastics, ‘exist without their subject’ and inhere in the substance of Christ. In 
the analysis of Transubstantiation, the formula ‘accidentia realia’ is not used in the theses 
of the first half of the seventeenth century. Neither is it common in late Scholastic 
philosophy.7 Suárez does speak of what are now commonly called ‘real accidents’ in DM, 
16, I, 3-4. While listing the types of accidents, Suárez claims that, among the accidents 
which affect their substance intrinsically, some accidents have their own entity and reality 
distinct from that of the substance and from that of other accidents; some other accidents 
are called ‘modes’: they are attached to other entities, and are really identical with their 
substance. Suárez gives the example of local presence as the same with substance, and 
figure as the same with quantity. The so-called ‘real accidents’ exert real formal causality, 
they are being by analogy, yet they are truly being. 
Now, if an accident can be ‘real’ in the sense in Forbes’s mind, it is not an accident as it 
is defined by Suárez. Suárez would not define accident as Forbes does, as ‘a mode of the 
subject’: all modes are accidents, but not all accidents are modes. Two developments seem 
to have occurred between the regents of the first half of the century and Forbes. First, the 
expression ‘real accident’ was used by Descartes, and Forbes is influenced by Descartes’s 
use of this new expression. Secondly, again under the influence of Descartes, Forbes 
claims that all that affects a substance, and indeed all material forms, are modes: another 
use of the term ‘mode’ which is not the Scholastic one. I believe that both Scottish 
Scholastics and Scottish Cartesians arguably misinterpreted the Catholic Scholastic 
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 D. Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 113, claims that the notion of ‘real accident’ is based on the misinterpretation 
by Descartes and Boyle of reality for substantial existence. It seems that the ‘reality’ of real accidents is 
solely due to the real distinction between them and their substance, for example, in Suárez [DM, 16, I, 2], 
who accepts the Catholic account of Transubstantiation. 
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definition of accident: in fact, the later ‘real accident’ corresponds to the earlier ‘accident 
which can exist without any substance’. 
Despite these differences, Forbes’s criticism of the notion of Transubstantiation is still 
the same as that of the first half of the century: the Scholastic notion of accident is 
contradictory. 
3) Forbes writes that Aristotle does not accept the notion of an accident which exists 
without its substance, that is, a ‘real accident’. Forbes is explicit in deriving the regents’ 
criticism of Transubstantiation from the philosophy of Aristotle. I believe that the regents 
perceived their doctrine of the relation between substance and accident to be more faithful 
to the teaching of Aristotle than was the Catholic version. 
I shall note that some regents do not invoke Aristotle’s authority on every doctrine. There 
seems to be a profound difference between, for example, Forbes 1624 who ascribes the 
doctrine of the creation in time of the world to Aristotle, and King 1616, who writes that 
Aristotle is not concerned with the notion of prime matter (TP II.1) because he only admits 
matter as potential principle of compounds and not as a metaphysical act. As a 
consequence, Aristotle is not present in the analysis of prime matter, which is regarded by 
King as entirely Scholastic. This remark somehow balances those regents who ascribed 
Christian doctrines to Aristotle, respectively on creation and on the immortality of the soul. 
Forbes 1684 and Skene 1688 shed light on the role of Aristotle in the graduation theses 
of the first half of the century. They tell us about how later regents understood the theory 
of their colleagues a few decades earlier: still in the 1680s Aristotle is perceived to hold a 
theory of substance which does not admit the notion of an accident existing without its 
substance, which is precisely the theory the regents criticised in the Catholic account of 
Transubstantiation. Thus, on this point, Aristotle is also perceived to be in agreement with 
a Reformed reading of the Eucharist. We can detect the traditional attempt to trace theories 
back to Aristotle, but the regents put forward a Reformed interpretation of Aristotle. 
Can we say that regents were Aristotelian in their theory of substance? With regard to the 
notion of accident, they seem to be closer to Aristotle than their contemporary Catholic 
Scholastics were. Needless to say, the relation between substance and accident is not the 
only aspect which should be investigated before answering the question. The regents 
belong to the Scholastic tradition and there is no evidence for the claim that they sought to 
return to a historically accurate interpretation of Aristotle. Neither did they regard 
themselves as ‘Aristotelians’ tout court. In the Scottish universities in the seventeenth 
century the Humanist reformation of philosophy had left an identifiable mark on the 
attention paid to the Greek text of Aristotle rather than to the tradition of the commentaries 
on Aristotle. Yet, Scholasticism was still the main source for the interpretation of Aristotle, 
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a Scholasticism which is influenced by Scotism and the Reformed reading of the Bible. 
Amidst many elements present in their interpretation of Aristotle (as we have seen in part I, 
chapter 3, section 2.3, regarding the unity of the compound) which qualify the regents as 
‘Scholastics’, the regents directly ascribe the theory of accidents to Aristotle. We cannot 
say whether the regents in the first half of the century criticised the Catholic dogma of 
Transubstantiation explicitly on the basis of what was understood as a correct reading of 
Aristotle: they certainly did so in the 1680s, and ascribed this approach to their earlier 
colleagues as well. 
In conclusion: 1) the regents tend to overlook the divergences between Aristotle and their 
philosophy, in the light of a Christian philosophy; 2) they also put forward an 
interpretation of the relationship between substance and accident which I also ascribe to 
their Reformed religion; 3) Aristotle was still regarded as a valuable source for 
philosophical enquiry, and it appears that the issue of a correct interpretation of Aristotle 
played an important part later on in the century, even if only in the afore-mentioned theory 
of accidents, a theory which has direct implications for the philosophical understanding of 
the regents’ faith. 
One final remark on the interpretation of Aristotle concerns John Seton, regent at 
Marischal College, and David Leech, regent at King’s College, and the broader debate on 
the relationship between theology and philosophy which took place in Aberdeen in the 
1630s and was finally halted by the depositions of regents following the National 
Covenant. Seton dedicates his 1631 Theses philosophicae to Aristotle, addressed in 
Noncupatio, page 1, as the ‘Prince of philosophers’ and a few lines after as ‘our teacher’: 
 
[...] Praeceptoris nostri ARISTOTELIS, laurea et 
palma, memoriaque sempiterna digni honori, rudem 
hanc tenuioris ingenii nostri opellam dicamus. 
 
Despite the highest consideration for Aristotle, in 1627 Seton had made it clear that 
Aristotle’s philosophy could not be regarded as anything more than a human enterprise: 
 
Aristotelem, quantumlibet acuto ac perspicaci 
valuerit ingenio, hominem tamen fuisse dicimus, a 
quo proinde nihil humanum alienum existimus 
oportet, humanum vero est interdum labi, ac errare, 
quicquid tamen ex propria sententia dixit, aliquomodo 
verum fuisse facile defendi potest. [TM 17] 
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How can we read this unique dedication to Aristotle in the context of the Aberdeen of the 
1630s?8 At the graduation ceremony of 1637 David Leech read before the audience an 
introductory oration titled Philosophia Illachrymans (Aberdeen 1637), an interesting 
source for the investigation of the cultural milieu of the Aberdeen colleges. Leech, among 
other things, claims that nowadays philosophy in Scotland is ‘in tears’, besieged by lack of 
material means, lack of cutting-edge research and, not secondarily, by attempts by 
theologians to impose their word in the philosophical domain. Seton’s dedication to 
Aristotle and his awareness of Aristotle’s fallibility may be regarded as, on the one side, a 
praise for philosophy in the person of the ‘Prince of philosophers’, but also as a hand 
outstretched towards theologians, in a period of heated theological debates. What I think is 
historically and philosophically central is that the regents go beyond a nominal praise for 
Aristotle and base their theory of substance on a reading of Aristotle which breaks with 
coeval Catholic Scholasticism and anticipates developments in early modern philosophy. 
The Aristotle of the regents was not the Aristotle of the Middle Ages. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
In the first part of my work I have analysed the concept of prime matter. I decided to 
structure the exposition in the same way as Eustachius did in the Summa philosophica 
quadripartita: the reason being that Eustachius’s approach has the advantage of clarity and 
completeness. The first three chapters focused respectively on the existence of prime 
matter, on its powers and on its properties. The fourth chapter dealt with the regents’ 
reading of the Eucharist. The first three chapters form a unity in virtue of the harmony 
between the order of being and the order of exposition. In fact, the unfolding of the 
analysis from the definition of prime matter to its properties mirrors the metaphysical 
structure of prime matter, from the metaphysical act to the relation with form in the 
compound. 
The first step is the evidence of the existence of prime matter and the definition of its 
concept (quod sit and quid sit): according to Aristotelian philosophy, a science cannot 
provide its own object, rather, a science expounds an object which is previously given to it. 
This way, answering the quod sit question is preliminary work to the analysis of prime 
matter. The second step is the investigation of the definition of prime matter as ‘entitative 
                                         
8
 I owe this contextualisation to Steven Reid. 
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act whose essence is being pure potency’. The third step is the analysis of prime matter as 
principle of natural compounds, that is, prime matter in its relation with form. 
The unity between the first three chapters and the fourth one is justified by the following 
reasons: 1) the reading of the Eucharist is an instance of the logical-metaphysical problem 
of the definition of the accident and of its relation with substance; 2) the analysis of prime 
matter, quantity and extension that regents expound in their criticism of the Catholic theory 
of Transubstantiation sheds fundamental light on their general theory of substance. 
The second part is about movement. I have chosen three topics which exemplify the 
debate in the theses: in the first chapter I have dealt with the general theory of movement, 
namely the meaning of nature, the act/potency theory, and the relation between movement 
and the categories. In the second and third chapters I have expounded respectively the 
theory of heavy and light bodies and the cosmology of the regents. The movements of 
heavy and light bodies and of the celestial bodies can only be understood in the light of the 
general Scholastic theory of movement, expounded in the first chapter. 
The analysis of prime matter and movement are two parts of a unitary narrative. Prime 
matter is in fact the material principle of all natural bodies, bodies which are defined by 
‘being in movement’. The Scholastic notion of nature implies movement, and there is no 
movement without an inner principle of movement of the bodies, that is, nature. 
Furthermore, the theory of movement is only intelligible in the light of the theory of 
substance. Prime matter and movement together are the two central theories of the natural 
philosophy of the theses, even if they by no means are the whole of natural philosophy. 
They are historically important theories, since they are the background of the later 
reception of Cartesianism and Newtonianism. 
I shall now present the conclusions of each chapter. 
 
 
3.1 Part I: De materia prima 
 
1) Prime matter is unanimously defined by the regents ‘receptive entitative act’. The 
essence of this metaphysical act is ‘being pure potency’. The notion of pure potency is 
traditionally employed by all Scholastics to define prime matter. Scholastics ground this 
definition in the Aristotelian theory of act and potency. A natural compound is the result of 
two principles which yield a unity per se: form, regarded as the actual principle, and 
matter, regarded as the potential principle. Regents claim that an unqualified ‘pure 
potency’ cannot be the component of a substance, since everything, in order to get in 
composition with something else, requires some sort of actuality. Therefore, they agree 
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with the notion of a metaphysical act proper to prime matter, aligning themselves with 
Duns Scotus against Thomas Aquinas. The natural philosophy of the regents thus bears the 
mark of Scotistic philosophy, which was indeed very influential in Scholasticism in the 
seventeenth century. Another aspect of the endorsement of Scotism is the metaphysics of 
essence. The regents claim that a substance exists in virtue of its essence, and therefore that 
there is no real distinction between existence and essence. The exposition of the quid sit 
question about prime matter has thus shown the general Scotistic approach of the theses. 
2) The definition of prime matter as ‘receptive entitative act’ prompts the question of the 
powers of prime matter: that is, what prime matter is and does in virtue of its essence. The 
focus thus moved from the existence of prime matter to the analysis of its essence. The two 
powers of prime matter are ‘being eductive’ and ‘being receptive’. This implies the relation 
with form: in fact, prime matter is essentially open to form and it cannot be understood 
independently of form. ‘Being receptive’ means that prime matter is a metaphysical act 
whose essence is receiving formal actuality. The regents once again engage with Thomistic 
philosophy, rejecting the principle according to which two acts cannot yield a unity per se. 
The problem is solved in Scotistic terms, by the distinction between metaphysical and 
formal act. Prime matter is ‘metaphysically’ actual, yet ‘physically’ pure potency. ‘Being 
eductive’ means that prime matter is the material principle of all forms (including the 
human soul), but more precisely, that material forms are educed from it. Material forms 
(forms without an independent existence from matter) originate from matter in virtue of an 
efficient cause, that is an agent triggering the eduction, and of the formal cause, the form 
which is triggered by the agent. Thus, the eduction of material forms and the information 
of matter by material forms are the same process, and the distinction is one of reason. In 
the conclusion of chapter 2 I have dealt with the set of theses by Dalrymple 1646, which 
breaks with traditional Scholasticism on the theories of the powers of prime matter and the 
real causality of secondary causes and seems to have been influenced by Descartes’ 
theories. 
3) According to the regents, the main property of prime matter is extension. In Scholastic 
philosophy, a ‘property’ is something that always and exclusively belongs to a substance 
(in Porphyry’s words), without being included in its essence and in virtue of its essence. 
Prime matter is not defined as ‘something extended’, yet, according to the regents, it is 
necessarily extended. The regents always attribute to matter ‘extension in place’, thus 
breaking with their Catholic colleagues, who claim that only ‘extension in ordine ad se’ 
can be considered a proprium of matter. The distinction is important: in fact, the regents 
hold that prime matter is spatially extended before the information by form, and spatial 
extension must be predicated of matter regardless of its being part of a compound or not. 
The reception of Aristotle in the Theses philosophicae and Conclusions 212 
Prime matter is also the subject of accidents, so that not all the accidents of a compound 
depend on form. Even if the regents stress the notion of the unity per se of the compounds, 
their theory of extended matter and the Scotistic notion of bodily form may lead to a form 
of dualism within the compound. It is then arguable that the Scotistic Scholasticism of the 
regents proves itself to be close to later developments of early modern philosophy, 
especially Descartes’. The theory of extended matter leads us to the discussion of the 
Eucharist. 
4) The rejection of the Catholic account of Transubstantiation helps us to clarify the 
theory of substance of the regents and to identify Reformed elements in their 
Scholasticism. The Eucharist is a theological notion, which nonetheless bears 
consequences in philosophy, since the Catholics developed philosophical doctrines in order 
to account for the supposed transubstantiation of the substance of bread and wine 
respectively into the body and blood of Christ, and of the preservation of the accidents of 
bread and wine throughout the process. As Reformed philosophers, the regents did not 
accept the interpretation of the Last Supper as a miracle, but saw it as a symbol. What is 
central to my scope is that the regents refuse to engage with theology and that they respond 
to Catholic Scholastics by deploying arguments which profoundly shape their philosophy. 
The regents claim that the traditional definition of accident, already expressed in the works 
of Aristotle and Porphyry, excludes the possibility of an accident existing without its 
substance. Just as prime matter is always extended in place, an accident always inheres in 
its substance. The form of the argument is the same in both cases, since quantity is 
regarded as an accident of matter: there is no real distinction between an accident and its 
actual inherence, therefore, an accident cannot be separate from its substance. I believe that 
this theory is a characteristic of the theses, and that it is the product of both the reading of 
Aristotle and the Reformed religion of the regents. They seem to exploit the Scotistic 
notion of formal/modal distinction in order to account for the necessary unity within the 
same compound of matter, quantity and place: these elements are defined in different 
ways, yet they are always conjoined. It is arguable that regents downplayed the importance 
of the real distinction in favour of the modal distinction. 
 
 
3.2 Part II: Movement 
 
1) The first chapter of part II is about the general features of movement and lays out the 
framework for the analysis of the movement of heavy and light bodies and celestial bodies. 
The regents held a Scholastic theory of movement: movement is described as the process 
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from a terminus a quo to a terminus ad quem, which means, from an old form to a new 
one. Movement is always referred to as regarding form, rather than the whole compound. 
The commonly accepted formula in the theses is that movement is a tendency, a way and a 
flux of form from one terminus to another. In this regard, the regents do not adopt the 
Scotistic theory of the forma fluens. In general, the regents’ theory of movement seems to 
have been less influenced by Scotism than their metaphysics. An important question is that 
of the relation between movement and the categories. The regents held that generation (that 
is, the process from the absence of a substance to a substance) cannot be properly called 
‘movement’ because it takes place in an instant, while movement necessarily takes place in 
time. Furthermore, a movement is between two contraries within the same species, and a 
non-substance and a substance are contradictories: therefore, generation is not a 
movement. The standard theory of the theses is that movement falls in the categories of 
quality, quantity and place: respectively, alteration, augmentation/diminution and local 
movement. Some regents raise the question of whether the categories of quality and 
quantity should be excluded from the number of movements. When the answer is 
affirmative, the reason is the same as for generation: movement only occurs in a succession 
of time. 
2) A fundamental part of the Scholastic theory of movement is the theory of natural 
places. Bodies tend towards their respective natural places, in virtue of the proportion of 
the elements they are composed of. Thus, bodies with a predominance of earth or water 
will be ‘heavy bodies’ and will fall towards the centre of the universe; similarly, bodies 
with a predominance of air or fire will be ‘light elements’, and will move upwards towards 
the sphere of the moon, the upper limit of the sublunary world. The analysis of this theory 
calls into question the historical debate on the coherence between the Physics and the De 
generatione et corruptione of Aristotle. In fact, the regents seem to favour the terminology 
of the Physics, since they account for the movement of heavy and light bodies in terms of 
their form. Heavy and light elements are included in the behaviour of a body dictated by its 
form (which, according to the regents, is the same as the nature). Heaviness and lightness 
are absolute (that is, non-relative) concepts: something is heavy or light in virtue of its 
nature, not in relation to something else. The natural end of a movement is rest: and this is 
true for heavy and light bodies as well. Reid 1626 seems to accept exceptions to this 
principle, when he claims that, for example, fire moves in order to move, not in order to 
rest. It is arguable that this theory hints at a break with the Scholastic tradition. Another 
key element is the notion of the ‘mover’ of heavy and light bodies: regents claim that 
heavy and light bodies move downwards and upwards in virtue of their forms. One final 
aspect concerns final causality: in Scholastic natural philosophy, final causality is the type 
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of causality exerted by the end of a movement. The regents accept this notion, and I argued 
that they offer compelling arguments in favour of the distinction between efficient and 
final causality. 
3) The cosmology of the theses is still based on the assumption of the difference in 
nature between sublunar and celestial bodies. The difference lies in the fact that sublunar 
bodies are subject to corruption, while celestial bodies are not. I argued that the paradigm 
of the difference in nature between sublunar and celestial bodies is a good example of the 
general style of Scholastic philosophy. I employed the term ‘paradigm’ because it seems to 
account well for the complexity of a worldview which is not based on empirical evidence, 
but rather justifies the empirical evidence brought in its support. Under this point of view, 
the Scholasticism of the theses appears to be still traditional, despite an increasing interest 
in the mathematical analysis of the heavens, as the Theses astronomicae show. One 
Scotistic element is the acceptance (at least as a logical possibility) of a natural void: the 
regents claim that a movement in a void, if such void exists, is possible, and it would take 
place in a succession of time. As a consequence, regents hold that the Aristotelian position 
of the infinite speed of a body moving in a void is wrong, since it exclusively relies on the 
notion of the resistance of the medium, without acknowledging the internal resistance of 
bodies. The conclusion of chapter 3 raises the question of the interpretation of book VIII of 
the Physics, and of the role of natural theology in the theses. I believe that the regents, 
influenced once again by their faith, exclude natural theology from the theses, by limiting 
the traditional principle ‘omne quod movetur ab alio movetur’ to natural philosophy. 
 
 
3.3 Final remarks 
 
I have defined the natural philosophy of the Theses philosophicae as ‘Eclectic Scotistic 
Reformed Scholasticism’ for the following reasons: 
1) It is a form of Scholasticism. The regents are still much indebted to the traditional 
philosophy of the schools, in terms of contents, form, references and structure of the 
exposition. If it is true that they abandoned the Medieval practice of the quaestiones, they 
nonetheless wrote in the style of the Scholastic textbooks of the early modern period. 
Neither can their philosophy be called ‘Aristotelian’ tout court. Even if Aristotle is the 
main source of inspiration, the regents do not generally seem to agree with the Humanist 
agenda of interpreting Aristotle outside the Scholastic framework. Yet, it seems that the 
regents benefited to some extent from reading Aristotle in the original text: for example, 
their theory of substance has some decisive Aristotelian features. 
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2) It is a Scotistic natural philosophy: the metaphysics of essence, the theory of prime 
matter, the use of the formal/modal distinction, the notion of bodily form, the theory of the 
movement in a void and the theory of the void as a geometrical space potentially occupied 
by bodies drew inspiration from the philosophy of Duns Scotus. The regents can be said to 
be part of the long tradition of Scotistic philosophy. 
3) It is, nonetheless, an eclectic natural philosophy. The regents never openly claim to 
philosophize in accordance with the principles of the philosophy of Scotus, in a period in 
which, in the Catholic world, the division in philosophical schools was very strong. 
Alongside this aspect, there is evidence that the regents were keen on learning from 
Catholic Scholastics, and make use of their philosophy in a creative and original way. Even 
if regents rarely stand out amidst their colleagues for particularly personal theories, every 
set of graduation theses shows a peculiar character. Graduation theses can be successfully 
treated as a ‘school’ within Scholasticism, even if they do not show an unequivocal 
uniformity. 
4) It is a Reformed natural philosophy. One fundamental principle of unity among the 
theses is the Reformed religion of the regents. Philosophical debates are posterior to the 
acceptance of the Christian faith in its Scottish Reformed form. Together with the 
traditional principles of Scholasticism in its attempt to harmonise revelation and human 
reason, the Theses philosophicae put forward two theories which I openly ascribe to the 
Reformed faith of the regents: 1) the actual inherence of an accident in its natural 
substance as part of the definition of the accident; and 2) the rejection of natural theology 
as an object of philosophical investigation. 
 
In the first half of the seventeenth century Scholasticism was still the traditional 
philosophy of the Scottish universities. It was a lively and much-debated common 
philosophy, which appears to have shared roots in Scotism and Reformed religion, even if 
it was not as internally coherent as a school can be. The regents were highly acquainted 
with contemporary Catholic Scholasticism, to such an extent that it is proven that 
Scholasticism in Scotland did not end with the Reformation. Scottish Scholasticism greatly 
benefited from the Reformation and to a certain extent from Humanism: I believe that 
some theories in metaphysics and natural philosophy, such as the theories of substance and 
prime matter, prove the constitutive openness towards later developments of early modern 
philosophy and the degree of originality of Scottish Scholasticism. It is then arguable that 
the influence of Scholasticism in Scotland extended well beyond the reception of Descartes 
in the early second half of the century. 
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I also believe that the investigation of Scottish Scholasticism can shed light on the still 
underexplored field of Protestant Scholasticism, and decisively influence our reading of the 
philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century. If we accept my arguments, it appears 
that Scholastic philosophy in Scotland was not simply a reaction against Catholic 
Scholasticism, or a heritage of the pre-Reformation curriculum of the universities. These 
aspects are certainly part of the narrative, but innovation and reinterpretation of 
Scholasticism are as well. Scottish Scholasticism seems to anticipate early modern 
philosophy, arguably in virtue of its Reformed character. I am convinced that three distinct 
directions of research shall complete the analysis of Scottish Scholasticism: 1) its relation 
with the general cultural life of Scotland in the seventeenth century; 2) its relation with 
Scholasticism in other branches of philosophy; and, finally, 3) its relation with modern 
philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment. 
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Appendices 
 
 
1. Theses physicae, G. Robertson, 1596 
 
Complete title: Theses philosophicae. Publicly discussed on August 2nd at King’s 
College of Edinburgh University, at 8am, as we are informed on the title page. Printed by 
Henry Charter in 1596, in Edinburgh. 
The theses are divided into four sections: logic, physics, Theses sphaericae on astronomy 
and ethics, for a total of 16 pages. 
This is the first extant set of graduation theses for the Faculty of Arts of the Scottish 
universities. The practice of printing graduation theses had been recently introduced in 
Edinburgh. The first graduation theses of the Faculty of Arts followed two theological 
theses, in 1594 and 1595, which are the earliest theses in Scotland. Andrew Melville and 
the printer Robert Rollock are the founders of the printed theses in Scotland. 
Despite the novelty of the format, the early date and the brevity of the work, Robertson’s 
theses are very similar in content and structure to later theses. It seems that the establishing 
of the practice of publishing graduation theses gradually led to more complex and longer 
theses (in Edinburgh especially in the 1610s and 1620s) but did not bear consequences in 
the curriculum being taught. 
 
 
Thesis I. Because of the lamentable original fall, not only by the paralysis of a dissolute 
affect, throughout all its acts, is will darkened, but mind as well, by Theban sphinxes and 
Cymmerian obscurities. 
The grievous human condition is in need not only of the cure of practical philosophy, but 
also of the collyrium and sun of contemplative science. 
 
2. In this worldly machine, the highest maker refined the whole so ingeniously, and 
connected the superior beings to the inferior with indestructible ties. 
Physical science is extremely necessary and useful. 
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3. The subject of Physics is the natural body as endowed with a nature. We establish a way 
of considering it as natural, just as common opinion does. 
Although the arts consider the natural body as subject of their operation, they do not admit 
the way of considering it as flowing from the nature of the (same) subject: the arts obtain 
the (proper) mode of the subject, from the point of view of an end which is only ours. 
 
4. Prime matter is a substantial, bodily and perishable being. 
We are not afraid to ascribe existence to prime matter alone considered without form, 
although an imperfect one, which the incoming act of form makes perfect. 
 
5. Potency and quantity follow from the nature of prime matter. 
We do not oppose the opinion of those who assert that the succession [flux] of all accidents 
is from a form or an agent. 
 
6. The mass [moles] of prime matter is unpolished and disordered, and the incoming form 
polishes and orders it. 
1. Before the arrival of form accidents which depend on matter are interminate. 
2. Thus, the quantity of prime matter is interminate. 
 
7. Matter is the subject of inhesion [inhaesionis], form is the condition of inhesion 
[inhaesionis] of the accidents (excluding the spiritual accidents), and inherence completes 
[terminat] the accidents. 
It is not impossible that some accidents remain the same in begotten and corrupted being, 
because of the change of the condition of inhesion and of the termini. 
 
8. The potency of prime matter (just like prime matter, which remains the same in itself), is 
made fit and arranged towards several more noble forms, by the change [accessione] of 
certain conditions. 
Therefore, we believe that prime matter does not differ from second matter, that first 
potency does not differ from second potency, and that they truly differ as more perfect from 
less perfect, and as absolute from modified. 
 
9. In order for form to come from the potency of matter, it is required not only that matter 
is capable of receiving form, but also that form depends on matter in three regards: in 
production, in being and in operation. 
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1. Therefore, the forms of inanimate beings in particular, namely mixed beings and 
elements, must be considered as coming from the potency of matter. 
2. In some sense, the sensitive and the vegetative souls come from the potency of matter 
(although they are in some measure raised by matter’s condition, as it is proven in the 
increment [accretio]), and truly the rational soul does not come from the potency of matter 
at all, if not perhaps from the point of view of [it being received by] the capability of 
matter. 
 
10. Matter remains the same in begotten and corrupted beings. 
Thus, form is the whole quiddity and essence of a thing, matter instead is its vehicle 
[vehiculum]. 
 
11. The matter of the heavens is actuated in itself. 
1. And so, there is no difference between the heavens and their nature. 
2. The nature of the heavens cannot be the middle term in the demonstration of the 
movement of the heavens: in fact, middle term and subject would not be different. 
 
12. The intelligence is the middle term in the demonstration of the movement of the 
heavens. 
The middle term in the demonstration of the movement of the heavens is an external cause, 
in respect of information: unless we believe that assistance is an internal cause. 
 
13. Generation and corruption refer to [determinant] one single mutation. 
These two terms only reflect two termini. 
 
14. The matter of the heavens is different from the matter of perishable bodies: in fact, the 
former is not in potency towards form, while the latter is never devoid of potency. 
Although action and passion occur between celestial and perishable bodies, no reaction 
and repassion [repassio]1 occur at all. 
 
15. The species of the elements is different from that of the mixed bodies. 
The forms of the elements, with regard to excellence, do not remain in mixed bodies. 
 
                                         
1
 “Dicitur repassio, qua agens vicissim patitur ab eo in quod agit; seu, receptio effectus ab agente 
imbecilliori: v. g. reception frigoris in ferro candente, ab aqua, cui immergitur.” É. Chauvin, Lexicon 
rationale, sive thesaurus philosophicus, Rotterdam 1692, art. Repassio. 
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16. It became common among everybody to believe that contrary beings cannot inhere in 
the same body, in their normal conditions. 
The qualities of the elements in mixed bodies are shattered and restrained [fractae et 
castigatae]. 
 
17. According to Aristotle, an increment requires three conditions in order to occur, 1. that 
the increase [accessio] of a quantified body takes place, 2. that the body whose increase 
takes place is augmented in respect of its minimal parts, 3. that the body remains 
numerically the same. 
To preserve the true sense of an increment, we can ascribe it only to animate beings, and 
to beings becoming ripe and growing up: in fact, when they are ripe and adults, a pause in 
the increment occurs, because of both the satisfied intention of nature and the disposition 
of matter. 
 
18. Every Physical form enjoys this great privilege: to inform and actuate matter and any 
of its individual parts. 
The soul is in the whole body and in all of its individual parts. 
 
19. Despite being devoid of quantity, form takes on quantity from matter by accident, since 
it extends to match the extension of matter. 
Therefore, although the soul with regards to its real being is in the singular parts of the 
body, with regards to quantitative extension, taken on from matter, it is not in the parts 
considered alone, but it truly expands itself throughout the whole organic body. 
 
20. The effects which emanate from their causes cannot be separated from the site of their 
causes. 
When the souls, which are in the individual parts of the body, emanate their effects, the 
faculties originally spring up in every part of the body. 
 
21. The organic faculties of the soul have designated and determined organs which serve 
them in their operations. 
Therefore, whichever faculty of the soul is not subjectively in any part of the body; 
however it is in it originally. 
 
22. It is familiar to all who just moved the first steps in philosophy that the nature of the 
genus is included in the nature of the species. 
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We do not agree with those who believe that the vegetative soul is the specific form of a 
plant, and that the sensitive soul is that of an animal: in fact we argue for silent and hidden 
forms in plants and animals. 
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2. Theses physicae, A. Aedie, 1616 
 
 
Complete title: Theses generales, logicae, ethicae, physicae, sphaericae. Printed in 1616 
in Edinburgh by Andrew Hart. The copy in Aberdeen university library I read lacks the 
title page, which usually informs on the place and date of the public graduation ceremony. 
This set of theses of Marischal College is the first one available for Aberdeen. It was 
printed in Edinburgh since no printer was working in Aberdeen at that time. All later 
Aberdeen graduation theses were printed in Aberdeen by Edward Raban. 
It is divided in five sections, the first being a section on ‘general theses’ on the 
relationship between philosophy and theology and on the order of philosophical 
disciplines. What is remarkable about these theses is the focus on special physics, which 
gives us an idea of contents of the curriculum which are usually missing from other theses. 
Alongside matter, increment and the nature of the soul, the regent expounds his theories on 
natural monsters, rainbows, colours, and odours. This gives a distinctive encyclopaedic 
flavour to the theses, enriched by quotations of classical authors, the reference to rare and 
imaginary animals and plants, and the use of Greek. 
Another uncommon yet revealing feature is the listing of Problemata which ends every 
thesis. In these parts, the regent raises some questions, whose answers are either 
‘affirmatur’ or ‘negatur’ (or ‘affirmo’ and ‘nego’) or ‘distinguitur’ (or ‘distinguo’). Theses 
questions might be examples of the kind of topics students had to discuss in order to give 
proof of their preparation and rhetorical skills. 
 
 
Thesis I 
The appetite of matter is defined by the Philosopher in I Acroa. text. 81 as the natural 
propension of matter towards forms indistinctly. 
Appendix I. It is necessary that when one form leaves matter another one arrives. 
2. As long as matter is determined towards a certain form, it has potency and appetite 
towards it closely and intensively. 
3. No form can satisfy the appetite of matter extensively. 
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4. While matter has one form so perfect in act that it cannot receive a nobler one, 
nonetheless it desires another one. 
5. Hence matter is called the cause of preservation. 2. de Ort. ch. 9 since the totality of 
sublunary forms subsists in a continuous series by the introduction of recent forms. 
6. The same matter is also considered the cause of the corruption of things. 9. Metaph. ch. 
9. since, while matter admits the qualities which drive out the previous forms, it also plots 
for the corruption of the compound. 
7. In fact, matter is the principle of being as much as of non-being of perishable things. 7. 
Metaph. ch. 7. 
8. It is not only the cause why generation is possible at all; but also the cause why the 
vicissitude of generation and corruption can be perpetual. 
9. The ancient philosophers who made up the story that prime matter is God made a 
miserable mistake, because God’s nature, being the purest act, is as far as possible from 
matter. 
Problem I. Whether matter is common to all bodies, or is proper to each body in its species. 
Both true. 
2. Whether the matter of the heavens and of the inferior bodies is the same and not the 
same. True. 
3. Whether the matter of contraries is the same and not the same. True. 
4. Whether the matter of all the elements is one, despite being the fourfold matter of the 
elements. Both true. 
5. Whether form (since it is coeval to matter), rather than matter, is the cause of corruption. 
Distinction. 
 
Thes. II. A monster is a living natural body provided with a certain defect of nature. 
Appendix I. Hence 2. Phys. Acroas. ch. 8. A monster is not inappropriately called 
aJmarthvma thvß fuvsewß1 [mistake of nature]. 
2. And it is not wrong to distinguish between a remiss or intense degree of nature and a 
wandering off of nature. 
3. They are insane those who exclude the females from the number of humans (forgetting 
that their mother was a female), and put them among the monsters. 
4. Neither do we agree with those who considered and still consider the pygmies and the 
giants, the dwarves or the little boys to be monsters. 
                                         
1
 I reproduce the Greek text as it appears in the text. The only change is the adoption of our contemporary 
style for the characters. All translations from Greek are mine. 
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5. Neither do we agree with Martin Veynrich, who includes those with six fingers and the 
cyclops or monocules among the monsters. 
Problem I. Whether all monstrous births from humans must be counted as human. False. 
2. Whether all monsters among humans must be baptised. False. 
3. Whether all monsters must be killed immediately after birth. Distinction. 
4. Whether mermaids and centaurs are only figments, or they also exist in reality. Former 
false, latter true. 
5. Whether there are monsters among plants (such as the vegetable lamb of Tartary), as 
there are among animals. True. 
6. Whether any monsters existed before the fall. False. 
7. Whether the judgment by Augustine in the Enchiridion, ch. 87. is true: that human 
monstrous bodies in this life will be given their integrity and perfection back in the last 
resurrection. True. 
 
Thes. III. O Qevoß kai; hJ fuvsiß ou~den mathn ou~de alovgwß poiou~si. [God and nature 
do nothing in vain or without reason] I de Coelo, ch. 5 and 2 de Coelo, ch. 11.2 
Appendix I. It seems that [God and nature] arranged the lines of hands, forehead and of the 
whole bodily mass, provided that it is externally different, according to an end. 
2. So that we do claim that Physiognomy, Metaposcopy, and Chiromancy are in things 
produced by GOD and nature. 
3. And that these arts are called conjectural; [name] that is added to them with respect to 
the practitioners rather than with respect to the things they deal with. 
4. They are wrongly considered as magical and forbidden arts. 
5. Ignorant people wrongly condemn the supporters of these practices as unworthy of the 
Christian community. 
Problem I. Whether Chiromancy can be proved from the evidence of the Scripture. True. 
2. Whether Aristotle said correctly in I De Hist. animal. ch. 15 that it is possible to judge 
on the length of a life from the length of the lines of the hand. True. 
3. Whether signs of a violent death can be gathered from those marks which are commonly 
called divine characters. True. 
4. Whether different conclusions about the death can be conjectured from different marks. 
True. 
                                         
2
 A standard text of the De coelo reads: hJ de; fuvsiß oujde;n ajlovgwß oujde; mavthn poiei,` book 2, chapter 11, 
291 b 13-14 (Karl Prantl, Lipsia 1881) It appears that the regent has added the term ‘god’, missing from 
Aristotle’s passage. The reference to book 1, chapter 5 is probably wrong. 
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5. Whether it is possible to determine something certain from lines inspected properly or 
casually without the observation of circumstances (what Egyptian vagabonds do). False. 
6. Whether it is possible to infer from external signs the very virtues of the souls or rather 
the propensities towards some virtues or others. The latter is true. 
7. Whether the same signs in different (as are commonly called) heaps [montibus] can 
mean different things. True. 
 
Thes. IV. Increment is defined as a movement tending from imperfect quantity to perfect 
quantity, by the conversion of nourishment into substance with the loss of a greater 
imperfection; therefore, all the parts of the body, together with the form, are made 
proportionally bigger in order for the living body to carry on the functions proper to life, 
once it has gained the right magnitude. I. de Ort. text. 25. and 31. and 35. 2 De Anima. 
text. 14. 
Appendix I. The body is augmented not as a whole but as a potency, because of the matter 
from which the accretion of the body results. 
2. An element cannot be the proper nourishment thanks to which a living body can grow. 
3. Indeed neither gold, which the Chemists call drinkable, since in the end it cannot be 
made similar [to the substance]. Scal. exercitat. 201. 
4. Neither can tobacco [Nicosiana illa ludica], whatever the Tobacconists babble to the 
contrary. 
5. In an increment, the parts of a living body do not grow according to the form of the part. 
6. Therefore, Aristotle refers to the form of the whole. I. de Ort. ch. 5. when he writes that 
the parts are increased in respect of their form. 
7. Therefore flesh grows by an inch as flesh, not as this signate flesh. 
Problem I. Whether by accretion the subject remains the same according to the material 
aspect, or instead according to the formal one. The latter is true. 
2. Whether a living body can live up to and longer than one year without nourishment. 
True. 
3. Whether the soapwort plant, granted that it devours iron, also digests it and converts it 
into the substance of the body, in order to grow. False. 
4. Whether the Chameleon only feeds on air and odours, as Pliny and others claim. False. 
5. Whether the herrings grow and feed on water only. Distinction. 
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6. Whether serpents eat only earth. Experience denies it. Neither is this opposed to Genesis 
ch. 3, v. 14.3 
7. Whether God three hundred or four hundred years after his birth can be accounted for a 
true and properly called increment. False. 
 
Thes. V. The rainbow as in chapters 4-5. of 3. Meteor. can be defined as an arch in a 
bedewed and hollowed cloud, which shows the various species of colour of the different 
parts because of the opposite sunrays, or of the refraction of the moon. 
App. I. The solar rainbow does not meet our vision unless we are between the sun and the 
cloud thanks to which the rainbow glitters. 3. Meteor. ch. 4. 
2. In our climate, a rainbow cannot be seen towards South, since it never occurs that we are 
between a cloud and the sun in that direction. 
3. A rainbow is usually smaller than a semicircle, and it is never bigger. 3. Meteor. ch. 5. 
4. We do not agree with Mirandula, who (in book 2. ch. De Humanae studio Philosophiae) 
claims to have seen a rainbow in a complete or almost complete circle. 
5. Were a rainbow in a complete circle, it would follow that a straight line would pass right 
through the centre of the rainbow, of the sun and of the horizon or through the eye of the 
observer on ground. 
6. Since the sun stretches more at sunrise or at sunset, the arch of the rainbow is bigger; on 
the contrary, the rainbow is smaller when the sun is at its highest on the horizon. 
7. The biggest rainbow of an entire day takes place when the sun is either rising or setting, 
and the smallest takes place in the remaining moments, when the sun is at noon or does not 
appear at distance. 
8. The rainbow can some times appear with a full arch and some other times with a broken 
arch, if the cloud which enables the impression of the rainbow is divided, like one part in 
the east and the other in the west. 
9. Two solar rainbows are frequent, three are rarer: the first is due to the reflection of the 
solar rays, the second is due to the first, the third to the second, with a clear inversion of 
the colours. 
10. Lunar and solar rainbows appear constantly, but the former is rarer and, if we are to 
believe the Philosopher, the latter is most rare during autumn. 
                                         
3
 “And the LORD God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, 
and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy 
life.” King James Bible, Book of Genesis, 3:14. 
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11. In a lunar rainbow only white colour with somewhat blackish lines is discerned, 
because the weakness of the lunar rays can hardly penetrate the darkness of the night and 
the thickness of the clouds. 
Probl. I. Whether rainbow existed before the flood or not. True. 
2. Whether a solar rainbow sometimes appears all white, as Melichius refers while 
commenting on the second book of Plyny. False. 
3. Whether Scaliger in exercitat. 80. sect. I. correctly claims that three colours usually 
appear in the rainbow, due to the variety of the matter of earth, water and air existing in the 
cloud. True. 
4. Whether a fourth colour can be added to the three colours of the rainbow, xavnqoß 
[yellow] or golden, which is due to the mixture of scarlet and green, according to the 
Philosopher 3. Meteor. 5 and Scal. in the passage mentioned above. True. 
5. Whether Cardan correctly calls the rainbows a pure figment of the eye. False. 
6. Whether a rainbow can be visible on the surface of the sea (as some claim), where there 
is no dewy cloud. False. 
7. Whether a rainbow always anticipates a future rain. False. 
8. Whether Seneca, book I natural. quaest. ch. 6, correctly claims that a rainbow in the east 
is sign of rain, in the west of nice weather. Whether more correctly, in book 2. natural. hist. 
ch. 6. Plyny claims that neither rain nor nice weather can be predicted with confidence 
from a rainbow. Former is false, latter is true. 
9. Whether a rainbow naturally or rather above or beyond [supra/praeter] nature indicates a 
non-future inundation of earth. Only the latter is true. 
10. Whether rainbows are more common in the East than in the West. It is probably so by 
natural causes. 
11. Whether in a solar rainbow an entire image of the sun can be represented, as in the 
parhelions. 
12. Whether a lunar rainbow never occurs unless in decima quarta or decima quinta moon, 
or around this time, as the Philosopher claims in 3. Meteor. ch. 5. True.4 
13. Whether the theologians correctly claim that in a solar rainbow there are two colours 
which are especially visible: internal blue and external scarlet. The former stands for the 
destruction of the world in the flood, the latter for its eventual destruction by fire.5 This 
does not seem either inconsistent or impious. 
                                         
4
 Traditionally, this is the time for the celebration of Easter, in the third week of the first lunar month, around 
the spring equinox. 
5
 “Secundum fidem Christianam [...] cum Apostolo credimus coelum et elementa omnia igna purganda”, 
Reid 1614, TP 22.6. 
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Thes. VI. Experience shows, and the Philosopher confirms that 2 de part. animal. ch. 7, 
that the brain of man is by nature colder and moister than that of other animals. 
App. I. Hence it is evident why man is surpassed by many animals in the sense of odour or 
olfaction. 2. de Anima, ch. 9. text. 92. 
2. And also why the odours which are well perceived are those which are more excellent in 
the extremes and not those which are more remitted in the middle. 
3. And why little or nothing is smelled in winter rather than in summer, or in great heat or 
cold. 
4. And why the latter [odours] are more strongly affected than the former. 
5. Thus, the upbringing and habits can change a lot the mixture of the brain, as it appears in 
those subjects who live in prisons or in squalid places. 
6. Although men are surpassed by beasts regarding the excellence of perception, on the 
contrary men surpass beasts by far in the eminence of judgment. 
7. Only man has this sense with regards to its perfection. Scal. exercit. 247. 
8. The theory of Bodin, in book 4. Theatri Naturae. is praiseworthy. He claims that the 
wisdom of the Maker is great, since if he had given a sharp and accurate olfaction to men, 
they would have not been able to bear not only other people’s smell, but not even their 
own. 
Probl. I. Whether odours feed, granted that they restore. False. 
2. Whether materially, or only formally, as the objects of the remaining senses are 
perceived. Only the latter is true. 
3. Whether man alone among all the animals receives pleasure from odours. Distinction. 
4. Whether odours can sustain life for some time, as Plyny writes about Democritus. True. 
5. Whether the dogs which the Scots use to follow the tracks of men have a different 
mixture of the brain from the others, and hence a different way of smelling, both are true. 
6. Whether the Astomi people that Plyny speaks of in book 7 of naturalis historiae, ch. 2 
can live off odours alone. False. 
7. Whether tomatoes [mala aurea] and the very genus ‘pomes’ are diminished by the mere 
emission of odours or of steams and vapours as well. Only the latter is true. 
 
Thes. VII. The Philosopher. I de Anima, ch. I. and 4. Then also in ch. 5, book 3. claims 
that the soul is cwrivsthn apo; tou swvmatoß [separate from the body], and in ch. I, book 
2. de Anima calls it movrfhn, and defines it as such. 
App. I. It appears that the Philosopher was aware of and approved of the immortality of the 
soul. 
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2. As a soul separate from body requires, it is also necessary a body just as matter which 
form informs, since form without matter cannot really be. 
3. Therefore we claim that the resurrection of the dead is probable by reasons in a certain 
way Philosophical. 
4. Indeed, it does not follow from what has been said that the soul does not die once 
separate from the body, since it seems that, from a Physical point of view, anything which 
is generated dies, like the day. I de Coelo, last chapter. 
5. And since the soul goes back to its matter as form, it is not possible to accept the 
metemyuvcwsa [metempychosis] of the souls in the fashion of the Pythagoreans. 2. De 
anima. end of ch. 3. 
6. Those belonging to the herd of pigs of Epicurus6 wrongly claimed that souls die with the 
body. 
7. Neither Origen’s mistake seems acceptable to ethnicists and philosophers, since it 
postulates infinite souls created in the beginning, which by whatever case or chance are 
placed in a body. 
Probl. I. Whether the Physical form is the soul or otherwise. False. 
2. Whether the soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in singular parts, it can be 
discussed pro and against. 
3. Whether the sensitive soul of beasts and men, and the vegetative soul of plants are of a 
common and same substance. False. 
4. Whether in what Arist. said in 2. de hist. animal. ch. 3. yuvcen quraqevn epeisiv einai 
[some claim that the soul is external], he recognized that the soul is by inspiration; it seems 
probable. 
5. Whether the rational soul acts in the body without bodily organs, as when it is separate. 
True. 
 
                                         
6
 Horace, Epistulae, I, 4, 10. 
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3. Theses physicae, J. Reid, 1626 
 
 
Complete title: Theses philosophicae. Discussed on July 31st 1626 (‘ad diem Pridie 
Calend. AUGUSTI’) in Edinburgh. Printed by John Weittoun in 1626 in Edinburgh. 
The set of theses is divided into five sections, on ‘general theses on disciplines’, logic, 
ethics, physics and Theses sphaericae on astronomy. 
James Reid is one of the most important regents of Edinburgh University in the first half 
of the seventeenth century. He is the author of five sets of theses (1610, 1614, 1618, 1622, 
1626), among the longest and most detailed in all Scottish universities. The 1626 set is his 
last academic work and stands away from both his previous sets and the rest of the theses 
for his unique theory of movement, which seems to break away from the Scholastic theory 
that every movement is always directed towards an end [which I analyse in part II, chapter 
2, section 4]. 
Reid’s theses enable us to investigate the development of the philosophy curriculum as it 
was taught by the same regent over twenty years. This is possible in particular for 
Edinburgh University, where from 1610 to 1628 three regents, Reid, King and Fairley held 
the position for almost two decades. 
 
 
Thesis I. By unanimous consensus of philosophers, matter in begotten and corrupted 
bodies is numerically one and the same. 
1. In the succession of generable and corruptible things, also matter which is numerically 
one can be under forms distinct by genus. 
2. In fact, no form actually gives number [numerical identity] to matter, either considered 
according to its own entity, or related to the nature of things. 
3. Since numerical and real unity cannot be without existence, the prime matter of all 
things will also have its own existence not depending on form. 
4. Although one and the same portion of matter can receive several forms in succession, it 
will not change several existences because of this; on the contrary, its existence must be 
said to be one and the same under any forms. 
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5. Since in fact existence is only a mode of a thing, not really distinct from it, and since 
some things are complete, some others are incomplete; so, also one existence can be said to 
be incomplete, and another one to be complete. 
6. Accordingly, the existence of matter and form is partial and incomplete: that of the 
compound is complete and total. 
7. There is an existence in things, distinct from the formal existence, which is only proper 
to the compound. 
8. Thus, the existence of form and the formal existence are different. 
9. And it is very different to exist in nature simply and completely, and to exist formally. 
 
II. Baruvtaton to; pa`sin uJfisavmenon toi`ß kavtw, koufovtaton de; to; pa`sin 
ejpipolavxon toi`ß a[nw feromevnoiß. I. de Coel. 3.1 
1. AÔplw~ß kou~fon levgomen to; a[nw ferovmenon kai; pro;ß to; e[scaton, baru; de; to; 
kavtw kai; pro;ß to; mevson. 4. de Coel. I.2 
2. Thus, it is only natural to earth to move towards the lowest place: and to fire to move 
towards the highest one, and natural to both to remain in them. fevretai fuvsei kai; 
mevnein ejn toi~ß oijkeivosiß tovpoiß e{cason tw~n somavtwn. 4. Phys. 4. text. 30.3 
3. Earth does not have a bigger propension to rest in the lowest place, than fire to 
movement, in the highest. 
4. As much as movement towards the sphere is given to fire beyond its own nature, why 
can’t we similarly believe that rest is assigned to earth, beyond its own nature? 
5. Nature is the principle and cause only of the movement of earth, not of its rest. 
6. And by its nature and natural condition, earth is mobile and not immobile. 
7. Therefore, since every rest, also the one following from natural movement, is privation 
of the same movement: so, nature does not specifically seek rest, neither it strives for 
[intendit] it. 
8. From this we conclude, first: that it is very different for a thing to remain in its own 
natural place, and to rest in it: in fact the former is natural for any natural body, the latter is 
natural for no natural body. 
9. Secondly: that nature likewise is said to be principle of movement and rest connectedly 
[copulative], if rest is intended fundamentally and not formally; and this is so if rest is 
                                         
1
 ‘The heaviest is what is underneath all bodies which go downwards, the lightest is what is above all bodies 
which go upwards.’ All translations from Greek are mine. I reproduce the Greek text as it appears in the 
text. The only change is the adoption of our contemporary style for the characters. 
2
 ‘We call light absolutely what is drawn upwards and towards to extreme, heavy absolutely what is drawn 
downwards and towards the centre.’ 
3
 ‘By nature every body is drawn to and remains in its own place.’ 
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understood as the very possession and fruition of the form and of the terminus, not simply 
as privation of movement. 
10. And in this sense, kinei`sqai kai; i{sasqai [to move and to stop] is the same as 
kinei`sqai kai; hjremivzesqai [to move and to rest], according to Aristotle, 6 Phys. 8 text. 
67. 
11. And also in this sense, very acutely Aristotle said that eijß to;n auJtou` tovpon fevreqai 
e{kason, eijß to; auJtou` ei\dovß ejsi fevresqai. 4. Coel. 3.4 
12. Finally, in the same sense, nature is not only the efficient cause, but also the end of 
every natural movement. hJ fuvsiß hJ legomevnh wJ gevnesiß, oJdovß ejsin eijß fuvsin 2 
Phys. 1. text. 14.5 
 
III. A“ghvraton ajnalloivwnton kai; ajpaqevß ejsi to; prw`ton tw`n somavtwn. I de Coel. 3. 
Text. 22.6 
1. According to Aristotle, the nature of the heavens is only the principle of natural 
movement in itself. 
2. Only the local movement is reciprocal with nature, and with the natural body in general. 
3. Then, movement generally taken is not an affection of the natural body. 
4. In the definition of nature, we must intend especially local movement, not movement in 
general. 
5. The act of the mobile as mobile is the definition of movement in general; anyways, it is 
not the definition of the affection, unless we limit it to local movement. 
6. Movement in general is reciprocal with the natural body not differently as sensitive is 
with animal, because of the unique tactile [property]. 
 
IV. Infinite is ou| ajeiv ti e[xw ejsiv [something beyond which there is always something 
else]. 3. Phys. 6. text. 62. 
1. So, infinite is properly without an intrinsic boundary. 
2. Consequently, because of the law of the opposites, every finite will include an intrinsic 
boundary at both ends. 
3. By which means, every motus with respect to finite magnitude, is finite and continuous; 
every motus (as much as all the other continuous things) has intrinsical boundaries not only 
in its end, but also in its beginning. 
                                         
4
 ‘To be drawn towards its own place is like to be drawn towards its own form.’ 
5
 ‘Nature is said to be, as generation, a path towards nature.’ 
6
 ‘The first body is ungenerated, incorruptible and not passive.’ 
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4. Therefore, ‘being changed’ is not simply the terminus of movement. 
5. Neither to ferovmenon [the moved body] nor diaivresiß kinhvseoß [division of 
movement], truly are proper and simple termini of movement: in fact the former is only 
assigned to local movement, the latter to any movement indeed, but only by metonymy. 
6. Therefore, as we are instructed by Aristotle himself in 6. Phys. 10. text 88., we are 
perhaps among the first (said without malice), to call kinhmata (in plainer and clearer 
way) the boundaries of movement simply indivisible, which respond to the name of point 
in a line and moment in time. 
 
V. It is well known by nature that heavier bodies are everywhere in the universe below 
lighter bodies, as it is well know by experience. 
1. It follows that the elements in the middle, in particular those which are [a mixture of] 
heavy and light, can gravitate and levitate in every place, in their place as much as in that 
of the other elements; when the other elements are removed, or when they are driven by a 
stronger force out of their natural place. 
2. Not only water but also air can be drawn spontaneously both to the centre [of the 
universe] and to the heavens, also without fear of the void; and not only in order for them 
to be mixed together, but also while they exist in a pure form. 
3. The elements can be driven (beyond their nature but yet by natural inclination) not only 
to fill the void, but also to drive out the plenum. 
4. Hence, the potency incorporated in the elements is double: one special for their 
preservation, another universal and obedient [oboedientialis] for the preservation of the 
universe: through the first one they seek a definite and special place: through the second 
one they seek no definite place in the universe; yet, they observe this inviolable rule that, in 
order to preserve the order of the universe, the heavier bodies are below the lighter ones. 
5. Accordingly, air is not moved upwards towards its place by one form, nor downwards 
towards the place of earth by another form, if there is either void or fire; on the contrary, it 
is moved by the same one according to a different end, one for its own preservation, the 
other for the preservation of the harmony, order and union of the universe. 
 
VI. E”an tiß metaqh/` th;n gh/`n ou| nu`n hJ selhvnhn, oujk oijsqhvsetai tw`n morivwn 
e{kaston pro;s au[thvn, ajll´o{pou per kai; nu`n. 4. de Coel. 3.7 
1. Parts do not move towards the whole, but towards the natural place. 
                                         
7
 ‘If we put the earth in the place of the moon, every part of the earth would not go towards the moon, but 
towards where it already goes now.’ 
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2. Thus, the natural place has got a force [vim] to attract and preserve the thing which is in 
place. 
3. Since the place of the heavy bodies is the centre of the universe (which is that dot in the 
middle of the universe which can be understood only through imagination, or otherwise 
nothing is really distinct from magnitude); this centre is said to attract towards itself and to 
preserve the heavy bodies. 
4. Undoubtedly after a more subtle scrutiny, this descent of earth to that point must seem 
more remarkable than the approach of a sword to the stone of Heracles: and yet we ask (as 
the very subtle Scaliger says) by which cause a thing attracts another to itself, like iron to a 
magnet: instead, by which means earth is driven towards something which is nothing, we 
do not ask. 
5. Therefore, in many things, not the subtlety of the thing itself in nature is the cause for 
admiration, but our own stupidity. 
 
VII. Especially among oviparous animals we know by experience that the eggs of females 
which are carried by males generate baby birds, not because of the incubation of males, 
but because of that of females, within the same species as much as among different species: 
like among hens, geese, ducks and so on. I. de gen. animal. 21. 
1. Hence, with regards to natural generation, one may infer various things: first, if the 
generation is supposed to be only in the production of baby birds, the seminal virtue (as 
they say) of the parents, especially of the male parent, is efficient to the extent that it 
regards the very production of form. 
2. Secondly, that the females provide some sort of matter, for example they give aliment, 
and they keep the seed warm with their natural heat, in favour of the formation of the 
foetus. 
3. Thirdly, generation is said to be univocal not with regards to the animal which broods or 
gives birth, but with regards to the animal which gives the seed, specifically the male. 
4. The animal which incubates and extrinsically broods can be said to be an equivocal 
cause. 
5. Not every equivocal cause is necessarily more noble than the effect by dignity and 
perfection. 
6. Neither every equivocal cause includes the perfections of other species by virtue and 
eminence, but only the common and celestial equivocal cause does. 
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VIII. In the generation of living creatures, seed is the material and the efficient cause as 
much as a craftsman is, according to Aristotle. I. Phys. 7. text. 2. 2 Phys. 3. text. 31. 
Metaph. z. q. text 31. I de gen. anim. 21. 
1. Thus, the seed is not a uniform body, but it is made of different parts, some more subtle, 
some others rougher; with respect to the more subtle ones it acts as a craftsman: with 
respect to the rougher ones, is passive [patiens], just like matter. 
2. Since the natural generation of living creatures, in plants and lower animals, is without 
any doubt univocal, it is, in generation, the principal cause, not an instrument. 
3. Thus, the seeds of plants and lower animals are animate in act. 
4. Hence, with Scaliger, very trained [exercitatissimo] in the subtleties of nature,8 the spirit 
[animus] is willing to confirm many almost paradoxical points. First, the seed of oil, is oil: 
and the seed of a dog, is a dog; although imperfect, lacking only a jointed structure. 
5. Secondly, the form of a dog can be said to be in the potency of the seed itself, since the 
seed is able to convey [potens] the form of dog it contains in itself. 
6. Thirdly, the form of a dog is educed out of the potency of the seed, not with respect to 
the first act but precisely with respect to the second one. In fact the very form pre-exists, 
therefore the outcome is not the form itself, but its act, thanks to which it can thereafter 
exert itself. 
7. Fourthly, the first actions of the soul in the seed, which follow closely from its potency, 
are the disposition and conformation of its limbs, in order to receive in conformed and 
well-disposed limbs later and more perfect actions, as the operations and the senses. 
8. The soul of the seed, without the instrument of its location [domicilij], is architectonic 
[architecta]. In fact, no quality known to man can be the instrument of the ordination, 
location [situs], number and shape of the parts of the organic body: although qualities can 
be the first instruments of secretion or condensing, of condensation or rarefaction, of 
extension or contraction, of roughness or smoothness, of hardness or softness. 
9. Purely natural generation is not the production ex novo of some form, but only the 
reduction of form to act, or better, its promotion to the production of effects. 
10. So, the tree generates as soon as the seed produces, it is not instead generated when it 
sprouts from the seed. Thus, the dog is not generated when a puppy is born, but when the 
seed sprouts. 
11. Neither it follows from this that the dog is fully subject to several souls, since it has 
only one, which is enough to the generation of many souls: like in the branches of oil in 
which there are many parts, a single soul is the one from which many come forth. 
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12. And as one single soul, in the increments, puts on in the aliment a new and multiple 
matter, it informs the same matter and it is united with the pre-existing matter; that is why 
the same soul, which is just material, cannot move itself forward in the generation towards 
many matters. 
13. In whatever way all the things said above are possible, anyways we conclude that the 
rational soul, according to Aristotle more divine than the others, does not propagate itself 
in the seed this way, but the deficiency of the generating soul in the seed is compensated 
by the immediate action of God, in the formation of the body as much as in the creation of 
a new form. 
14. And according to these premises, we reject by faith the truth of this proposition, a man 
can generate another man, although almost everybody cry out in protest; and a good many, 
who rant on about it in its defence, miserably torment themselves. 
                                                                                                                           
8
 Reid is playing with the title of Scaliger’s Exoticarum Exercitationum Liber XV de Subtilitate, ad 
Hieronimum Cardanum. 
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4. Theses physicae, J. Dalrymple, 1646 
 
 
Complete title: Theses logicae, metaphysicae, physicae, mathematicae, et ethicae, 
Glasgow 1646, printed by George Anderson. This set of theses was discussed on July 27th 
1646, ‘sun qew, publice, in communi Gymnasij Auditorio hora solita’. 
James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair (1619-1695) was a lawyer, a philosopher and a 
politician. He joined Glasgow University in 1633 and graduated in 1637. We unfortunately 
have no graduation theses for the student years of Dalrymple in Glasgow. From his 
departure from university to his appointment as regent in 1641 Dalrymple spent some time 
in the army fighting against the king in the first Bishops’ War (1639). Dalrymple’s first 
appointment was for a fourth class teaching (Greek and dialectic), renewed in 1642 when 
the regenting system was revived. The 1646 graduation theses were written for the 1643 
class. After leaving university in 1647, Dalrymple moved on to a legal career. We are 
informed by the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography that Dalrymple did not study 
law abroad: this information is helpful in the assessment of his philosophy as well. If he 
did not study abroad, we can assume that his philosophical formation was acquired in 
Glasgow. 
His legal and political career (culminated in a number of key roles played in Scottish 
political life and in the composition of the Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 1661) 
Dalrymple left the country in 1682 for the Low Countries, due to political reasons and 
threats to his life. There he published the Institutions (1681) and the Physiologia Nova 
Experimentalis, Leiden 1686. Dalrymple eventually returned to Scotland, as a supporter of 
the 1688 revolution, and engaged in politics again.1 
His set of theses is particularly important for three reasons: 1) it is the only one extant for 
the University of Glasgow in the first half of the seventeenth century; 2) the regent brings 
forward some innovative theories in the context of Scholastic philosophy [which I analyse 
in part I, chapter 2, section 2.2], and his theses are in general among the most detailed in 
Scotland; 3) J. Dalrymple, later Viscount Stair, member of a distinguished Glaswegian 
family, was later in life raised to a public role in Scotland, and made important 
contributions to Scottish law and philosophy. 
                                         
1
 I take this information from the DNB entry. 
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Dalrymple’s graduation theses are an insightful case of late Scottish Scholasticism 
arguably influenced by some themes of early modern philosophy. 
 
 
Thesis I. Fusiß ejsin a[rch kai ai[tia tou kineisqai, kai h[remein, e;n w u{parcei 
prwtwß, kaq auto, kai mh kata sumbebhkoß,2 Arist. ch. I. bk. 2. Nature thus defined 
does not include the essences of other beings (which are the principles of the changes 
[mutationum] and of the properties which belong to the beings in a state of rest) any less 
than it includes the essence of the body, unless some reason to say the contrary can be 
given; nature is therefore restricted to the essential parts which constitute the body, those 
which, in particular, deserve the name of nature; and the very body is called natural, and 
the whole science is called Physics or natural science: science which carefully considers 
the body, in itself and in its species absolutely considered, by investigating its Nature and 
demonstrating its affections by Universal principles. 
 
II. There are three principles of the natural body in becoming [in fieri]: matter, form and 
privation; in fact there are two which take on the name of nature, matter and form, of 
which the latter is the active principle, the former the passive principle; it is possible to 
freely assign the name of nature either synonymically or analogically, or jointly and 
collectively, or separately and distinctively. 
 
III. Prime matter is the subject out of which a thing becomes [fit], and which endures in 
every mutation; it is ungenerable and incorruptible, neither is it now something different 
from matter when it was first created. 
 
IIII. Matter as such is bare of all form, thus it lacks every Physical act; yet, since a being is 
similar to other beings in some degrees of entity, and is different in some others, matter 
does have a distinctive [differentialem] entitative act, in virtue of which it is different from 
the other beings; which act can be very well understood as pure passive potency open to 
the reception of form, neither can anyone deny that pure physical potency is a 
Metaphysical act. 
 
                                         
2
 ‘Nature is the principle and the cause of movement and rest, in everything that exists first per se and not by 
accident.’ All translations from Greek are mine. I reproduce the Greek text as it appears in the text. The 
only change is the adoption of our contemporary style for the characters. 
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V. By an innate appetite, prime matter strives for all forms without distinction: not with the 
particular regard to what is more perfect or less perfect, or to this or that, but with the 
simple regard to form; thus neither form is unwillingly retained by matter, nor matter 
attempts to reject a form in order to receive another one; therefore, prime matter is falsely 
accused of being the origin of corruption, because it concurs just in a passive way. 
 
VI. Matter lacks any activity and efficacy, unless it is raised as instrument of something 
else. 
 
VII. Physical form is a substance really different from matter, and just as matter is pure 
potency, form is pure Physical act, which does not include anything material; yet, which 
naturally requires it as partner for its own good, or which necessarily demands it in order to 
be preserved and operate; hence this form is called material, the other is called spiritual and 
immaterial. 
 
VIII. When Aristotle defines form as logon thß oujsiaß,3 he is not talking about the 
Physical form (in fact he is dealing with causes in general), but about the Metaphysical 
form, which is very appropriately called a ‘formality’, from which the specifications of all 
things arise; specifications which are nevertheless taken on remotely by the physical form. 
 
IX. The natural bodies are not specified by form with respect to their particular entity, but 
by reason of their nature; namely, as it is the principle and root of the different affections 
impressed on itself by the agent, and of the operations thence emanating: so, there are not 
as many different forms as species of bodies, and the species can vary while the form 
remains the same; neither is it necessary to imagine in the perpetual course of generations 
that new forms arise from non-existing things. 
 
X. To ascribe the origin and the production of forms to the eduction from matter leads to a 
hopeless entanglement; because the potency of matter is wholly ineffective, just passive 
and receptive, and the eduction often takes place by Instrumental cause, or by a cause 
inferior to the effect that is to be produced. 
 
                                         
3
 ‘[formal] reason, essence of the substance’. 
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XI. We ascribe the production of forms to GOD, and we ascribe the propagation to the 
union or to the disjunction of the same produced form, or to the specification of the 
different impressed affections. 
 
XII. GOD in the beginning impressed one intimate bodily form on the whole mass [massae] 
of matter, form from which matter is established as a body; which form remains the same 
in all bodies, has no contrary form through which it is expelled, and is coeval with matter, 
and of equal antiquity; it is however the cause of all the various affections, by virtue of 
several concurring agents; therefore, sometimes it takes on one species, sometimes another. 
 
XIII. Besides, there are other forms, which Bodiliness admits as further degrees of 
essential perfection; in the creation of each species of individuals, these forms are first 
divinely bestowed and are carried forward up to this time by continuous offspring, 
therefore the Generans does not bestow on the generated only a portion of matter but also a 
portion of form; from which the agent, by favouring and exciting them, can rouse a new 
individual of the same species. 
 
XIV. In rougher bodies, any part can become a new and complete individual of the same 
species, either by mere discontinuity (as for water divided in several portions), or by the 
fertile assistance of a different agent, which confers the dispositions required to the 
exercise of the faculties (as for a cut-off branch, which becomes a whole tree if put into the 
ground). On the other hand, in more perfect bodies there is a certain part, intended by 
nature, which alone can be roused to the perfection of a new individual, if it is commanded 
and assisted by a suitable cause (as for the seed of living creatures, of plants in the ground, 
of animals in the womb, labouring as in a receptacle). 
 
XV. After the destruction of an individual, the whole form does not cease at once, but, 
while still adhering to matter, it takes on new species, similar but less perfect, from which 
worms appear out of the corpses, and various little animals appear out of the flesh of 
different sorts of animals. 
 
XVI. The affections of a natural body belong to it principally in reason of its matter or of 
its form; Quantity, Continuity, Infinity and Whereness [Ubicatio] in place are affections of 
the first kind: movement and duration are of the second. 
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XVII. We are doubtful whether Quantity first belongs to prime matter, or to the body, 
neither do we determine whether quantity really differs from matter, or not; nonetheless, 
we positively hold that quantity (whatever quantity is) is adequate to matter and 
immutable, neither can it increase or decrease, unless matter is added or subtracted. 
 
XVIII. Any quantified and continuous being is infinitely divisible, but it does not include 
within itself actually infinite divisibles, whether in number or size [mole]; neither is there 
any potency out of which they can be drawn, and although it includes indivisibles as 
termini, it cannot be composed of either finite indivisible termini, or infinite indivisibles. 
 
XIX. Whereness is the extension of the body as it impenetrably occupies a certain space, 
which is equal to it in all dimensions, and it essentially has place as a boundary, which 
therefore is not the surrounding surface, present only by accident, but the very space or 
gap, which cannot be missing at all. 
 
XX. A surface can be called an extrinsic place by analogical attribution of an extrinsic term 
to the thing named; for that reason, place is defined by Aristotle as the immobile and first 
surface of the containing body; without excluding the space itself, but excluding the former 
gap, explained by it: more correctly, by claiming this surface immobile, Aristotle shows 
that space is the very internal place, surface is its boundary, for surface is called immobile 
only as boundary of an immobile space. 
 
XXI. By its reason, a change of surface is not a change of place or local movement [latio], 
but a change of surface (as it is the extrinsic boundary) of an immobile space. 
 
XXII. Quantity and Body, or impenetrability and quantity, cannot be one without the other: 
therefore this implies that several bodies cannot be in the same equal place at the same 
time. 
 
XXIII. And a single body, as a whole, can be in different places no more and no more truly 
than it can be detached from itself. 
 
XXIV. Movement is the act of a being in potency, insofar as it is in potency, not towards 
another act but towards its same act; and, given this definition, movement includes every 
changes, as well as mutations which occur in an instant; it extends not only to Physical 
changes but also to any other changes, unless it is limited by the intent of the Philosopher. 
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XXV. There are only three species of real movement, as distinct from mutation, viz. 
increment, alteration and local movement. In fact, generation takes place in an instant, and 
corruption and decrease are not real and positive mutations. 
 
XXVI. Rarefaction and condensation are not movements towards quantity, but alterations 
through which the shape [figura] of a body is changed, because of the entry of a finer body 
through the pores and channels of the body, from which the body appears to extend further, 
yet, still with the same quantity. 
 
XXVII. Alteration neither takes place by the change of all the pre-existing qualities, nor by 
merely a firmer rooting in the subject; it takes place by adding a further degree to the pre-
existing quality, a degree which is a partial quality, similar to the pre-existing one; and it is 
pointless to ask whether it is of the same or of a different species, whether heterogeneous 
or homogeneous, since it concurs in the same numerical and individual identity. 
 
XXVIII. The first specific division of the body is into simple and mixed; these bodies are 
not different because of different Physical forms, which belong reciprocally to both, but 
because of abstract Metaphysical formalities; it is therefore more of a Metaphysical 
division than of a Physical one. There is a similar division of the simple body into Heavens 
and Elements. 
 
XXIX. The world has five elements, the mixed ones are four, viz. Earth, Water, Air, Fire; 
people can form their own opinion about whether the Element of fire is in the hollow space 
of the moon,4 while keeping proportion with the rest of the Elements; in whatever manner, 
Fire truly is a simple Body and one among the Elements. 
 
XXX. Single Elements require their own proportion, which is difficult to determine with 
precision. In reality this proportion does not consist in quantity, but in the rarity and 
position of the parts, which single Elements require by nature; therefore, when gunpowder 
is ignited and it immediately breaks out of a compressed place, and it seems to occupy a 
bigger place; this does not happen because the same matter, when set alight, takes on a 
bigger quantity, but because, when set alight, it requires by nature a dilatation and rarity of 
                                         
4
 The idea is that the natural place of the element fire is an empty moon. The moon is in the first celestial 
sphere, but the fire can still be in a relation with the other sublunar elements. 
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the parts, caused by the permeation of a finer Body, and it breaks forth to receive it, and, 
once it is received, it lights up by its own light; and even if it is one undivided body, there 
are in fact two. 
 
XXXI. The heavy Elements move downwards with a natural impetus by an internal 
principle, towards the centre of the universe, and not towards their own Element; hence, 
the whole Earth, once placed close to the sphere of the moon, would go down towards the 
centre; or, while the earth is kept there, just one particle of earth falls downwards, it does 
not lose its appetite, as it stays still thanks to its own Element’s intervention; yet, impulse 
and compression remain, sideways and downwards; but, since it is completely surrounded 
by bodies that have equal effectiveness, it does not gravitate in its place with respect to the 
adjacent body. 
 
XXXII. Anyone can choose according to their own liking whether it is possible for a light 
element to naturally move away from the centre, and for it to naturally tend towards an end 
where it rests; or rather whether it is called light because it is just less heavy, and because it 
is pushed upwards by the pressure [compressione] of a heavier element. 
 
XXXIII. The mixture is the union of contrary mixables [miscibilium alteratorum], not by 
confusion or continuation, but by one common form or formality, in which, as in a copula, 
all the material parts of the mixture come together. 
 
XXXIV. The production of an animate body is a mixture, neither is it required for the 
concept of a mixture that mixable elements be pure or separate immediately before 
generation. 
 
XXXV. In the animate body, the form of the mixture is not different from the bodiliness 
and the soul; on the contrary, mixables are united in it in the unity of one body and one 
species. 
 
XXXVI. The soul is the first act of an organic body, which has life in potency; therefore, it 
is distinguished in it from other forms, because it has different vital faculties and distinct 
bodily instruments by which the faculties are exercised. 
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XXXVII. It is a stupid figment to say that there are several souls of one single animate 
body, either successive or concurrent; rather, one single soul includes in itself and exerts 
all the faculties. 
 
XXXVIII. The faculties of the soul neither are simply the same with their substance, nor is 
there are a large diverse multitude of faculties, such that so many are the external senses, 
so many the internal, so many are the faculties of intelligence, agent and patient; rather, in 
a moderate way, we distinguish one faculty of knowledge, appetite and movement from the 
very substance of the soul, and we refer all the faculties to those just mentioned: it is open 
to anyone to call them faculties that are distinct to a certain extent or to call them one 
faculty that is exercised in different ways. 
 
XXXIX. There is no sensation in the external sensorium which is distinct from perception 
in the common sense; instead, there is one apprehension which, when the sensorium is 
affected, apprehends the object as present, and therefore is called external, because an 
external organ is affected. 
 
XL. Sensation requires a sensible object, the sensorium, and an impression made by the 
object on the sensorium, which represents the object, and the impression is therefore called 
an impressed species. The natural sympathy between the soul and the body during their 
union is the reason for the stimulation of the soul to drawing out the notitia,5 in such a 
manner that whatever the body undergoes, something similar is represented in the soul, 
from where also the senses of joy, pain etc. originate. 
 
XLI. The instrument of this sympathy is the brain because, when it is affected in various 
ways, the apprehension is similarly altered: like when the spirits in the brain are at rest 
because of its fullness, and sleep follows, even if the objects produce a species in the 
sensorium, there is no perception. 
 
XLII. Many useless questions are asked about the reception of the species in the soul, or 
about the movement of the impressed species by animal spirits as vehicles, from the 
sensorium to the brain, or about the illumination of the phantasmata by the Agent Intellect, 
and about the production of new intelligible species, the impression in the passive Intellect, 
or their conservation in memory as in a repository. 
                                         
5
 ‘Notitia’ is something notus [known] to us, the final result of the process of knowledge. 
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XLIII. We claim that the Soul has only one faculty of knowledge, through which it 
perceives by its natural sympathy the object which affects the sensorium, as it affects it, 
and draws out its representation; which is an act of simple apprehension, neither do we 
recognise any other expressed species. Afterwards other acts about the same object follow, 
which acts, while they do not transcend the perfection proper to beasts, are called 
Phantasmata: then, purer ones follow, which are called Intelligible Species, Acts of 
Intellect, mental Terms; by which the faculty is helped at drawing out similar acts: and 
from all these different operations, the senses, the Phantasies, Intellect and memory, one 
faculty of knowledge comes out. 
 
XLIV. The faculty of appetite, as it tends towards less noble objects, and moves the spirits 
with a stronger impetus, and alters the body, is called Sensitive Appetite: instead, as it is 
about more sublime objects in a purer way, it is called Will. 
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